

Ladders in Post-Secondary Education

Academic 2-year colleges as a Stepping Stone

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Abstract

An important number of high-school graduates start their post-secondary educational careers at academic 2-year colleges even though returns to graduation are negligible. However, the returns to transferring to 4-year colleges are large: academic 2-year colleges act as a *stepping stone* in which agents learn about themselves in a cheaper and less demanding environment than 4-year colleges. This paper presents a model of educational choice that incorporates academic 2-year colleges together with 4-year colleges and work. Agents are initially uncertain about their innate ability to accumulate human capital. Pessimistic agents join the workforce, optimistic agents enroll in 4-year colleges and those in the middle enroll in academic 2-year colleges. Exams govern the accumulation of credits and provide information that update beliefs, inducing dropouts and transfers. The model is consistent with facts that are documented for two different data sets: (1) among those initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges, more able agents are less likely to graduate, more likely to transfer, and less likely to dropout; (2) among those initially enrolled in 4-year colleges, more able agents are more likely to graduate and less likely to dropout or transfer; (3) there is a higher concentration of high ability students among transferees. A decomposition of returns shows that the dropout and transfer options account for 90% of the full return to enrolling in an academic 2-year college while the dropout option explains 70% of the full return to enrolling in 4-year colleges. Academic 2-year colleges are found to be close substitutes for 4-year colleges and thus the welfare effect of the availability of academic 2-year colleges is limited and is primarily driven by a slight increase in participation. The model is also able to reconcile low enrollment and graduation rates with high returns at 4-year colleges. The low graduation rate results from the interaction of learning and option value while the low enrollment and wedge in returns are explained by academic 2-year colleges.

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1 Introduction

An important number of high-school graduates start their post-secondary educational careers at academic 2-year colleges even though returns to graduation are negligible. [Table 1](#) presents the wage differential in 1985 for students that initially enroll in academic 2-year colleges according to their dropout, graduation and transfer status relative to agents that join the workforce directly after high-school graduation for the *National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972*. Three conclusions can be drawn: (1) certification at academic 2-year colleges provide little value in the labor market¹, (2) certification provides no value to students that transfer to 4-year colleges, and (3) students that transfer to 4-year colleges enjoy high returns.² Computing Internal Rates of Return that account for both direct and indirect costs of education shows that returns from graduation at academic 2-year colleges are low while the returns to transferring to 4-year colleges are large: academic 2-year colleges act as a *stepping stone* in which agents learn about themselves in a cheaper and less demanding environment than 4-year colleges.

Dropouts		15%	(332)
Graduates		28%	(50)
	transferred to 4-year college	52%	(24)
	joined workforce	6%	(26)
Transfers to 4-year college		52%	(171)
	with no degree at academic 2-year colleges	52%	(147)
	with degree at academic 2-year colleges	52%	(24)

Table 1: Wage differential in 1985 for students that initially enroll in academic 2-year colleges and a particular educational history relative to agents that join the workforce directly after high-school graduation. In parenthesis: number of agents in each bin.

¹Test of significance can not reject that the return to graduating from academic 2-year colleges and joining the workforce is equal to the return to dropping out.

²The data set used in the paper contains students that did not experience discontinuities on their educational spells or had missing values for the different measures of ability discussed later. Analyzing the entire universe of students that enroll in academic 2-year colleges does not lead to different conclusions even though the returns to graduation from academic 2-year colleges and joining the workforce become slightly bigger than those for dropouts. See [Table 21](#) in [Appendix H](#) of the Appendix for the results using the entire universe of students.

This paper presents a model of post-secondary educational choice that incorporates academic 2-year colleges together with 4-year colleges and work. High-school graduates are uncertain about their ability to accumulate human capital. Pessimistic agents join the workforce, optimistic agents enroll in 4-year colleges and those with intermediate beliefs enroll in academic 2-year colleges. During their tenure as students, agents are presented with exams, which govern the accumulation of credits and provide information that updates beliefs about ability, inducing dropouts and transfers. For some early work on self-selection see [Willis and Rosen \(1979\)](#) and [Kenny et al. \(1979\)](#) who estimate returns to college education accounting for self-selection bias. The sequential process of education was pointed out first in [Comay et al. \(1973\)](#). [Altonji \(1993\)](#) computes Internal Rates of Return for a simple sequential model where agents are uncertain about future income flows and thus evaluation of expectations induces dropout behavior. [Heckman and Urzua \(2008\)](#) and [Stange \(2007\)](#) estimate models of educational choice where students are allowed to drop out.

Academic 2-year colleges are ideal for students with aspirations regarding graduation at 4-year colleges but with low expectations about their ability to accumulate human capital. Depending on the evolution of their beliefs and accumulation of credits, students can decide to transfer to 4-year colleges and carry with them a proportion of their stock of credits, implying that academic 2-year colleges act as a *stepping-stone* towards more demanding environments, namely, 4-year colleges. Further, the model has features of bandit models as students learn about their innate ability to accumulate human capital. [Jovanovic and Nyarko \(1997\)](#) evaluate the predictive power of bandit and stepping stone models in terms of job mobility and find that there is some evidence favoring a combination of both. Post-secondary education also presents features of bandit and stepping stone models. In the educational ladder, 4-year colleges play the role of the step above academic 2-year colleges.

An important feature of the model is its tractability, which allows for a clear characterization of the optimal policy that governs enrollment, dropout and transfer behavior. The model is parameterized using data from NLS-72 by assuming that observable measures of ability are correlated with the high-school graduate initial beliefs, in order to evaluate the model's predictions. The model is consistent with the following facts, which are documented for two different data sets: (1) among those initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges, more able agents are less likely to graduate, more likely to transfer, and less likely to dropout; (2) among those initially enrolled in 4-year colleges, more able agents are more likely to graduate and less likely to dropout or transfer; (3) there is a higher concentration of high ability students among transferees.

A decomposition of returns shows that the dropout and transfer options account for 90% of the full return to enrolling in an academic 2-year college while the dropout option explains 70% of the full return to enrolling in 4-year colleges. Full insurance would reduce enrollment in academic 2-year colleges from 17% to 5%, while enrollment in 4-year colleges would rise from 25% to 42%. The interaction of risk and option value proves to be an important force in post-secondary education.

The paper then turns to evaluate how close of a substitute are academic 2-year colleges for 4-year colleges to find a high degree of substitutability. In accordance with this high degree of substitutability, the welfare effect of the availability of academic 2-year colleges is very low and is primarily driven by a slight increase in participation.

The model is also able to reconcile low enrollment and graduation rates with high returns to 4-year college graduation. Heckman et al. (2008a) evaluate the Internal Rate of Return³ of the 4-year college investment option relative to work, to find that since 1960 Internal Rates of Return had been around 10% or higher depending on the cohort and different specifications of labor markets

³The rate of return that makes the discounted value of two investment decisions to be equalized.

and taxes.⁴ Judd (2000) combines CAPM techniques with the indivisibility of human capital to compare the return to 4-year college graduation with assets of similar risk to find an excess of return to the college investment option. Cunha et al. (2005), using data from NLSY/1979, extend the analysis to evaluate the Internal Rate of Return for the marginal student relative to work (i.e. the agent with the lowest observable measures of ability that enrolls in 4-year college) to find an unexplained wedge in returns.⁵

Using evidence from two panels of post-secondary education, NLS-72 and NLS-92⁶, this paper argues that incorporating 2-year colleges, or community colleges, into a model of post-secondary educational choice together with 4-year colleges and work can reconcile the low enrollment rate and wedge in returns. Estimating a mincer regression that allows for heterogeneity across types of institutions and graduation premium, and by relaxing the assumption of linearity in years of education and experience, Internal Rates of Return are recomputed to find that the wedge in returns is explained by 2-year colleges. Low graduation rates follow from the learning mechanism, which is consistent with the results of Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008b) who present strong evidence of the learning channel's explanatory power regarding dropout rates as opposed to competing stories, such as non-pecuniary costs of education.⁷ Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008b) show not only that low grades explain dropouts, but also show that they precede claims about disliking college.

To reconcile low enrollment with high returns to 4-year college graduation, Cunha et al. (2005) and Carneiro et al. (2003) argue in favor of non-pecuniary costs of education. Their findings show

⁴Belzil and Hansen (2002) find Internal Rates of Return of 7% for the NLSY/1979 cohort.

⁵See also the Handbook of Economics of Education (Heckman et al. (2006)).

⁶NLS-92 is part of NELS:88. NLS-92 refers to the study of post-secondary patterns of high-school graduates at 1992.

⁷Also known as psychic costs.

that these costs play an important role in enrollment decisions. These costs are viewed in a broad way and can be understood as a combination of tastes for college-going, tastes for studying, etc. In these models, agents are assumed to be risk neutral so risk aversion is also part of the non-pecuniary costs of education.

To explain high college dropout rates Heckman and Urzua (2008) and Stange (2007) extend the model to allow for a sequential revelation of information and students dropping out as a result of an optimal re-evaluation of expectations. In their setups, students learn about their own ability and non-pecuniary costs of education. Estimates show that learning about non-pecuniary costs is important in explaining dropout behavior.

2 Patterns of Post-Secondary Education for the Class of 1972

This section presents statistics on post-secondary educational patterns and returns based on the *National Longitudinal Study of 1972* or NLS-72.⁸ The unit of analysis are high-school seniors that join the workforce directly (with no spells of post-secondary education) or join a post-secondary institution with no discontinuities in their educational spells.⁹ NLS-72 follows the educational histories of the senior class of 1972 up to 1980. A final wave in 1986 was performed to acquire

⁸The choice of NLS-72 over other data sets is not an arbitrary one. *High school and Beyond*, or HS&B, follows a cohort from 1982 to 1990. *National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988*, or NELLS:88, follows a cohort from 1992 to 2000. From now on, this data set will be described as NLS-92. Relative to NLS-92 and HS&B, NLS-72 presents longer horizon wage information (13 years vs. 8 years after high-school graduation in the newer data sets). Also, the design of the questionnaire of NLS-72 included questions regarding the type of 2-year college education at any point in time (broadly speaking, 2-year colleges are a combination of academic 2-year colleges and vocational school). These questions were not available in the newer data sets. Lastly, NLS-72 has a more detailed analysis of the cost structure of post-secondary education. An alternative would be to use *National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth*, or NLSY, that presents better life-cycle earnings information but that requires extensive data mining (in particular, there is no straightforward way to disentangle vocational school from academic 2-year colleges). Further, many community colleges have extended their scope to offer both types of programs making increasingly difficult to distinguish one from the other. Section 9 merges vocational school and academic 2-year colleges and compares dynamic and enrollment patterns for both NLS-72 and NLS-92.

⁹Discontinuous spells are treated as educational histories that include periods of work.

long-run job market information.

2-year colleges originated in the late 19th century when W.R. Harper, founding president of The University of Chicago, ideated a plan to teach students lower division "preparatory" material in order to increase higher education participation without compromising existing 4-year colleges.¹⁰ Between WWI and WWII there was an unsatisfied demand for technified workers and 2-year colleges started to expand their scope to prepare a labor-force by providing specialized terminal programs. Is in this era where the distinction between academic-year colleges and vocational school arose. In this paper, academic 2-year colleges are understood as institutions where the transfer function is the main goal (even though they also provide terminal degrees) while vocational schools are understood as institutions where the main goal is to produce a labor force. Kane and Rouse (1999) present a more detailed analysis and description of the history of 2-year colleges.

	share	j								
		vocational school			academic 2-year college			4-year college		
		T to j	G at j	D at j	T to j	G at j	D at j	T to j	G at j	D at j
voc. school	9	-	6	88	3	22	78	3	22	78
ac. 2-year c.	15	4	14	86	-	5	59	32	56	44
4-year c.	25	3	11	89	2	11	89	-	54	41

Table 2: **Transitional dynamics for first and second educational spells after high-school graduation. Source: NLS-72** T stands for Transfer, G for graduation and D for drop out. Share: share of high-school graduates that enroll either at vocational school, academic 2-year colleges or 4-year colleges.

Table 2 presents the post-secondary educational histories for the Senior Class of 1972. Individuals are faced with an initial enrollment choice between 4-year colleges, academic 2-year colleges, vocational school or joining the workforce. The first spell of education can end in three different ways. First, a student can dropout (D) and join the workforce. Second, a student can transfer (T) to a different type of educational institution.¹¹ Third, a student can graduate (G) and join the

¹⁰The Joliet junior college was the first 2-year college in the U.S. and still functions in the Chicago area.

¹¹Within-type transfers (e.g. 4-year college to 4-year college) are not understood here as transfers.

workforce.¹² The proportion of students that transfer more than once is negligible and therefore the analysis that follows is reduced to only account for students that transfer at most once. Students that transfer can end their second spell of education in two ways: obtaining a degree or becoming a dropout.

Only half of the senior class of 1972 pursues higher education directly after high-school graduation. Among them, nearly 20% enroll in vocational school, around 30% enroll in academic 2-year colleges and the rest enroll in 4-year colleges.

