uclogo.gif  Economics 30500. Game Theory.

Course description. This course is a rigorous introduction to the main ideas of game theory. Topics include: general models of games (the extensive, strategic, and Bayesian forms), dominance and rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, sequential rationality and consistent beliefs, refinements of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, incentive compatibility, repeated games, bargaining and cooperation.
Spring 2005, Mon, Wed 10:30am-12:00pm in Ro 329. Instructor: Roger Myerson. (Office hours: Wed 1-4pm).

Text:
R Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard U Press (1991).
Additional notes.

Course outline:

  1. Duality, utility, and domination (Ch 1, 3.8).
  2. Basic models of games: extensive, strategic, Bayesian (Ch 2).
  3. Equilibria of strategic-form games: fixed-point theorems and existence, computation, interpretation, problems of  discontinuity (Ch 3).
  4. Information in equilibria: Bayesian equilibria, monotonicity, purification, behavioral strategies (3.9-3.11).
  5. Sequential equilibria of extensive-form game: sequential rationality and consistent beliefs, Zermelo's thm (Ch 4).
  6. Refinements of equilibrium: perfect, proper, forward induction, generic properties (Ch 5).
  7. Games with communication: correlated equilibrium, incentive constraints, efficient mechanisms (Ch 6, notes on virtual utility).
  8. Repeated games: general feasibility theorems, stationary equilibria of stochastic games, imperfect monitoring (Ch 7).
  9. Models of bargaining: Nash's axioms, sequential-offer games (Ch 8).

Other recent papers:
R Myerson, "Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory," Journal of Economic Literature 36:1067-1082 (1999). (preprint version)
P Milgrom and C Shannon, "Monotone comparative statics," Econometrica, 62:157-180 (1994).
E Kohlberg and P Reny, "Independence in relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees," Journal of Economc Theory 75:280-313 (1997).
B vonStengel, "Efficient computation of behavior strategies," Games and Economic Behavior 14:220-246 (1996).
R Myerson, "Dual reduction and elementary games," Games and Economic Behavior 21:183-202 (1997).
G Mailath and S Morris, "Repeated games with almost public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory 102:189-228 (2002).
C Harris, M Stinchcombe, and W Zame, "The finitistic theory of infinite games," UTexas working paper (2000).
D Monderer and D Samet, "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior 1:170-190 (1989).
H Carlsson and E vanDamme, "Global games and equilibrium selection," Econometrica 61:989-1018 (1993).
R Myerson, "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory 27:375-392 (1998).

URL of this course page: http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/ec30500.htm