

# The Cyclical Behavior of Labor Markets

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# Outline

- Develop six facts to guide theoretical models.
- Discuss the quantitative failures of existing models.
- Highlight recent research that promises to overcome these failures.

# Relevant Papers

- “The Consequences of Rigid Wages in Search Models,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2004.
- “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies,” *American Economic Review*, 2005.
- “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment,” 2005.
- Work by Robert Hall and many others.

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
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- Data are available at <http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/data/>


# The Job Finding Rate

- Goal: Measure the job finding rate using readily available data.
- $U_t$  is the number of unemployed workers in month  $t$ .
- $E_t$  is the number of employed workers in month  $t$ .
- $U_t^s$  is the number unemployed for less than one month in month  $t$ .

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- I use these to construct two variables:
  - ◊ The unemployment rate in month  $t$  is  $\frac{U_t}{U_t + E_t}$ .
  - ◊ The job finding rate is  $f_t$  solving  $\exp(-f_t) = \frac{U_{t+1} - U_{t+1}^s}{U_t}$ .







# Fact 1

The correlation between the cyclical components of the job finding and unemployment rates is  $-0.97$ .

# The Separation Rate

- Goal: Construct an analogous measure of the separation rate.
- Suppose we know  $U_t$ ,  $E_t$ , and  $f_t$ .
- Then the separation rate must solve  $U_{t+1} - U_t = E_t s_t - U_t f_t$ .






## Fact 2


The correlation between the cyclical components of the separation and unemployment rates is 0.65.

# Labor Market Flows and Labor Market Stocks

In Steady State  $E_t s_t = U_t f_t$ .

Compare  $u_t \equiv \frac{U_t}{U_t + E_t}$  with  $\frac{s_t}{s_t + f_t}$ .







## Fact 3


Unemployment is Always in Steady State.

# The Effect of $f_t$ and $s_t$ on Unemployment

Compare  $\frac{s_t}{s_t + f_t}$  with  $\frac{s_t}{s_t + \bar{f}}$  and  $\frac{\bar{s}}{\bar{s} + f_t}$ .







## Fact 4

The Job Finding Rate Accounts for 79% of  
Unemployment Fluctuations.

## Fact 4'

The Job Finding Rate Accounts for 95% of  
Unemployment Fluctuations since 1985.

# What Causes Job Finding Rate Fluctuations?

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
$$f_t = \frac{m(u_t, v_t)}{u_t} = m(1, \theta_t), \text{ where } \theta_t = \frac{v_t}{u_t}.$$


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Measure  $v_t$  as the Conference Board Help-Wanted Advertising Index.





## Fact 5

The correlation between the cyclical components of the job finding rate and v-u ratio is 0.96.


# Vacancies Drive the Unemployment Rate


Construct  $\tilde{u}_{t+1} = \tilde{u}_t + (1 - \tilde{u}_t)\bar{s} - m(\tilde{u}_t, v_t)$ .


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
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
$$m(\tilde{u}_t, v_t) = 0.017 \tilde{u}_t^{0.5} v_t^{0.5}.$$











## Fact 6

To explain fluctuations in unemployment,  
we need to explain fluctuations in vacancies.

# Benchmark Model

- Pissarides (1985) with productivity ( $p$ ) shocks.
- Risk neutral workers supply labor inelastically.
- Profit maximizing firms use a technology that is linear in labor.
- If profitable, they create vacancies to recruit workers.
- The firm keeps a fraction  $1 - \beta$  of the value of match surplus.
- There are shocks to the productivity of all jobs.

# Benchmark Model

- Recursive equation for the value of match surplus:

$$rV(p) = p - (z + f(\theta(p))\beta V(p)) - sV(p) + \lambda(\mathbb{E}(V(p')|p) - V(p)).$$

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$$rV(p) = p - (z + f(\theta(p))\beta V(p)) - sV(p) + \lambda(\mathbb{E}(V(p')|p) - V(p)).$$

- Free entry condition for vacancies:

$$c = \frac{f(\theta(p))}{\theta(p)} (1 - \beta)V(p).$$

# Benchmark Model

## Standard Deviations

	U.S. Data	Model
Log Productivity	0.020	0.020
Log V-U Ratio	0.382	0.035


Critical assumption:  $z = 0.4\bar{p}$ .


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  - ◊ Hall, *American Economic Review* 2005.
  - ◊ This definitely makes the v-u ratio more volatile.
- But are wages too flexible in the benchmark model?
  - ◊ Look at data on real output and compensation per worker.





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\*Assumes wages are continually renegotiated.

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Log V-U Ratio	0.382	0.035	0.035
Log Compensation	0.016	0.020	0.005

\* Assumes wages are continually renegotiated.

† Assumes wages are bargained only in new matches.

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  - ◊ Shocks to the productivity of new jobs only.
  - ◊ On-the-job search.
  - ◊ Asymmetric Information.

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