Dynamics (i.e. dropout, graduation and transfer behavior) differ for students depending on their initial enrollment choice. Dropout rates are high in the three types of institutions but are higher in vocational schools and academic 2-year colleges than in 4-year colleges.¹³ Transfer rates are important in academic 2-year colleges: approximately 32% of students that initially enroll in this type of institution eventually transfer to 4-year colleges; Only 4-year colleges graduate a large percent of their students. Note that the graduation rate at 4-year colleges is similar for those initially enrolled at 4-year colleges and for those that transferred from academic 2-year colleges. This fact favors the idea that the initial enrollment choice does not hinder the probability of graduation at 4-year colleges. [Section 9](#) contrasts NLS-72 with NLS-92 to find similar patterns.

Low enrollment and high attrition rates can be associated with the risk (possibly due to heterogeneity in returns) and costs attached to education. Costs include foregone earnings (income stream that a student 'loses' by attending school) and direct costs of education that include tuition (and associated fees) and housing. [Table 3](#) shows that 4-year colleges cost twice as much as academic 2-year colleges, providing one reason why students might enroll in academic 2-year colleges.

¹²A student that transfer holding a degree is counted as a transfer.

¹³Dropout rates at vocational schools are inflated since vocational schools have students that enroll in particular classes such as Pottery, learning to use Excel, etc. Once they acquire the particular skill, these students leave the school and return to the workforce. These students don't get terminal degrees and so they are recorded as dropouts.

	Tuition	Tuition + R&B
4-year college	3420.73 (2510.25)	5038.8 (4010.8)
academic 2-year college	1811.36 (1355.1)	2729.65 (4665.35)
vocational school	3803.84 (6131.9)	5904.74 (9615.25)

Table 3: **Differences in Cost of Education (NLS-72)**. Missing Values were imputed by running a Cost regression and imputing missing values through observables. The values are measured in 1984 dollars. In parenthesis: standard deviation in the cross section.

2.1 Returns to Education

The typical Mincer regression evaluates the effect of educational histories on lifetime earnings by estimating a wage regression on years of education and work experience. There is a significant ongoing literature that accounts for non-linearities in years of education (see [Grubb \(1993\)](#), [Heckman et al. \(2006\)](#), [Heckman et al. \(2008b\)](#) and [Kane and Rouse \(1995\)](#)). The typical example in favor of non-linearities is the graduation premium or sheepskin effect. This literature has treated years of education (or amount of credits earned) in different type of institutions as perfect substitutes. Instead, it is now assumed that different educational histories affect lifetime earnings in different ways. Further, as has been already discussed in the literature, this analysis breaks the additive form (in the log version in the Mincer regression) of years of education and experience by estimating a growth equation.

[Table 4](#) presents the results of the extended mincer regression, accounting for the different types of education and graduation premium. See Version A. Graduation in both vocational schools and 4-year colleges is associated with higher wages relative to dropping out. The same idea does not apply to academic 2-year colleges as the return to becoming a dropout is higher than the return from graduation. The low number of students that graduate at academic 2-year colleges raises

questions about the significance of the difference. The significance test presented in [Table 4](#) shows that there is not enough evidence to reject that the return to graduation is similar (or even higher) to the return to dropping out.

description		Version A	Version B	
			(1)	(2)
ϖ_C^D	drop at 4-year C.	0.24 (0.042)	0.22 (0.041)	-
ϖ_A^D	drop at Ac. 2-year C.	0.09 (0.045)	0.077 (0.044)	-
ϖ_V^D	drop at Voc. school	0.072 (0.046)	-	-
ϖ_C^G	graduation at 4-year C.	0.304 (0.04)	0.286 (0.04)	0.2122 (0.037)
ϖ_A^G	graduation at Ac. 2-year C.	0.015 (0.1)	0.0149 (0.104)	0.0445 (0.104)
ϖ_V^G	graduation at Voc. school	0.284 (0.15)	-	-
		Prob > F	Prob > F	
Test: $\varpi_A^G = \varpi_A^D$		0.5698	0.5735	-
Test: $\varpi_C^G = \varpi_V^G$		0.9092	-	-

Table 4: **Mincer Regression (NLS-72)**. Dependent Variable: log of wages in 1985. Independent Variables: graduation and dropout dummies for each type of institution and controls for characteristics. Version B collapse together vocational schools and workforce.

[Table 5](#) presents the results of a growth regression where the dependent variable is the average growth rate of wages between 1979 and 1985. The growth rate for vocational school graduates, α_G^V is around half the growth rate of 4-year college graduates α_G^C . This fact, together with the results from [Table 4](#) reads as follows: graduation at vocational schools provide a higher wage and 4-year colleges provide steeper profiles of wages, while graduation at academic 2-year colleges is dominated.

description		Version A	Version B	
			(1)	(2)
α_G^C	growth rate for C. grads.	0.0447 (0.0144)	0.0457 (0.011)	0.0507 (0.0143)
α_G^A	growth rate for A. grads.	-0.0036 (0.0351)	-0.0071 (0.018)	0.0046 (0.0358)
α_G^V	growth rate for V. grads.	0.0268 (0.0536)	-	-
α_D^C	growth rate for C. dropouts	0.024 (0.0165)	0.0236 (0.0164)	-
α_D^A	growth rate for A. dropouts	0.0103 (0.0196)	0.0091 (0.0194)	-
α_D^V	growth rate for V. dropouts	-0.0071 (0.0202)	-	-
α^0		-0.009 (0.0166)	-0.006 (0.0164)	0.0101 (0.0147)

Table 5: **Growth Regression (NLS-72)**. Dependent Variable: average growth rate of wages between 1979 and 1985.

Backing out the initial wage upon graduation can not be done directly from the data because wage information prior to 1979 is scarce. To produce the initial wage, it is possible to combine the results of [Table 4](#) and [Table 5](#). In fact, these tables allow for the computation of the entire wage profile of an agent as presented in [Figure 1](#).

Using the results in [Table 3](#), [Table 4](#) and [Table 5](#) and assuming a finite lifetime of 47 years (retirement or death at age 65), [Table 6](#) presents the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the average student with a particular educational path relative to joining the workforce directly after high-school graduation (see [Appendix F](#) for the details of the calculations). [Table 22](#), [Table 23](#) and [Table 24](#) in [Appendix H](#) present the average time spent in each institution for a given educational path that follows upon conditioning on initial enrollment, dropout and transfer behavior. Few agents join the workforce after graduating from academic 2-year colleges providing low confidence




Figure 1: **Wage profiles according to graduation and dropout status.** Follows from direct computations using Table 4 and Table 5. Wages are measured in wages of agents that join the workforce directly after high-school graduation in 1985. G_C : graduation at 4-year college; G_A : graduation at academic 2-year college; G_V : graduation at vocational school; D_C : dropping out at 4-year college; D_A : dropping out at academic 2-year college; D_V : dropping out at vocational school; Work: joining workforce directly after HS graduation.

in the estimated coefficients in the mincer and growth regressions. In fact, Table 4 presents the results of a test that evaluates whether the estimated wage differential of graduating at academic 2-year colleges differs from the estimate for dropouts. The test can not reject the equality of the coefficients. With this in mind, Internal Rates of Return are calculated in two different ways. The first uses direct results from both mincer and growth regressions. The second calculates Internal Rates of Return by assuming that graduates at academic 2-year colleges enjoy similar wage profiles than dropouts.

The results in [Table 6](#) do not represent the true internal rate of return of each alternative since it relies on estimates of wage differentials that do not adjust for self-selection but nonetheless provide intuition regarding to the value attached to each of the possible educational paths.¹⁴

	Voc. school	Ac. 2-year C.	4-year C.
Graduation	9.37	-0.63 / 4.06	9.93
Dropout	2.07	6.4	8.55
Transfer to V.S.	-	1.44	0
Transfer to Ac. 2-year	3.71 / 4.74	-	3.37 / 3.46
Transfer to 4-year	8.49	8.84	-
Enrollment	2.75 / 2.78	6.63 / 6.87	8.93 / 8.94

Table 6: Internal Rates of Return (NLS-72). The cost of education includes R&B for 4-year colleges (hybrid case). All the values are in percentage points. [Appendix F](#) presents the details of the calculations. The excluded group are agents that join the workforce directly. Wage profiles for different educational histories are imputed using the mincer and growth regressions ([Table 4](#) and [Table 5](#)) in addition of cost of education ([Table 3](#)) and average time of different educational histories ([Table 22](#), [Table 23](#) and [Table 24](#) in [Appendix H](#)) and by assuming a finite lifetime of 47 years. Returns to graduation at academic 2-year colleges are computed in two different ways: (1) using the parameters obtained by both mincer and growth regressions and (2) imposing a similar wage profile for graduates than for dropouts.

[Table 6](#) shows that enrollment in 4-year colleges provides the highest return and is mostly driven by the return for graduates.¹⁵ Among agents that enroll in academic 2-year colleges the results show that the best educational path is to eventually transfer to 4-year colleges rather than staying and eventually graduating, reinforcing the 'transfer function' associated with academic 2-year colleges. Finally, note that the internal rates of return conditional on initial enrollment choice are ordered: low in vocational school, average in academic 2-year colleges and high in 4-year college.

See the return to graduation at 4-year colleges. This value is similar to findings by [Heckman et al. \(2008a\)](#), [Cunha et al. \(2005\)](#) and [Belzil and Hansen \(2002\)](#) and suggest that returns are too high if compared to low enrollment and graduation rates. If we extend the definition of 4-year college to include dropout and transfer options by adding those that drop and transfer, the mean

¹⁴See [Willis and Rosen \(1979\)](#) and [Kenny et al. \(1979\)](#) for early work on self-selection in college enrollment decisions.

¹⁵The results are in line with [Cunha et al. \(2005\)](#), [Heckman et al. \(2008a\)](#), and [Belzil and Hansen \(2002\)](#), among others.

return decreases from 9.93% to 8.93%. Now, note that 74% of the mean return to 4-year college enrollment can be explained by the return for those initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges. How is the wedge between 4-year colleges and academic 2-year colleges explained? To answer this question, a model of educational choice will be evaluated to show that this wedge in measured returns is possible even though ex-ante the marginal student is indifferent between both options.

2.2 Sorting in Initial Enrollment

Students that enroll in 2-year colleges have observable measures of ability that lie between those of high-school graduates that join the workforce directly and those of students that enroll in 4-year colleges as noted by Grubb (1993) and Kane and Rouse (1999). Table 7 presents summary statistics for measures of ability affecting enrollment decisions tabulated by initial enrollment choice, extending the analysis of Grubb (1993) and Kane and Rouse (1999) by splitting 2-year colleges between vocational schools and academic 2-year colleges. From left to right the table shows that there is some evidence of an ordered enrollment choice. For example, see the Rank in the senior year at high-school class. The rank decreases monotonically with the enrollment choice.

Ordered returns to enrollment (see Table 6) together with the evidence presented in Table 7 suggest that the initial enrollment choice is ordered as follows: work, vocational school, academic 2-year colleges, and 4-year colleges. Table 25 (see Appendix H) presents the results of an ordered probit regression of the initial enrollment choice on a vector X of observable measures of ability. Let β denote the vector of factor loadings. Relative to Kane and Rouse (1999), the analysis is extended here to consider vocational school and academic 2-year colleges as separate institutions. The reference column in Table 25 is Version A (Version B pools vocational school and work together).

The value $X'\beta$ is a composite measure of ability, consistently estimated by $X'\hat{\beta}$. To evaluate

		work	V.S.	Ac. 2-year	4-year C.
Male		0.492 (0.5)	0.4 (0.49)	0.54 (0.5)	0.524 (0.5)
Black		0.108 (0.31)	0.126 (0.33)	0.085 (0.28)	0.105 (0.3)
Socio. Status:	Low	0.415 (0.49)	0.294 (0.45)	0.192 (0.39)	0.166 (0.37)
	Medium	0.506 (0.5)	0.582 (0.49)	0.55 (0.49)	0.407 (0.49)
	High	0.078 (0.27)	0.122 (0.33)	0.253 (0.43)	0.426 (0.49)
Education of Father:	<HS	0.516 (0.5)	0.391 (0.48)	0.289 (0.45)	0.215 (0.41)
	HS	0.323 (0.46)	0.398 (0.49)	0.344 (0.47)	0.288 (0.45)
	4-year C. (no degree)	0.108 (0.31)	0.145 (0.35)	0.211 (0.41)	0.19 (0.39)
	4-year C. graduate	0.051 (0.22)	0.064 (0.24)	0.155 (0.36)	0.305 (0.46)
Rank		0.495 (0.31)	0.435 (0.28)	0.395 (0.27)	0.271 (0.24)

Table 7: **Summary Statistics for measures of ability (NLS-72)**. Rank=rank in high-school class. Socio-Status: Socioeconomic Status of Family at moment of high-school graduation.

a measure of the degree of sorting in initial enrollment, [Table 8](#) produces the mean and standard deviation (in the cross-section) of $X'\hat{\beta}$ across the different alternatives. See Version A in the first row of the table. The measure of ability $X'\beta$ is unitless as it is just an ordinal representation of ability measures. Start with high-school graduates that join the workforce - labeled as work in the table - and move upwards across enrollment options. The mean value for the measure of ability increases monotonically with the enrollment options.

