


U. of Chicago Conference on Foreign Assistance and Political Development in Fragile States

Session 6: Problems of Host Resistance to Reform and
Donor Conditionality

Keith W. Mines
U.S. Institute of Peace

May 16, 2020

- ❖ Colombia
- ❖ Grenada
- ❖ El Salvador
- ❖ Somalia
- ❖ Haiti
- ❖ Darfur
- ❖ Afghanistan
- ❖ Al Anbar, Iraq



- Political Consolidation
- Building Security Forces
- Economic Development

Nation – political compact that unites a people of a defined territory under a single identity.

State – The institutions that can manage the business of governing within that nation.

Questions in Play

1. What do we want?
2. What tools do we have to achieve it?
3. How do we deploy those tools?
4. How does the host country/tribe/movement respond?
5. Lessons Learned



Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - I

1. What do we want?

- Stability w/o migration + democracy + human rights
- Aristide: From misery to poverty with dignity

2. What Tools?

- Economic and Political: Foreign Assistance
- Security and Justice: Programs and Advisors

3. How Deploy Foreign Assistance?

- Conditioned on neo-liberal framework
- Short term (jobs) vs. long-term (good policy)
- Transactional (nature of the transaction not clear)
- Weak advisory presence

Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - II

3. How Deploy Security and Justice?

- Training of new police and special units (advisors)
- Judicial and prisons
- Coast Guard – per resources high and long-term

4. How Respond? Economic Assistance

- Internal power struggle Aristide vs. Preval over privatization
- Parliament Fractured, \$500M stayed on the table
- Weak ministries – low absorptive capacity


4. How Respond? Security & Justice

- Human capacity and willingness had real limits
- Also political tool
- When training and advisors present + persistent = success
- Justice was complex system – reforms only in 2015-17

Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - III

What did we Learn?

- Institutionalization before Liberalization (Roland Paris and Kimbra Fishel)
- Simple Financial Transactions to us are Complex Political Transactions to Them
- Assistance needs to Land Well (Ministry Advisors - Shadow Government)
- Security + Justice takes time – a positive low-key presence is everything



Afghanistan – 2002 Counter- Terrorism - I

1. What did we want?

- Mixed: Eliminate terrorist safe havens, corner Bin Laden, demonstration vs. terrorist supporters
- Later – Drugs and non-corrupt government (state building?)

2. What Tools?

- Foreign Assistance (\$52 per Afghan vs. \$1,400 Balkans)
- Security assistance & U.S. force deployment
- Training and Advisors for ANA (1 SF B Team)
- Ministry Advisors
- Diplomatic Support
- Political Support – Loya Jirga

Afghanistan – 2002 Counter- Terrorism - II

3. How Deploy?

- Not much to deploy (U.S. shift to Iraq) see Dobbins
- No real institutional assistance (Fin Min only)
- UN Minimal (low profile, small footprint)

4. How Received?

- Openness to ministerial advisors
- Desire for donor coordination
- Acceptance of technical assistance (currency rollout)
- Warlords and regional strongmen
 - ⑩ Rent Capture – border posts, drugs, aid
 - ⑩ Loya Jirga
 - ⑩ Ismael Khan – Herat
 - ⑩ No effort to nationalize militias (CT partners)

Afghanistan –
2002
Counter-
Terrorism - III

5. What did we Learn?

- Build essential institutions early (e.g. anti-corruption)
- Advisors Matter (Canadian SAT)
- Transactions multi-faceted and have local context
- Early trade offs have consequences (e.g. militias)
- Humility: We don't always know better



Darfur – 2007 Unify Rebel Groups I

1. What do we Want?

- Macro: Stop genocide
- Micro: Unify rebel groups into a cohesive political force

2. Tools

- Macro: Sanctions, int. isolation
- Micro: PKO, foreign and humanitarian assistance

3. How Deploy?

- Support for PK architecture (AU/EU/UN - CFC)
- Support for Commanders Conference
- Assistance to Rebel Groups as inducement

Darfur – 2007 Unify Rebel Groups II

4. How Received?

- Acceptance of architecture but . . .
- . . . no real inducement to unify or make peace
- Missing local context

5. What did we Learn?

- International regional actors often better (e.g. Aprezi and Kouyate)
- Need Flexible Funding and Enough of it
- Long-term Field Officers (M. Nolte)
- All Peace is Local

Slide 14

KM2

Keith Mines, 5/14/2020



Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative -- Fight Drugs I

1. What do we Want?

- U.S. Drugs, border security, close ungoverned spaces, protect human rights
- Them: End violence and make peace

2. Tools

- Colombia \$12B, Mexico \$4B
- Advisors, program managers
- Good Relations
- Trade
- Reputation, Tourism

3. How Deploy?

- Largescale programs: equipment, technical advice, training

Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative – Fight Drugs II

4. Response - Colombia

- Pro-US
- Leadership consistent
- Strong Societal Support
- Institutions well led, good framework
- Low levels of corruption
- Planning effective

4. Response - Mexico

- Federalism complicated
- Leadership up and down, inconsistent at different levels
- Often non-existent institutions
- Hesitation about U.S. assistance

Plan Colombia
and Merida
Initiative –
Fight Drugs III

5. What did we Learn?

- Sometimes the stars align
- Respectful of local experience
- Whole of government brings synergy
- Local popular backing helps (good brand)
- Resource proportionality



Ramadi Peace
Park, 2004
Stabilizing
Gesture I

1. What do we Want?

- Tear down Ba'ath Party HQ, build a peace park

2. Tools

- \$70K

3. How Deploy?

- Open Bidding Process

Ramadi Peace
Park, 2004
Stabilizing
Gesture II

4. Response

- Seven bids, 1 Colonel, and 1 Sheikh
- HQ down, no peace park
- Safer Streets

5. Lessons Learned

- Some things are more important than an open bidding process



Somali Peace
Negotiations,
1994
End Famine,
Build State

1. What did we Want?

- End violence
- Build basic state institutions

2. Tools

- Foreign Assistance
- Moral Authority
- Relations with int. community

3. How Deploy?

- Kismayu to Nairobi peace negotiations

Somali Peace Negotiations, 1994 End Famine, Build State

4. Response

- 70 Clan leaders to Nairobi
- 2 weeks of talks in 3 ½ star hotel
- Assumption we wanted it more than them
- Then . . . the threat of a sex strike

5. Lessons Learned

- A switched on civil society can be a more powerful inducement to peace than foreign assistance