HIST 17502/HIPS 17502

Science, Culture, and Society III

Instructor: Adrian Johns

Assistants: Catherine Gainty, Marcia Holmes, Caren Walker

 Spring Quarter, 2008


Syllabus

 [http://home.uchicago.edu/~johns/scs_3_2008.html]


Course Outline

In recent years science has provided some of the biggest headlines in the world's press.  From the argument over genetically modified foods to the debate over nuclear missile defense, and from the controversies over alleged spying at Los Alamos to the struggle over intellectual property in digital media, many of the major issues of the day emerge from the worlds of science, medicine and technology.  This course finds much of its rationale in such cases, where scientific questions become inseparable from social ones.   It has two main aims.  First, it helps students to understand what science itself is, as a social as well as intellectual enterprise.  And, second, it helps us to decide what role that enterprise plays - and should play? - in our society.  

The course is organized around a series of broad questions about science.  These questions are addressed by means of examples drawn from both the past and the present.  The historical cases arise in chronological sequence, ranging from the development of experimental methods in the late seventeenth century to the advent of biotechnology in the modern era.  They furnish a selective set of materials for a history of scientific practice.  Their other purpose here, however, is to highlight the depth and importance of many problems still confronting the world of science today – problems that are cultural as well as scientific, and that demand of us an understanding of what science is and how it works. 

No scientific knowledge of any kind is needed to take this course.


Course Requirements

Class sessions meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 12:00-1:20 in HM 130.

Written work.  This falls into three categories.

1.    Students are to prepare a one-page paper every week (except for April 29 and June 3), due at the time of the class on Tuesdays.  They will generally be returned at the Thursday class.  In total these papers amount to 20% of your final grade.  

2.    A short (5-7 page) paper is due on April 29.  30%.  This should be an analysis of an issue or subject raised in the first half of the course.

3.    A longer (12-15 page) paper is due on June 3.  50%.  This should be a more extensive study of an issue or subject addressed in the course; it cannot be on the same subject as the short paper.  Students graduating this quarter – and therefore needing to get their grades submitted early – should contact me to determine a different schedule.

Students should obtain the approval of an assistant for the title of the longer essay before writing it.  For both of the two papers, they should use academic conventions - in particular, they should cite full bibliographic and page information for any source from which they quote or employ ideas, using footnotes or endnotes.  They should also include bibliographies.  These essays should try to do more than simply describe; they should attempt some critical engagement with ideas and issues.  They should also strive to be grammatical.  Papers should be word-processed and stapled, and you must retain copies of them.  They may not be submitted electronically, but must be handed to a TA (or otherwise by approval).  Students who submit papers late without reason may be penalized.


Readings

There is no single textbook for this class.  Three highly readable books revealing important aspects of the modern scientific enterprise are recommended, however, and you should have read through all three by the end of the quarter.  They are available at the Seminary Co-op:

  • J. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA (many editions; orig. 1968).
  • D. Kevles, The Baltimore Case: A Trial of Politics, Science, and Character (1998).
  • J. Hughes, The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb (2003).

It is further suggested that you keep yourself informed of new developments in the world of science by means of a major newspaper (the New York Times is a good choice).  Periodicals such as The Economist, The New Yorker, New Scientist, and Scientific American also contain regular reports on relevant topics.  It is especially interesting to contrast the stances towards science and scientific claims taken by such different periodicals: The Economist and the Wall Street Journal, for example, are consistently very different in this respect from Newsweek, which is in turn very different from the New York Times.


Appointments

My office is in Social Sciences 505.  I have office hours on Fridays at 10-12.  You are welcome to come by at this time and ask me anything about the course; if you plan to do so, please try to sign up on the sheet at my office door.  You are also welcome to schedule appointments at other times.  My phone number is 702-2334.   My email address is johns@uchicago.edu.


Science, Culture, and Society 3

Schedule of Topics

 

This is a provisional schedule of topics.  The subjects we actually address may differ from these, depending partly on developments in science itself.  

