

*Curriculum Vitae: April 13, 2018*

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*Personal Information:*

Born 1951, in Boston, Massachusetts. Citizenship: U.S.A.  
Married to Regina Weber Myerson, with two children, born 1983 and 1985.

*Education:*

Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics, Harvard, 1976 (thesis: "A Theory of Cooperative Games").  
A.B. summa cum laude, and S.M. in Applied Mathematics, Harvard University, 1973.

*Professional Experience:*

University of Chicago: Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor (2007-), Professor of Economics (2001-), Visiting Professor of Economics, (1985-1986, 2000-2001).  
Northwestern University: Professor (1982-2001), Associate Professor (1979-1982), Assistant Professor (1976-1979) of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences.  
Universität Bielefeld: Z.i.F. Visiting Researcher (1978-1979).

*Professional Honors and Responsibilities:*

Fellow of the Econometric Society, elected 1983; Econometric Society offices:  
Council member (1996-2002, 2005-2007), Vice President (2007-8), President (2009).  
Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 1993; Academy offices:  
Midwest Council member (1995-2002), Vice President for Midwest (1999-2002),  
member Board of Directors (2013-2015).  
Game Theory Society, Vice President (2010-12), President (2012-14), Past President (2014-16).  
Member National Academy of Sciences (elected 2009).  
Member, Council on Foreign Relations (elected 2011).  
Program Committee member for American Political Science Association 2002 annual meeting.  
Editorial board member, Games and Economic Behavior (1989-1997).  
Editorial Board member, International Journal of Game Theory (1982-1992).  
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (1983-1993).  
Guggenheim Fellow (1983-1984). Sloan Foundation Fellow (1984-1986).  
Doctor Honoris Causa awarded by Universität Basel, Switzerland (2002).  
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, with Leo Hurwicz and Eric Maskin (2007).  
Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize (Toulouse, 2009).  
Oskar Morgenstern Medal, University of Vienna (2013).

*Books:*

Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press (1991). Chinese translation published 2001 by China Economics Publishing House.

Probability Models for Economic Decisions, Duxbury Press (2005). Second edition with Eduardo Zambrano submitted for publication by MIT Press (2018).

*Software:*

Formlist.xla (for auditing formulas in Microsoft Excel) v1.5, 22 kb, updated 12/1999.

Simtools.xla (for simulation and decision analysis in Excel) v3.31, 97 kb, updated 3/2000.

Available at <http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/addins.htm>

*Op-ed piece in print newspapers:*

"The dangers of going it alone," Minneapolis Star-Tribune, Feb 17, 2003, page A11.

"How to build democracy in Iraq," Arabic translation in Al Nahdhah, Baghdad, July 2003.

"No one can be let off the hook for bringing democracy to Iraq", Chicago Tribune, Aug 4, 2004, page 21.

"A way forward for Ukraine," with Scott Gelbach and Timofiy Mylovanov, International New York Times, Mar 20, 2014.

"Three ways America should respond to the Ukraine crisis," with John Herbst, World Post, Dec 4, 2014; other articles <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-myerson/>

"Five rules to get state-building right," with J. Kael Weston, Wall Street Journal, Oct 22, 2016 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/five-rules-to-get-state-building-right-1476985296>

*Papers:*

1. "Values of Games in Partition Function Form," International Journal of Game Theory 6 (1977), 23-31.
2. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research 2 (1977), 225-229.
3. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Econometrica 45 (1977), 1631-1637.
4. "Discussion (of Harsanyi's 'Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics')," American Economic Review 68 (1978), 231.
5. "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1978), 73-80.
6. "Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games," Mathematics of Operations Research 3 (1978), 265-274.
7. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 47 (1979), 61-73.
8. "An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions," Theory and Decision 11 (1979), 339-352.
9. With W. Thomson, "Monotonicity and Independence Axioms," International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 37-49.

10. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 169-182.
11. "An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy," Mathematical Programming 21 (1981), 182-189.
12. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica 49 (1981), 883-897.
13. "Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model," CMSEMS DP No. 339 (August, 1978), French translation in Les Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econometrie #22 (1980), Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.
14. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58-73.
15. With D. P. Baron, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica 50 (1982), 911-930.
16. "Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 (1982), 67-81.
17. "The Basic Theory of Optimal Auctions," in Auctions, Bidding and Contracts, edited by R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and R. Stark, NYU Press (1983), 149-163.
18. With M. A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983), 265-281.
19. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica 51 (1983), 1767-1797.
20. With B. Holmstrom, "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 51 (1983), 1799-1819.
21. "A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectation," Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 4 (1983), 309-351.
22. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 52 (1984), 461-487.
23. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory 13 (1984), 69-86.
24. "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Social Goals and Social Organization, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229-259.
25. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, edited by A. Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 59-69.
26. With R. Radner and E. Maskin, "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies 53 (1986), 59-69.
27. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica 54 (1986), 323-358.
28. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory 15 (1986), 133-154.

