Epilogue—which documents the movement of religious liberals away from the positivistic psychological mainstream—is ample demonstration of the thing he hopes to disprove.

*Unsettled Minds* is a significant alternative narrative of the new psychology—a narrative that clearly illumines the deep religious motivations of certain key members of that first generation of American psychologists, and the religious use to which they put their work. This religious side of the new psychology—precisely the sort of thing that presentist historiography has traditionally expunged from its own accounts—was the very heartbeat of the new science. White has done us a great service by so clearly demonstrating that this was indeed the case.

**REFERENCE**


Reviewed by RUSSELL D. KOSITS, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Redeemer University College, Ancaster, ON, Canada.


While reading Richards’ biography of Haeckel I sensed—and Richards confirms this explicitly on the final page—that Richards is a lot like Haeckel. He has a powerful intellect, abundant creativity, diligence in research, a sharp wit, complete faith in science, and hatred for religion.

Richards’ work contains many important insights. Building on his previous work on “Romantic biology,” he ably demonstrates the Romantic influences on Haeckel. While he overemphasizes this side of Haeckel somewhat, he does clearly acknowledge the rationalistic and even mechanistic side of Haeckel, too.

Richards argues forcefully—and correctly—against those historians who try to distance Haeckel from Darwin. He persuasively demonstrates the close affinity between these two scientists. Even though Haeckel laid greater stress on Lamarckian mechanisms that Darwin did, both embraced natural selection. Richards also demonstrates that Darwin accepted Haeckel’s biogenetic law, i.e., that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Some historians believe that Haeckel’s progressivist variety of evolution differed from Darwin’s, but Richards disagrees, arguing that Darwin was also a progressivist.

The title signals another important point. Richards remarks, “My overarching argument will be that Haeckel’s science and his legacy for modern evolutionary theory display the features they do because of his tragic sense of life” (p. 16). Richards thinks that Haeckel’s “tragic sense of life” was shaped primarily by personal tragedies that befell him, such as the death of his intensely beloved first wife on his thirtieth birthday.

Unfortunately, despite his many important findings, at times Richards is more like Haeckel than he should be. Haeckel famously distorted evidence (embryo drawings) to
promote his idea that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Richards describes this episode quite well). Likewise, Richards sometimes distorts evidence when it does not reflect well on his hero. For example, Richards rightly criticizes Daniel Gasman for overemphasizing Haeckel’s anti-Semitism, and he correctly argues that Haeckel did not contribute to Nazi anti-Semitism. However, in order to rescue Haeckel from the slightest taint of anti-Semitism, Richards does some pretty fancy gymnastics when handling the sources. He also ignores his own evidence: Haeckel placed the Indo-Germanic race above the Semitic race in his evolutionary trees (and Richards fails to tell us that in the 1870 edition of *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* Haeckel stated in the text that the Indo-Germanic race was superior to the Semitic race (Haeckel, 1870, pp. 616–617)).

The reason Richards tries so hard to distance Haeckel from anti-Semitism is that he is determined to deny any link between Haeckel and Nazism. During the Nazi period some Nazi biologists and anthropologists lauded Haeckel for promoting Nazi ideals. Then the historian Daniel Gasman dedicated an entire book to one-sidedly arguing that just about all Nazi ideology originated with Haeckel. While Richards is right to take Gasman to task, he swings to the opposite extreme—ignoring, using euphemisms, toning down, or making excuses for anything in Haeckel’s writings that smacks of Nazism, including eugenics, infanticide, euthanasia, nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism.

In order to accomplish his mission, Richards omits many important facts. He never informs his readers that: (1) Haeckel was the first German scholar to promote infanticide for the disabled. (2) Haeckel was an important figure in the Pan-German League and ardently supported German nationalism and imperialism. (3) Haeckel accepted honorary membership in the German eugenics organization. (4) Haeckel played a leading role in the Krupp Prize Competition, which played a major role in advancing social Darwinism and eugenics. (5) Haeckel supported the expansionist Fatherland Party during World War I (to his credit, Richards does discuss Haeckel’s support for Germany in World War I). Of course, no scholar can include everything in a biography, but not even mentioning these important elements of Haeckel’s life, which many other scholars have documented, seems rather suspicious, especially when he is trying by his own admission to rehabilitate Haeckel.

