1 Ü-Tsang performative egophors

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Ü-Tsang / ‘Standard’ Tibetan marginally uses egophoric marking to make ‘perlocutionary performatives,’ or clauses that spell out the very perlocutionary effect brought about by the speaker in uttering them. This paper gives an account of these egophoric performatives, in terms of the broader function of Tibetan egophors: such egophors typically require the evidential origo to be a participant in the eventuality described by the clause that they mark, and in some constructions, when no other role can be construed for it, the origo can be construed as the causer of that eventuality. And so an egophor can commit the origo to being the cause of the very eventuality being reported, which results in a performative reading in cases where one’s speaking performatively causes this eventuality to occur. Some considerations are offered as to where these performatives are predicted to appear, and what its significance is for the typology of egophoricity.

1 Introduction

Egophoric marking in Ü-Tsang / ‘Standard’ Tibetan (ÜT)\(^1\) can allow some sentences to have a special performative interpretation. That is, some

\(^1\)I’ll use the label of Ü-Tsang Tibetan (ÜT) to refer broadly to the primary language of Central Tibet, as well as to the lingua franca of the Tibetosphere and the Tibetan diaspora more generally. I therefore don’t draw any careful distinctions between diasporic Tibetan (what Caplow (2017) calls ‘DCT,’ Diasporic Common Tibetan), the language spoken in Central Tibet itself, and the ‘Lhasa dialect’ specifically, in the hopes that there aren’t any dialectal differences between them relevant to the examples in this paper (this isn’t an entirely safe bet: the difference between diasporic and non-diasporic Tibetan can affect the functional TAME marking of the language, as Vokurková (2017) outlines, for example; but I don’t know of any such differences affecting this specific topic). My primary consultant was born in Central Tibet, and lives in the United States now, speaking diasporic Tibetan. I’ll use the term ‘Tibetan’ when talking about features common in Tibetan languages more broadly.
egophorically marked sentences in the language, when used to make assertions, commit the speaker not to reporting an antecedent fact about the world that might be true or false independently of the speech act, but rather constitute attempts by the speaker to make the content of the assertion true by means of that very speech act. Here are a few examples that some other authors have previously noted.

(1) \textit{deb 'di khyed.rang la (yin / red)} \\
This book is for you [...]I’m giving it to you / ...as a matter of fact].’ \\
[cf. Agha (1993: 176, ex. 23b)]

(2) \textit{khyed.rang gi ming rdo.rje rnam.rgyal (yin / red)} \\
you GEN name Dorje Namgyal be.EGO be \\
‘Your name is Dorje Namgyal \\
 [...]I’m naming you / ...as a matter of fact].’ \\
[Garrett (2001: 141, ex. 33)]

(3) \textit{'di khyed.rang gi ja (yin / red)} \\
this you GEN tea be.EGO be \\
‘This is your tea [...]I’m giving it to you / ...as a matter of fact].’ \\
[Tournadre & Dorje (2003: 94)]

For copular constructions like the benefactive predication in (1) or the equatives in (2)-(3), there’s a binary choice to use either the egophoric copula \textit{yin}, or the non-egophoric, evidentially neutral copula \textit{red}.

\footnote{This is a simplification: the ÚT copular system is complex, and exactly how many options for the copula exist in a particular construction depends on how one counts. In the case of equatives, predications with nouns, and benefactive predicates, \textit{yin} and \textit{red} are the default paradigmatically contrasting options, but there are a range of other possibilities that have various evidential meanings (such as the ‘revelatory’ copula \textit{red.bzhag}) or epistemic modal meanings (cf. Vokurková (2017)). It’s not clear to what extent these other options paradigmatically contrast with \textit{yin} and \textit{red} in these constructions. Other copular constructions, involving predication with adjectives and existence-location-possession, make use of other copulas, some of which are egophoric, and some of which are not; these will be mentioned below as needed. I won’t provide an overview of the encoding of egophoricity in the ÚT verbal system here: cf. Caplow (2017), Garrett (2001: §4.3), Oisel (2017), and Yukawa (2017) for summaries of the language’s egophoric constructions, and descriptions of the (both more central and more marginal) contributions of egophoricity in the language. The morphological shapes \textit{yin} and \textit{red} are used for a huge number of purposes throughout the language, depending on the constructions they appear in: the description here has to do just with these specific kinds of copular clauses.}
of the non-egophoric red in either case results in a sentence that yields an ordinary constative assertion, which purports to state some antecedent fact: about who the book is for in (1), or what the addressee’s name is in (2), or whose tea the referent is in (3). The use of the egophoric yin has a different possible interpretation in each case: a speaker might use (1) to offer the book to the addressee, or in other words to make it so that the book is for the addressee; a speaker might use (2) to name the addressee, or in other words to make it so that the addressee’s name is Dorje Namgyal; and a speaker might use (3) to give the tea to the addressee, or in other words to make it so that the tea is the addressee’s.

When read in this way, the egophoric versions of the sentences in (1)-(3) are performative, in that when they’re uttered in the right circumstances, their semantic content can be made true by means of this very utterance: (1) is true when the book is intended for the addressee, and on the performative reading, this is what is made true by means of the utterance; (2) is true when the addressee’s name is Dorje Namgyal, and on the performative reading, this is what is made true by means of the utterance; (3) is true when the tea belongs to the addressee, and on the performative reading, this is what is made true by means of the utterance.

These are not, however, classical performatives in the sense of Austin (1962), because their semantic content doesn’t spell out the illocutionary force of the speech act they’re used to perform: that is, they’re not performatives like I name you Dorje Namgyal, or I give this tea to you. Rather, their semantic content spells out the perlocutionary effect achieved by the speech act they’re used to perform. They are therefore what I’ll call perlocutionary performatives: in stating what the perlocutionary effect achieved by the speech act is, one brings about that very effect. Somehow, egophoric marking makes this possible.

Here are a couple more examples of perlocutionary performatives I’ve come across, to illustrate the point:

(4)  ’di bkra.shis yin
     this Tashi  be.EGO
     ‘This (one) is Tashi [...I’m assigning this one to be Tashi].’

(5)  khyed.rang dge.rgan yin
     you      teacher  be.EGO
     ‘You’re (a / the) teacher [...I’m assigning you the role of teacher].’
The use of egophoric *yin* in simple equatives and predications like these can grant them a performative flavor. For instance, (4) was offered as appropriate if the speaker is not merely identifying Tashi, but rather *picking* something to represent Tashi by fiat in some context, e.g. to select which character Tashi is to play in a video game, or to pick which object represents Tashi in a game of make-believe, or in a scenario that the speaker recounts using spatial props (say, using a marker to represent Tashi in telling a visual story). (5) was offered as appropriate not when the speaker is stating a fact about the addressee’s job, but rather when the speaker is assigning the addressee a role as teacher, in a game or play (for instance, it might be said by a casting director who needs to choose an actor to play the part of a teacher).