 

1      What is a scientific fact?    04-01, 04-03

Facts are the bedrock of science.  They are commonly taken to be incontestable bits of truth, discovered objectively and shorn of all social or cultural content.  Some of these facts have enormous influence.  But humans have not always thought of nature in terms of "facts."  So where did these things come from, and why did we come to believe in them?  We can understand what facts are (and are not) by looking at how they are arrived at, how they become the subjects of controversy, and how they sometimes disappear.

Historical example: Robert Boyle and the "experimental philosophy" (17th century).

Modern examples: DNA fingerprinting, missile defense.

  • T. Sprat, History of the Royal Society (1667), 95-109.
  • S. Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (1996), 89-117.
  • R. Dawkins, "Arresting Evidence," The Sciences, November-December 1998, 20-25.
  • H. Collins and T. Pinch, The Golem at Large (1998), 7-29.

 

2         What is a scientific discovery?    04-08, 04-10

Science makes discoveries.  That is, it reveals to us new things in the natural world: things like oxygen, electrons, and living coelacanths.  The endless parade of new discoveries is largely what has given science its immense cultural value.  Looked at closely, however, the process of discovery itself becomes distinctly mysterious.  Is there a "logic" of discovery - a method by which discoveries may be attained?  If so, what is it?  What is the relation between the discovery and its discoverer?  Finally, how do we decide that a dramatic new claim is in fact a discovery after all?  

Historical example: Joseph Priestley and the discovery of oxygen (18th century).

Modern example: Joseph Weber and the non-discovery of gravity waves; (perhaps) cold fusion and the recent Oak Ridge fusion claims.

Extracts from Priestley, in J.B. Conant (ed.), Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science (1957), I, 88-103.

T.S. Kuhn, "The historical structure of scientific discovery," in Kuhn, The essential tension (1977), 165-77 (orig. 1962).

H. Collins and T. Pinch, The Golem: What you should know about science (2nd edn., 1998), 91-107.

 

3           Did science slay God?    04-15, 04-17

Ever since its first publication, the Darwinian theory of evolution has been the focus of bitter controversies about science and religion.  One recent  biography of Darwin barely escaped being given the subtitle The man who slew God.  Here we'll look at how those controversies flared up at the outset, with the development and reception of Darwin's theory in his own day.  Then we'll move forward in time to consider the Scopes Trial in 1920s Tennessee, at which proponents of evolution clashed head-on with defenders of fundamentalist Christianity.  Finally, we'll address current arguments about "intelligent design" in the context of debates about science and secularism. 

Historical examples: Darwin; the Scopes Trial (1850s-80s;1920s).

Modern example: "Intelligent design" and the politics of science education.

  • C. Darwin, The Origin of Species (1859), "Introduction," "Variation under Domestication," "Variation under Nature," "Struggle for Existence," "Recapitulation and Conclusion."  These are available in many printings; a convenient source is D.M. Porter and P.W. Graham (eds.), The Portable Darwin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), 107-59, 194-215. 
  • J.H. Brooke, Science and Religion: Some historical perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 275-96.
  • E. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate over Science and Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1997), 170-93.
  • .M.J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The biochemical challenge to evolution (NY: Free Press, 1996), 26-48 - read alongside:
  • R.T. Pennock, Tower of Babel: the evidence against the new Creationism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 263-72.

 

4               What is a scientist?           04-22, 04-24    

The figure of the scientist is an enormously influential one in modern society.  But what are the characteristics that denote a scientist?  Where do they come from, and why are they so respected?  Above all, how are they changing today?  To answer these questions we'll begin with the coining of the term "scientist" itself, and with sociologist Max Weber's classic formulation of science as a "vocation."  Then we'll compare that formulation to the portrait given  in James Watson's Double Helix - the first modern warts-and-all account of a scientific discovery, and itself something of a classic.  Finally we shall consider how the figure of the scientist is changing as university researchers engage in today's realm of biotechnology.  

Historical examples: The invention of the "scientist" (1830s-40s); Max Weber on science as a vocation (1918).

