The prospective as nonveridical: polarity items, speaker commitment, and projected truth

Anastasia Giannakidou
University of Chicago
March 15, 2014

1. Introduction: NPIs in prospective contexts

Frans Zwarts and I wrote two papers in 1999 on the connection between temporal structure and nonveridicality—Aspectual properties of temporal connectives, and Temporal, Aspectual operators and nonveridicality. In those papers, we discovered a link between temporal structure and negative polarity, in the fact that NPIs (such as English any, and its Dutch and Modern Greek cognates ook maar iets, kanenas) appear in ‘prospective’, i.e. future oriented clauses including will and before clauses, but not in ‘retrospective’, i.e., past clauses. That great project, which was honored with a fellowship to me from the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, was alas not completed, as life and work moved me from Groningen to Chicago; but it remained dear to my heart, and left me with a curiosity about temporal reasoning, truth and polarity that I kept since then. I worked out details in my more recent work on the subjunctive, modals and the future, and this paper is a report to Frans of how far reaching our initial ideas were.

I will take the following passage from our 1999a paper as the point of departure. I will call the ‘Prospective is Nonveridical’ thesis:

(1) ‘Prospective is Nonveridical’ thesis

“In a linear model of time, retrospective past is deterministic, and in this sense, veridical. Prospective future, on the other hand, embodies a notion of projected but not actual truth, hence it is non-deeterministic, and thus nonveridical: we do not know whether the expected events will take place. Hence, in our view, future behaves more like a modality than a real tense.” (Giannakidou and Zwart 1999a: 109).

The intriguing premise is the suggested difference between actual and projected truth, and it is this difference that I will address here. The initial empirical motivation for (1) was to explain why NPIs appear with prospective and future oriented operators, but not under past. I illustrate below in English, Dutch, and Greek. The respective future markers are the modal verbs will, zullen, and the Greek particle tha:

---

1 I am thrilled to be able to write this paper on the occasion of Frans’ retirement— a humble, and most certainly inadequate, thank you for the opportunities he gave me, and for his faith in me and in this program. By giving me an aio position in his research group in Groningen, Frans literally changed the course of my life, honored me with his intellectual as well as practical support— and, above all, his friendship through the years. I will never forget the warmth that Frans and his wife Sharon have been offering so generously to me for more than 20 years now, and for this, I am deeply grateful to both of them. Frans, I hope that now that you will be retired, we may take up some of these intitial questions together again. I have been waiting for a long time!
At the dinner tonight, Nicholas will eat anything.

* At the dinner last night, Nicholas ate anything.

* De kinderen vertrokken zodra ze ook maar iets ontdekten.
The children left as soon as they discovered anything.

De kinderen zullen vertrekken zodra ze ook maar iets ontdekken.
The children will leave as soon as they discover anything.

What will Nicholas eat?

* O Nicholas ete otidhipote.
Nicholas ate a pasta dish.

Nicholas will eat a pasta dish.

Importantly for future orientation is not just the particle or the modal verb, but also the verbal form I label here PNP, for perfective non-past (we come back to this in section 3). When these NPI data were first discovered in the mid-90s, the shared wisdom about NPIs was that they appear in negative or mere downward entailing (DE) contexts—and Frans’s earlier work (most notably, his 1986 dissertation and his 1996 paper) were among the pioneers of that thesis. However, when confronted with data like the above, one needs to say that the sensitivity of NPIs goes beyond mere polarity (negation-affirmation) or DE. NPIs must also be sensitive to temporal structure; somehow, the past is bad for them, but the future is good. Why is that? This difference cannot be tied to negation and DE.

Frans and I suggested that this temporal sensitivity of NPIs is due to veridicality: the past is veridical, but FUT p is nonveridical. Therefore the veridicality judgment, i.e. the judgement about the truth of sentences, is apparently relevant for the licensing of polarity items, in at least these three languages. Since then, similar data have been produced for east Asian languages (Korean; Lee 1999, Lin 1996 for Chinese), Salish languages (ku-determiner, Matthweson 1998), Navajo (Fernald and Perkins 2006), Albanian (Xherija 2013) and other languages, see Giannakidou 2011 for an overview). And although any licenses a free choice implicature in these contexts (Giannakidou 2001, 2011), in Greek, Dutch, and the other languages we are talking about, the NPIs appearing in future clauses do not have free choice readings. At the same time, free choice items (FCIs) also appear in the future context, as illustrated below for Greek:

What will Nicholas eat?

* O Nicholas ete otidhipote.
Nicholas ate a pasta dish.