29. "An Introduction to Game Theory," in Studies in Mathematical Economics, edited by S. Reiter, Mathematical Association of America (1986), 1-61.
30. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," in Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow 3, edited by W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, Cambridge U. Press (1986), 3-24.
31. "Incentive Constraints and Optimal Communication Systems," in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, edited by M. Y. Vardi, Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann (1988), 179-193.
32. With R. J. Aumann, "Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: an Application of the Shapley Value," in The Shapley Value, edited by A. E. Roth, Cambridge University Press (1988), 175-191.
33. "Mechanism Design," in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, New York: Norton, (1989), 191-206.
34. "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1989), 264-303.
35. "Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation," in Negotiation Analysis, edited by H. P. Young, University of Michigan Press (1991), 67-85.
36. With G. B. Pollock and J. M. Swinkels, "Viscous Population Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1991), 101-109.
37. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," Rationality and Society 4 (1992), 62-73.
38. "Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory," in Rational Interaction, edited by R. Selten, Springer-Verlag (1992), 13-33.
39. "Mechanism Design and Incentive Constraints" and "Revelation Principle," in New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, New York: Stockton Press (1992).
40. With R. J. Weber, "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 102-114.
41. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior 5 (1993), 118-132.
42. "Review of 'Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting' and 'Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition'," Journal of Economic Literature 31(1) (March 1993), 237-240.
43. "Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections," in Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation, edited by W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, Cambridge University Press (1993), pp. 107-133.
44. With R. Forsythe, T. A. Rietz, and R. J. Weber, "An Experiment on Coordination in Multicandidate Elections: the Importance of Polls and Election Histories," Social Choice and Welfare 10 (1993), 223-247.

45. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 856-869.
46. "Communication, Correlated Equilibria, and Incentive Compatibility," chapter 24 in Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 2, edited by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier Science (1994), pages 827-847.
47. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," Games and Economic Behavior 9 (1995), 35-65.
48. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:1 (1995), 77-89.
49. "Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption," Social Choice and Welfare 12 (1995), 59-74.
50. "An Early Paper on the Refinement of Nash Equilibrium," Duke Mathematical Journal 81 (1996), 67-75.
51. "John Nash's Contribution to Economics" Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996), 287-295.
52. "Análisis económico de las instituciones políticas: una introducción" (translated into Spanish by J. Ignacio Conde Ruiz), Cuadernos Economicos 62 (1996), 7-28.
53. "Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games," in Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, edited by W. Albers, W. Gueth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme (Springer-Verlag, 1997), pages 111-121.
54. "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," in Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46-65.
55. "Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons," in P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler, and A. Vercelli, eds, The Economics of Transnational Commons (Oxford U. Press, 1997), 17-34.
56. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 183-202.
57. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 375-392.
58. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior 25 (1998), 111-131.
59. "Working in Game Theory: A Personal Perspective" in Passion and Craft: How Economists Work, edited by M. Szenberg, University of Michigan Press (1998), pages 227-233.
60. With Thomas Rietz and Robert Weber, "Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections." Economics and Politics 10 (1998) 185-217.

61. With Daniel Diermeier, "Bicameralism and its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures" American Economic Review 89 (1999), 1182-1196.
62. "Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," European Economic Review 43 (1999), 671-697.
63. "Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters," European Economic Review 43 (1999), 767-778.
64. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1999), 1067-1082.
65. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory 94 (2000), 7-45.
66. "Economic Analysis of Constitutions," Chicago Law Review 67 (2000), 925-940.
67. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi" Games and Economic Behavior 36 (2001), 20-25.
68. "Review of 'Incentives and Political Economy' by Jean-Jacques Laffont" Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2001), 1277-1279.
69. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory 103 (2002), 219-251.
70. "Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (2004), 187-209.
71. "Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria," Chicago Journal of International Law 5 (2004), 91-107.
72. "Harsanyi's Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science 50 (2004), 1818-1824.
73. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy" Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2006), 3-23.
74. "On Game-Theoretic Consistency and the Theory of International Relations," Journal of Theoretical Politics 18 (2006), 416-433.
75. "Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption" Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108 (2006), 727-742.
76. With Serguey Braguinsky, "A Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition: the Role of Oligarchic Property Rights," Economics of Transition 15 (2007), 77-107.
77. "Virtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory 136 (2007) 260-285.
78. With Serguey Braguinsky, "Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights," Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (2007), 676-704.
79. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," American Political Science Review 102 (2008), 125-139.
80. With Dino Gerardi, "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication,"

