


# Statebuilding by Consent

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
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# Statebuilding can take many different forms.



# Statebuilding where foreign entities enter with host state consent are an important category of statebuilding missions.



# Delegation agreements (DAs) are designed to strengthen security and reform states.



Scoop



Jorge Dan Lopez/Reuters

## DAs are a common form of cooperative statebuilding.

- Invited interventions allow foreign troops, police, investigators, prosecutors, or judges temporary authority to implement laws or policies in host states to another sovereign entity.
  - Security institutions: "authority to use, or order the use of, force...to protect the state and its citizens" (Chalmers 2000)
- Delegation agreements are a subset with the added authority to change state institutions.
- In Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-2015, 80 percent have some type of invited intervention, and 43 percent hosted a statebuilding delegation agreement.

### *Drawing on:*

Matanock AM. 2014. Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood. *Governance* 27: 589-612.

Matanock AM. in progress. *Inviting Intervention: Statebuilding by Delegating Security*. Book Manuscript.

# Much less invasive forms of intervention also help build states.



UN Photo/J Bleibtreu



OAS Photo/Unknown



CDC Photo/Unknown


## International actors use similar tools to enforce domestic deals across issue areas.

- Monitoring: International actors identify clear standards for compliance and check behavior especially at important moments for implementation.
  - Elections and other *systematized spotlights*, where institutions repeatedly draw international actors' attention, are useful (especially Matanock 2017).
- Incentives conditioned on compliance: Economic, legal, and political benefits provided that can be withdrawn for violations (especially Donno 2013).

*Drawing on:*

Matanock AM. 2020. How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals. *Annual Review of Political Science* 23(1).

# Statebuilding where foreign entities enter with host state consent are an important category of statebuilding missions.



## **When Does Statebuilding by Consent Occur — and Work?**

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## The host state's consent is crucial in these cases.

- Delegation agreements are likely when leaders face particular challenges that make constraints useful:
  - When leaders have already signed on to share power with their opponents (and both want to constrain each other);
  - When leaders face imminent loss of power (constrain opponents)
  - When outsider leaders seek to produce a new order (constrain all)
  - Or, when outside actors demand change (assuage their concerns).

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- Monitoring and conditional aid are likely when governments and their opponents seek to overcome particular commitment problems (*reversion problems*).
- State receptiveness and other factors also likely matter:
  - States are more responsive to conditional incentives when more dependent on international trade and foreign aid (e.g. Girod 2012).
  - Evidence on regime type, etc., is mixed.
  - Backlash can occur across contexts.

## International actors also must be motivated.

- International actors seem to engage when they face disproportionate consequences for disorder.
  - They are willing to engage and punish violations when they care enough and hold sufficient leverage.
- But they need to not have such strong ties to the incumbent that they systematically favor it.
- This defines a *Goldilocks condition* according to Matanock 2020.

## This research agenda moving forward:

- When are different enforcement mechanisms used and — related — how well do they work?
- Are there differences across types of consent-based missions and even issue areas (reversion problems in civil war versus repression)?
- How does a transition work and what happens in the longer-term?
  - There are limitations of consent-based statebuilding in terms of shaping perceptions of states (see Matanock and Garbiras-Diaz 2020 on an experiment on Guatemala.)
- What does the changing international system mean for this type of involvement?

## For further reading on statebuilding by consent, please see:

- Matanock Aila M. 2014. Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood. *Governance* 27: 589-612.
- Matanock Aila M. 2020. How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals. *Annual Review of Political Science* 23(1).
- Matanock Aila M. in progress. *Inviting Intervention: Statebuilding by Delegating Security*. Book Manuscript.

Comments most appreciated ([matanock@berkeley.edu](mailto:matanock@berkeley.edu)).

Thank you!