Nicholas will eat a pasta dish.
Giannakidou 1998, 2001 show that FCIs are also polarity items, in the sense that their distribution is limited to more or less the same contexts as NPIs, as seen also above. Therefore, the overarching generalization seems to be that future clauses are good environments for polarity items generally (NPIs and FCIs) while past positive sentences systematically block them. The Giannakidou and Zwarts thesis offers an explanation of this fact by saying that (a) the past is veridical and the future nonveridical, and (b) veridicality and nonveridicality are key factors in understanding the distribution of NPIs.

I will proceed with discussing the notion of veridical and nonveridical when applied to temporal domains in the next sections. But for now, as another piece of foundational information on why this generalization is important, consider that NPIs tend to appear in other contexts that, like the future, are nonveridical, and have prospective orientation, i.e. they make reference to times (and possibly events) after the speech time. These contexts are the scope of modal verbs, deontic as well as epistemic, but I will give here mostly deontic examples because of their clear prospective orientation:

(6) O Nicholas bori na milisi me kanenan/opjondhipote fititi.
the Nicholas may SUBJ talk.PNP.3sg to NPI-/ FCI student
John may talk to any student.

(7) O Nicholas prepei na milisi me kanenan fititi. ²
the Nicholas may SUBJ talkPNP.3sg to NPI student
Nicholas must talk to any student.

(8) Fae kanena/opjodhipote glyko!
Eat any cookie!

Deontic modalities and the imperative have prospective orientation, and they seem to be good for NPIs and FCIs. Hence the generalization is, correctly, about prospectivity and not, strictly speaking, the future. Also, I give below examples from Middle Dutch (from Hoeksema 2010) illustrating the NPI enig, which just like Greek lacks FCI use:

(9) Men moest toch wel enige aanwijzing hebben.
one ought PRT PRT some clue have
‘One should have some clue.’

(10) *Subjunctive*
    d. En wie geen steenen kan aandragen storte [..] eenige gift in de offer bus.
And who no stones can to-carry throw some gift in the offertory-box
‘And who cannot carry bricks, should donate some gift in the offertory box’

Here again we observe prospective orientation with a deontic modal and a subjunctive.

Besides the future, Greek possesses a number of other prospective particles, and which also typically license NPIs: the subjunctive particle na— which we saw already as a complement

² FCIs are not plausible with the universal modal contexts because they trigger an exhaustivity inference that seems to be at odds with the universal quantifier (Giannakidou and Quer 2013); any, naturally, also is odd, because of its free choice implicature. I will largely shy away form the interpretation of NPIs and FCIs in this paper because the focus is on the prospectiveness question.
to the modal verbs, but can also occur in main clauses (Giannakidou 2009)—, the optative *as*, the conditional particle *an*, and the temporal connective *prin* ‘before’. As shown here, NPIs appear in all these cases:

(11) What should Nicholas bring for dinner?
   a Na (subj.) feri kanena glyko.
       ‘It will be a good idea to bring a dessert.’
   b As (optative) feri kanena glyko.
       ‘Let him bring a dessert.’

These are neutral, soft invitations or suggestions for Nicholas to bring dessert, some dessert or other, the speaker remains agnostic as to what the actual dessert will be. (FCI interpretation is again odd, hence *any* is impossible).

(12) *Prin* erthi {kanenas/opjiosdhipote},
Prepi na katharisoume to domatio.
Before anyone comes, we must clean up the room.

(13) *An* erthi {kanenas/opjiosdhipote}
Prepi na katharisoume to domatio.
Before any guest comes, we must clean up the room.

Notice again the use of the PNP, crucial to the prospective orientation. It becomes obvious that we have a real generalizatin here: prospective orientation creates a good licensing environment for polarity items of various kinds, and, as Giannakidou and Zwarts suggested, the reason for this is that prospective contexts are non-veridical.

Now, putting together the fact that these polarity items also appear in negative and downward entailing contexts, we can summarize the whole theory of NPIs in the diagram below. This schema says that all polarity item licensers are nonveridical. The inner most circles are the negative domain, what Zwarts calls strong negations; DE is *minimal* negation. Crucially, negative contexts are proper subsets of the nonveridical. But the set of nonveridical opertors includes non-negative functions too. The prospective operators we are talking about belong to this class— and as we saw, they are overwhelming licensers of polarity items crosslinguistically. Nonveridicality thus allows us to explain why NPIs appear with seemingly unrelated licensers – e.g. negation, the future and other modalities— without claiming that negation somehow becomes modal.

(14) The Giannakidou-Zwarts Theory of polarity items
Having clarified these foundational premises, we can now proceed to address the two important points in the *Prospectiveness and Nonveridicality* thesis (1): (a) the past is deterministic and therefore veridical, and (b) that prospective expressions (including the future) “embody a notion of projected but not actual truth” and are therefore non-nonveridical. I will illustrate by studying the Greek particles.

