Ethan Bueno de Mesquita's Publications and Working Papers
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

Harris School of Public Policy Studies
The University of Chicago





Publications

Peer Reviewed Articles

Forthcoming. Rebel Tactics. Journal of Political Economy.

2011. Ideologues or Pragmatists? (with Amanda Friedenberg). Journal of the European Economic Association 9(5):931-951.

2011. Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits (with James Alt and Shanna Rose) Journal of Politics 73(1):171-186.

2010. Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs American Political Science Review 104(3):446-466.

2009. Elections with Platform and Valence Competition (with Scott Ashworth). Games and Economic Behavior 67(1):191-216.

2008. Terrorist Factions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3(4):399-418.

2008. Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage (with Scott Ashworth). Journal of Politics 70(4):1006-1025.

  • R code for simulations in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4-5, and 6

2008. Public Protection or Private Extortion? (with Catherine Hafer). Economics and Politics 20(1):1-32.

2008. Informative Party Labels with Institutional and Electoral Variation (with Scott Ashworth). Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(3):251-273.

2007. Regulatory Quality under Imperfect Oversight (with Matthew Stephenson). American Political Science Review 101(3):605-620.

2007. The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization (with Eric Dickson). American Journal of Political Science 51(2):364-381.

2007. Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror. International Organization 61(1):9-36.

2006. Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings (with Scott Ashworth). Journal of Politics 68(1).

2006. Legal Institutions and Informal Networks (with Matthew Stephenson). Journal of Theoretical Politics 18(1):41-68.

2006. Monotone Comparative Statics for Models of Politics (with Scott Ashworth) American Journal of Political Science 50(1):214-231

2005. The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political Science 49(3):515-530.

2005. The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2):237-258.

2005. Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. International Organization 59(1):145-176. (An early version of this paper was entitled, "An Adverse Selection Model of Terrorism".)

2002. Informative Precedent and Intra-Judicial Communication (with Matthew Stephenson). American Political Science Review 96(4):755-766.

2002. The Binds that Tie: Creating a Virtuous Cycle of Commitment through Communal Expectations. CCAR Journal: A Reform Jewish Quarterly Winter: 93-103.

2000. Strategic and Non-Policy Voting: A Coalitional Analysis of Israeli Electoral Reform. Comparative Politics 33(1):63-80.


Other Publications

2008. The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work. The Political Economist 10(1):1-12.

Conference and Working Papers

Accountability Traps (with Scott Ashworth and Amanda Friedenberg)

Regime Change with One-Sided Limit Dominance

Does Clarifying Responsibility Always Improve Policy? (with Dimitri Landa)

Moral Hazard with Sequential Policy Making (with Dimitri Landa)

Disasters and Incumbent Electoral Fortunes: No Implications for Democratic Competence (with Scott Ashworth)




bdm@uchicago.edu
773.834.9874 (o)
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