In either of these cases, the use of the non-egophoric *red* would be construed as merely stating Tashi’s identity or the addressee’s job: the use of *yin* instead triggers a perlocutionary performative, where by merely saying what Tashi is or what role the addressee has, they come to occupy those roles (at least in the representation or role-play that can be performatively established). The speaker here doesn’t state a fact about pre-assigned roles given, but rather *assigns* those roles by making an utterance, and the egophor somehow marks this, despite (4)-(5) having no clear first-person orientation.

Perlocutionary performatives are interesting for the study of egophoricity because they use egophoric marking in a way that defies the descriptions typically given of its semantic function. Unlike the vast majority of uses of egophors in ÚT, for instance, perlocutionary performatives don’t require the evidential origo (the speaker, for egophorically-marked matrix indicative clauses used to make assertions) to appear as an argument of the clause’s predicate, either explicitly or implicitly: there is no apparent ‘first-person orientation’ in the examples above. Further, unlike slightly more marginal uses of egophors in ÚT (see the note at the end of section 4), the perlocutionary performative examples also don’t obviously orient toward the origo in a weaker way, e.g. by requiring the origo merely to stand in a genitive relation to one of the arguments of the predicate, or to express some other deep or intimate familiarity with the eventuality.

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3Throughout, I use the Tibetanist’s term ‘(evidential) origo’ for the individual that is responsible for the information associated with a clause that’s marked with an egophor or evidential, and so responsible for the information a speech act using that clause conveys. In the study of egophoricity, there are many labels for this same notion: a survey and list of these is given in San Roque et al. (2018).
And so perlocutionary performatives provide an interesting test case for theories of egophoricity: one desideratum of such a theory should be that it captures even unusual uses of egophors like these, which don’t obviously fit into any previous construals of the topic. To that end, it might be a good idea to work backwards, suggest a general account of egophoricity that can accommodate these uses, and see whether the results leave us with a more satisfying account of egophoricity as a whole. This is what I’ll attempt in the present study, by offering an account of egophoricity in ÚT, and showing how it can allow perlocutionary performatives to fall out as a natural result. Such an account should explain not only why perlocutionary performatives exist, but also why they’re so marginal.

A couple points bear mentioning before continuing. First, I want to make clear that the performative readings of (1)–(5) are not the only ones available. In fact, egophors in such sentences have a vague range of possible interpretations (when they’re felicitous at all), out of which the performative readings appear as one striking possibility. So for instance, (1) might convey that the speaker is offering the book to the addressee, but it also might convey that the speaker wrote the book for the addressee, or bought it for them, etc. Likewise, (3) might imply that the speaker is the one that made the tea, and so on.

These sorts of possible readings, which are not strictly performative, will be important for the ultimate account given of these phenomena in section 3.3. Crucially, there doesn’t seem to be any intrinsic performative semantics to egophors: rather, egophoricity is a broader semantic category, which allows for a vague range of interpretations in non-canonical situations (e.g., when there is no first-person material in an assertion), which for some reason lends itself well to performativity.

Second, the distribution of perlocutionary performatives is extremely restricted. Part of this is obviously for pragmatic reasons: there are very few things that one can make true by declaring them to be so in a performative speech act, and any assertion that doesn’t pertain to this small set of things will have a performative reading ruled out by default, due to the pragmatics, and not due to the semantics of egophoric marking. But these performatives are also apparently grammatically restricted: I haven’t seen any examples of such egophoric performatives in ÚT that don’t use the copula yin. The significance of this fact will be addressed below.4

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4That I haven’t come across any such examples of course doesn’t mean that there aren’t any: a more sophisticated elicitation might uncover them, although performati...
2 The issue with Garrett (2001)’s view

Garrett (2001) comments extensively on this phenomenon, and his explanation for why egophoric marking in ÜT (which encodes what he calls ‘ego evidentiality’) yields perlocutionary performative readings centers on his idea that “there is an evidential link between first-person knowledge and performativity” Garrett (2001: 142). That is, the special kind of ‘first-person knowledge’ of the evidential origo that egophors encode is somehow especially appropriate to record the peculiar way in which a speaker justifies a performative statement.

The account of what exactly this evidential link amounts to is nuanced, and its pieces are scattered throughout Garrett’s dissertation, but the basic idea rests on two commitments. First, he follows Bach & Harnish (1992), against the classical treatment in Austin (1962), in holding that performatives have ordinary assertive illocutionary force: that is, they state something ‘about the world’ in the way an assertion using an indicative sentence usually does, which can either be true or false, but they appear trivially true when their felicity conditions are met, since in that case all it takes to make them true is the speaker’s very utterance (and accompanying intentions), meaning that they’re ‘true by say-so.’ Second, he holds that evidentials in general, of which he takes egophors to be a subset, enforce a relation between the evidential origo and a proposition, and that ‘ego evidentiality’ in particular requires “evidential immediacy, which is the primitive and special way information about oneself is portrayed to oneself” Garrett (2001: 150). This means that the use of an egophor requires the origo to be related to the proposition denoted by its clause in this special, immediate way.

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egophors are rare enough that one has to be careful on over-relying on the artificiality of such elicitation.

5 This is, so far as I know, the only account that’s been offered for this phenomenon. Agha (1993: 176 ff.) gives vague a passing comment on similar examples.

6 This is the work that Garrett makes reference to, but it’s part of a latter-day polemical exchange regarding the idea as it was introduced elsewhere. The original positive statement by Bach and Harnish of the view that performatives are ‘like constatives’ in their illocutionary force can be found in chapter 10 of Bach & Harnish (1979). See the references therein for the classical debate as to whether the original Austinian examples of performatives ought to be construed with an ordinary ‘constative’ illocutionary force. This debate is briefly outlined, with some more references, in Garrett (2001: §4.2.3.2).

7 There’s a third crucial component to Garrett’s account that I can’t do justice to here:
The use of an egophor can then yield a performative reading, because the performative utterance makes the proposition asserted ‘true by say-so,’ and this is done (aside from the surrounding felicity conditions being met) solely by the speaker’s intention. Since “the speaker’s own intentions intimate themselves to the speaker herself in a unique way – they do not and cannot have the same effect on other people” (ibid. 150-151), one of the things the egophor can encode is that the origo has special, unmediated access to those intentions (that is, the intentions to make the proposition true by the utterance). Hence, the egophor can imply a performative reading of the assertion, if its use implies that the speaker is claiming to have unmediated access to such an intention as the justification for why the asserted proposition is true.