2. (Non)Veridicality judgment: subjunctive, optative and commitment weakening

Consider first bare, i.e. unmodalized, non-negated, sentences in the simple past or present (which is the present progressive in English):

(15)  a Nicholas brought dessert.
      b Nicholas is washing the dishes.

These are sentences about actual events that happened in the past or are happening right now; in the present, the speaker actually may be witnessing the event unfolding. So, when one judges the sentences describing these facts, one judges them as true. This truth judgment is a veridicality judgement, and the speaker judges the past and the present progressive to be veridical. The veridical assertion is then added to the common ground, and the discourse proceeds by only looking at worlds where Nicholas brought dessert or is washing the dishes.

Consider now the sentences we mentioned earlier with the subjunctive and the optative:

(16)  What should Nicholas bring for dinner?
      a Na (subj.) feri  kanena  glyko.
           ‘It will be a good idea to bring a dessert.’
      b As (optative) feri  kanena  glyko.
           ‘Let him bring a dessert.’
Both sentences are invitations to bring a dessert ($p$), but do not entail that $p$ is true, or that it will be true. In both cases, there is also non-assertive illocutionary force; but neither force nor the desire that $p$ entail $p$ now or in a future time. With these sentences the speaker expresses a desire that there be an event described by $p$, at some point in the future, but has no commitment to the event happening; a desire does not commit the speaker to $p$, or add $p$ to the common ground. (The same, by the way, is true of imperatives.). These sentences are nonveridical.

So, when we talk about truth judgements, we talk about them by appealing to speakers’ commitment to the truth of a sentence. Prospective oriented particles do not convey commitment to the truth, but when a speaker asserts a past or present sentence, they are referring to facts, and by asserting them they are committed to them. In this context, veridicality — being a judgment about the truth of a sentence — it applies in two ways. First, objectively: if an expression entails the truth of its argument, it is veridical. This was the original inception of Zwarts 1995, and Giannakidou 1994, 1997:

(17) Def 1: *Objective veridicality*
A propositional function $F$ is veridical if $F\phi$ entails $\phi$; otherwise, $F$ is nonveridical.

We can think of this as ‘objective’ veridicality. It is very close to factuality—a sentence $\phi$ under $F$ is true if it refers to a fact. In this sense, veridicality is more or less equivalent to the traditional realis, and any sentence that does not refer to a fact is nonveridical. Past or present sentences are veridical in this objective way, hence Giannakidou and Zwarts’ claim that past is deterministic. The prospective domains aren’t veridical. In a branching time model, future branches share a history, a past up the time where they branch out, and this divides the model into a deterministic (past/now) space which is objectively veridical, and non-deterministic, prospective space, which branches and allows for a number of possibilities. I come back to this in section 3.

As I have shown in earlier work (Giannakidou 1994, 1998, 1999, 2009), this notion of objective veridicality can afford substantial results in natural language, but it needs to be enriched with an epistemic component when we consider mood choice, NPIs, and modality. Truth judgment is done by individuals (in main clauses the speaker), and when the speaker assesses truth, she does so based on her beliefs and knowledge. It this case, one talks about *subjective* veridicality. Subjective veridicality is shown, in recent work, to be important in extracting truth assessment from texts (de Marneffe et al. 2012), and in Trnavac and Taboada (2012) and Giannakidou 2013, to appear, a correlation is posited between nonveridicality and evaluation that further supports the subjective nature of the veridicality judgment.

To capture the idea that truth is assessed relative to an individual, I defined ‘models’ of evaluation (Giannakidou 1998, 1998, 1999). These models are sets of worlds, relative to an individual $i$, the epistemic agent, corresponding to what the agent believes or knows. We can think of them as information states, or modal bases, associated with individuals:

(18) Epistemic model of an individual $i$ (Giannakidou 1999: (45))
An epistemic model $M(i) \subseteq M$ is a set of worlds associated with an individual $i$ representing worlds compatible with what $i$ believes or knows.

(19) Truth in an epistemic model
A proposition $p$ is true in an epistemic model $M(i) \subseteq p$:
$\forall w [w \in M(i) \rightarrow w \in \lambda w'. p (w') ]$
In main past sentences, the model represents the epistemic space of the speaker, and it includes worlds compatible with what she believes, what she knows, or believes that she knows. I will call these models epistemic spaces from now on. A proposition $p$ of a main assertion will be evaluated with respect to the epistemic space of the speaker:

$\text{(20) } \begin{align*}
a & \text{ John won the race.} \\
b & \text{ } [\text{John won the race}] = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w: w \in \text{M(speaker)} \rightarrow w \in w'. \text{John won the race in } w'
\end{align*}$

