- Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from Nonlinear Electricity Pricing
American Economic Review, 104(2): 537-63, 2014.
- Abstract | NBER WP | EI WP | Slides
Nonlinear pricing and taxation complicate economic decisions by creating multiple marginal prices for the same good. This paper provides a framework to uncover consumers' perceived price of nonlinear price schedules. I exploit price variation at spatial discontinuities in electricity service areas, where households in the same city experience substantially different nonlinear pricing. Using household-level panel data from administrative records, I find strong evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal or expected marginal price. This suboptimizing behavior makes nonlinear pricing unsuccessful in achieving its policy goal of energy conservation and critically changes the welfare implications of nonlinear pricing.
- Asymmetric Incentives in Subsidies: Evidence from a Large-Scale Electricity Rebate Program
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(3): 209-37, 2015.
- Abstract | NBER WP | EI WP | E2e WP
Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. Such policy designs create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. I investigate the implications of such policies by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program. Using household-level panel data, I find that the incentive produced precisely estimated zero treatment effects on energy conservation in coastal areas. In contrast, the rebate induced short-run and long-run consumption reductions in inland areas. Income, climate, and air conditioner saturation significantly drive the heterogeneity. Finally, I provide a cost-effectiveness analysis and investigate how to improve the policy design.
- Sequential Markets, Market Power and Arbitrage, with Mar Reguant
American Economic Review, 106(7): 1921-57, 2016.
- Abstract | NBER WP | Japanese
We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss.
- Moral Suasion and Economic Incentives: Field Experimental Evidence from Energy Demand, with Takanori Ida and Makoto Tanaka
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, accepted.
- Abstract | NBER WP | EI WP | E2e WP | Washington Post | Forbes | Japanese
Firms and governments often use moral suasion and economic incentives to influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for economic activities. To investigate persistence of such interventions, we randomly assign households to moral suasion and dynamic pricing that stimulate energy conservation in peak-demand hours. We find significant habituation and dishabituation for moral suasion\the treatment effect diminishes after repeated interventions but can be restored to the original level by a sufficient time interval between interventions. Economic incentives induce larger treatment effects, little habituation, and significant habit formation. Our results suggest moral suasion and economic incentives produce substantially different short-run and longer-run policy impacts.
- The Economics of Attribute-Based Regulation: Theory and Evidence from Fuel-Economy Standards, with James Sallee.
Review of Economics and Statistics, accepted.
- Abstract | NBER WP | E2e WP | Nikkei Business | Japanese
We develop a theoretical framework to study "attribute-based regulations," under which regulatory compliance depends upon a secondary attribute that is not the intended target of the regulation. Our theory characterizes the distortionary costs and potential benefits of attribute basing. To test our theoretical predictions, we exploit quasi-experiments in Japanese fuel economy regulations, under which fuel-economy targets are step functions of vehicle weight. Using bunching analysis, we identify large distortions in vehicle weight. We then develop a method that leverages double-notched policies to conduct welfare analysis. We evaluate policy alternatives and quantify the important welfare trade-offs created by attribute-based policies.
- Willingness to Pay for Clean Air: Evidence from Air Purifier Markets in China, with Shuang Zhang
NBER Working Paper 22367.
Revise and resubmit, Journal of Political Economy.
- Abstract | NBER WP | Japanese | Wall Street Journal | Forbes | Bloomberg
We develop a framework to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for clean air from defensive investment. Applying this framework to product-by-store level scanner data on air purifier sales in China, we provide among the first revealed preference estimates of WTP for clean air in developing countries. A spatial discontinuity in air pollution created by the Huai River heating policy enables us to analyze household responses to long-run exposure to pollution. Our model allows heterogeneity in preference parameters to investigate potential heterogeneity in WTP among households. We show that our estimates provide important policy implications for optimal environmental regulation.
- How Do Consumers Respond to Nonlinear Pricing? Evidence from Household Water Demand
Current Draft: April 2013.
- Challenges for Upcoming Deregulation of Japan's Electricity Sector
Keizai Kyoshitsu, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 2016
- Reforming Japan's Electricity Sector: Abe's Push for Deregulation
National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2013
- Do Energy Rebate Programs Encourage Conservation?
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Policy Brief #2419, April 2012
- Reforming Japan's Power Industry
Presentation at "One Year After Japan's 3/11 Disaster: Reforming Japan's Energy Sector, Governance, and Economy," Stanford University, February 2012