Economics 36101.
Economic Models of Politics

Course description: This course is an introduction to current research in political economics. The emphasis is on game-theoretic models that can be used to study the effects of different constitutional structures on the competitive behavior of politicians and the welfare-relevant performance of government. Strudents who take the course for credit will be required to present a paper from the reading list.
Winter 2016, Tue & Thurs 9:00-10:20pm.
Instructors: Roger Myerson and Richard van Weelden.


For most updated references, see

Social Choice and Spatial Models

1. The Median Voter Theorem and Probabilistic Voting:

2. Social Choice Theory: Muller-Sattherwaite Thm and Binary Agendas:

3. Candidates:

4. Valence Models:

Agency Models of Elections

5. Pure Moral Hazard

6. Ideological Competition and Agency Models:

7. Lobbying and Common Agency:


8. Information Aggregation and the Swing Voter's Curse:

9.  Turnout:

Comparative Electoral Systems

10. Electoral Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems:

11. Federalism:

Communication and Organizational Structure

12. Pandering:

13.  Communication:

14.  Bureaucracies and Regulation

Legislative Structures

15. Legislative Bargaining:

16. Legislative Organization:

Endogenous Institutions and Institutional Stability

17. Nondemocratic Politics:

18. Redistribution, the Revolutionary Threat, and Democratization:

19.  Conflict and Violence:

[Students in the 2009 public-sector field exam were asked, among other things, to summarize the main assumptions and conclusions of a theoretical model from one of the papers that were covered in this course, where the student could choose which paper to discuss.]

See also old syllabus from 2006.