If the speaker truthfully asserts the sentence $\text{John won the race}$, she must believe or know that John won the race. Believing the proposition means that all worlds in her epistemic space are $\text{John-won-the race}$ worlds. Hence: $\text{M(s)} \subseteq p$. This explains Moore’s paradox, i.e. why "$\text{John won the race, but I don’t believe he did}$" is odd. In the main unmodalized past assertion the speaker is fully committed, within her belief/knowledge space, to the truth of the proposition she expresses with the sentence she utters. Veridicality is this state of full commitment:

$\text{(21) } \begin{align*}
\text{Def. 2. Veridicality, nonveridicality, antiveridicality wrt individuals} \\
i. \text{ A function } F \text{ is veridical iff } F\phi \text{ conveys an epistemic state } \text{M(i)}, \text{ relative to an individual } i, \text{ such that: all worlds in } \text{M(i)} \text{ are } \phi \text{ worlds, i.e. } \text{M(i)} \subseteq \phi. \\
\text{ii. If } i. \text{ doesn’t hold, } F \text{ is nonveridical.} \\
\text{iii. If all worlds in } \text{M(i)} \text{ are non- } \phi \text{ worlds, then } F \phi \text{ antiveridical.}
\end{align*}$

Under this definition too, optative and subjunctive particles are nonveridical because of $ii$. In both definitions, nonveridicality is the absence of veridicality. Negation, on the other hand, is the opposite of full commitment, antiveridicality: the speaker is fully not committed to $p$. An antiveridical operator is also nonveridical, since $i.$ is valid for it too.

$\text{(22) } \text{Ariadne did not kiss Nicholas.} \\
\text{(23) } \text{Ariadne is not kissing Nicholas.} \\
\text{(24) } \text{[NOT (Ariadne kiss Nicholas)] is true iff: all worlds in } \text{M(s)} \text{ are worlds where} \\
\text{Ariadne did/does not kiss Nicholas}
$

So, both versions of veridicality, objective and subjective ($\text{Defs 1 and Def. 2}$) capture the sensitivity of NPIs to both negation and the, seemingly unexpected from the perspective of negation and DE, prospective operators. Possibility modals like $\text{might, may—}$, regardless of orientation— are also nonveridical and license NPIs as we saw.

$\text{(25) } \begin{align*}
a & \text{ Nicholas might bring a dessert.} \\
b & \text{ Nicholas may bring a dessert.}
\end{align*}$

$\text{(26) } \begin{align*}
a & \text{ Nicholas might have brought a dessert.} \\
b & \text{ Nicholas may have brought a dessert.}
\end{align*}$

Past possibilities contrast with the simple past assertions in that the speaker is no longer committed to the truth of $p$; $p$ is regarded merely as possibility. Adding the possibility modal weakens the commitment and creates non-veridicality. As de Marneffe et al. put it, “declaratives
like Ariadne left conveys firm speaker commitment, whereas qualified variants with modal verbs or embedded sentences *imbue the sentence with uncertainty*” (de Marneffe 2012: 102). Giannakidou 2013 calls assertions with possibility modals *inquisitive assertions*, and one can think of the subjunctive, optative, and possibility modals as a class of commitment weakening operators whose function is to create a nonveridical space:

(27) **Commitment weakening and possibility operators**
    i. Commitment weakening is the creation of a *nonveridical epistemic* space.
    ii. Possibility operators (subjunctive, optative, possibility modals) have the function of weakening an individual’s commitment to a proposition.

The epistemic effect of commitment weakening can be viewed now as conveying a partitioned space containing both *p* and *non-p* worlds.

(28) Def. 3: *Veridicality, nonveridicality, antiveridicality and commitment*
    An epistemic space (a set of worlds) *M(i)* relative to an individual *i*:
    (i) Is *veridical* with respect to a proposition *p* just in case all worlds in *M(i)* are *p* worlds. (*Full commitment*)
    (ii) If there is at least one world *w* in *M(i)* that is a *not-p* world, *M(i)* is *nonveridical*. (*Weakened commitment*)
    (iii) If all worlds in *M(i)* are *not-p* worlds, *M(i)* is *antiveridical*. (*counter-commitment*)

The nonveridical epistemic space in this definition contains at least one *not-p* world. As previously, in the extreme case where all worlds are *not-p*, we have an antiveridical space, that I call here *counter-commitment*. Counter-commitment as well as weakened commitment are non-commitment to *p*. Only in veridical spaces is *i* committed (i.e. fully committed) to *p*.

Notice that commitment weakening is irrespective of the past-prospective contrast, since modals (as we saw), as well as *na* and *as*, can be used with past tenses and weaken commitment:

(29) a  Isos na ixe gripi.  
    Perhaps SUBJ had.2sg flu  
    ‘Maybe he had the flu.’

(b)  Malon *na/tha* ixe gripi.  
    probably SUBJ/FUT had.2sg flu  
    ‘Probably he had the flu.’