Version	work	vocational school	academic 2-year college	4-year college
A	-1.782 (0.567)	-1.609 (0.571)	-1.348 (0.604)	-0.972 (0.649)
B		-1.426 (0.572)	-1.013 (0.609)	-0.633 (0.654)

Table 8: **Evidence on Sorting: Measure of Ability (NLS-72)**. Constructed from Ordered Probit Estimation (see Table 25). In version B work and vocational school are merged.

2.3 Academic 2-year colleges as a Stepping Stone in an Educational Ladder

Ladders have been associated with the growth of skill as discussed in [Jovanovic and Nyarko \(1997\)](#). Lower steps of the ladder are characterized as stepping stones because they provide a less risky environment to learn compared to higher steps. As agents acquire the necessary skills, they move upwards in the ladder. The process that starts after high-school graduation and culminates with 4-year college graduation is a ladder with two steps. The first step, the stepping stone, is academic 2-year colleges. The second step is 4-year colleges. But there also ways of going down. First, a student at 4-year college can decide to transfer to academic 2-year colleges. Second, a student can decide to dropout.

In contrast with the characterization of the ladder discussed above where agents move on once they acquire the necessary skills, this ladder also present features of bandit models as those discussed in [Johnson \(1978\)](#), [Miller \(1984\)](#) and [Jovanovic and Nyarko \(1997\)](#)). Models of skill accumulation (usually associated with the pure stepping stone story) imply that agents should enroll first in the lower step of the ladder, as it provides a less riskier environment for learning and experimentation (through the lower cost of education and the shorter time to graduation). Bandit models suggest that students should enroll in the harder step - the last step - since the learning technology provides more information about innate ability (classes in 4-year colleges are harder than in academic 2-year

colleges).

3 Model

The economy is populated by agents that, upon high-school graduation, decide whether to join the labor force or pursue a degree at a post-secondary educational institution. At $t = 0$ agents graduate from high-school endowed with asset level a_0 . Agents differ in their ability to accumulate human capital, that can either be low or high. Let μ denote the ability level, with $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$, where $\mu = 0$ denotes low ability. The ability level μ is not observable by the agent. Instead, a high-school graduate inherits a signal about her true type, denoted by $\vartheta \in [0, 1]$. Let $j_\mu(\vartheta)$ denote the density of signal ϑ conditional on the true ability level of the agent being μ , with $j_0 \rightarrow [0, 1)$ and $j_1 \rightarrow (0, 1]$. With the information at hand, a high-school graduate generate a subjective belief about her own true ability level $p_0 \in [0, 1]$, where $p_0 = Pr(\mu = 1)$.

At any period in time an agent can either be working, studying at 4-year college (or C) or at academic 2-year colleges (or A). Let $i \in \{A, C\}$ denote the type of institution. The cost of education per period of schooling (includes tuition, room and board, fees, books, etc.) is denoted by τ^i , with $\tau^C > \tau^A$. A student graduates from institution i after accumulating T^i credits, with $T^C > T^A$. The evolution of credits is closely tied to signals that arrive during tenure as student by the agent that are labeled by η .

Work is assumed to be an absorbing state with constant wage function $h(GS, i, \mu)$, where the first argument accounts for the graduation status of the agent, the second for the institution where the agent graduated from (highest degree) and the third for her true ability level.¹⁶ Further, the

¹⁶In the current setup dropouts do not enjoy higher wage profiles. That is, increases in wages only occur after graduation. The model can be easily extended to include this feature by making the function $h(\cdot)$ to depend on amount of credits s but it will loose much of its tractability.

function $h(GS, i, \mu)$ is specified as follows:

$$h(GS, i, \mu) = \begin{cases} h^w & \text{if GS}=0; \\ h^i(\mu) & \text{if GS}=1. \end{cases}$$

with $h^i(1) \geq h^i(0) > h^w$ for all i and $h^C(\mu) \geq h^A(\mu) > h^w$ for all μ . That is, for any talent level, graduation at 4-year college implies higher wage profiles than graduation at academic 2-year colleges and, for any institution i , wage profiles of graduates are increasing in their ability level.

The evolution of the asset level a is given by

$$a_{t+1} = \begin{cases} (1+r)a_t - \tau^i - c_t & \text{if enrolled at } i; \\ (1+r)a_t + h(GS, i, \mu) - c_t & \text{if working.} \end{cases}$$

where no borrowing constraints are present. The assumption of no borrowing constraints is consistent with [Cameron and Heckman \(2001\)](#), [Cameron and Taber \(2004\)](#) and [Keane and Wolpin \(2001\)](#), who found no evidence in favor of constraints for the NLSY and with [Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner \(2008a\)](#) who found no evidence of credit constraints affecting dropout behavior of student for a panel designed for evaluating dropout behavior.¹⁷

During tenure as students agents receive signals in form of exams labeled as η . Let η denote the signal with PDF given by $f_i(\eta|\mu)$.

Assumption 1 *The ratio of densities $\frac{f_i(\eta|\mu=1)}{f_i(\eta|\mu=0)}$ satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property*

¹⁷Recent studies found evidence in favor of borrowing constraints (see [Belley and Lochner \(2008\)](#) and [Lochner and Monge-Naranjo \(2007\)](#)).

(MLRP). That is, for any $\eta_1 > \eta_0$,

$$\frac{f_i(\eta_1|\mu=1)}{f_i(\eta_1|\mu=0)} \geq \frac{f_i(\eta_0|\mu=1)}{f_i(\eta_0|\mu=0)}$$

The assumption states that high ability students are prone to receiving better signals than low ability students.

The evolution of credits is a function of current signal η and amount of credits already accumulated s ,

$$s' = s + \Omega(\eta, s)$$

with

$$\Omega(\eta, s) = \begin{cases} \Omega(\eta) & \text{if } s < T^i; \\ 0 & \text{if } s \geq T^i. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

with $\Omega'(\eta) \geq 0$ so that the evolution of credits is a non-decreasing function on the received signal.¹⁸ **equation (1)** states that, while the amount of current credits is less than the necessary amount for graduation, accumulation of credits is only a function of the received signal η .

Students are allowed to transfer and can carry with them part of the credits earned in the current institution. Let θ^i denote the operator that maps credits s in institution i to credits s in institution $-i$. Formally,

$$\theta^i(s) : s \times i \rightarrow [0, T^{-i}]$$

where it is assumed that $\theta^i(s)$ is non-decreasing in credits s . A high-school graduate, endowed with her prior p_0 and initial asset level a_0 chooses her consumption stream $\{C_t : t \geq 0\}$ and whether

¹⁸Obtaining a C or an A in a particular subject provides the same accumulation of credits but a different re-evaluation of own ability.

to enroll in, dropout or transfer in A or C , in order to maximize her time-separable expected discounted lifetime utility derived from consumption,

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ \sum_0^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^t \left(\frac{e^{-\gamma c_t} - 1}{-\gamma} \right) \middle| F_0 \right\}$$

where $F_0 = \{p_0, a_0\}$ and γ is the coefficient of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA).

Let $V_i(a, s, p)$ denote the value for a student currently enrolled in i with asset level a , amount of credits accumulated s and prior p . Also, let $W(a; h(GS, i, \mu))$ denote the value for a worker with asset level a and wage profile $h(GS, i, \mu)$. Finally, let $\Lambda(a_0, p_0)$ denote the value for a high-school graduate with asset level a_0 and prior p_0 .

The value for a high-school graduate $\Lambda(a_0, p_0)$ equals

$$\Lambda(a_0, p_0) = \max(W(a_0; h^w), V_A(a_0, 0, p_0), V_C(a_0, 0, p_0))$$

as the agent chooses whether to join the workforce or pursue higher education (either in academic 2-year colleges or 4-year colleges) by comparing the value of each alternative.

3.1 The problem of a worker

A worker with current asset level a and constant wage h faces the following problem:

$$W(a; h) = \max_{c, a'} \frac{e^{-\gamma c} - 1}{-\gamma} + \frac{1}{1+r} W(a'; h) \tag{2}$$

where a' is

$$a' = (1+r)a + h - c$$

That is, the worker has to decide her consumption in the current period and the asset level for next period. The timing of the model is such that decisions (c and a') are made before the worker receives the payment for her work, h .

The next proposition summarizes the solution to this simple problem.

Proposition 1 *The value for a worker with asset level a and wage profile h is*

$$W(a; h) = -\frac{1+r}{\gamma r} e^{-\gamma(ra+h)} + \frac{1+r}{\gamma r} \quad (3)$$

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

One of the goals of the paper is to evaluate the effect of insurance on the allocation. Noting that $\gamma = 0$ provides the same allocation as full insurance, the next corollary presents the solution to the worker's problem under risk neutrality.

Corollary 1 *The value for a risk neutral worker is linear in assets and wage profile. That is,*

$$\lim_{\gamma \rightarrow 0} W(a; h) = \frac{1+r}{r}(ra+h)$$

Proof. Follows directly by applying L'hospital rule to equation (3). ■

3.2 The problem of a student

The student's beliefs are updated by the stream of information that arrive through the signal η . Let $p' = b(\eta; p)$ denote the posterior that depends on the prior p and the signal η . For a given

institution i , Bayes' rule is

$$b(\eta; p) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{f_i(\eta|\mu=0) \frac{1-p}{p}}{f_i(\eta|\mu=1)}}$$

The evaluation of expectations about future income flows depends on the likelihood of the signals.

Any new signal can be produced by either $f_i(\eta|\mu = 1)$ or $f_i(\eta|\mu = 0)$ so that expectations about the governing pdf have to be accounted for. Define

$$H_i(\eta, p) = pF_i(\eta|\mu = 1) + (1 - p)F_i(\eta|\mu = 0)$$

as the CDF that accounts for this uncertainty.

Lemma 1 *For a given prior p , $H_i(\eta, p)$ is a well-defined CDF.*

Proof. Follows from $F_i(\eta|\mu)$ being a CDF and $p \in [0, 1]$. ■

The problem faced by a student in institution i can be written as:

$$V_i(a, s, p) = \max_{c, a'} \frac{e^{-\gamma c} - 1}{-\gamma} + \frac{1}{1+r} \int_{\eta} \tilde{V}_i(a', s', p') H_i(d\eta, p) \quad (4)$$

with

$$\begin{cases} a' = (1+r)a - \tau^i - c \\ s' = s + \Omega(\eta) \\ p' = b(\eta; p) \end{cases}$$

The value $\int_{\eta} \tilde{V}_i(a', s', p') H_i(d\eta, p)$ accounts for the continuation value, where a student evaluates the different available options. In any given period a student that accumulated s' credits faces alternatives. If $s' < T^i$ she can decide to stay in the current institution, transfer or drop. If $s' = T^i$

graduation is a fact and the options are reduced to graduation, drop or transfer. Let $\mathbb{I} = 1$ if $s' < T^i$ and $= 0$ otherwise. $\tilde{V}_i(a', s', p')$ is equal to

$$\max \{W(a'; h^w), \mathbb{I}V_i(a', s', p') + (1 - \mathbb{I})[p'W(a'; h_1^i) + (1 - p')W(a'; h_0^i)], V_{-i}(a', \theta^i(s'), p')\} \quad (5)$$

Lemma 2 *A student currently enrolled in institution i with accumulated credits T^i will never drop of the current institution.*

Proof. As $h_1^i > h_0^i > h^w$ and $W(a; h)$ increasing in wage h , it follows directly that $pW(a; h_1^i) + (1 - p)W(a; h_0^i) > W(a; h^w)$ as $p \in [0, 1]$. Then, the dropout option is strictly dominated by the graduation option. ■

The timing of the problem is as follows. Given an institutional choice i , a given period can be decomposed into two subperiods. In the first subperiod, a student chooses her consumption and level of assets for the next period given her expectations about future income streams. In the second subperiod, the student receives the signal η , producing bayesian updating of prior $p' = b(\eta, p)$, and the amount of credits accumulated for next period s' . When the new period begins the student chooses whether to dropout or remain a student and whether to transfer to another institution.

The next proposition summarizes the solution to the problem.

Proposition 2 *The value for a student enrolled in institution i with asset level a , accumulated credits s and prior p is*

$$V_i(a, s, p) = -\frac{1+r}{\gamma r} e^{-\gamma(ra+v_i(s,p))} + \frac{1+r}{\gamma r} \quad (6)$$

where $v_i(s, p)$ solves

$$v_i(s, p) = \frac{\tilde{v}_i(s, p) - r\tau^i}{1+r} \quad (7)$$

and $\tilde{v}_i(s, p)$ solves the recursive equation:

$$\tilde{v}_i(s, p) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left[\int_{\eta} -\max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} -e^{-\gamma h^w}, -e^{-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s'), p')}, \\ -\left(\mathbb{I} \left(p' e^{-\gamma h_1^i} + (1-p') e^{-\gamma h_0^i} \right) + (1-\mathbb{I}) e^{-\gamma v_i(s', p')} \right) \end{array} \right\} H_i(d\eta, p) \right] \quad (8)$$

with $p' = b(\eta, p)$ and $s' = s + \Omega(\eta)$.