I’ll leave it to the side in the text, since I don’t think it’s crucial to evaluating his claim, but it deserves a comment. Garrett holds that ‘ego evidentiality’ in ÚT is not substantively semantically encoded by egophoric copulas and auxiliaries, but is rather a kind of ‘default evidentiality’ that appears on evidentially neutral markers. The idea is that, since ÚT elsewhere grammatically encodes both ‘direct’ (e.g. in copulas like ’dug) and ‘indirect’ (e.g. in copulas like yod.red) evidential marking, the remnant neutral, semantically unmarked copulas (which for Garrett include what I take to be genuine egophoric markers in copular constructions, viz. yin and yod) are forced by implication to encode whatever evidential value remains on the sorts of evidential ‘hierarchies’ of information source proposed by authors like Barnes (1984), de Haan (1999), and Faller (2012). Since ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ evidentiality mutually exhaust that entire hierarchy, all that remains is for the neutral markers to encode a kind of ‘groundless’ or ‘zero’ evidentiality, which is rooted neither in perception nor inference, and this ends up having egophoric connotations, because ‘ego evidentiality’ is in some sense not rooted in any information source at all. I think that this view is untenable, for two reasons, one having to do with Tibetan itself, and the other having to do with the broader typology of egophoricity. As to Tibetan: it’s now generally agreed that Tibetan lacks ‘indirect’ evidential markers of the sort Garrett talks about, and that what were thought to be such indirect markers (like yog.red [yod.red]: cf. Denwood (1999: 121 ff.)) are in fact evidentially neutral, but can sometimes acquire indirective implications due to their paradigmatic contrast with other evidentials (cf. the comments in Caplow (2017: 234); DeLancey (2018: 587); Oisel (2017: 96); Tournadre (2017: 104)). As such, a key piece of the ‘evidential hierarchy’ account falls apart, since Tibetan evidentials don’t exhaust any such hierarchy. As to the typology more broadly: we now know that it’s just empirically false that egophoricity is typically encoded by default markers (this should be clear from even a sampling of recent descriptive work on egophoricity, e.g. in the volume Floyd et al. (2018): but see, e.g., Curnow (2002) [on Awa Pit] or Hargreaves (2005) [on Kathmandu Newari] for examples of earlier works detailing egophoric marking that is in no sense morphologically default). That Tibetan copulas and auxiliaries often have the same form in both egophoric and evidentially neutralized environments appears just to be a local morphological quirk that other language families don’t share. And so the key evidence lying behind the ‘default’ view also falls apart.
The basic idea, in other words, is that egophoricity in general encodes access to special information about the origo that only the origo itself can access, and that the intentions accompanying a performative are just one kind of such special information. Egophoric markers therefore have no specifically performative meaning in their semantic content – the ‘link’ between egophoricity and performativity mentioned above is rather that access to the intentions required for carrying out a performative speech act are one species of the sort of thing accessible solely to the origo in an immediate way, and so justifying a performative on the basis of access to such intentions is just one of the sorts of thing an egophor can do.\textsuperscript{8}

This explanation of perlocutionary performatives has a problem: it’s not true in general that in ÚT, assertion justified by special access to information available only to the evidential origo always licenses the use of an egophor. In particular, so-called \textit{endopathic effects} (cf. Tournadre & Polla (2014)) in ÚT show that there are cases in which the use of an egophor is \textit{not} appropriate, even when the speaker asserts something about themselves on the basis of information available only to themselves in a special, immediate way; in these cases, some other evidential marker has to be used instead. This kind of privileged, immediate access to information by the origo is therefore not a sufficient condition for the felicitous use of an egophor in ÚT, and so the crucial premise holding together Garrett (2001)’s account falls through: even granting Garrett’s premises about the origo’s special access to their own intentions in using performatives, we’re left without a sufficient explanation for why this should license the use of an egophor.

To illustrate the problem, we have to be familiar two related facts about ÚT. The first fact is that in addition to egophoricity, the language contains a further major evidential category: it grammatically encodes (in the appropriate sorts of clauses) what we might call perceptual evidentiality.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{8}This sort of analysis of egophors as encoding access to information that only the origo can in principle have is foreshadowed elsewhere, e.g. in DeLancy (1985), who suggests that the use of volitional egophors, like the perfective agentive egophor \textit{pa.yin}, can only be used with a first-person subject because they require the origo to have access to the volition responsible for the action, which in principle only the actor (referred to by the subject) can have access to, meaning that the actor must be the origo (=the speaker) for the use of the egophor to be appropriate.

\textsuperscript{9}The terminology regarding this category is all over the place in the literature, but the idea is consistent: e.g., Caplow (2017) calls these markers ‘perceptual,’ Oisel (2017) ‘sensorial,’ Hill & Gawne (2017) ‘experiential,’ and Tournadre & Dorje (2003) ‘testimonial.’ Perceptual evidentials in ÚT typically contrast paradigmatically with both egophors and evidentially neutral markers. They appear only in finite clauses that
Roughly, perceptual evidentials encode that the evidential origo of the clause in which they appear has learned of the eventuality described by that clause by directly witnessing it. The second fact is that there’s a peculiar interaction in UT between the use of these perceptual evidentials and the use of predicates that relate to certain internal states of experiencers. In particular, reports of some kinds of an individual’s internal states (such as cold or hunger) using a perceptual evidential typically require the origo to be identical to the experiencer (the one who is cold or hungry, etc.). The restriction is that only the experiencer of such states themselves can learn by direct witness (of the sort appropriate for the use of a perceptual evidential) that they are in such states. For assertions with perceptual evidentials, the result is that speakers are typically allowed to pronounce only on their own internal states using perceptual evidentials, and not on the states of others.

Here are a couple typical examples, using the verbs ‘khyag ‘be cold’ and grod.khog.togs ‘be hungry’ (cf. Garrett (2001: §3.4)). The use of the

10 I say ‘roughly,’ because a lot of qualifications would be needed to make this characterization accurate (perhaps some of you who know a lot about evidentials, Tibetan, or both, are yelling at the page right now), but this will work for present purposes. One note about the most glaring problem with this gloss, though: as Hill (2017) outlines, Tibetan perceptual evidentials interact with temporal marking to determine what exactly the origo is required to witness. One crucial effect this has is that in aspectually perfect constructions, a perceptual evidential conveys that the origo witnessed the results of an eventuality, instead of the eventuality itself (see below). A more accurate summary of the category’s contribution is that it requires the origo to have learned about an eventuality by witnessing something connected to that eventuality at the reference time encoded by the finite clause (and when the reference and eventuality time are the same, the origo has to witness the eventuality itself).

11 These sorts of endopathic effects are typical of Tibetan: cf. Sun (1993) on such effects in Amdo Tibetan. Other authors have noticed endopathic effects in other language families, but the comments are so cursory and scattered that it would be impossible to collect decent references to them; Lee (2012) has a more extended discussion of this sort of thing in Korean, which also has perceptual evidentiality. There doesn’t appear to be any way to determine from the objective features of the ‘internal states’ of experiencers exactly which sorts of predicates denoting those states will trigger endopathic effects: although there are broad generalities, with things like hunger and cold being paradigmatically ‘endopathic,’ it looks to be a matter of cross-linguistic variation which such internal states are treated as only being observable by their experiencer.
perceptual evidentials means not only that the speaker is claiming that someone is cold or hungry, but that they (the origo) know about this because they directly perceive this very cold or hunger. Since one is taken to be able to directly perceive only one’s own internal state of cold or hunger, the result is that the first-person statements are felicitous, while their non-first-person counterparts aren’t. This difference in felicity, based on whether the origo and experiencer are identical, is the endopathic effect.\footnote{A few clarifications regarding these examples. First, the endopathic restriction isn’t strictly a first-person one: it always follows the origo, and so in constructions where the origo shifts away from the speaker, so does the restriction (thus, an unbiased question as to whether the addressee is cold, using a perceptual evidential, would be felicitous instead only in the second person, because there the addressee is the origo, not the speaker). Second, Kalsang et al. (2013: 554) have disputed the exact range of these endopathic effects, claiming that sometimes one can use perceptual evidentials like ’dug in ÚT to report on others’ internal experiential states. I haven’t witnessed this myself, and so won’t pronounce on it, but in either case, the only relevant thing is that the effect exists, and creates a contrast in felicity, not that this contrast is absolute or always active in every discourse context. Finally, the English glosses of these experiential verbs might be misleading: both are verbs, not copular constructions with adjectival predicates; ’khyag pertains to ‘internal’ processes of cold like freezing, not objective low temperature or disposition to cause experiences of cold in others (for which the adjective grang.mo is more appropriate); grod.khog ltogs is technically complex, incorporating the noun grod.khog ‘stomach,’ but apparently semantically redundantly.}