(30) As tou milouse.  
    OPT he.gen. talked.3sg  
    ‘If only he had talked to him.’

The subjunctive *na* is used together with the possibility adverb ‘isos’ *maybe*, and the impossibility of the stronger adverb ‘probably’. That one is compatible with the future, suggesting that the future itself has stronger force (see discussion in section 3). The co-occurrence of *na* with *maybe* can be viewed as a case of modal concord, and it suggests the subjunctive being akin to a possibility modal (see also Giannakidou 2014). The optative has
countercfactual force, a fact observed for optatives in general (Grosz 2011), so it behaves antiveridically with the past—though nonveridically with the non-past, as we saw earlier.

So, to sum up: possibility expressions, including the subjunctive and the optative, are commitment weakeners: they create a nonveridical epistemic space. With some of them, the speaker is in what Giannakidou 2013 calls ‘non-veridical equilibrium’.

\[
\text{(31) Nonveridical equilibrium (Giannakidou 2013: 14)}
\]

\[
\text{An epistemic space } M(i) \text{ is in nonveridical equilibrium iff:}
\]

\[
M(i) \text{ is partitioned into } p \text{ and } \neg p, \text{ and there is no bias towards } p \text{ or } \neg p.
\]

The equilibrium means that the speaker considers \( p \) and \( \neg p \) as equally good possibilities, so sentences with equilibrium as typically neutral. But as I argued in the 2013 paper, the equilibrium is easily disturbed. This happens with the optative and other counterfactual operators for instance, which in the past create bias toward \( \neg p \). When we use future expressions and necessity epistemic modals, as we see next, positive bias is created (Giannakidou and Mari 2013, 2014), and it brings with it the projected truth mentioned by Giannakidou and Zwarts. Projected truth is responsible for the stronger flavor that universal modals and the future have.

3. The future: nonveridicality, partial commitment, and projected truth

The starting point of discussions of future sentences is often Aristotle’s very famous sea battle example (Περί Ερµηνείας, De Interpretatione 9).

\[
\text{(32) a. There will be a sea-battle tomorrow.} \\
\text{b. There will not be a sea-battle tomorrow.}
\]

A major goal of Aristotle in Περί Ερµηνείας is to discuss the thesis that, of every contradiction, one member must be true and the other false (the “Law of the Excluded Middle”). Regarding the future sentences, Aristotle acknowledges that the truth or falsity of each sentence will, in time, be fully determined by how things will turn out: there will either be or not be a sea battle. Aristotle also acknowledges that, at present (i.e., at the speech time), it is not known, in the sense that a past sentence can be known, that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. So, the future sentences at \( n \) are objectively nonveridical, i.e. the future is non-deterministic.

The future is also subjectively nonveridical, as it is compatible with an epistemic state that includes, for a future time, both \( p \) (there will be a sea battle) and \( \neg p \) (there will not be a sea battle). This is the position Alda Mari and I defended in recent publications (Giannakidou 2012, Giannakidou and Mari 2013, 2014), and I will try to spell it out in the rest of this section. In \( \text{FUT} \ p \), the epistemic state \( M(s) \) of the speaker at present is nonveridical and allows, for a future time, both \( p \) and \( \neg p \); but unlike with possibility modals, there is a subspace within \( M(s) \) that fully supports \( p \). This creates partial commitment of the speaker to \( p \), and makes the statement with the future stronger than the mere possibility statements.

3.1. The future, the present and the non-past

From the perspective of nonveridicality, future statements are pretty much like statements with necessity modals like MUST:
Modal verbs, in epistemic and mostly deontic uses, come with the same kind of indeterminacy about the prejacent proposition \( p \), and are therefore also nonveridical. Broekhuis and Verkuyl in press correctly point out the parallelism of the future auxiliary with other modal verbs in Dutch, e.g., in their example (9), given here below:

(34) a. Elsa \textit{zal} dan wandelen. \\
Elsa will then walk  \\
‘Elsa will walk then.’ \\
b. Ik \textit{zal} je bellen. \\
I will you call  \\
‘I will call you’ \\
c. We \textit{zullen} morgen thuis zijn.  \\
We will tomorrow at home be  \\
‘We will be at home tomorrow.’

Future orientation is common to \textit{zullen} and non-\textit{zullen} modalities, as we see in the prime examples. Broekhuis and Verkuyl claim that, despite the future orientation, it doesn’t make sense to say that the modal verbs \textit{moeten} ‘must’, \textit{kunnen} ‘may’, and therefore also \textit{zullen} are future tenses. Future orientation is going to be attributed to the present tense on the auxiliaries, which in their account carries prospective meaning. The modal verb itself (i.e., minus the present) is thus an indicator of pure modality.

At this point, I want to go back to the observation that prospective orientation in Greek comes with non-past.