Proof. See Appendix B. ■

The value $\tilde{v}_i(s, p)$ is the consumption equivalent of the continuation value.

Proposition 3 $V_i(a, s, p)$ increasing and convex in p and s .

Proof. See Appendix D. ■

Lemma 3 characterizes the solution when $\gamma \rightarrow 0$.

Lemma 3 The value of initial enrollment at institution i for a risk neutral agent is given by

$$V_i(a, s, p) = \frac{1+r}{r} (ra + v_i(s, p))$$

with

$$v_i(s, p) = \frac{\lim_{\gamma \rightarrow 0} \tilde{v}_i(s, p) - r\tau^i}{1+r}$$

where

$$\lim_{\gamma \rightarrow 0} \tilde{v}_i(s, p) = \int_{\eta} \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} h^w, v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p)), \\ \mathbb{I} (b(\eta, p) h_1^i + (1-b(\eta, p)) h_0^i) + (1-\mathbb{I}) v_i(s + \Omega(\eta), b(\eta, p)) \end{array} \right\} H_i(d\eta, p)$$

Proof. See Appendix C. ■

3.3 Characterization of Solution

The model is built to analyze a particular pattern of education. That is, students with high priors enroll in 4-year colleges, average priors enroll in academic 2-year colleges and low priors join the workforce directly. The next assumption addresses this point.

Assumption 2 *The primitives of the model are such that*

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{\tilde{v}_C(0,1)-r\tau^C}{1+r} \geq \frac{\tilde{v}_A(0,1)-r\tau^A}{1+r} \geq h^w \\ \frac{\tilde{v}_C(0,0)-r\tau^C}{1+r} \leq \frac{\tilde{v}_A(0,0)-r\tau^A}{1+r} \leq h^w \end{array} \right.$$

The assumption states that high-school graduates with low ability to accumulate human capital are better off joining the workforce and, in the eventuality of enrollment, they are better off in academic 2-year colleges than in 4-year colleges. The opposite idea applies for high ability agents. They are better off by pursuing higher education and the best enrollment choice for them are 4-year colleges.

Assumption 2 has an interesting interpretation. The existence of academic 2-year colleges in this model is driven by the learning mechanism and the option value of transferring.

Proposition 4 *For any amount of credits s , the optimal policy is independent of the asset level a .*

Further, the optimal policy is a collection of dropout and transfer thresholds,

$$\{p_d^i(s), p_t^i(s)\}_{s \in [0, T^i]}$$

Proof. The optimal policy is independent on the asset level a as every value function shares the common term where a appears, $e^{-\gamma r a}$. For any amount of credits s , a student compares the value of continuation with the alternatives (transfer and drop). As the value functions are linear in $e^{-\gamma r a}$, the optimal policy that arises from the comparison of value functions is independent of asset level a . Finally, since the amount of accumulated credits s affects both the amount of credits that can be transferred and also the likelihood and time to graduation, the optimal policy is a function of accumulated credits s . ■

Assumption 2 drives the optimal policy not only at time 0 but also as credits accumulate. Consider the case where T^i is large so that in terms of distance until graduation an agent with $s = 0$ and one with $s = 1$ are very similar. It follows that a similar condition holds for $s = 1$ but the difference in the value functions should decrease as students get closer to graduation.

Proposition 5 *The optimal policy for students enrolled in institution i is*

$$\text{Enrolled in } i \text{ today: } \begin{cases} \text{join workforce tomorrow} & \text{if } p < p_d^i(s) \\ \text{enrolled in } A \text{ tomorrow} & \text{if } p \in [p_d^i(s), p_t^i(s)] \\ \text{enrolled in } C \text{ tomorrow} & \text{if } p > p_t^i(s) \end{cases}$$

The next proposition evaluates the interaction of accumulated credits s and the evolution of the thresholds for the case where the support of credits s is \mathbb{R}^+ .

Proposition 6 *If (1) $F_i(\eta|\mu)$ is continuous and differentiable for all i and μ , (2) $\Omega(\eta)$ is continuous and differentiable, and (3) $\theta^i(s)$ is continuous, differentiable and concave with $\frac{\partial \theta^i(0)}{\partial s} < 1$, it is the case that*

$$\begin{cases} p_d^i(s_1) \leq p_d^i(s_0) \\ p_t^A(s_1) \geq p_t^A(s_0) \\ p_t^C(s_1) \leq p_t^C(s_0) \end{cases}$$

Proof. See Appendix E. ■

The proposition states that as credits accumulate, the likelihood of transferring or dropping out decreases as the terminal payoff at institution i is getting closer.

3.4 Returns to Enrollment

The lack of available assets to diversify the risk that comes from education (as income flows are unknown) imply that standard techniques to value the option to pursue post-secondary education can not be applied. To value the option and compute returns, define $\Sigma_i(p)$ as the value-added (or payoff) of enrollment in institution i relative to joining the workforce directly after high-school graduation for an agent with prior p .¹⁹ $\Sigma_i(p)$ is the compensating variation of enrollment in institution i over the outside option and can be understood also as the maximum amount of units of consumption a high-school graduate is willing to forego in order to remain enrolled in i and not be forced to drop out (note that the option includes tuition),

$$V_i(a - \Sigma_i(p), 0, p) = W(a; h^w)$$

¹⁹Miao and Wang (2007) uses a similar approach to value an investment project where the income flow is uncertain and the risk is uninsurable.

Solving the above equation yields an expression for the value-added by enrollment,

$$\Sigma_i(p) = \frac{v_i(0,p) - h^w}{r}$$

The intuition behind the formula for $\Sigma_i(p)$ has a clear interpretation. It is simply the difference between the risk-adjusted expected discounted flow of income due to enrollment and the discounted flow of income of the outside option.

The price of the option is given by the opportunity cost of becoming a student, $\frac{1+r}{r}h^w$. That is, the discounted income flow from joining the workforce directly after high-school graduation. The return to enrollment at institution i relative to joining the workforce $R_i(p)$ is defined as

$$R_i(p) \equiv \frac{\Sigma_i(p)}{\frac{1+r}{r}h^w} \tag{9}$$

3.5 Exams: Experimentation and Evolution of Credits

The signal η plays two different roles in the model. First, it updates beliefs p as the signal conveys information regarding the likelihood of the true talent level of the student. Under this definition, the signal η accounts for grades in exams, in subjects, problem sets, overall experience as a student, etc. The second role of the signal η is to generate accumulation of credits through the function $\Omega_i(\eta)$, which suggests that the signal is closely tied to grades in subjects.

To simplify the model, it is assumed here that the signal η is the mean of the grades in a quarter obtained by a student.²⁰ The set of possible values of η is simply the set of possible grades. For simplicity assume three possible grades: $\{F, N, E\}$. That is, a student can fail, get a neutral grade

²⁰It is possible to relax this assumption by choosing functional forms for the signal η that allows for a decomposition of the signal in two parts: one that accounts for grades in subjects and another that accounts for the rest.

or excel in a particular exam. Let $q_\mu^i(\eta)$ denote the probability of each event. Further, assume that $q_1^A(F) = q_0^C(E) = 0$. That is, high ability students never fail an exam at academic 2-year colleges and low ability students never excel at 4-year colleges.

4 Parametrization

The model explores the interaction of academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges. The evidence obtained from NLS-72 shows that vocational school (excluded from the model analysis) can be merged with the workforce as little interaction occurs between vocational school and other types of institutions (see [Table 2](#)) and the initial sorting analysis (see [Table 25](#) and [Table 8](#)) places vocational school below academic 2-year colleges. Version B in all of the tables accounts for the case where work and vocational school are merged. Further, (2) on the tables accounts for the cases where increases in wages only occur upon graduation (as in the model).

The operator that maps credits s in institution i to credits that remain after transferring $\theta^i(s)$ is simplified to be of the multiplicative form,

$$\theta^i(s) = \begin{cases} \theta^i s & \text{if } \theta^i s < T^{-i} \\ T^{-i} & \text{if } \theta^i s \geq T^{-i} \end{cases}$$

Parametrization of the model requires to chose values and functional forms for different objects: risk-free rate r (1 parameter), risk aversion parameter γ (1 parameter), length of education T^A and T^C (2 parameters), wage structure (5 parameters), cost of education τ^A and τ^C (2 parameters), transfer of credits θ^A and θ^C (2 parameters), evolution of credits $\Omega(\eta)$ and density function for η . Exams are simplified to have only three mutually exclusive grades: fail (F), neutral (N) and

excellent (E) with corresponding probabilities given by $q_\mu^i(\eta)$ (6 parameters as $q_1^A(F) = q_0^C(E)$). Further, the evolution of credits is chosen to be as follows: $\Omega(F) = 0$, $\Omega(N) = \Omega(E) = 1$. Overall, 19 parameters have to be chosen.

The time period is chosen to be a quarter, therefore $T^A = 8$ and $T^C = 16$ (a student needs to accumulate T^i quarters of accumulated credits at institution i to graduate). The risk-free interest rate r is set to be 0.45% which implies a yearly interest rate of 1.81% and a yearly discount factor of 0.9822. All the monetary values in the model are measured in logs and further standardized by the wage of agents with no degrees h^w , so that $h^w = 1$.²¹ Academic 2-year colleges are located in every city and town while 4-year colleges are scarce. This way, the cost of education includes housing for 4-year colleges and does not include housing for academic 2-year colleges because students there can live with their parents. The standardized cost of education is then $\tau^A = 0.1152$ for academic 2-year colleges and $\tau^C = 0.3205$ for 4-year colleges (see [Table 3](#)). The risk aversion parameter γ is hard to identify and the literature didn't spend much time estimating risk aversion parameters using CARA utility functions. There is a whole string of literature in asset pricing starting with [Mehra and Prescott \(1985\)](#) that argues that the CRRA risk aversion parameter σ lies between 4 and 10. Using the definition of relative risk aversion it is possible to relate σ and γ ,

$$\gamma c = \sigma$$

In the model presented here consumption level c has a lower bound given by $ra + h^w \geq 1$ so $\gamma < 10$. Here γ is chosen to be equal to 8.

[Figure 2](#) plots the fraction of the initial population of academic 2-year colleges that drop,

²¹The mean wage in 1985, in 1984 dollars, for agents with no degrees was 17740.63.

transfer or graduate for a given period. As seen in [Figure 2](#), transfer occurs, on average, after the completion of the first year of education.²² Then, θ^A is chosen to be $\frac{1}{2}$.




Figure 2: **Transitional dynamics for students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges.** Source: NLS-72.

The evidence for students that transfer from 4-year colleges to academic 2-year colleges is less revealing as the fraction of students that transfer is very low (see [Table 2](#)). [Figure 3](#) shows that students transfer during their first year of education. Among academic 2-year college graduates, those that started their educational career at 4-year colleges spend more time in school prior to

²²Students transfer before obtaining a degree or completing the course-work at academic 2-year colleges. Only 12.5% of students that transfer from academic 2-year colleges to 4-year colleges in the NLS-72 sample holds a degree and usually transfer around one year later than those not holding a degree.

graduation (4.5 years vs. 3.84 years). The evidence suggests that $\theta^C = 0$.




Figure 3: **Transitional dynamics for students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges. Source: NLS-72.**

The remaining parameters, $q_\mu^i(\eta)$ and $h^i(\mu)$ are estimated using a Simulated Method of Moments. Simulating the model requires to solve it numerically, produce transition probabilities and simulate priors. The prior p_0 can be produced in different ways. One way comprehends specifying a functional form for $j_\mu(\vartheta)$ and produce p_0 using Bayes' rule. This approach implies that the parameters of $j_\mu(\vartheta)$ also have to be estimated. An alternative is to drive the estimation more heavily in the data. Let

$$p_0 = (1 + e^{-X'\beta + \varepsilon})^{-1}, \varepsilon \sim N(0, 1) \quad (10)$$

where X is a vector that includes all the observable characteristics of high-school graduates that are correlated with the ability level of the agent and β is the vector of factor loadings, identified by an ordered probit for the initial choice of agents presented in [Table 25](#).²³ The parameter ι is a parameter that can not be identified directly from the data and acts as a re-scaling parameter. The scale of the prior p_0 , even though not important for the enrollment pattern (the only thing that matters here is the ordering) plays an important role for transfer and dropout behavior as the initial prior p_0 is an unbiased estimator of the actual probability of an agent being high ability. This parameter will be jointly calibrated with $q_\mu^i(\eta)$ and $h^i(\mu)$.

Students with high priors join 4-year colleges, with average priors join academic 2-year colleges and with low priors join the workforce. The thresholds are those of the optimal policy considered above for $s = 0$ as agents that graduate from high-school don't acquire any credits yet. Further, monotonicity of p_0 as a function of $X'\beta + \varepsilon$ implies that β can be estimated by an ordered probit on the initial choice ([Table 25](#) - Version B) and then upper and lower bounds for ε can be computed using $X'\hat{\beta}$ and the choice of the agent. Further, the cutoffs shown in [Table 25](#) (version B) are monotonic transformations of the threshold for p . The exponent on p_0 , the parameter ι , can not be identified from data.