\begin{verbatim}
(6) (nga / ?bkra.shis) grod.khog.ltogs kyi. ’dug
    I Tashi be-hungry IPFV.PER
    ‘(I’m / ?Tashi’s) cold [...as I learn by perceiving this].’
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
(7) (nga / ?bkra.shis) ’khyag gi. ’dug
    (I Tashi) be-cold IPFV.PER
    ‘(I’m / ?Tashi’s) cold [...as I learn by perceiving this].’
\end{verbatim}

There are two related things to note about these sorts of examples. First, they show that knowledge of one’s own internal states by perception constitute exactly the sort of case of special, immediate knowledge Garrett is talking about in ÚT: it’s possible for someone to know about another’s internal state, but not in the special way required by direct perception of it. Second, it’s not just that the use of the perceptual evidential is expected or default, when pronouncing on one’s own internal experiential states on the basis of experiencing them. Rather, the use of an egophor here is
actually infelicitous, on the reading of the sentences intended for (6)-(7) above. One can use an egophor in these sorts of first-person ascriptions, but the interpretation is different: what the sentences then mean is not that one is presently cold, hungry, etc., but that one is habitually cold or hungry, as a constitutional matter (a temporal adverb like *deng.sang* ‘these days’ can also be used to make the example more natural, and enforce the habitual reading explicitly).

(8) *(deng.sang) nga grod.khog.ltogs kyi.yod*

these-days I be-hungry IPFV.EGO

‘(These days) I’m hungry [...am chronically hungry].’

(9) *(deng.sang) nga ’khyag gi.yod*

these-days I be-cold IPFV.EGO

‘(These days) I’m cold [...am chronically cold].’

Not only is there an aspectual difference, so that the sentences in (8)-(9) must be read habitually as opposed to progressively, but also the evidential

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13 Hili & Gawne (2017: 16, exx. 9e, 10d) note a similar sort of example with the verb *na* ‘be sick:’ *nga na gi.’dug* ‘I’m sick (at the moment)’ vs. *nga na gi.yod* ‘I’m (chronically) sick.’ In addition to the aspectual difference they note, the evidential one holds here, too: the first sentence commits the speaker to knowing that he’s sick by presently feeling sick, whereas the second just presumes long familiarity with his own constitution. *na* ‘be sick’ doesn’t typically trigger endopathic effects, so the effect is more general than with just endopathic predicates.

14 A note here on ÚT aspectual marking: the verbal construction used here, which allows both the perceptual marker *kyi.’dug / gi.’dug* and the egophoric marker *kyi.yod / gi.yod*, is a neutral imperfective, which is semantically indifferent between progressive and habitual readings, though context, the verb used, and other semantic material in the clause can bias the reading of a sentence toward one or the other. In this case, the other semantic material (the egophoric or perceptual marking) is biasing the clause toward one reading or the other, and so it’s a combination of evidentiality and aspect that makes the examples more narrowly progressive or habitual. Crucially, the marker *gi.yod* in of itself has no anti-progressive semantics: it is elsewhere perfectly compatible with progressive as well as habitual readings. There is therefore something about egophoric evidentiality that makes its use inappropriate for progressive readings in cases like these, pertaining to experiencers’ internal states, which is highly surprising on Garrett’s account of egophoricity, since it’s precisely to these states that the origo has special, unmediated access to. My own account to follow should make it clear what I think the problem is: one must learn that one is in some such internal state via a distinct eventuality of having a specific feeling, and this is incompatible with the use of an egophor, which requires the eventuality denoted by the clause itself (in this case, just being cold, sick, etc.) also to be the very eventuality that causes the origo to know about it.
justification for making an assertion with the sentences changes. The way one knows about one’s own present experiential state according to (6)-(7) is by presently experiencing it; the way one knows about one’s own habitual state, or disposition to be in such states, according to (8)-(9) is simply by long, unspecified familiarity with one’s own constitution.

From the behavior of endopathic effects above, we see that in ÜT there are certain cases of privileged information accessible only to the origo in a special way, namely information acquired by direct sensation of the origo’s own present internal state, but that asserting that one is in such an experiential state on the basis of such special access cannot be done using an egophor: use of an egophor is instead restricted to commenting on one’s own habitual disposition to such states. Egophors in general are therefore not always licensed in ÜT by the origo’s access to such special, immediately presented information. And so the crucial premise motivating Garrett (2001)’s account of perlocutionary performatives is false, as the ‘evidential immediacy’ that Garrett describes is not guaranteed to license the use of an egophor. And so regardless of whether the origo actually has immediate access to any special performative intentions, of which only the origo can be aware, such access is not a satisfactory explanation for why perlocutionary performatives license the use of egophors.

3 Egophors as simplex markers of learning

In the following I’ll outline my own alternative account of what’s going on with perlocutionary performatives in ÜT, in several steps: the goal is to work backwards, by sketching a plausible account of egophoricity generally in ÜT, and then showing that this account can derive the possibility of perlocutionary performatives marked with egophors as a consequence. In

Oddly, Garrett (2001: §4.2.3.4) argues for his case regarding performatives by appealing to a notorious phenomenon in Japanese (cf. Tenny (2006)) that mirrors endopathic phenomena in other languages, but does not require the use of overt perceptual evidentials. Garrett takes the relation of performativity and these endopathic effects in Japanese to be confirmation of his hypothesis that egophoricity and performativity are linked, apparently mistaking endopathic effects for egophoric ones. This is unexpected, since Garrett is independently aware of Tibetan endopathic effects; he just doesn’t draw the connection between Tibetan and Japanese. So Garrett certainly expects egophoricity to pattern with endopathic effects, since he associates the two in his comments on Japanese. And so I take it we’re on the right track in criticizing his view, when we point out that this association actually does not hold in ÜT itself, where endopathic effects are tracked by perceptual evidentiality, and not egophoricity.
section 3.1, I briefly summarize a current view in the semantics literature, that ‘classical evidentials’ (that is, non-egophoric evidentials) introduce secondary learning events specifying how the evidential origo has learned about the eventuality described by a clause, and show how it applies to ÜT perceptual evidentials. In section 3.2, I propose that egophors, in contrast to classical evidentials, be treated as markers that require that the origo has learned about the eventuality denoted by a clause from that very eventuality itself, and show how some interesting results follow from this, which explain the distribution of the most canonical use of egophors in ÜT. Finally, in section 3.3, I show how this account of egophors also provides an interesting way to account for perlocutionary performatives. The result is a picture of egophoricity on which such performative uses are not only expected to exist, but expected to be marginal.