- Games and Economic Behavior 60 (2007), 104-134.
81. "Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game Theorist's Perspective," monograph of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, (Nov 2007).\*  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub823.pdf>
  82. "Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory," in American Economic Review 98(3):586-603 (2008), and in Les Prix Nobel (2007), 320-341.
  83. "Roger B. Myerson: Autobiography," in Les Prix Nobel (2007), 309-319.
  84. "John C. Harsanyi," "Revelation Principle," and "Mechanism Design" [33] in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan (2008).
  85. "John F. Nash, Jr.," in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan Reference USA (2008).
  86. "Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz," Review of Economic Design 13 (2009) 59-75.
  87. "A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(3) (2009), 470-482.
  88. "Local foundations for strong democracy in Pakistan," Social Science and Policy Bulletin 1(2):2-20 (Lahore University of Management Sciences, 2009).
  89. "Learning from Schelling's 'Strategy of Conflict'," Journal of Economic Literature 47(4):1109-1125 (2009).
  90. "Capitalist Investment and Political Liberalization," Theoretical Economics 5(1):73-91 (2010).
  91. "Rethinking the Fundamentals of State-Building" PRISM 2(2):91-100 (2011).
  92. "Toward a theory of leadership and state building," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 108 (supplement 4), 21297-21301 (Dec 2011).
  93. With Rebecca B. Morton, "Decisiveness of Contributors' Perceptions in Elections" Economic Theory 49, 571-590 (2012).
  94. "A Model of Moral-hazard Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy 120(5):847-878 (2012).
  95. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8(3):305-337 (2013).
  96. "Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan," World Development 53 (January 2014), 46-54.
  97. "Standards for state-building interventions," in Economics for the Curious, edited by Robert Solow and Janice Murray (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pages 174-188.\*
  98. "Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: a Review of Admati and Hellwig's 'Bankers' New Clothes'," Journal of Economic Literature 52(1) (2014), 197-210.
  99. "Moral-hazard Credit Cycles with Risk-averse Agents" Journal of Economic Theory

- 153:74-102 (2014).
100. "Local Foundations for Better Governance: A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's *Localizing Development*," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7131 (2014).
  101. "Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy" Econometrica 83 (2015), 2083-2126.
  102. With Ali Cheema and Adnan Q. Khan, "Breaking the Countercyclical Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan," in Is Decentralization Good for Development?, edited by JeanPaul Faguet and Caroline Pöschl (Oxford University Press, 2015), pages 68-79.
  103. With Jörgen Weibull, "Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria" Econometrica 83 (2015) 943-976.
  104. "Decentralized Democracy in Political Reconstruction," in Globalization and Its Impact on the Future of Human Rights and International Criminal Justice, edited by M. Cherif Bassiouni, (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2015), pages 479-485.
  105. "Democratic Decentralization and Economic Development" in Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics, edited by Justin Yifu Lin and Celestin Monga, (Oxford University Press, 2015) pages 756-769.
  106. "The Strength of American Federal Democracy," World Bank Policy Research Paper 7512 (2015); also in Horizons (Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, Autumn 2015).\*
  107. "Local and National Democracy in Political Reconstruction", chapter 28 in Economic Aspects of Genocide, Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention," edited by Charles Anderton and Jurgen Brauer, (Oxford University Press, 2016).
  108. "Meeting John Nash," Games and Economic Behavior 103:12-14 (2017).
  109. "Linking the Best and Worst of Global Trends," Journal of Policy Modeling 39:608-610 (2017).
  110. "How to Prepare for State-Building," PRISM 7(1):3-15 (NDU Press, 2017).
  111. "Autobiography of a game theorist" (February 2014), to appear in Lives of the Laureates (7th ed.), edited by Roger Spencer and David Macpherson (MIT Press).
  112. "Local Agency Costs of Political Centralization" (December 2015).\*
  113. With Philip Reny, "Conditional Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions" (May 2015).\*
  114. "A Theoretical Perspective on Possible Political Reforms for the Philippines" (August 2016).\*
  115. "Public Political Capital for Economic Development" (October 2016).\*
  116. "Village Communities and Global Development" (June 2017).\*

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