(35) a. \textit{As fiji} o Janis. \\
as leave.PNP.3sg the John  \\
‘Let John go.’ \\
b. \textit{Na fiji} o Janis. \\
na leave.PNP.3sg the John  \\
‘Let John go.’ \\
c. \textit{Tha fiji} o Janis. \\
tha leave.PNP.3sg the John  \\
‘John will leave.’

The imperfective non-past is the actual semantic present in Greek (Giannakidou 2009, in press). The PNP is a defective perfective nonpast that can’t function as a present, because of its aspectual limitation of perfectivity. So, Greek actually possesses a semantic present (morphologically: imperfective nonpast) \textit{and} a semantic nonpast. In the occurrences of PNP plus particle we have prospective orientation, so future reference, just like in Dutch, is not a privilege of the future particle \textit{tha}. In Giannakidou (2009) I claimed that Greek perfective nonpast denotes a prospective interval—but unlike the prospective present interval whose left boundary is \( n \), the left boundary of the nonpast is undefined. It contains a dependent variable \( t \).
A dependent variable cannot remain free, but must be valued by some higher value. This idea is inspired by Abusch's (2004) analysis of WOLL as a substitution operator. According to Abusch, "In the substitution operator, t is a bound variable that corresponds to the tense argument of will [which is n, coming from an implied higher PRES; clarification mine]. For a top-level occurrence of will, the effect is to substitute \((n, \infty)\) for \(n\)" (Abusch 2004:39).

The Greek perfective nonpast then is a WOLL, but unlike will—where \(n\) is triggered by default (Abusch 2004: (48))—the Greek perfective nonpast does not trigger PRES; so it becomes necessary to have an overt exponent of \(n\) in the structure, otherwise the structure is illicit:

\[
(37) \quad * \text{TP: } \lambda t \exists e \ [\text{write} (j, e) \land e \subseteq (t, \infty)] \quad \text{‘grapsi o Janis’ ‘John write.PNP’}
\]

The interval \((t, \infty)\) is ill-formed, because \(t\) is unvalued. The particles save the structure by providing \(n\). If we add, for example, the future \(tha\), \(t\) can now be identified with \(n\):

\[
(38) \quad [[\text{tha}]] = n
\]

\[
(39) \quad [[\text{tha}]] (\text{TP (19)}) = \lambda t \exists e \ [\text{write} (j, e) \land e \subseteq (t, \infty)] \quad (n) = \exists e \ [\text{write} (j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)]
\]

The event of John’s writing will now be located at the interval that starts at \(n\) and stretches through infinity. This explains the possibility of future for the PNP. The analysis says that the additional structure provided by the particles gives a locus for triggering of the speech time.

3.2. **Epistemic future and MUST**

It is a common observation that future morphemes exhibit purely epistemic readings, and in Giannakidou and Mari we call this ‘epistemic future’. Here are some well known examples (see also Enç (1996), and Tsangalidis (1998)):

\[
(40) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a.} \quad & \text{The French’ll be on holiday this week.} \quad \text{(Palmer 1987)} \\
\text{b.} \quad & \text{No doubt, you’ll remember John.} \\
\text{c.} \quad & \text{Ed will lay in bed all day reading trashy novels.} \quad \text{(Huddleston 1995)} \\
\text{d.} \quad & \text{Oil will float on the water.} \quad \text{(Haegeman 1993)}
\end{align*}
\]

According to Palmer, \(will\) here expresses conclusion of reasoning that the speaker does, (see also Broekhuis and Verkuyl). What kind of reasoning? Obviously, reasoning that relies on what the speaker knows or has evidence for. In concluding with \(will\), the prejacent is supported. However, and we come back to this, the speaker’s confidence is not as high as it would have been had she chosen a non-modalized form, e.g., *The French are on holiday this week*. The non-modalized sentence is veridical, and therefore expresses full commitment.
In Greek, as we see below, the future particle in the non-predictive use can be followed by a present or a past form. With the past, we see that it is compatible with past adverbials:

(41) a. I Ariadne tha pezi tora. (non-predictive)
   the Ariadne FUT play.imperfective.nonpast.3sg now
   ‘Ariadne must be playing now.’

   b. I Ariadne tha kimithike prin 2 ores. (non predictive)
      the Ariadne FUT sleep.PP.3sg before two hours
      ‘Ariadne must have slept two hours ago.’

   b. I Ariadne tha milise xthes. (non predictive)
      the Ariadne FUT talk.PP.3sg yesterday
      ‘Ariadne must have spoken yesterday.’