3.1 Classical evidentials and learning events

There’s a view current in the formal semantics literature which says that evidentials are essentially markers of learning. Their main semantic contribution is to attach to a clause that denotes an eventuality, and to introduce a distinct, secondary event to the semantic content conveyed by that clause. This secondary event is a learning event, i.e. the event of the evidential origo learning about the existence of the eventuality associated with the clause marked by the evidential. In other words, what an evidential does is to place a commitment on the origo, to the effect that they learned about the eventuality associated with a clause in a certain way. Different kinds of evidentials might then relate the newly introduced learning event and the ‘main eventuality’ of the clause in different ways, to produce different sorts of ‘information source’ to which the origo is committed (direct, indirect, etc.), and time marking on the clause might compose with the evidential

\[16\] This view can be found most clearly in works like Lee (2011), Smirnova (2013), Klose (2014), and Koev (2017), where it’s been applied to Korean, Bulgarian, and Aymara. There are other closely related views, such as that of Speas (2010), which has been applied to ÜT in Kalsang et al. (2013), and which casts evidentials as relating two distinct situations (essentially corresponding to an ‘event situation’ and a ‘learning situation’). A very similar forerunner to this view, applied to Cuzco Quechua, is found in Faller (2004), and other precursors include Woodbury (1986)’s comments on Sherpa, and Nikolaeva (1999)’s treatment of Northern Ostyak. There are also certain descriptive accounts, such as Fleck (2007)’s treatment of Matses evidentials, that are in a highly similar spirit.
to determine how the learning event and main eventuality are temporally related to one another.

This picture has been applied only to non-egophoric evidentials, which for convenience I’ll call ‘classical evidentials,’ in order to distinguish them from egophors. The terminology doesn’t much matter to me – one can either see egophors as part of a class distinct from evidentials, or one can see them still as evidentials, so long as they’re distinguished from their classical counterparts. The only purpose of the term ‘classical evidentials’ is to have a way of distinguishing the two categories, which have similar, but distinct, semantic roles.

It’s worth briefly sketching how such an account might work in the case of ÙT classical evidentials. As noted in section 2 above, ÙT contains at least one category of classical evidential, encoded by its perceptual markers, which require the origo to have learned about an eventuality through perception of a certain sort. Since the goal of this paper is to treat the egophors in ÙT, and not its classical evidentials, I won’t go into any exact implementation of this sort of treatment for ÙT perceptual markers, but an outline will be useful in setting up the account of egophors in contrast.

To give an example of a typical ÙT perceptual evidential construction, we can use the verbal imperfective perceptual marker gi.’dug (contracted as gis) already seen in section 2. On a present progressive reading of a sentence containing this evidential, the result is a sentence which places two commitments on the origo (=speaker) when it’s used for an assertion: (i) the origo commits to the existence of the eventuality denoted by the clause that the evidential marks; and (ii) the origo commits to learning about the existence of this eventuality by directly perceiving it.

(10) char.pa btang (gi.’dug / gis)
    rain    send IPFV.PER

‘It’s raining [...as I learn by perceiving this].’

There’s also a marginal reading of (10) that’s read habitually as opposed to progressively: the resulting meaning is that it tends to rain, and the origo has learned this by habitually perceiving this happen. This reading is usually offered with some hesitation, I presume because it’s pragmatically odd: the conditions required to learn about a habitual tendency through perception are prohibitively stringent, and apparently require witnessing the habit manifest multiple times. I assume this reading, and its marginality, would have to eventually be explained by how aspect and evidentiality compose, but I leave this to the side for now, and focus just on the ‘normal’ progressive reading of (10). btang here is really more of a semantically-bleached verbalizer: throughout, I just translate these with the closest gloss of their main verb counterparts.
(10) commits the origo (=speaker) to holding that: (i) it’s raining, at the
time of utterance (that is, a specific raining event encompasses the reference
time, which here is the time of utterance); and (ii) the origo has learned
(or learns, or is learning, if you like) about this very raining event at the
reference time, i.e. during the ongoing raining event itself, by perceiving
that it’s happening. The perception in question can be of any kind, so that
(10) is justified when the speaker sees it raining, feels the water on her skin,
hears raindrops on the roof, etc.

On the present picture of classical evidentials as markers of learning, we’d
schematize these two commitments of the speaker in the following way:
(i) there exists an ongoing raining event; and (ii) there exists a secondary
perceptual learning event, of the speaker coming to know about the existence
of the first event, such that this secondary event is causally responsible
for the speaker knowing about the first event at the time of utterance. It’s
something like the following, where \( e \) is the main eventuality denoted by the
clause, \( e' \) is the learning event, \( \odot \) is the origo, and \( t \) is the reference time:

\[
\text{(11) Commitments on char.pa blang gi.'dug} \\
\text{a. At-issue, proffered content:} \\
\text{rain}'(e) \land t \subseteq \tau(e) \\
\text{b. Not-at-issue, secondary content:\textsuperscript{18}} \\
\text{LEARN}(e, e', t, \odot) \land \text{PER}(e, e') \land e \neq e'
\]

We read (11) as follows. The at-issue content says that the eventuality \( e \),
the main eventuality denoted by the clause, is a raining event. Further, due
to progressive aspect, the reference time \( t \) is contained within the timespan
of the raining event, \( \tau(e) \). The not-at-issue content says that the secondary
learning event \( e' \), contributed by the evidential, is not identical to the main
eventuality \( e \). Further, \( e' \) is an event of the origo \( \odot \) learning about the
existence of \( e \) during \( t \) the reference time: we say that \text{LEARN}(e, e', t, \odot) is
true just in case the origo knows at the utterance time about the existence

\textsuperscript{18}I draw a distinction here between the at-issue and not-at-issue contents of an assertion.
Evidentials generally (classical and egophoric), including those in UT, robustly display
a certain special discourse behavior, where the secondary commitment introduced
by the evidential is introduced as new discourse content, but without proffering that
content as being ‘at-issue.’ I won’t address exactly what this amounts to, or how
to compose these distinct commitments, here: cf. Koev (2018) on the notion of ‘P-
(not)-at-issueness,’ which evidentials display, and Korotkova (2020) on complications
relating to at-issueness in the use of evidentials.
of $e$, and $e'$ is an event of the origo acquiring the knowledge that $e$ exists during $t$ (which knowledge persists until the utterance time).\footnote{One clarification about the \textsc{learn} predicate appealed to here. The idea is not that the learning event $e'$ is a learning event in the sense that $e$ is a raining event, or in the sense that a verb like \textsc{learn} would encode. The event is whatever it is – maybe an event of seeing, or hearing, or what have you, and \textsc{learn} simply attributes a special property to that event, whatever it is. Namely, that event of seeing, hearing, or whatever, is also an event in which the origo comes to know about the existence of $e$, which knowledge persists until the utterance time. This clarification is necessary due to certain complications in the ontology of events: the way I’ve presented things may imply some weird stuff about the nature of events more generally, but I’m not too concerned about it – as long as the intuitive idea is clear, the technical details can be reframed as needed. I also have the verbs and evidentials introduce event variables, which I presume are assigned values in context like any other – for simplicity I don’t include existential generalization over events here, and assume that if existential generalization occurs, it does so at a discourse level.}

