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CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Philip John Reny

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EDUCATION: Ph.D. Economics, Princeton University, 1988
M.A. Economics, The University of Western Ontario, 1982
B.A. Economics/Mathematics, Carleton University, 1981

POSITION:

July 1, 2007 – : William C. Norby Professor in Economics and the College, Univ. of Chicago

July 1, 2006 – June 30, 2009 : Department Chair, University of Chicago

July 1, 1999 – June 30 2007: Professor in Economics and in the College, University of Chicago

July 1, 1994 – June 30, 1999: Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

July 1, 1991 - June 30, 1994: Associate Professor of Economics, Univ. of Western Ontario

July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1991: Assistant Professor of Economics, Univ. of Western Ontario

PROFESSIONAL COUNCILS/COMMITTEES:

1993-1994: Member of the Executive Council, Canadian Economics Association

1994 & 1996: Member of the Program Committee for the Summer Meetings of the
Econometric Society.

2000-2001: Program Chair of the 2001 Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society

2001-2002: Program Chair of the 13th Annual Game Theory Festival in Stony Brook

2003-2004: National Science Foundation Panel Member

2003-2004: Program Chair of the Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society

2008-present: Council of The Game Theory Society (elected January 2008)

SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP:

1996 - Fellow of the Econometric Society
1999 - Charter Member of The Game Theory Society

RESEARCH GRANTS

1990-1992: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
1992-1995: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
1996-1998: US-Israel Binational Science Foundation
1997-1999: National Science Foundation grant # SBR-970932
2000-2003: National Science Foundation grant # SES-9905599
2003-2006: National Science Foundation grant # SES-0214421
2006-2009: National Science Foundation grant # SES-0617884

PUBLICATIONS:

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (2007): "The Role of Excess Capacity in Determining Market Power in Natural Gas Transportation Markets," *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 32, 209-223.

Reny, Philip J., and Motty Perry (2006): "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 74, 1231-1269.

Reny, Philip J., and Motty Perry (2005): "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 72, 567-592.

Reny, Philip J., and Arthur J. Robson (2004): "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 48, 355-384.

Reny, Philip J., and Shmuel Zamir (2004): "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," *Econometrica*, 72, 1105-1126.

Govindan, Srihari, Philip J. Reny, and Arthur J. Robson (2003): "A Short Proof of Harsanyi's Purification Theorem," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 45, 369-374.

Reny, Philip J., and Arthur J. Robson (2002): "Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Public Randomization: A Short Proof," *Economics Bulletin*, 3, 1-8.

Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny (2002): "An Efficient Auction," *Econometrica*, 70, 1199-1212.

Reny, Philip J. (2001): "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach," *Economics Letters*, 70, v.1, 99-105.

Reny, Philip J. (1999): "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games." *Econometrica*, 67, 1029-1056.

Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny (1999): "On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions," *Econometrica*, 67, 895-900.

Perry, Motty and Philip J. Reny (1999): "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 26, 279-285.

Reny, Philip J. and Myrna Wooders (1998): "An Extension of the KKMS Theorem." *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 29, 125-34.

Kohlberg, Elon and Philip J. Reny (1997): "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 75, 280-313.

Reny, Philip J. and Myrna Wooders (1996): "The Partnered Core of a Game Without Side Payments," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 70, 298-311.

Reny, Philip J. (1995): "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 28, 1-16.

Bhattacharya, U., Philip J. Reny., and M. Spiegel (1995): "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 65, 136-170.

Harris, C., Philip J. Reny and A. Robson (1995): "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Extensive-Form Correlation", *Econometrica*, 63, 507-544.

Perry, M., and Philip J. Reny (1994): "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," *Econometrica* 62, 795-817. Reprinted in *Recent Advances in game Theory*, Eric Maskin (ed.), Edward-Elgar Publishing, 1999.

Elmes, S., and Philip J. Reny (1994): "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," *Journal of Economic Theory* 62, 1-23.

Perry, M., and Philip J. Reny (1993): "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," *Journal of Economic Theory* 59, 50-77.

Reny, Philip J (1993): "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information." *Journal of Economic Theory* 59, 257-274.

Reny, Philip J (1992): "Rationality In Extensive Form Games." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 6, 103-118.

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (1992): "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design." *Econometrica* 60, 395-421.

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (1992): "A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem Without Closure Under Suprema," *Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society* 114, 61-67.

Reny, Philip J. (1992): "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," *Econometrica* 60, 627-649.

Hellwig, M., W. Leininger, Philip J. Reny, and Arthur Robson (1990): "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: An Elementary Approach to Existence and Approximation by Discrete Games." *Journal of Economic Theory* 52, 406-422.

McAfee, R. Preston, John McMillan, and Philip J. Reny (1989): "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction." *Econometrica* 57, 1451-1459.

Reny, Philip J. (1988): "Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information." In A. Fine and J. Leplin (eds.), *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association: Volume 2* East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association (1989): 363-369.

Chow, Gregory C., and Philip J. Reny (1985): "On Two Methods for Solving and Estimating Linear Simultaneous Equations Under Rational Expectations." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 9, 63-75.

Articles in Books and other Publications:

Reny, Philip J. (2008): "Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Existence," entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition.

Reny, Philip J. (1997): "Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core," in *Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches*, S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (eds.), Springer-Verlag.

Reny, Philip J., and Myrna Wooders (1996): "Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths," in *Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten*, W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme (eds.), Springer.