Indirect inference, through Simulated Method of Moments, is used to estimate the remaining 11 parameters (the 6 learning parameters, the four wages and ι). The chosen moments are (see [Table 2](#)): (1) proportion of students that join workforce from high-school, (2) proportion of students that enroll in academic 2-year colleges, (3) proportion of students that enroll in 4-year colleges, (4) proportion of students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges that dropped-out, (5) proportion of students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges that transfer to 4-year colleges, (6)

²³The problem of the high-school graduate implies comparing her initial belief p_0 with the enrollment thresholds. Given the functional form chosen for p_0 , this problem can always be transformed to an ordered probit.

proportion of students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges that graduate at 2-year colleges (highest degree), (7) proportion of students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges that dropped-out, (8) proportion of students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges that transfer to academic 2-year colleges, (9) proportion of students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges that graduate at 4-year colleges, (10) mean wage for academic 2-year college graduates after first spell of education, and (11) mean wage for 4-year college graduates after first spell of education. The estimated parameters for the learning process are presented in [Table 10](#) and in [Table 9](#) for the wage distribution. ι was estimated to be equal to 2. [Table 11](#) compares the moments for data with those generated by the model conditional on the distribution of priors implied by the data.

To produce the different moments it is necessary to compute the probability of dropout, transfer and graduation at both academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges for each level of the initial prior p_0 . A simple way of computing these values is via the Kolmogorov Forward Equation. To fixate ideas see the next example. Let $Pr^A(D|p, s)$ denote the dropout probability at A with current prior p and accumulated credits s . Also, define $\omega_\eta^A = pq_\eta^A(1) + (1-p)q_\eta^A(0)$ as a set of weights. Finally, let p'_η denote the posterior for grade η and prior p . For $p \in [p_d^A(s), p_t^A(s)]$,

$$Pr^A(D|p, s) = \sum_{\eta} \omega_\eta^A [\mathbb{I}\{p'_\eta > p_t^A(s')\} * 0 + \mathbb{I}\{p'_\eta < p_d^A(s')\} * 1 + \mathbb{I}\{p_d^A(s') \leq p'_\eta \leq p_t^A(s')\} * Pr^A(D|p'_\eta, s')]$$

and with terminal condition (for $p \in [p_d^A(T^A), p_t^A(T^A)]$),

$$Pr^A(D|p, T^A) = 0$$

Using this recursive equation it is possible to back-out $Pr^A(D|p_0, 0)$. This can be easily extended to all the other probabilities.

Estimation of the model requires the next steps: (1) pick values for the learning parameters, the wages and ι , (2) for every value of $X'\beta$ (that is, for every individual on sample - using the results of the ordered probit regression in [Table 25](#) and the initial choice of each individual -) produce the distribution of possible initial priors p_0 , (3) solve numerically the model, (4) for every p_0 , use the Kolmogorov Forward Equations to produce the probabilities of each different event, (5) using step (2) compute the probabilities of each different event and wages upon graduation for every individual on sample, (6) produce a set of moments, and (7) repeat the procedure until the convergence criterion is reached (objective is to minimize the squared difference of the simulated and true moments from data).

[Table 9](#) shows that the wage differential to graduation at 4-year colleges relative to academic 2-year colleges if the ability level is high is high which suggest that agents with high expectations currently enrolled in academic 2-year colleges should be eager to transfer to 4-year colleges. The wedge in the wage upon graduation at 4-year colleges is large compared to the wedge at academic 2-year colleges. As students can transfer credits, many enroll in academic 2-year colleges as risk-averse agents care about the high volatility in wages.

		wage	st. dev.
academic 2-year colleges			
low ability	$\frac{h^A(0)-h^w}{h^w}$	0.03	0.024
high ability	$\frac{h^A(1)-h^w}{h^w}$	0.08	0.075
4-year colleges			
low ability	$\frac{h^C(0)-h^w}{h^w}$	0.04	0.031
high ability	$\frac{h^C(1)-h^w}{h^w}$	0.22	0.343

Table 9: **Wage differential by Simulated Method of Moments.**

Table 10 shows the estimated learning parameters. Trivially, by assumption, failing an exam at academic 2-year colleges signals low ability while an excelling at 4-year colleges signals high ability as the probability of failing an exam at academic 2-year colleges was set to be zero for high ability students and the probability of excelling in an exam at 4-year college was set to zero for low ability students. The likelihood of obtaining a neutral or an excellent at academic 2-year colleges is higher for high ability students and thus receiving these signals improves the expectations about the innate ability. Similar idea happens for a neutral grade at 4-year colleges while a fail lowers the expectations.

	academic 2-year colleges		4-year colleges	
	low ability $\mu = 0$	high ability $\mu = 1$	low ability $\mu = 0$	high ability $\mu = 1$
Fail	0.23 (0.012)	0	0.22 (0.025)	0.01 (0.009)
Neutral	0.695	0.87	0.78	0.81
Excel	0.075 (0.089)	0.13 (0.485)	0	0.18 (0.808)

Table 10: **Learning Parameters estimated by Simulated Method of Moments.** $q_1^A(F) = q_0^C(E) = 0$ by assumption.

Figure 4 presents the graphic analysis of the evolution of credits and beliefs as signals arrive. Receiving a fail in either academic 2- or 4-year college makes the posterior to fall sharply and the credits to remain constant. Obtaining a neutral or an excellent in both types of school increase by one the amount of credits and makes the posterior to be higher than the prior. A neutral grade at academic 2-year colleges has a higher effect on the belief than in 4-year colleges while an excellent provides much less information. These results show an important characteristic of post-secondary education: academic 2-year colleges are easy and thus provide more information in the left tail while 4-year colleges are hard and thus provide more information in the right tail. Further, note that the higher tuition at 4-year colleges relative to academic 2-year colleges is not only due to higher wages upon graduation. As seen in the figure, the variance of the signals is higher at 4-year

colleges meaning that it provides more information.




Figure 4: **Evolution of Priors and Credits as a result of the received grade.**

As initial priors are generated by using the empirical distribution of $X'\beta$ the estimation strategy is attempting to match not only the 11 aggregate moments but instead the marginal density of them. [Table 11](#) presents the value of the eleven moments used in the estimation for both the NLS-72 and the simulated version of the model. As seen in the table, the model closely matches the initial enrollment distribution, the educational history for agents that initially enroll in 4-year colleges and the wage distribution. For those initially attending academic 2-year colleges, the model over predicts transfer behavior in detriment of dropouts.²⁴

The evolution of thresholds as a function of accumulated credits are presented in [Figure 5](#) and

²⁴If an arbitrary distribution of priors is used the 11 moments can be matched perfectly.

% of High-school graduates that	Data	Model
join Workforce	59.4	57.3
enroll in A	15.2	17
enroll in C	25.4	25.7
% of those initially enrolled in A that		
drop at A (1 st spell)	63.2	30
transfer from A to C (1 st spell)	32.2	61.8
graduate at A (1 st spell)	4.6	8.2
% of those initially enrolled in C that		
drop at C (1 st spell)	40.9	40.5
transfer from C to A (1 st spell)	2	0.8
graduate at C (1 st spell)	57.1	58.8
Mean Wage Differential for Graduates after (1st spell)		
academic 2-year college	0.045	0.045
4-year college	0.212	0.215
Moments to Discipline Priors		
FOCs from ordered probit (for β)		YES
distribution of X		YES

Table 11: **Moments in Data (NLS-72) and Model.** The initial prior p_0 is produced by assuming that is a function of the empirical distribution of $X'\beta$.

Figure 6. In a broad way, as discussed in [Proposition 6](#), the inaction region in both academic 2- and 4-year colleges increases with credits. Opposed to [Proposition 6](#) the inaction does not increase monotonically provided that signals are discrete and, as a result, the amount of credits s can only take a finite amount of values and thus the proof does not go through: the discreteness of the accumulated credits s together with the transfer function $\theta^i(s)$ being increasing, imply that non-monotonicity can arise naturally in the framework.²⁵

²⁵To fully understand this results consider the case where $\theta^i(s) = 0$. Let $s_1 > s_0$ be two different amounts of credits. Further, let $p_t^A(s_0)$ denote the transfer threshold at s_0 at academic 2-year colleges. By definition, $v_A(s_0, p_t^A(s_0)) = v_C(0, p_t^A(s_0))$. As both functions are increasing and convex in p and $v_A(0, 1) < v_C(0, 1)$, the fact that $v_A(s_1, p_t^A(s_0)) > v_A(s_0, p_t^A(s_0)) = v_C(0, p_t^A(s_0))$ implies that $p_t^A(s_1) > p_t^A(s_0)$.




Figure 5: **Dropout and Transfer thresholds as a function of accumulated credits s at academic 2-year colleges.**

5 Fit of Model

The prior p_0 is positively correlated with the measure of ability $X'\beta$ obtained from the ordered probit regression (Table 25 and Table 8) so that the enrollment pattern generated by the model fits the empirical distribution obtained from NLS-72.

The model also has predictions regarding the dropout, transfer and graduation behavior of students. In particular, conditional on the initial enrollment choice, the model produces probabilities of different educational patterns as a function of the initial prior p_0 , as shown in Figure 7. The




Figure 6: **Dropout and Transfer thresholds as a function of accumulated credits s at 4-year colleges.**

initial prior p_0 affects the decision making of the student and the dynamic pattern in two different ways. First, it affects the likelihood of different educational histories as the distance to different threshold values changes with the prior. Second, the value of the prior is related to the likelihood of different signals as $p_0 = \Pr[\mu = 1]$. In fact, the estimation of the model attempted to match the empirical marginal density of dropouts, transfers and graduation at both academic 2- and 4-year colleges.

Figure 7 has three different regions (the straight vertical lines separate the different regions). The first region, given for low values of the prior p_0 , is for agents that join the workforce directly.

The second region, the middle one, is for agents that enroll in academic 2-year colleges (average values for the prior) and the third region, the top one, is for agents that enroll in 4-year colleges. Conditional on the initial enrollment choice, [Figure 7](#) presents the likelihood of each of the three possible events (i.e. drop, transfer or graduation) in the first spell of education for a student with a given initial prior p_0 . The likelihood of graduation and dropping out in academic 2-year colleges are decreasing functions of the initial prior p_0 while the likelihood of transferring to 4-year colleges is increasing. For students that initially enroll in 4-year colleges, the likelihood of graduation increases with the prior while the likelihood of dropping out decreases with the prior. Another interesting aspect observed in [Figure 7](#) is that students that transfer from 4-year colleges to 2-year colleges have above average priors (relative to students that enroll in 4-year colleges).²⁶

To evaluate the predictions of the model regarding the transition probabilities, [Table 12](#) shows students by behavior (i.e. dropout, transfer, graduation) in the first spell of education and size of the measure of talent $X'\hat{\beta}$. For students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges, the pattern observed for dropout and transfer probabilities is similar to the model's predictions. A similar thing happens for the dropout and graduation probabilities for students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges. Graduation probability in academic 2-year colleges and transfer probability in 4-year colleges are less revealing due to the low number of students included in these cells. Still, the evidence in these two cases does not conflict with the model's predictions.

An alternative, and more involved way of evaluating [Figure 7](#) would be, conditional on the initial enrollment choice of agents, to estimate the density of each of the different educational histories non-parametrically (see [Figure 8](#)). Inspection of [Figure 8](#) provides similar results to what was discussed in [Table 12](#). Weighting these densities accordingly, it is possible to produce the empirical

²⁶The shape of the figure is robust to different calibrations of the model. In particular, calibrations that match more closely dropout and transfers (in detriment of enrollment moments).




Figure 7: **Probability of Dropout (D), Transfer (T) and Graduation (G) for students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges.**

counterpart of Figure 7. First, the density associated with a given history is weighted by its share on initial enrollment in a given institution. For a given measure of talent $X'\hat{\beta}$, now it is possible to compute the proportion of agents that eventually end their first spell of education either by becoming dropouts, transferring or by graduation. Figure 9 presents the results. Notice how the patterns in Figure 7 (model) are very similar to those in Figure 9 (data).

	Ac. 2-year C.			4-year C.		
	D	T	G	D	T	G
Low $X'\hat{\beta}$	77.3%	17.6%	5.1%	51.7%	1.7%	46.6%
Med $X'\hat{\beta}$	66.1%	29.4%	4.5%	45.4%	2.4%	52.2%
High $X'\hat{\beta}$	44.9%	50%	5.1%	35.6%	2.4%	62%
# of obs.	332	192	26	392	47	474

Table 12: **Proportion of agents initially enrolled in i with particular history (conditional on initial enrollment status).**




Figure 8: **Fraction of students as a function of the measure of talent $X'\hat{\beta}$.** The estimation is performed conditional on the initial enrollment choice of agents.