A good example of Richards’ use of euphemisms occurs in the passage where he discusses Haeckel’s 1870 advocacy of infanticide. Richards cannot quite bring himself even to use the word “infanticide” or “killing” or any such synonym. Instead, he cryptically states, “The Spartans and American Indians, he [Haeckel] believed, knew how to correct the momentary lapses of nature. Indeed, the eugenic practices of these natural men might be thought of as nature healing her own” (p. 231). Only in an appendix, when discussing Haeckel’s later book, *Wonders of Life* (1904), does Richards finally discuss killing disabled infants in clearer terms, but he fails to inform his readers there that in *Wonder of Life* Haeckel advocated killing mentally disabled adults, too.

One of the most flagrant distortions is Richards’ claim that Haeckel “was initially recruited to the side of National Socialism but then quickly rejected by party functionaries” (p. 445). Richards found only three articles in Nazi periodicals critical of Haeckel and jumped to the conclusion that despite a “recruitment phase,” Nazis categorically rejected Haeckel. Richards apparently does not realize that many Nazi officials and publications honored Haeckel all through the Nazi period. For instance, the official Nazi newspaper still paid tribute to Haeckel in 1939 on the twentieth anniversary of his death. Also, the Nazi Ministry of Education in 1939 elevated the status of the Ernst-Haeckel-Haus and provided funds to refurbish it, causing its director to remark, “For a long time it belonged to good style to give Haeckel the cold shoulder. In today’s light all the charges against him fall away” (Franz,
1939). Haeckel was a contested figure in Nazi Germany, but Richards' claim that the Nazis rejected Haeckel after an initial "recruitment phase" is incorrect.

Despite these occasional (but systematic) lapses, Richards' biography is a rich resource. For the most part it accurately represents Haeckel's scientific work, his struggle against religion, his scientific voyages, and his family life. However, anyone wanting to learn about Haeckel's support for social Darwinism, eugenics, involuntary euthanasia, anti-Semitism, or imperialism will have to look elsewhere to get the full picture.

REFERENCES

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Here we have another weighty tome on William James, this time from the vantage point of the sociology of scientific knowledge. It comes from a James scholar new to the field but seasoned under the watchful eye of the Lorraine Daston and Robert Richards school of thought—world class scholarship with a heavy emphasis on European literature, particularly the German, and an apologia pro vita sua for the glorious flaws found in the Western tradition of modern science, which still remains intact by the end of the book. Prof. Bordogna's agenda: to investigate the many ways that James crossed the boundaries that were being erected between the disciplines in the mapping of knowledge domains in the late nineteenth century. From this angle, she corroborates William James on Consciousness Beyond the Margin (Taylor, 1996), where, with regard to the topic of consciousness, James transcended his contemporaries. At the same time, she is much more expansive in the literature she covers, partly due to the new availability of the James correspondence and James's collected works. Nevertheless, she misses the mark just slightly in capturing the widespread effect of James's thought while she also almost misses its essence or core, as James intended it—the overthrow of reductionistic positivism in experimental psychology and in science generally.

For instance, James has a tripartite metaphysics—pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism. She treats each separately, does not exactly show their relation, and does not exactly center radical empiricism as the core of James's vision. Also, James's return to philosophy after 1898 I do not feel she has completely right. Though an MD, he was both a philosopher and a physiologist from the very start, rising through the ranks as a professor of philosophy in Harvard College and the School of Arts and Sciences. He became Harvard's first professor of psychology for eight years. In that time, returning PhDs from the German laboratories decided that psychology was to be a science modeled after nineteenth-century Newtonian