Finally, this learning is of whatever formal character it needs to be to satisfy the perceptual requirements on the evidential (so that $\text{PER}(e, e')$). We don’t need to decide exactly what sort of relation this perceptual requirement is here: maybe it means that during $e'$, $e$ overlaps with the perceptual field of the origo (ala \textsc{Faller (2004)}), or that $e'$ and $e$ are spatiotemporally overlapping in a certain way (ala \textsc{Koev (2017)}), or that $e'$ mereologically contains $e$ (ala \textsc{Speas (2010)}); all that matters is that $e'$ and $e$ are related in such a way as to guarantee that $e'$ causes the origo to know about $e$ by perceiving it. Of course, all of the above would have to be composed from the parts of the clause, including the separate contributions of the verb, aspect, and evidentiality: here I just list the presumed ‘finished product.’

There are several pleasant features of this kind of treatment of perceptual evidentials in \textsc{UT}. First, it accounts for the causal relation that the evidential introduces between the speaker’s perception of the eventuality denoted by the clause and their knowledge of it. (10) requires not just that it’s raining, and that the speaker witnessed this, but also that their witnessing that it’s raining is the reason that they presently know that it’s raining. Perceptual evidentials are not felicitous if, for some reason, the speaker witnessed something, but knows about it now for some other reason, e.g. if they forgot what they saw in the meantime, and relearned that it happened as a result of someone else’s testimony. In such a case, the origo witnessed the event, and knows about it, but their witness is not the reason that they presently know about it. The \textsc{learn} predicate ensures that the learning event is responsible for their present knowledge.
Second, it accounts for the *specificity* of ÜT perceptual evidentials (cf. Goldstein & Nornang 1984: xvi, quoted in Garrett (2001: 83)). This basically means that such evidentials require not just that the origo knows about an eventuality because of perception, but that there’s some *specific* instance of perceiving a *specific* eventuality that is responsible for the origo’s present knowledge. This is accounted for by the fact that the evidential introduces two specific eventualities, \( e \) and \( e' \), and so requires the origo not only to perceive \( e \) itself, but also that there must be some specific event \( e' \) in which this happens.

Third, because this approach countenances the existence of two distinct eventualities, it allows us in principle to manipulate the temporal relations between these two, which in turn can explain how temporal marking on the clause can change the way the learning event and the main eventuality interact. This is desirable, because we see this kind of interaction in ÜT, which marks many of its finite clauses simultaneously with aspect and evidentiality. For example, an assertion about rain like (10) can have its temporal location modified in a few ways, and when this happens, the temporal relation between the learning event and the raining eventuality always behaves predictably. Take (12), which by the use of the temporal adverb *kha.sa* ‘yesterday’ prefers a past progressive reading with *gi.’dug / gis*, and (13), which by the use of a perceptual perfect (cf. Hill (2017)) *bzhag / ’dug* (with no intervening *gi*) forces a ‘results’ reading of the evidential.

(12)  
\[
\textit{kha.sa char.pa btang (gi.’dug / gis)}
\]

yesterday rain send IPFV.PER

‘It was raining yesterday [...as I learned by perceiving it].’

(13)  
\[
\textit{char.pa btang (bzhag / ’dug)}
\]

rain send PRF.PER

‘(Oh,) it’s rained [...as I learn by perceiving the results].’

---

20Here’s a representative example that I like, which demonstrates this feature of ÜT perceptual evidentials. Predication in ÜT using perceptual evidential copulas yields readings that are significantly different from cases of predication with evidentially neutral copulas. For example, one might say *bkra.shis spyang.po yod.red* ‘Tashi is clever,’ using the evidentially neutral copula *yod.red*, to make a general statement about a long-standing intrinsic property of Tashi, with no commitment to Tashi doing any specific clever thing. *bkra.shis spyang.po ’dug* ‘Tashi is clever,’ on the other hand, using the perceptual copula *’dug*, requires the speaker to commit to a specific instance of witnessing Tashi doing some particular clever thing. It cannot merely commit the speaker to thinking that Tashi is clever in general, on the basis of having seen him at various points, for example.
(12) requires that: (i) there was an ongoing raining event at some time during the day before the day of the utterance time; and (ii) the origo (=speaker) learned about this at that time, during the raining event on the previous day, by perceiving it. This makes sense, given our treatment here: if the temporal adverb places the reference time in the past, then that reference time, due to the progressive aspectual marking, must remain contained within the timespan of the raining event, and since the LEARN predicate makes use of the reference time as well, the learning (and so the perception) must have happened at this past time, too (not at the utterance time).

(13) requires that: (i) there was a raining event that’s now finished, and whose results [e.g., wet ground] remain at the reference / utterance time; (ii) the origo (=speaker) learned (or has just learned, or is just learning, if you like) about this event by perceiving, at the reference / utterance time, the results of the raining event (i.e., the origo has just perceived the wet ground, not the raining event itself).

Schematizing these examples in the same way we did (11), we’d get something like this, where \( t^\ast \) is the time of utterance:

(14) **Commitments on kha.sa char.pa btang gi.’dug**

a. At-issue proffered content:
\[
\text{rain}'(e) \land t \sqsubseteq \tau(e) \land t \prec_{\text{day}} t^\ast
\]

b. Not-at-issue, secondary content:
\[
\text{LEARN}(e, e', t, \odot) \land \text{PER}(e, e') \land e \neq e'
\]

(15) **Commitments on char.pa btang bzhag**

a. At-issue proffered content:
\[
\text{rain}''(e'') \land \text{END}(e'', e) \land t \sqsubseteq \tau(e)
\]

b. Not-at-issue, secondary content:
\[
\text{LEARN}(e, e', t, \odot) \land \text{PER}(e, e') \land e \neq e'
\]

Supposing that *kha.sa* ‘yesterday’ simply places the reference time within the day prior to the utterance time \( t^\ast \) (such that \( t \prec_{\text{day}} t^\ast \)), then (14) is the same as (11), except that the reference time has been so moved – and this requires the learning time, which tracks the reference time, to move as well, resulting in the right interpretation: the speaker now knows that

\[21\text{Cf. Lee (2011) for similar interactions in Korean between temporal marking and evidentiality that derive ‘results readings’ of perceptual evidentials.}\]
it was raining on the day prior to the utterance time, in virtue of having perceived the raining event during the time it was happening.

Then supposing that the contribution of the perfect is simply to replace the raining event with its end-state $e''$ (such that $\text{END}(e'', e)$, that is, $e$ is the end-state of $e''$, the raining event), then (15) is the same as (11), except that the relevant event $e$ is the end-state of the raining event, and this in turn is what the reference time is included within, and what it is that the origo learns about by perceiving it.\textsuperscript{22}

And so this sort of learning-event account of classical evidentials has some very fruitful applications for ÜT, and allows us insight into a wide array of behaviors of evidentials in the language. With this sketch in place, we can move on to see how the learning event approach can be modified to treat egophors, as learning markers of another sort.