6 Insurance and Option Value

High dropout and transfer rates are features commonly associated with risk and thus the availability of transfer and dropout options should be highly valued by agents as they provide lower bounds to the risk of the investment. In terms of risk, keeping the primitives unaltered the model is solved again letting γ tend to zero. This case maps to risk full insurance. Comparing the benchmark




Figure 9: **Empirical Probability of Dropout (D), Transfer (T) and Graduation (G) for students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges as a function of talent $X'\hat{\beta}$.** First, a conditional (on the initial enrollment choice) nonparametric estimation of each event was performed. Next, each density was weighted by their share in initial enrollment. Finally, for every level of $X'\hat{\beta}$, the proportion of each event was constructed.

model (i.e. $\gamma = 8$) with the risk-neutral case provides insights regarding the interaction of risk and insurance with the optimal policy and returns in this economy.²⁷ A similar strategy is followed to evaluate the size of the option value. Still keeping the primitives unaltered, the model is solved two more times. The first time, the transfer option is discarded and the second time eliminates both the transfer and dropout options. The value-added of each option is then evaluated using a decomposition of returns.

²⁷The analysis will abstract from Moral Hazard that can potentially arise from credit provision.

6.1 Insurance

For a high-school graduate with any given prior p_0 , [Figure 10](#) presents the returns for the benchmark model ($\gamma = 8$) and the model where $\gamma \rightarrow 0$. The comparison is important since risk aversion is tightly connected to market completeness. The more complete the markets, the lower the value for γ . [Figure 10](#) therefore compares the benchmark model with an economy where markets are complete. When risk aversion decreases, the enrollment thresholds shift to the left as the risk implied by education is discounted less heavily by agents. The fact that the shift to the left is stronger in the threshold between 4-year colleges and academic 2-year colleges than for the one between academic 2-year colleges and work is not casual: enrollment at 4-year colleges is more risky than enrollment at academic 2-year colleges (simple comparison of the ratio of wages). It follows that a decrease in risk aversion has a stronger effect on 4-year colleges than in academic 2-year colleges. [Figure 10](#) also shows that risk aversion hinders the returns to education in an important way, and the effect is stronger the more uncertain the prior is.

[Table 13](#) presents the mean return (and standard deviation) for the cross-section of agents that initially enroll at either academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges for both the benchmark model and the risk-neutral model using the estimated distribution of priors for the NLS-72 data. The provision of insurance increases returns unambiguously for every prior p_0 but decreases measured returns in academic 2-year colleges through the compositional change that follows the provision of full insurance.

Providing insurance not only increases returns for every prior but also affects enrollment decisions (this can be seen in [Figure 10](#) where the vertical dotted lines denote the enrollment thresholds). [Table 14](#) computes the distribution of initial enrollment for both cases. As expected, full insurance




Figure 10: **Return of Enrollment for a given initial prior p_0 .** The vertical lines define the indifference prior for enrollment between work and academic 2-year colleges and between academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges. Return: measures the return at high-school graduation of enrollment at institution i relative to joining the workforce.

	Ac. 2-year C.	4-year C.
$\gamma = 8$	1.07 (0.43)	4.05 (0.42)
$\gamma \rightarrow 0$	0.13 (0.09)	4.7 (1.71)

Table 13: **Returns for $\gamma = 8$ and $\gamma \rightarrow 0$ for the estimated distribution of priors p_0 .** All the numbers in the table are in percentage points. In parenthesis: standard deviation in the cross-section.

increases total enrollment by 10.6% and enrollment in 4-year colleges - where risk matters the most as the wedge in wages and cost of education are higher and time until graduation longer -by 17.82%.

Finally, the mass of students still enrolling in academic 2-year colleges with full insurance highlights the importance of the learning channel as a feature of academic 2-year colleges. Insurance affects the enrollment distribution both at the extensive and intensive level. At the extensive level, providing full insurance increases total enrollment. At the intensive level, the provision of full insurance affects the composition of enrollment as risk, tuition and wages upon graduation differ across types of institutions.

	workforce	Ac. 2-year C.	4-year C.
$\gamma = 8$	57.39	16.98	25.62
$\gamma \rightarrow 0$	52.54	5.17	42.29

Table 14: **Distribution of initial enrollment for $\gamma = 8$ and $\gamma \rightarrow 0$ for the estimated distribution of priors p_0 .** All the numbers in the table are in percentage points.

6.2 How much Option Value?

The model is solved again once more to evaluate the size of the option value, this time reducing the amount of options. First, the transfer option is discarded and therefore the only available alternative after the initial enrollment choice is to dropout. Second, the dropout option is discarded thus no action, other than consumption decisions, is possible during tenure as student. Let $R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)$, $R_i^{E+D}(p_0)$, and $R_i^E(p_0)$ denote the value of enrollment at institution i : with both options available to the agent; with only the dropout option available; and with no dropout or transfer options available.

Trivially,

$$R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0) = R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0) + R_i^{E+D}(p_0) - R_i^{E+D}(p_0) + R_i^E(p_0) - R_i^E(p_0)$$

Rearranging and dividing by $R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)$ provides the decomposition of returns,

$$1 = \frac{R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0) - R_i^{E+D}(p_0)}{R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)} + \frac{R_i^{E+D}(p_0) - R_i^E(p_0)}{R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)} + \frac{R_i^E(p_0)}{R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)}$$

The first term in the right hand side is the value-added to total returns $R_i^{E+D+T}(p_0)$ by the transfer option, the second term provides the value-added by the dropout option and the third term accounts for the value with no options available. [Figure 11](#) shows that returns at 4-year colleges are explained by the dropout option and by simply having the enrollment choice, in accordance with high graduation and dropout rates observed for 4-year college students at NLS-72. Also, [Figure 11](#) accounts for the importance of the transfer option in explaining returns to academic 2-year college enrollment. As observed in NLS-72 (see [Table 2](#)), the value-added by the enrollment option that accounts for the simple human capital accumulation story is a small part of the role of academic 2-year colleges and thus explains little of the returns.

[Table 15](#) produces the same decomposition this time for the mean return of the population distribution of priors p_0 . The transfer option is very valuable in academic 2-year colleges, accounting for 52% of total value. The dropout option is valuable in both types of institutions but more so in 4-year colleges (71% vs. 39%).

	ac. 2-year C.		4-year C.	
	value-added	cumulative	value-added	cumulative
Enrollment	8.56	8.56	28.57	28.57
Dropout Option	39.17	47.73	71.37	99.94
Transfer Option	52.27	100	0.06	100

Table 15: **Proportion of and cumulative returns explained by each option for the estimated distribution of priors p_0 .** All the numbers in the table are in percentage points.




Figure 11: **Decomposition of Returns.**

7 How close of a Substitute are Academic 2-year Colleges for 4-year Colleges?

The main purpose of enrollment in academic 2-year colleges is to learn in a less demanding and cheaper environment and eventually transfer to 4-year colleges with a fraction of the already accumulated credits. Still, agents have the choice to enroll at 4-year colleges. Given that a set of agents prefer to enroll in academic 2-year colleges, the question that arises is how much value academic 2-year colleges provide to these agents relative to initial enrollment at 4-year colleges. That is, how

close of a substitute are these institutions? To answer this, [Figure 7](#) evaluates how the elimination of academic 2-year colleges affects the return for an agent with prior p_0 . For students that enroll in 4-year colleges in the benchmark model, the availability of academic 2-year colleges provides no value since the transfer option has no value for them. For students that enroll in academic 2-year colleges in the benchmark model what happens when academic 2-year colleges are eliminated is: (1) most students simply enroll in 4-year colleges and the difference in value is very small, and (2) the rest join the workforce. Overall, academic 2-year colleges are very close substitutes for 4-year colleges.




Figure 12: Value added by the availability of Academic 2-year colleges.

In order to characterize the welfare effect of academic 2-year colleges, an analysis of population

aggregates is needed. Specifically, it is important to evaluate how participation in post-secondary education and welfare change due to the availability of academic 2-year colleges. Recall that $R_i(p)$ is a monotonous transformation of $v_i(0, p)$ that in turn is the certainty equivalent of enrollment at institution i abstracting from the wealth level a . As a result, $R_i(p)$ is a good measure of utility and therefore a comparison of returns provides a good approximation for welfare losses or gains. [Table 16](#) compares total participation and measured returns for the benchmark model where academic 2-year colleges are available and the only enrollment option are 4-year colleges. The availability of academic 2-year colleges increases participation by 2.8% and generates a drop in measured returns of 1.7% mostly due to the compositional change in total participation.

	total participation	return
4-year colleges + ac. 2-year colleges	43%	2.85%
Only 4-year colleges	41.8%	2.9%

Table 16: **Change in total participation and measured returns in the benchmark model without the availability of academic 2-year colleges.**

8 Accounting for Low Enrollment and Graduation rates at 4-year Colleges when Returns to Graduation are High

Several studies claimed that there is under investment in education. [Judd \(2000\)](#) combines CAPM techniques with the indivisibility of human capital to compare the return to 4-year college graduation with assets of similar risk to find an excess of return to the college investment option. [Heckman et al. \(2008a\)](#) evaluate the Internal Rate of Return of the 4-year college investment option relative to work, to find that since 1960 Internal Rates of Return have been around 10% or higher depending on the cohort and different specifications of labor markets and taxes. [Cunha et al. \(2005\)](#), using

data from NLSY/1979, extend the analysis to evaluate the Internal Rate of Return for the marginal student, the agent with the lowest observable measures of ability that enrolls in 4-year college, to find an unexplained wedge in returns.²⁸ Cunha et al. (2005) concluded that this wedge is explained by non-pecuniary costs of education, namely, tastes for school, risk aversion, and other.

The evidence presented in this paper points in a different direction: the wedge in returns is explained by the existence of academic 2-year colleges (in fact it is actually more general because vocational schools explain the wedge in returns for students that enroll in academic 2-year colleges) as high-school graduates sort across the different enrollment alternatives. In particular, high-school graduates that enroll in 4-year colleges have measures of observables that lie above of those that enroll in academic 2-year colleges. It follows that the high-school graduate with the lowest measures of observables that enrolls in 4-year colleges is indifferent with enrollment at academic 2-year colleges as opposed to be indifferent with joining the labor-force. Using the parameterized version of the model it is possible to quantify the return for this marginal student and how much of average returns for the population that enrolls in 4-year colleges is explained by the return of the marginal student. See Figure 10. The return for the student at the threshold between academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges is 2.56% which accounts for 63% of the measured average return to 4-year college enrollment. To obtain a monetary value for the return for the marginal student recall that $\Sigma_i(p)$ is the compensating variation of enrollment in institution i relative to joining the workforce and that is measured in units of h^w , the wage for agents with no degree. It follows that the monetary value in 1984 dollars is simply $\Sigma_i(p) \times 16454.41$. Then, the monetary value of enrollment for the marginal student is 96,600 dollars.

²⁸See also the Handbook of Economics of Education (Heckman et al. (2006)).

9 Supporting Evidence from NLS-92

NLS-92 follows the cohort that graduates from high-school in 1992 up to the year 2000. As previously discussed, there are several reasons to use NLS-72 over this newer data set. First, NLS-72 presents wage information gathered 13 years after high-school graduation while NLS-92 gathers the information only 8 years after high-school graduation. Second, the questionnaire in NLS-72 has a specific section that allows for an easy distinction of academic 2-year colleges and vocational schools, while this distinction can only be made in NLS-92 by looking at the credits and subjects taken by a student and deciding whether they are vocational or academic credits. Third, NLS-72 presents the dynamics of enrollment behavior by year allowing for an understanding of the dynamic pattern of education while in NLS-92 there is no straightforward way to do so. Finally, NLS-72 has detailed cost information (tuition, room and board, books, etc.) and NLS-92 does not.

In any case, the fact that NLS-72 is outdated raises concerns about the validity of the results discussed here. With this in mind, this section intends to replicate part of the evidence and implications of the model for NLS-92 and contrast it with NLS-72. [Table 17](#) shows that the distribution of initial enrollment changed from the 70's to the 90's as noted by the increase in the share of high-school graduates enrolling in 4-year colleges in detriment of the share joining the workforce. As noted in [Heckman and LaFontaine \(2008\)](#) this fact can be explained by the increase in the amount of high-school students obtaining a GED. [Table 18](#) presents the aggregate dynamics for students initially enrolled in 2- and 4-year colleges for both NLS-72 and NLS-92. The table shows that the patterns of education are similar for both data sets.

[Table 19](#) shows that the hypothesis of sorting discussed for NLS-72 also holds for NLS-92 (an ordered probit regression was performed using the same variables as regressors as those used in

%	W	V+A	C
NLS-72	51	24	25
NLS-92	27	23	50

Table 17: **Distribution of Initial Enrollment: NLS-72 vs. NLS-92.**

Table 25) but merging academic 2-year colleges and vocational school.

	%	D at (V+A)	D at C	T to (V+A)	T to C	G at (V+A)	G at C
NLS-72	V+A	73	45	-	21	6	55
	C	89	41	5	-	11	54
NLS-92	V+A	37	27	-	45	18	73
	C	78	26	1	-	22	73

Table 18: **Aggregate Dynamics: NLS-72 vs. NLS-92.**

The evidence shows that the idea of an educational ladder also holds for the data set constructed from NLS-92.