Reny, Philip J. (1991): "Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," in *Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction*, Bicchieri and Dalla Chiara (eds.), Cambridge University Press, reprinted with permission from the Philosophy of Science Association.

Books:

Jehle, Geoffrey, and Philip J. Reny (1997): *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, Addison-Wesley.

Book Reviews:

Reny, Philip J., (2003): "The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 42, 327-332.

Reny, Philip J., (1995): "A Course in Game Theory: M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 28, 726-729.

Work in Progress:

Reny, Philip J.: "Further Results on the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games."

Reny, Philip J.: "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games."

Perry, Motty, Arthur. J. Robson, and Philip. J. Reny: "Testing Theories of Sex Against the Observation that Sex is Biparental," revise and resubmit, *Evolution*.

SERVICE TO JOURNALS:

Associate Editor

Econometrica

Editorial Board

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Referee

Journal of Economic Theory
American Economic Review
Games and Economic Behavior
Review of Economic Studies
Journal of Political Economy

GRADUATE SUPERVISION:

<u>Name of Student</u>	<u>Degree Date</u>	<u>Appointment</u>
Francesco Decarolis*	2009	University of Wisconsin
Francesco Nava*	2009	London School of Economics
Yukio Koriyama*	2008	Ecole Polytechnique
Amit Gandhi	2006	University of Wisconsin
Jacques Potin	2005	ESSEC Business School

Alex Karaivanov*	2003	Simon Fraser University
Vasiliki Skreta	2002	University of Minnesota
Ki Joon Jung	1998	Korean Government
Murali Agastya	1993	University College, London
Wing-Yiu Chan	1993	returned to China
Quan Wen	1991	University of Windsor
Chantalle LaCasse*	1991	University of Ottawa
Jacques Robert*	1989	University of Montreal
Dominique Demougin*	1988	University of Toronto

*Committee member.

SPEAKING INVITATIONS:

- 1987-88: McMaster University
 Harvard University
 Columbia University
 Princeton University
 Carnegie-Mellon University
 University of Toronto
- 1988-89: Carleton University
 University of Minnesota
 University of Chicago
 State University of New York at Stony Brook
 Johns Hopkins University
 Ohio State University
 University of Rochester
 University of Toronto
 Queen's University
 Brock University
- 1989-90: Northwestern University
 Penn State University
 University of Toronto
 Stanford University
 California Institute of Technology
 University of California at Berkeley
 University of California at San Diego
 Tel Aviv University
- 1990-91: University of Texas at Austin

University of Wisconsin at Madison
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1991-92: University of Wisconsin at Madison
State University of New York at Buffalo
Washington University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University
Penn State University
University of Arizona
Boston University

1992-93: University of Wisconsin at Madison
Northwestern University
Stanford University
University of Windsor
University of Rochester
University of Pittsburgh
Princeton University
Yale University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University

1993-94: University of Texas at Austin
Texas A&M University
Cornell University
University of Toronto
Princeton University
McGill University
University of Michigan

1994-95 S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook
University of Pennsylvania
Stanford University
Industrial Institute for Economic
and Social Research, Stockholm

1995-96 Northwestern University
Penn State University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1996-97 University of Maryland
Princeton University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1997-98 University of Western Ontario
Northwestern University
Brown University
Boston University
Harvard University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1998-99 Brown University
University of Michigan
University of Minnesota
Princeton University
University of Rochester
University College London
Penn State University
University of Chicago

1999-00 Yale University
Harvard University
MIT
European University Institute
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mannheim
Bilbao

2000-01 Wisconsin
MEA Panel: "The Future of Microeconomic Theory"
Northwestern
Stanford
Stony Brook Plenary Speaker

2001-02 University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Econometric Society Winter meetings
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Northern Illinois University
Northwestern
Duke
Columbia
London Business School
London School of Economics
Dauphine, Paris

2002-03 Princeton
Yale
Harvard/MIT
Stanford

UCLA
London School of Economics
University of Paris
University of Toulouse
Northwestern University
University of Maryland
University of Wisconsin
Washington University
University of Rochester
INSEAD
Econometric Society Summer meetings, invited session
European Summer Symposium, invited session

2003-04
Vanderbilt University
University of Western Ontario
California Institute of Technology
University of California at San Diego
Keynote Speaker: Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Montreal
Woodsworth Visitor, University of British Columbia
Invited Discussant at Yale Conference on Robust Mechanism Design
Invited Lecturer, Econometric Society Meetings, Madrid

2004-05
Johns Hopkins University
Carleton University, Canada
Columbia University
Ohio State University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University
Nemmer's Conference Invited Speaker, Northwestern University

2005-06
University of Arizona
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
CIREQ Conference on Auctions Invited Speaker, University of Montreal
Decentralization Conference Invited Speaker, University of Paris
University of Pittsburgh
Yale University

2006-07
Yale University
Princeton University
Washington University
New York University
University of Pennsylvania

2007-08
Laffont Lecture, 2008 Econometric Society European Meetings
Caltech
University of Essex

Indiana University
Iowa State University
Midwest economics Association Invited Lecture
University of North Carolina
Northwestern University
Penn State Auction Conference
University College London
UCLA
Simon Fraser Conference on Evolution and Economics
Washington University Theory Conference

2008-09 University of Barcelona, JOCS Seminar
Econometric Society Winter Meetings
University of Paris
Institut Henri Poincare
Ecole Polytechnique
University of Rochester