### 3.2 Egophors in contrast to classical evidentials

With the above sketch of classical evidentials in place, we’re a skip and a hop away from a promising account of egophors.\textsuperscript{23} The basic idea I want to pursue is that, like classical evidentials, egophors are markers of learning. What differentiates them is that while classical evidentials are complex markers of learning – that is, they introduce a secondary event $e'$, not identical to the main eventuality described by the clause, $e$ – egophors are

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\textsuperscript{22}I take for granted that learning of the end-state of an event entails learning about the existence of the event itself, since the existence of the former implies the existence of the latter: hence to learn about $e$ is to learn about $e''$, the raining event that is now over.

\textsuperscript{23}The only formal account of the semantics of egophors I’m aware of is Coppock & Wechsler (2018), which implements Wechsler (2018)’s idea that egophors essentially encode self-ascription of properties by the evidential origo, so that they are a sort of de se marking. Coppock & Wechsler offer a sample semantics in this spirit, to treat the egophors of Kathmandu Newari. Their treatment is incomplete, even for that language, for a number of reasons, but ones which aren’t so far as I can see fatal to the approach. However, what in my view makes their basic approach untenable is that while egophors do require de se self-ascription, in particular because (as I’ll argue) they require the origo to identify themselves with one of the participants in the eventuality they’re asserting to exist, this is not all egophors do: they also have a learning requirement, such that the origo commits to presently knowing about the eventuality because they were a participant in it. This is required to account for a wide range of exceptional behaviors that egophors exhibit, and that I don’t think Coppock & Wechsler’s account can handle, since egophors are often inappropriate even where one is self-ascribing properties, if one is not in the appropriate learning relation to the described eventuality. See the comments below.
simplex markers of learning, which simply equate the eventuality denoted by the clause with the learning eventuality. That is, an egophor’s main semantic contribution is to require that the origo associated with a clause has learned about the eventuality denoted by that clause, not from a distinct learning event, but from the original eventuality itself, so that our $e$ is both the main eventuality, and the learning eventuality.

We can schematize the contribution of an egophor in the same way that we did for perceptual evidentials in ŪT above: the only difference is that we don’t introduce a secondary learning event $e'$, but rather place $e$, the main event denoted by the egophorically-marked clause, in all the relevant roles with respect to the origo and the LEARN predicate. So take an example with egophoric marking, as with the verbal imperfective egophor gi.yod:

(16) $(nga)\ kha.lag\ bzo\ gi.yod$

'I’m preparing (the) meal.' / ‘I prepare (the) meal.’

[Tournadre & Dorje (2003: 156)]

We would summarize the semantic content of (16) as follows, where $s^*$ is the speaker of the utterance and $m$ is the relevant meal:

(17) **Commitments on** $nga\ kha.lag\ bzo\ gi.yod$:

   a. At-issue proffered content:

   $make'(e) \land ag'(e, s^*) \land pat'(e, m) \land t \subseteq \tau(e)$

   b. Not-at-issue content:

   $\text{LEARN}(e, e, t, \odot)$

The commitments that the origo (=speaker) takes on in virtue of asserting (16) are therefore: (i) that the event $e$ is a making event, of which the speaker $s^*$ (denoted by the first-person pronoun) is the agent [the maker], and of which the meal is the patient $m$ [the thing made], and that the reference time is contained within the timespan of this making event; and (ii) that that very same event $e$ is also one of the origo $\odot$ learning of the existence of $e$ during $t$. Note: the origo did not learn about the making event from

---

24 The noun kha.lag ‘food / meal’ could be glossed either as definite or indefinite here. The optional first-person pronoun is especially redundant in this construction, which is heavily biased toward a first-person orientation (such that the speaker is the subject or maker of the food) due to the egophor: see below. In the schematization in (17), I assume a progressive interpretation for simplicity, but as the gloss shows, a habitual interpretation is also fine.
any other distinct event, and so there is no other event that is causally responsible for the origo knowing that the speaker is making the meal: not a distinct perception, not a distinct report, nothing other than the making event itself.25

What nga kha.lag bzo gi.yod ‘I’m preparing the meal’ means, then, is that the speaker is in the process of making the relevant meal at the reference time, and that the origo, who here is the speaker, knows about this making event because the making event itself is also an event of the origo coming to know about it (such that the origo still presently knows about it, at the time of utterance). I claim that this basic formal feature of egophors – that they equate the main eventuality with the learning eventuality, rather than introducing a new variable for a learning event non-identical with the main eventuality denoted by the clause – is at the root of all of egophors’ special semantic behaviors.

Before describing the crucial formal feature of this account that is relevant for the treatment of perlocutionary performatives here, it’s worth briefly noting that this treatment has a number of attractive consequences, much like the treatment of classical evidentials in section 3.1 above, and these consequences highlight exactly the ways in which egophors both resemble and differ from their classical counterparts.

First, recall from section 3.1 above that on the present treatment of evidentials as learning markers, ‘information source’ in evidentials (e.g., whether they’re ‘direct,’ ‘indirect,’ or what have you) arises as a result of two distinct events being related to one another by some relation like PER, which requires that the main eventuality and learning event be related in some way that’s appropriate for requiring perception of the main event by the origo. Whatever this relation is, it crucially requires two distinct

25 This is not to say that the origo might not, or does not, also perceive the making event, or hear a report about it, etc. Indeed, it’s quite common to have multiple sources of evidence for the existence of the same eventuality. What the egophor requires, however, is that even if one also has a separate perception or report of the making of the meal, this is not the reason that the origo currently knows about it – what is causally responsible for their present knowledge is the event of making the meal itself, in which the origo is participating. A separate event, e.g. of seeing this happen, is not taken by the grammar to grant the origo knowledge of what is ‘already known’ by egophoric means. Indeed, not to use an egophor here implies by contrast that the origo has not learned of the main eventuality from the eventuality itself, but by some other means, which has all sorts of semantic consequences. If one knows that one is making a meal by perceiving oneself doing it, this implies something odd (e.g. that one is waking up from a state of unconsciousness, or seeing a representation or recording of oneself, etc.).
eventualities, and the different ways in which those two eventualities relate is what causes differences in type of information source. For egophors, which do not introduce a second learning event, no such difference in relations between two eventualities is possible, which means that egophors do not encode distinctions among information source.