Modern examples: James Watson and the discovery of DNA; the culture of biotech.

  • [W. Whewell], extract of review of Mary Sommerville, On the connexion of the physical sciences, Quarterly Review 51 (1834), 58-60.
  • M. Weber, "Science as a vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber (1946), 129-56.
  • Watson, Double Helix, esp. chs. 7, 10, 21-29. 
  • P. Rabinow, Making PCR: A story of biotechnology (1996), 19-45. 

 

 

5    What is a scientific laboratory?    04-29, 05-01

Scientific experiments and tests are most commonly carried out in places called laboratories.  The word is an old one, coined in the seventeenth century.  It originally seems to have referred to an alchemist's den - a place of work (in Latin, labor) and a place of prayer (oratorium).  But today's laboratories are highly professionalized places.  How do the characteristics of the lab affect the work that goes on there?  And how can we be confident that the artificial conditions of the lab properly reflect the circumstances of the "real world" outside?  To answer those questions we'll consider the fortunes of Louis Pasteur in the late nineteenth century, when he attempted to use laboratories to revolutionize the life sciences of his time.  But we'll also find that they remain live issues today in the testing of Genetically Modified Organisms.

Historical example: Louis Pasteur (1870s-80s).

Modern example: GMO testing.

Translated extracts from Pasteur's "Memoir on the organized corpuscles which exist in the atmosphere," in J.B. Conant (ed.), Harvard case studies in experimental science, II (1957), 508-17.

B. Latour, "Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world," in K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science (London: Sage, 1983), 141–70.

C.C. Mann, "Biotech goes wild," Technology Review July/August 1999.

 

6    What is a scientific prediction?    05-06, 05-08    

Scientists supposedly test their claims.  They do so largely by making predictions and then seeing if those predictions come true.  But what tolerances do they adopt when they perform such tests?  More generally, how much certainty should the public place in scientific predictions, especially of great events that cannot be closely modeled in a laboratory?  Major policy issues may hang on such questions, as in the case of nuclear waste disposal, which demands an understanding of events 100,000 years in the future.  And what about disciplines whose predictions don't work, as has been the case with earthquake science?  

Historical example: Albert Einstein and the testing of relativity (1880s-1930s).

Modern examples: nuclear waste disposal; earthquake science.

  • "Joint eclipse meeting of the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society," The Observatory 42 (1919), 389-98.
  • Collins and Pinch, The Golem, 27-55.
  • G. Polakovic, "Predicting the Big One a Big Zero," Los Angeles Times, September 7, 1999, A1, A6.
  • J. Wheelwright, "For our Nuclear Wastes, there's Gridlock on the way to the Dump," The Smithsonian, May 1995, 40-50.

 

7   What is a scientific instrument?   05-13, 05-15

Scientific tests and predictions often rely on machines called instruments.  The manufacturing of scientific instruments is an enterprise centuries old, but in the last hundred years or so the scope, scale and size of such instruments has increased dramatically.  Today's devices are no longer the children's toys that Isaac Newton bought from his local fair in order to investigate the behavior of light.  They are specialized, complex equipment, often developed specially for the purpose.  But as we depend ever more on these machines, we need to ask the simple question: what comes first, the instrument or the science?  Do ideas drive technology, or does the available technology determine the science that is done?

 

Historical example: cloud and bubble chambers (1890s-1980s).

Modern example: LIGO (and we may also talk about the Hubble Space Telescope).

C.T.R. Wilson, "On a Method of Making Visible the Paths of Ionising Particles through a Gas," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 85 (1911), 285-88 (online at JSTOR here).

P. Galison and A. Assmus, "Artificial Clouds, real particles," in D. Gooding, T. Pinch, S. Schaffer (eds.), The uses of experiment (1989), 225-69.