	W	V+A	C
NLS-72	-1.71	-1.38	-0.94
	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.61)
NLS-92	-2.67	-1.87	-1.23
	(0.683)	(0.767)	(0.77)

Table 19: **Sorting: NLS-72 vs. NLS-92.**

To test whether the predictions of the model also hold for the newer data set, Table 20 replicates the analysis performed in Table 12 that can be contrasted with Figure 7. Comparison of Table 20 and Table 12 show that the model's predictions also hold for newer cohorts as those included in NLS-92.

10 Conclusion

The ex-post return to graduating from an academic 2-year college is low, but there is a large return to transferring to a 4-year college: academic 2-year colleges act as a *stepping stone* in which

	Ac. 2-year C.			4-year C.		
	D	T	G	D	T	G
Low $X'\hat{\beta}$	55%	30%	15%	29%	13%	58%
Med $X'\hat{\beta}$	36%	42%	22%	20%	7%	73%
High $X'\hat{\beta}$	21%	66%	13%	6%	3%	91%
# of obs.	200	248	91	248	106	990

Table 20: **Proportion of agents initially enrolled in i with particular history (conditional on initial enrollment status and measure of talent $X'\hat{\beta}$) - NLS-92.**

agents learn about themselves in a cheaper and less demanding environment than 4-year colleges. A model of post-secondary educational choice that incorporates academic 2-year colleges together with 4-year colleges and work is explored where high-school graduates are uncertain about their ability to accumulate human capital. Depending on the value of their beliefs, agents sort across enrollment alternatives. During tenure at school, students receive signals that lead to a re-evaluation of beliefs that, by interacting with the current amount of accumulated credits, produce dropouts and transfers. The properties of academic 2-year colleges, a type of 2-year college, make these institutions an ideal practice ground for students with aspirations of graduation at 4-year colleges but with low expectations about their ability.

The parameterized version of the model is used to evaluate first, how full insurance affects the allocation and measured returns and second, the value-added of the transfer and dropout options to total value. The results show that risk plays an important role in explaining why agents enroll in academic 2-year colleges and that the availability of dropout and transfer options explain much of the returns to academic 2-year college enrollment. A similar idea applies for 4-year colleges. First, full insurance increases total enrollment at 4-year colleges mostly by a shift in the composition. Second, the decomposition of returns show that the dropout option is an important source of value. All of these results point towards a single conclusion: the interaction of risk and option value is

a major force in post-secondary education. Out-of-sample predictions of the model hold for both NLS-72 and NLS-92 and constitute a novel feature of the paper.

The paper then evaluates how close of a substitute are academic 2-year colleges for 4-year colleges to find a high degree of substitutability. In accordance with this high degree of substitutability, the welfare effect of the availability of academic 2-year colleges is very low and is primarily driven by a slight increase in participation.

The paper also presents new evidence on why returns to 4-year college graduation are large relative to the low enrollment and graduation rates: the wedge in returns for the marginal student in 4-year college is explained by 2-year colleges.

Understanding the interaction of academic 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges is an important step towards providing policy recommendations that target both participation and graduation rates: selection, dropouts and transfers are all linked and should not be evaluated separately.

What policy recommendations follow from this analysis? The first and more straightforward recommendation is that providing better screening technologies during high-school or at high-school graduation (e.g: SATs, ACTs) can move the allocation closer to the first best where high ability agents enroll in 4-year colleges and low ability agents join the laborforce. A more subtle point is whether it is possible to implement or come close to implement full insurance. Recall that the agents' ability level is positively correlated to the probability of graduating from a 4-year college and negatively correlated with the probability of dropping out from any type of educational institution. The second policy recommendation then is to provide credit lines that have to be repaid only upon graduation from 4-year colleges.

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Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1

Solving for c from the budget constraint and substituting back into [equation \(2\)](#) reduces the problem to a single variable problem. Further, it is straightforward to check that the conditions for unique solution to [equation \(2\)](#) are satisfied (see [Lucas and Stokey \(1989\)](#)).

The first order condition with respect to a' reads

$$e^{-\gamma((1+r)a-a'+h)} = \frac{1}{1+r} \frac{dW(a'; h)}{da'}$$

Substituting back into [equation \(2\)](#) provides the maximized value function,

$$W(a; h) = \frac{1}{-\gamma(1+r)} \frac{dW(a'; h)}{da'} + \frac{1}{1+r} W(a'; h) + \frac{1}{\gamma}$$

This equation is satisfied for $W(a; h) = -\frac{1+r}{\gamma r} e^{-\gamma(ra+h)} + \frac{1+r}{\gamma r}$

B Proof of Proposition 2

Solving for c from the budget constraint and substituting back into [equation \(4\)](#) reduces the problem to a single variable problem.

The lowest level for a' that can be chosen is 0 and the highest is $(1+r)a - \tau^i$. Define $\Gamma(a) = [0, (1+r)a - \tau^i]$ so that the choice variable a' belongs to the graph $\Gamma(a)$.

The next proposition shows that there exists a unique solution to [equation \(4\)](#).

Proposition 7 $V_i(a, s, p)$ is single-valued.

Proof. First note that the only choice variable is a , that p evolves stochastically and s' is a function of p and signals.

Signals η that arrive produce updating in the state p , which is thus stochastic.²⁹ Let P be such that $p \in P$. Trivially, $P = [0, 1]$ and thus P is compact. Also $s \in [0, T^i]$ so the set for s is compact. The union of compact sets is compact. Further, the transition from p to p' satisfies the feller property.

Next, note that $\Gamma(a)$ is non-empty, compact and continuous. Also, as $c > 0$, $\frac{e^{-\gamma c} - 1}{-\gamma}$ is bounded.

Then, Theorem 9.6 of [Lucas and Stokey \(1989\)](#) is satisfied and thus the proposition holds. ■

After substituting the first order condition into [equation \(4\)](#) provides the maximized value function,

$$V_i(a, s, p) = \frac{1}{-\gamma(1+r)} \frac{d \int_{\eta} \tilde{V}_i(a', s', p') H(d\eta, p)}{da'} + \frac{1}{1+r} \int_{\eta} \tilde{V}_i(a', s', p') H(d\eta, p) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \quad (11)$$

²⁹In principle the function $p' = b(\eta, p)$ can be inverted to produce a stochastic process for the evolution of p .

Conject that $\int_{\eta} \tilde{V}_i(a', s', p') H(d\eta, p) = -\frac{1+r}{\gamma r} e^{-\gamma(ra' + \tilde{v}_i(s, p))} + \frac{1+r}{\gamma r}$ and substitute into [equation \(11\)](#) together with $a' = a - \frac{\tau^i}{1+r} - \frac{\tilde{v}_i(s, p)}{1+r}$ to obtain

$$V_i(a, s, p) = -\frac{1+r}{\gamma r} e^{-\gamma(ra + v_i(s, p))} + \frac{1+r}{\gamma r}$$

where $v_i(s, p)$ solves the recursive equation

$$v_i(s, p) = \frac{\tilde{v}_i(s, p) - r\tau^i}{1+r}$$

Further, applying the conjecture and using [equation \(5\)](#) reads,

$$\tilde{v}_i(s, p) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left[\int_{\eta} -\max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} -e^{-\gamma h^w}, -e^{-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s'), p')}, \\ -\left(\mathbb{I} \left(p' e^{-\gamma h_1^i} + (1-p') e^{-\gamma h_0^i} \right) + (1-\mathbb{I}) e^{-\gamma v_i(s', p')} \right) \end{array} \right\} H_i(d\eta, p) \right]$$

with $s' = s + \Omega(\eta)$ and $p' = b(\eta, p)$.

Finally, note that the conjecture for \tilde{v}_i holds as a result of the functional form of $V_i(a, s, p)$.

C Proof of [Lemma 3](#)

See [equation \(8\)](#). For any given prior p , each of the exponentials inside the $\max\{\}$ as function of η are bounded as the set of attainable $b(\eta, p)$ being compact ($b(\eta, p) \in [0, 1]$) and the set of attainable payoff being $\left[e^{-\gamma h^w}, e^{-\gamma h_1^C} \right]$, also compact. It follows that each of the functions inside the $\max\{\}$ can be arbitrarily well approximated by a Taylor expansion (each of these functions is also differentiable). As an example, see that

$$e^{-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p))} \approx 1 - \gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p)) + O(-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p)))$$

where the term $O(-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p)))$ is a sequence of terms of order higher than one. Moreover, each of the functions $O(-\gamma v_{-i}(\theta^i(s + \Omega(\eta)), b(\eta, p)))$ is a convergent series and thus bounded.

The previous argument can be used to approximate the elements of $\max\{\}$. For example,

$$b(\eta, p) e^{-\gamma h_1^i} + (1 - b(\eta, p)) e^{-\gamma h_0^i} \approx 1 - \gamma(b(\eta, p) h_1^i + (1 - b(\eta, p)) h_0^i) + O(\gamma, h_1^i, h_0^i, b(\eta, p))$$

where $O(\gamma, h_1^i, h_0^i, b(\eta, p)) = b(\eta, p) O(-\gamma h_1^i) + (1 - b(\eta, p)) O(-\gamma h_0^i)$ is bounded and convergent by composition of bounded and convergent series.

Rewrite the original expression as

$$\tilde{v}_i(s, p) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left[\int_{\eta} \left(1 - \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \gamma \left(h^w - \frac{O(\gamma, h^w)}{\gamma} \right), \gamma \left(v_{-i} - \frac{O(-\gamma v_{-i})}{\gamma} \right), \\ \mathbb{I} \gamma \left(v_i - \frac{O(-\gamma v_i)}{\gamma} \right) + \\ (1 - \mathbb{I}) \gamma \left(p' h_1^i + (1 - p') h_0^i - \frac{O(\gamma, h_1^i, h_0^i, p')}{\gamma} \right) \end{array} \right\} \right) H_i(d\eta, p) \right]$$

where $p' = b(\eta, p)$ and the state of v_i and v_{-i} is omitted to ease notation.

The lemma follows by taking the limit when γ approaches 0. L'Hopital is required as $\lim_{\gamma \downarrow 0} \tilde{v}_i(s, p) = \frac{0}{0}$. The issue is whether the function $\max\{\}$ is differentiable with respect to γ and, in the affirmative case, to characterize the derivative.

Recall that both v_i and v_{-i} depend of credits s and prior p . Define

$$\begin{aligned} J_1(\gamma, p', s') &= \gamma \left(h^w - \frac{O(\gamma, h^w)}{\gamma} \right) \\ J_2(\gamma, p', s') &= \gamma \left(v_{-i} - \frac{O(-\gamma v_{-i})}{\gamma} \right) \\ J_3(\gamma, p', s') &= \mathbb{I}\gamma \left(v_i - \frac{O(-\gamma v_i)}{\gamma} \right) + (1 - \mathbb{I})\gamma \left(p'h_1^i + (1 - p')h_0^i - \frac{O(\gamma, h_1^i, h_0^i, p')}{\gamma} \right) \end{aligned}$$

so that the previous expression for $\tilde{v}_i(s, p)$ can be written as

$$\tilde{v}_i(s, p) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \ln \left[1 - \int_{\eta} \max \left\{ \begin{array}{l} J_1(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)), \\ J_2(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)), \\ J_3(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)) \end{array} \right\} H_i(d\eta, p) \right]$$

Lemma 4

$$\int_{\eta} \max \{ J_1(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)), J_2(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)), J_3(\gamma, b(p, \eta), s + \Omega(\eta)) \} H_i(d\eta, p) \quad (12)$$

differentiable with respect to γ .

Proof. J_1 , J_2 and J_3 are continuous functions and under the assumptions discussed in the paper, there is a unique threshold value for the signal η (that depends on s , p , γ , and other parameters) that equates J_1 with J_2 and J_2 with J_3 . Let $\eta^L(\gamma, p, s)$ and $\eta^H(\gamma, p, s)$ denote these thresholds. Note that, as J_1 , J_2 and J_3 are differentiable with respect to γ , these thresholds are also differentiable by construction. It follows that [equation \(12\)](#) can be rewritten as

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\eta^L(\gamma, p, s)} J_1(\gamma, p', s') H_i(d\eta, p) + \int_{\eta^L(\gamma, p, s)}^{\eta^H(\gamma, p, s)} J_2(\gamma, p', s') H_i(d\eta, p) + \int_{\eta^H(\gamma, p, s)}^{\infty} J_3(\gamma, p', s') H_i(d\eta, p) \quad (13)$$

where $p' = b(p, \eta)$ and $s' = s + \Omega(\eta)$. that is differentiable with respect to γ . ■

Let $Q(\gamma, p, s)$ denote the object in [equation \(12\)](#).