None of these cases is ‘future’ in the sense of making reference to an event that follows now. Rather, as can be seen in the translations, we use must. Giannakidou and Mari call this the ‘epistemic future’. Epistemic future and MUST convey strong support for p, but no full commitment, no veridicality. This is shown by the test below (Giannakidou and Mari 2013):

(43) a. I Ariadne itan arosti—#ala dhen ime ke endelos sigouri. Ariadne was sick—#but I am not entirely sure.

   b. I Ariadne tha itan arosti—ala dhen ime ke endelos sigouri. Ariadne will/must have been sick—but I am not entirely sure.

Tha, FUT, and modalization in general—including must—appear to convey nonveridical modal spaces, and still allow for not-p worlds. Hence, all modalized sentences, even with necessity modals, are ‘weaker’ than non-modalized assertions (pace von Fintel and Gilles 2010; for recent critical discussion see also Lassiter 2013). Future tha in the epistemic use is thus akin to must, i.e. a universal quantifier (recall its compatibility with malon ‘probably’), and the modal base (∩f(w)) is epistemic.

(34) For any world w, and conversational backgrounds f, g:
    \[[\text{prepi}/ \text{tha}/ \text{MUST}]\] w.f,g = λq<st>. ∀w’ ∈ Best g(w) (∩f(w)): q(w’) = 1;
    \[
    \text{where } \text{Best } g(w)(X) \text{ selects the most ideal worlds from } X, \text{ given the ordering given by } g(w)\]

Crucially, only in the Best (see Portner 2009 and discussion therein) worlds is p true, therefore the universal modal is nonveridical, since the modal base still contains not-p worlds. In terms of truth conditions, then, epistemic FUT and must are equivalent, and in Greek they can co-occur with modal concord: e.g. Tha prepi na exi gripi ‘She must have the flu’. Tha prepi is equivalent to prepi ‘must’ (Giannakidou 2012).

So, FUT and must contain nonveridical spaces, but at the same time, they contain a privileged (Best) inner domain of commitment, the domain they quantifier over. For this reason, universal epistemic modals are stronger than the mere possibility statements which express no commitment, as we discussed earlier. The effect of bias will be seen more strongly in the predictive use that I consider next. Before I move on to show this, I wanted to note a similarity, in exactly this respect of combining nonveridicality with partial commitment, between FUT/must and the so called ‘modal’ discourse particles in Germanic such as wohl (Zimmermann 2011):
Zimmermann claims that with *wohl*, the epistemic commitment of the speaker is weakened compared to the plain sentence, while also conveying a confidence that the proposition is likely to hold. Still, though, this is only partial commitment: in case I know p, I cannot use the particle.

Likewise, in Greek, if I know for sure, I can’t utter *tha ine sī thalasa* ‘He must be at sea’. In using the epistemic future and *wohl*, I am in a nonveridical state of knowledge that still allows *not p*, and if the context forces full knowledge (as is the case e.g. of direct evidence) the result is odd. These particles, and *must*, Giannakidou and Mari 2014b argue, depend on *partial* knowledge. Crucially, Dutch *zullen* seems to function similarly, as we see below. The Dutch counterpart of *wohl*, *wel* can also combine with *zullen* (and we can think of this as modal concord too, on a par with co-occurrences of *tha* and *prepi* mentioned earlier):

---

3 Many thanks to Jack Hoeksema for discussion of these examples.
Because the ordering source is the ‘ideal’ (i.e. the golden standard in the context), partial support of \( p \) in the best worlds makes that set privileged and creates bias. In the case of partial support, we talk about projected truth within the set supporting \( p \). All universal modal operators thus have this dual nature of allowing both \( p, \) not \( p \), while privileging option \( p \). And for this reason they give the impression that they are ‘strong’.

I move on now, finally, to show how these ideas explain the modality of prediction, based on the analysis of Giannakidou and Mari 2013b, 2014a.

3.2. The future: projected truth and bias in reasonable worlds

Prediction, Giannakidou and Mari argue, also has an epistemic basis (see also Broekhuis and Verkuyl in press). In predicting \( \text{FUT} \ p \) at the speech time \( n \), the speaker is confident that the proposition will be made true at some point following \( n \). This confidence relies on knowledge at the present, but it is not itself knowledge of the future event, since such events have not yet materialized.

The future is typically thought of in terms of branching times (Thomason 1984, Kaufmann at al. 2005), and Giannakidou and Mari argue that the speaker uses her knowledge as a domain restriction, i.e., to universally quantify over only a subset of these metaphysical alternatives. Speakers project their knowledge to clean up the metaphysical branches, to carve them out into reasonable and unreasonable ones (Mari 2013). Reasonable futures are those where everything proceeds as expected and nothing peculiar happens (see Mari 2013 for extended discussion of this). The knowledge a speaker has at \( n \) allows her to know which branches are reasonable, and which not. In the figure below, the dotted line to \( w_3 \) indicates unreasonable future (Giannakidou & Mari 2014 (58)):

\[
\text{ReasFut}(t) = \{w_1, w_2, w_0, w_4\}
\]

Now consider the sentence John will be here at 5.