H. Collins, “LIGO becomes big science,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 33 (2003), 261-297.

 

8    Did science get too big?    05-20, 05-22

Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, people began to talk in terms of something they called “big science.”  By this they meant a kind of large-scale, state-funded enterprise – something that could never be carried out by small groups of researchers, let alone an individual scientist.  The original instance of big science was the Manhattan Project, which culminated in the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945.  At the time, the huge size of that project was justified by participants in terms of the vital need to defeat Nazism – which they feared was in determined pursuit of its own nuclear weapon.  In the wake of the Manhattan Project, however, the victorious United States engaged in a debate about what science should look like in the postwar order.  The result was the creation of a series of large-scale research agencies and funding bodies that are still with us today.  The most evident examples are the National Science Foundation, which funds much civilian scientific research, the NIH, which deals with medical research, NASA, and the national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Argonne, which were inaugurated to continue Manhattan-Project-style work in the context of the Cold War.  Here we shall look at the origins and nature of “big science,” at the “ethos” that it encapsulated, and at the doubts it raised among scientists themselves.  We shall conclude by examining the crisis facing the enterprise as the Cold War came to an end.

Historical example: Totalitarian science, the Manhattan Project, and the establishment of big science.

Modern example: Los Alamos and the Wen Ho Lee case.

  • A. Weinberg, “Impact of large-scale science on the United States,” Science 134 (1961), 161-4 (online here).
  • J. Hughes, The Manhattan Project (2002), 45-104.
  • Dan Stober, Ian Hoffman, A Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear Espionage (2002), 17-44.

 

9   Is science moral?   05-27 (No meeting 05-29)           

It is fairly common to hear science characterized as an ethical enterprise - one with its own norms of conduct, which are policed by the scientific community itself.  Thus many people believe that science is less subject to fraud or hucksterism than most human activities, and that when such misconduct does occur it is quickly rooted out by virtue of the very process of testing that makes science what it is.  If this is so, then what exactly are the norms of science?  Where did they come from?  What effect do they have on the practice of scientific work?  And, perhaps most important, who makes sure that they are observed?  We'll begin to answer these questions by looking at the classic description of the scientific ethos as moral and self-policing.  We shall then examine three recent cases where important elements of that ethos have been questioned: the so-called "Baltimore case," in which Congress insisted on imposing outside oversight of laboratory practices; Bjorn Lomborg’s controversial critique of climate science, which led to his being temporarily accused of misconduct; and the recent declaration by the Union of Concerned Scientists that the Bush administration has actively censored the scientific process.                               

  • R.K. Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science," in Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (1973), 267-78 (originally published in 1942).
  • Union of Concerned Scientists, "Federal Science and the Public Good": http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/restoring/federal-science.html. 
  • D. Kevles, The Baltimore Case, 198-265.
  • B. Lomborg, "The truth about the Environment," Economist, August 4, 2001.
  • "Misleading math about the Earth," Scientific American, January 2002, 61-71.

 

 

10    Who owns science?    06-03

One of the "norms" that Merton posited for science was what he called "communism."  He meant that scientific knowledge itself was common to all humanity.  But it turns out that knowledge can be made a subject of property, at least temporarily: this is what patents and copyrights are for.  But where should property rights in scientific knowledge stop?  This has become a vital question today in two respects.  First, there is a strong public movement for access to the results of publicly-funded research.  The NIH has recently declared that science produced under its auspices, for example, should be freely available after six months.  This accords well with our image of science as public knowledge – but it also imperils the economic processes by which that knowledge has been circulated since Newton’s day.  So how do we reconcile the need for credible publication with the imperative for access?  And, second, pharmaceutical patents have been widely condemned for corrupting the research process and inhibiting the availability of drugs to the developing world.  But, again, it is not obvious what viable alternative exists.  Today we shall look at how these developments are forcing society once again to reconsider the very nature of the scientific enterprise.

  • D. Kevles, “Patents, protections, and privileges: intellectual property protection in animals and plants,” Isis, June 2007.
  • C. McSherry, Who owns academic work? Battling for control of intellectual property (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 144-89.
  • A. Swan, "Open access and the progress of science," American Scientist May-June 2007. 

 


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