Proposition 8

$$\frac{dQ(\gamma, p, s)}{d\gamma} = \int_{\eta} \max \left\{ \frac{\partial J_1(\gamma, p', s')}{\partial \gamma}, \frac{\partial J_2(\gamma, p', s')}{\partial \gamma}, \frac{\partial J_3(\gamma, p', s')}{\partial \gamma} \right\} H_i(d\eta, p)$$

Proof. Follows by applying Leibniz's rule to [equation \(13\)](#) and by noting that

$$\begin{aligned} J_1(\gamma, b(p, \eta^L), s + \Omega(\eta^L)) \frac{\partial \eta^L}{\partial \gamma} &= J_2(\gamma, b(p, \eta^L), s + \Omega(\eta^L)) \frac{\partial \eta^L}{\partial \gamma} \\ J_2(\gamma, b(p, \eta^H), s + \Omega(\eta^H)) \frac{\partial \eta^H}{\partial \gamma} &= J_3(\gamma, b(p, \eta^H), s + \Omega(\eta^H)) \frac{\partial \eta^H}{\partial \gamma} \end{aligned}$$

by construction of the thresholds η^L and η^H . ■

Now, **Lemma 3** follows by applying L'Hopital's rule for the case where $\gamma \downarrow 0$ and by the results of **Proposition 8**.

D Proof of Proposition 3

The proof for p follows by induction. The ultimate goal in post-secondary education is graduation at 4-year colleges so start with a student that accumulated $s = T^C - 1$ credits. $\frac{V_C(a, T^C - 1, p)}{dp} > 0$ as (1) the wage upon graduation is increasing in the agent's true ability level, (2) the prior p measures the probability of high ability, (3) the pdf of grades satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio property and (4) $\Omega(\eta)$ non-decreasing. For a student enrolled in academic 2-year colleges with $s = T^A - 1$ the same proof applies but it is necessary to add that the continuation value (through the transfer option) is increasing in the prior p . For $s = T^C - 2$ and any institution i the proof follows as properties (2)-(4) still hold and the continuation values are increasing in p . Convexity follows directly as, (a) for any p the continuation value is bounded below by the dropout option, (b) the continuation value of transferring or remaining at institution i increasing in p , (c) the function $\max()$ being convex.

The proof for s is very similar and simpler so it is left as an exercise to the interested reader.

E Proof of Proposition 6

Let $p_d^i(s_0) > 0$ be the dropout threshold associated with s_0 so that

$$V_i(a, s_0, p_d^i(s_0)) = W(a; h^w)$$

As $V_i(a, s, p)$ increasing in credits s ,

$$V_i(a, s_1, p_d^i(s_0)) > W(a; h^w)$$

Finally, as $W(a; h^w)$ independent of p and $V_i(a, s, p)$ increasing in p , $p_d^i(s_1) < p_d^i(s_0)$. Note that if $p_d^i(s_0) = 0$, then the same argument implies that $p_d^i(s_1) = p_d^i(s_0) = 0$.

Next the proof for $p_t^A(s_1) > p_t^A(s_0)$ is provided (the proof for $p_t^C(s_1) < p_t^C(s_0)$ is almost identical). Let $p_t^A(s_0) < 1$ be the dropout threshold associated with s_0 so that

$$V_A(a, s_0, p_t^A(s_0)) = V_C(a, \theta^i(s_0), p_t^A(s_0))$$

Consider the case where the value V_i for $s = s_0$ do not include the transfer option. The next lemma shows that, in this case, $V_A(a, s_1, p_t^A(s_0)) > V_C(a, \theta^A(s_1), p_t^A(s_0))$.

Lemma 5 $V_A(a, s_1, p_t^A(s_0)) - V_C(a, \theta^A(s_1), p_t^A(s_0)) > 0$.

Proof. Let $s_1 = s_0 + \epsilon$ where $\epsilon \in (0, T^A - s_0]$. Let (to ease on notation) $\Upsilon_j^q = \{a, s_j, p_t^A(s_q)\}$ and $\Psi_j^q = \{a, \theta^A(s_j), p_t^A(s_q)\}$. Applying a Taylor Expansion of second order to both $V_A(a, s_1, p_t^A(s_0))$ and $V_C(a, \theta^A(s_1), p_t^A(s_0))$ around s_0 provides (the assumptions on the proposition guarantees that

the value function is continuous and differentiable with respect to s),

$$V_A(\Upsilon_1^0) \approx V_A(\Upsilon_0^0) + \frac{\partial V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s} \epsilon + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s^2} \epsilon^2$$

and

$$V_C(\Psi_1^0) \approx V_C(\Psi_0^0) + \frac{\partial V_C(\Psi_0^0)}{\partial s} \frac{\partial \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s} \epsilon + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 V_C(\Psi_0^0)}{\partial s^2} \left[\frac{\partial \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s} \right]^2 \epsilon^2 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial V_C(\Psi_0^0)}{\partial s} \frac{\partial^2 \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s^2} \epsilon^2$$

Note that, by definition of $p_t^A(s_0)$, $V_A(\Upsilon_0^0) = V_C(\Psi_0^0)$. Moreover, by the optimality of the policy, $\frac{\partial V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s} = \frac{\partial V_C(\Psi_0^0)}{\partial s}$ and $\frac{\partial^2 V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s^2} = \frac{\partial^2 V_C(\Psi_0^0)}{\partial s^2}$ as when s is moved away from s_0 it is the case that both V_A and V_C coincide. Then, $V_A(a, s_1, p_t^A(s_0)) - V_C(a, \theta^A(s_1), p_t^A(s_0))$ reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} V_A(\Upsilon_1^0) - V_C(\Psi_1^0) &= \frac{\partial V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s} \left[1 - \frac{\partial \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s} \right] \epsilon + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s^2} \left[1 - \left(\frac{\partial \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s} \right)^2 \right] \epsilon^2 \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial V_A(\Upsilon_0^0)}{\partial s} \frac{\partial^2 \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s^2} \epsilon^2 \end{aligned}$$

Finally, as $V_A(a, s, p)$ increasing and convex in s , $\theta^A(s)$ increasing and concave and $\frac{\partial \theta^A(s_0)}{\partial s} < \frac{\partial \theta^A(0)}{\partial s} < 1$,

$$V_A(\Upsilon_1^0) - V_C(\Psi_1^0) > 0$$

which completes the proof. ■

Lemma 6 *For any $p > \min \{p_d^A(s), p_d^C(s)\}$, the difference $V_A(a, s, p) - V_C(a, \theta^A(s), p)$ satisfy the single-crossing property.*

Proof. Follows from strict convexity of $V_A(a, s, p)$ and $V_C(a, s, p)$ as a function of p together with $V_C(a, s, 1) > V_A(a, s, 1)$ and $V_C(a, s, 0) < V_A(a, s, 0)$. ■

Assume now that $p_t^A(s_1) \leq p_t^A(s_0)$ (the proof follows by contradiction). Then, by the single crossing property (see **Lemma 6**) $V_A(a, s_1, p_t^A(s_0)) - V_C(a, \theta^A(s_1), p_t^A(s_0)) < 0$ which violates **Lemma 5**. Then, it follows that $p_t^A(s_1) > p_t^A(s_0)$.

Note that the only case where $p_t^A(s_1) = p_t^A(s_0)$ is when both thresholds are inactive (that is, equal to 1). The proof in this case is trivial.

F Computing Internal Rates of Return

Let w_0 denote the wage for an agent that joins the workforce at $t = 0$. Let L denote the lifetime of an agent, S_i the proportion of time spent at institution i , τ_i the flow cost of attendance, ϖ_i^D the increase in wages due to dropping out at institution i , ϖ_i^G the graduation premium, α_i the increase in wages due to experience, G_i a dummy that accounts for graduation at institution i and D_i a dummy that accounts for dropping out at institution i . Further, assume that students transfer only once.³⁰

³⁰Very few students transfer more than once in NLS-72. Also, the assumption makes the presentation of the methodology much easier.

The initial wage for a student with history $H = \{S, G, D\}_{i \in \{V, A, C\}}$ when joining the workforce is

$$w_0(H) = w_0 e^{\sum_i \varpi_i^D D_i + \varpi_i^G G_i}$$

The present value of costs $K(H, r)$ attached to history H is

$$K(H, r) = \int_0^{S_i} e^{-rs_i} \tau_i ds_i + \int_{S_i}^{S_i + S_{-i}} e^{-rs_{-i}} \tau_{-i} ds_{-i}$$

that can be reduced to

$$K(H, r) = (1 - e^{-rS_i}) \frac{\tau_i}{r} + e^{-rS_i} (1 - e^{-rS_{-i}}) \frac{\tau_{-i}}{r}$$

The internal Rate of Return is the interest rate $r(H)$ that solves,

$$\int_{S_i + S_{-i}}^L e^{-(r(H) - \alpha_i)t} w_0(H) dt - K(H, r(H)) = \int_0^L e^{-(r(H) - \alpha_0)t} w_0 dt - K(0, r(H))$$

The variables S_i , D_i and G_i can be obtained directly from inspection of the dynamic patterns of education. L is chosen so that agents are alive until they are 65 years old. Then, $L = 47$.

Table 4 shows the results of an extended Mincer regression using the log of wages in 1985 as dependent variable and years of education at a particular institution and graduation dummies as explanatory variables. The coefficients ϖ_i^D and ϖ_i^G can be obtained from that table (see Version A).

Table 5 present the results of a growth regression on the graduation status and type of every individual. The results of this table are interpreted here as estimates of α_i (see Version A).

G Construction of Data set from NLS-72

The *National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972*, or NLS-72, is a panel that follows the educational histories of high seniors in 1972. Participants in the study were selected when they were seniors in high school in the spring of 1972, and in a supplementary sample drawn in 1973. The records include the "Base Year" survey; follow-up surveys in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1979, and 1986.

The analysis in this paper is specialized to high-school graduates as high-school dropouts are not allowed to enroll in 4-year colleges so these agents were dropped from the sample. Also, this paper contains no theory as to why agents have discontinuous spells of education. Why do these people work first? Or why some of them drop, work for a while, and then enroll again? Tastes, learning and credit constraints can be touted as possible explanations. Further, there is no clear pattern in terms of observables that explain discontinuities. As so, agents with discontinuous spells of education were excluded. Also, data limitations do not allow for an analysis of how graduate school fits into the model logic and so agents that pursued graduate education were also excluded.

The paper relies on observable measures of ability to link priors to data. The variables used here are: race, gender, socioeconomic status of family, maximum educational Level of father, rank in high-school class and location of high-school. Agents with missing values for any of these variables were discarded.

The cost of education present many missing values. Instead of excluding these observations a cost regression was performed to predict these values. The regression runs cost of education on observable measures of ability and geographic location of students and then the estimates are used to compute the expected cost of education for agents presenting missing values.

The construction of the data set from *National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988*, or NELS:88, follows similar rules.

H Other Tables and Plots

dropouts		17% (409)
graduates		31% (74)
	transferred to 4-year college	41% (37)
	joined workforce	20% (37)
transfers to 4-year college		36% (371)
	not holding an academic 2-year college degree	36% (334)
	holding an academic 2-year college degree	41% (37)

Table 21: **Wage differential in 1985 for students that initially enroll in academic 2-year colleges and a particular educational history relative to agents that join the workforce directly after high-school graduation - entire universe from the NLS-72.** In parenthesis: amount of agents in each bin.

Initially enrolled in V	time at V	time at A	time at C
graduate at V	3.26	-	-
dropout at V	1.45	-	-
transfer to A	1.22	-	-
transfer to C	1.11	-	-
graduate at A	-	3.5	-
dropout at A	-	1.28	-
graduate at C	-	-	4.75
dropout at C	-	-	2.8

Table 22: Mean times for different educational histories for students initially enrolled in vocational school.

Initially enrolled in A	time at V	time at A	time at C
graduate at A	-	3.84	-
dropout at A	-	1.72	-
transfer to V	-	1.43	-
transfer to C	-	2.21	-
graduate at V	1.66	-	-
dropout at V	1.05	-	-
graduate at C	-	-	3.36
dropout at C	-	-	2.42

Table 23: Mean times for different educational histories for students initially enrolled in academic 2-year colleges.

Initially enrolled in C	time at V	time at A	time at C
graduate at C	-	-	5.23
dropout at C	-	-	3.02
transfer to V	-	-	1.61
transfer to A	-	-	1.53
graduate at V	1.66	-	-
dropout at V	1.44	-	-
graduate at A	-	3.5	-
dropout at A	-	2.05	-

Table 24: Mean times for different educational histories for students initially enrolled in 4-year colleges.

Variable		Version A	Version B
Male		0.181 (0.041)	0.234 (0.044)
Black		0.357 (0.068)	0.365 (0.073)
Socio. Status:	Low	-0.896 (0.088)	-0.9 (0.093)
	Medium	-0.596 (0.071)	-0.609 (0.074)
Education of Father:	<HS	-0.363 (0.072)	-0.381 (0.076)
	HS graduate	-0.137 (0.065)	-0.115 (0.068)
	4-year graduate	0.324 (0.083)	0.352 (0.086)
Rank		-1.301 (0.072)	-1.41 (0.078)
Cut 1		-1.129 (0.077)	-0.893 (0.079)
Cut 2		-0.859 (0.077)	-0.368 (0.078)
Cut 3		-0.339 (0.075)	- -
# of observations		3462	3462

Table 25: **Evidence on Sorting: Ordered Probit Regression (NLS-72)**. Ordered probit estimation of the initial enrollment choice on observable measures of ability. Version B merges vocational school with work.