(51)
The event unfolds in the actual world $w_0$, which has a reasonable development $w_1$. The sentence says that if the course of events remains reasonable, the speaker is highly confident that John will be here at 5. However, it is still possible that an accident happens. In this case, the actual world-to-come becomes an unreasonable one:

![Figure 5: The actual world at $t'$ coincides with a reasonable future determined at $t$](image)

When we predict, we normally don’t consider as relevant such possibilities (only if we know that John is prone to accidents, do they become relevant, in which case the force of our prediction $John \ will \ be \ here \ at \ 5$ becomes weaker). As a universal quantifier over reasonable worlds then, FUT expresses support for $p$ within the reasonable worlds, thus ‘projected truth’ onto that set:

![Figure 6: The actual world at $t''$ does not coincide with a reasonable future determined at time $t$](image)

(52) **Truth conditions for predictive FUT** \ (Giannakidou and Mari 2014)

At speech time $n$ and with respect to the speaker’s epistemic state $M(s)$ at $n$:

i. $[[\text{FUT}(p)]]$ is 1 iff $\forall w' \in \text{ReasFut}(n): \exists t' \in (n, \infty) \& p(w', t')$, i.e. $p$ is true in all reasonable futures, given present knowledge in $M(s)$.

ii. Not all worlds in $M(s)$ are ReasFut at $n$. (Nonveridicality)

These truth conditions render predictive future a positive bias nonveridical operator; and allow us to see why, despite nonveridicality, we get Moore’s paradox (thanks to Itamar Francez for raising this question):

(53) # John will be here at five, but I don’t believe it.
The reason why this sentence is bad is not because the speaker is committed to $p$ with the future conjunct, but because the speaker projects truth onto the set of reasonable worlds. $FUT \ p$ is supported in the reasonable worlds, i.e. all reasonable worlds $w$ are $p$ worlds, Though the epistemic state $M(s)$, which included the modal base, allows not $p$, the continuation targets the reasonable worlds, and I don’t believe it contradicts the universal quantification, by asserting that in the reasonable worlds there are also non-$p$ worlds. In other words, with positive bias nonveridical operators are bound to get the Moore effect because the second clause targets the supporting worlds, hence they are weaker than the veridical operators where the Moore effect targets the whole $M(s)$ (see Giannakidou and Mari 2014 for more details). Why the supporting worlds are targeted is probably due to a pragmatic fact: they are, by the use of $FUT$, the most salient ones.

To sum up, the predictive future statement has this dual nature: nonveridical and thus weaker than the unmodalized past assertion and allowing for NPIs— while also stronger than mere existential statements, and expressing partial commitment to $p$ and projected truth onto the $p$-supporting set.

4. Conclusion

My goal of this paper was to show Frans what an extraordinary journey our initial ideas in Giannakidou and Zwarts 1999 have initiated. Given the breadth of data discussed here and in my work since the 1990s, Frans will be happy to see that the notions of projected truth (now understood as partial, bias creating commitment) and nonveridicality, that we so humbly envisioned as relevant fifteen years ago, have far-reaching consequences— consequences that, in fact, go beyond the mere licensing of polarity items. In the end, veridicality judgment has been shown to be decisive for mood triggering, i.e. in order to capture commitment weakening with subjunctive and optative particles. And it is also necessary for the analysis of all modalities— while discriminating between weaker modalities (possibility ones, with nonveridical equilibrium) and stronger ones, i.e. universal modalities of the future and MUST with partial support and positive bias for $p$. The notions of actual and projected truth that accompany the veridicality judgment have also been shown to be useful tools for modeling linguistic semantic facts. Ultimately, then, the (non)veridicality judgment appears to be complex, and this is a good thing: it mirrors the complexity of (non)veridicality phenomena in human language. The way epistemic agents judge truth is not a simple matter, and frankly, life would be quite boring if it were.

Acknowledgement. In honoring Frans, I also wanted to acknowledge the unfailing intellectual support of Jack Hoeksema through the years. Jack, a huge thank you to you too. I hope it will be a long time before I will be writing a paper for your retirement. Victor Sanchez-Valencia has also been instrumental in my thinking about time and nonveridicality, and it is such a pity that he left us so early. Parts of this paper in particular were presented at a CLCG colloquium at the University of Groningen (April 2013), and I am grateful to the audience for their comments and suggestions, most notably John Nerbonne and Jan Wouter Zwart. Many thanks, finally, to my close collaborator Alda Mari. She has deservedly taken Frans’ place in my wanderings in the land of the future and nonveridicality, as a most insightful and enthusiastic companion.
References
Lassiter, Daniel. 2013. Must is weak. Presentation slides, Stanford University.