

# YUKIO KORIYAMA

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## Contact Information

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**Personal Information:** Male, Japanese citizen (J-1 Visa with no restriction)

## Education:

Expected June 2008	Ph.D., Economics	University of Chicago (USA)
2002	M.Sc., Mathematical Sciences	University of Tokyo (Japan)
2001	MBA	Collège des Ingénieurs (France)
2000	Diplôme d'Ingénieur	Ecole Polytechnique (France)
1998	B.Sc., Mathematics	University of Tokyo (Japan)

## Thesis:

Title: "Essays on Social Decision-Making Mechanisms"

Expected Completion Date: June 2008

Thesis Committee and References:

**Professor Roger B. Myerson (chair)**

1126 E 59<sup>th</sup> Street, Chicago IL, 60637 USA  
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**Professor Balázs Szentes**

1126 E 59<sup>th</sup> Street, Chicago IL, 60637 USA  
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**Professor Philip J. Reny**

1126 E 59<sup>th</sup> Street, Chicago IL, 60637 USA  
preny@uchicago.edu, 1-773-702-2417

**Professor Robert M. Townsend**

1126 E 59<sup>th</sup> Street, Chicago IL, 60637 USA  
rtownsen@uchicago.edu, 1-773-702-7587

## Research Fields:

Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory, Political Economics, Public Economics

Secondary fields: Spatial Economics, Development Economics

## Teaching Experience:

Teaching assistant, University of Chicago

"Price Theory II" (Roger Myerson, Philip Reny, graduate, 2006, 2007)

"Price Theory III" (Roger Myerson, Hugo Sonnenschein, graduate, 2006)

"Methods and Models in Spatial Economics" (John Felkner, undergrad, 2005, 2006)

"Topics in Development and Economic Growth" (John Felkner, undergrad, 2005)

## Research Experience and Other Employment:

Research assistant, University of Chicago

Robert Townsend (2004, 2005, 2007), Balázs Szentes (2005, 2007), Willie Fuchs (2006)

Market analyst, Sinomonitor International, in Beijing, China

Department of multimedia research (2002)

Research analyst, French Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa

Mission économique (2000)

## Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2006 Henry Morgenthau Jr. Memorial Fund Dissertation Fellowship (Chicago)

2003-2005 Japan-IMF Scholarship (IMF)

2002-2003 Nakajima Foundation Scholarship (Japan)  
1998-2000 Heiwa Nakajima Foundation Scholarship (Japan)  
1991 Commended at Japan Mathematical Olympiad

**Referee Services:**

Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Political Economy

**Job Market Paper:**

“**A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem**” (joint with Balázs Szentes)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where, (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals, and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire information, and then, they make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size,  $k^*$ , is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size  $k^*-2$ . This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.

**Research Papers in Progress:**

“**A Spatial Kuznets Analysis: Dynamic Poverty and Inequality Mapping in Thailand**” (joint with Robert Townsend)

Abstract: Although industrializing countries have experienced high growth, there is much interest in if, when, and how this trickles down to the larger population, particularly the poor and those in peripheral rural areas. Estimation of income, consumption and wealth are typically limited to large areas and a single census year. In this paper we use an innovative spatial regression scheme as well as a principal component method to estimate with fine resolution how levels of these variables, and measures of inequality, evolve over space and time. We combine high quality socio economic survey on income and consumption with a comprehensive village level census having a large set of explanatory variables to study the evolution of Thailand at the sub-county over a span of 12 years. This includes a period of high growth and the financial crisis.

“**On Voluntary Participation in Public Good Provision**” (in progress)

Abstract: Voluntary participation in the public good provision is considered. There is a social planner who can choose the production rule represented by the minimum number of contributors required to produce the public good. That is, the planner can reject voluntary contributions when the number of participants is not high enough. It is shown that, even if profitable public good provision might be rejected with a positive probability, social welfare may increase as the social planner sets the higher minimum number of contributors. In other words, it may be beneficial for the society if the social planner can commit to ex post inefficient social decision. We show how the results would depend on the cost structure, as well as on population uncertainty.

**Presentations:**

2005 July Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
“The 16<sup>th</sup> Jerusalem School in Economic Theory”  
2005 November University of Chicago, Economic Theory workshop  
2006, 2007 University of Chicago, Development/Theory working group

**Languages:**

English (fluent), French (fluent), Japanese (native), Chinese (intermediate)