There is therefore no such thing as a ‘direct’ egophor, or an ‘indirect’ egophor, or anything like that: there are just egophors, and this falls out of their simplex nature as learning markers, since kinds of information source require distinct relations between eventualities. This is the right result, both from a typological perspective, and a language-internal one. Typologically, egophors simply don’t differ from language to language as to the kind of information source they encode: there is no cross-linguistic variation of the sort seen for classical evidentials between e.g. ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ egophors. Language-internally, for ÚT or for any other language with egophoricity, egophors have no special fixed relation to the notion of information source as encoded by classical evidentials: they have uses that could be called either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect,’ but the deeper point is that because they do not encode relations among distinct eventualities, such questions about directness and indirectness and so on simply don’t arise, and egophoricity is orthogonal to them.26

Second, the fact that for egophoric clauses the main and learning eventualities are the same means that the two cannot have distinct timespans: by definition, the timespan of the main and learning eventuality are identical, because the eventualities are identical. Therefore, while classical evidentials can shift the time of the main eventuality and learning event apart from one another (as with the perfect perceptuals treated in section 3.1 above, where the event of the origo perceiving something was shifted to take place after the raining event by the presence of perfect aspect), this simply cannot happen with egophors – the learning must always take place at the time of the main eventuality itself.

26One might object to this construal, on the grounds that egophors require a kind of ‘direct’ participatory evidence. While it’s true that one typically also perceives an eventualty that one consciously participates in, egophors in general don’t require directness in the classical sense. Hill (2013: 49-50) gives a nice example, of a livestock magnate who says g.yag mang.po yod ‘I have lots of yaks,’ and may be entitled to do so in virtue of being the yaks’ owner, despite never having seen the yaks or purchasing them himself. Additionally, that ‘directness’ in the sense of learning by perception and egophoricity are orthogonal categories in ÚT is shown by the fact that they are in asymmetrical pragmatic contrast: to use a perceptual typically implies a lack of egophoric evidence, while the reverse is not true.
This is right: it is never possible to use an egophor in a situation where the origo learns about the existence of an eventuality at a time distinct from that very eventuality. If one reports even an event that one took part in oneself, an egophor is not appropriate if one only learned about it after happened, e.g. due to some lack of awareness. For example, someone who kills an insect, but only realizes after the fact what they’ve done, might appropriately use a perceptual perfect to register their realization, but not an egophor:

(18) \[ \text{ngas } \text{bu } \text{bsad bzhag} \]

\[ \text{I.ERG bug kill PRF.PER} \]

‘I’ve killed an insect [...as I learn now, by perceiving the result].’

[Oisel (2017: 114, ex. 71)]

Third, because egophors invoke LEARN in the same way that classical evidentials do, the same ‘learning requirements’ which causally relate the learning and main eventualities is in force for egophors. That is, it is not enough for an egophor to be appropriate that the origo have participated in the main eventuality, and know that they did (even de se): it must also be that the eventuality itself is the reason that they presently know about its existence. If someone, for example, consciously participates in an eventuality, but then forgets about it later, and is yet later informed of what happened to them by hearsay, then an egophor is not appropriate, because the reason the origo knows about the eventuality at the utterance time is by report, not from the eventuality itself.

A vivid example of this can be seen in ‘past life effects,’ where the origo once knew something by direct participation in it, but after a long period of time (from one life to the next), forgot about it, and had to relearn it later by other means. Note how in (19), the evidential is perceptual, not egophoric:

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27 An example like (18) might be thought to have to do with volitionality: that is, the lack of an egophor signals that the bug was killed inadvertently. It’s true that the lack of an egophor can imply a lack of volitionality, specifically when a volitional verb is used in a construction where an egophor would typically imply that the origo is agent of the main eventuality (see below). But in this case, a lack of agency isn’t enough to explain why an egophor isn’t appropriate: for example, an egophor wouldn’t be used here even if the killing was volitional, so long as the origo didn’t realize it was a bug they killed until later. In this case, the origo killed on purpose, but didn’t learn that they killed a bug (which is what the sentence reports) until afterward.
But the most important feature of this account, and the one that’s crucial for perlocutionary performatives, is that according to it, the use of an egophor requires that the origo be a participant in the main eventuality denoted by the clause. This is because: (i) the learning eventuality is one of the origo learning about the existence of the main eventuality; (ii) therefore, the origo must be a participant in the learning eventuality; (iii) the egophor requires that the learning and main eventualities are the very same; and so (iv) the origo must be a participant in the main eventuality. This participatory requirement doesn’t hold for classical evidentials, since the learning and main eventuality are distinct, meaning that the origo must be a participant in the former, but not necessarily the latter, but with an egophor, there is nowhere else for the origo to go – it must participate in the one and only eventuality that’s introduced.

This feature of egophors results in their most striking feature: that they are first-person oriented (or origo-oriented, meaning speaker-oriented in assertions), in the sense that the origo is typically required to occupy a role in the asserted eventuality, which often means a role projected by the verb, which in turn often means (in sentences used for assertions) that there’s a first-person argument to the verb. We saw this above in (16), where the egophor strongly prefers a first-person subject, because the origo (=speaker) occupies the role of agent [maker]. This is often the only plausible reading of an egophorically-marked clause like (16), which can either include a first-person subject, or drop its subject and receive a first-person interpretation anyway: this is because the role of agent is often the only one for the origo to occupy, since the other main role in the eventuality [the thing made] is already occupied by the meal (which is presumably not the speaker!).

And so to begin with, an egophorically-marked clause will be strange if there’s no plausible way to construe the origo as a participant in the eventuality:28 For instance, in (20), the main roles of the making event are

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28An example like (20) doesn’t have to be infelicitous: but crucially, its felicitous use will
already occupied by individuals other than the speaker, which makes the egophor odd in most circumstances (though not all, as we’ll note below). Its commitments would be as in (21), where $b$ is Tashi, and $m$ again is the meal:

(20) $^?{\text{bkra.shis kha.lag bzo gi.yod}}$

Tashi meal make ipfv.ego

$^?{\text{‘Tashi’s preparing (the) meal.’}}$ / $^?{\text{‘Tashi prepares (the) meal.’}}$

(21) **Commitments on bkra.shis kha.lag bzo gi.yod:**

a. At-issue proffered content:

$\text{make}'(e) \wedge \text{ag}'(e, b) \wedge \text{pat}'(e, m) \wedge t \sqsubseteq \tau(e)$

b. Not-at-issue content:

$\text{LEARN}(e, e, t, \circ)$

The not-at-issue content requires that the main event $e$ be one of the origo learning about it; but this can’t be unless the origo is a participant in $e$, and in this case it’s not clear how the origo would be a participant in the making event, which includes Tashi and the meal as semantically-encoded participants.

An interesting feature about this prediction (which will be crucial for the ultimate explanation of perlocutionary performatives below) is that for egophors that have no semantically-encoded relation to a particular event-role, there is no *particular* role in the eventuality that the origo must occupy in order to satisfy this requirement. The origo must simply be a participant of some sort, regardless of what syntactic position, if any, an expression referring to it occupies, and regardless of what sort of role this positions encodes. We can see this with the imperfective egophor $\text{gi.yod}$, which is happy accepting the origo in any canonical role at all, encoded in any syntactic position in principle: for instance, (22) shows the origo as recipient, in an indirect object position.

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require construing the origo as somehow occupying some other role in the eventuality, other than the obvious roles of agent [maker] and patient [thing made]. Options would include construing the sentence to mean ‘Tashi is preparing the meal for me,’ ‘My Tashi is preparing the meal,’ or something vaguer, like ‘Tashi, prepares the meal [as I know from long acquaintance with his habits].’ This will not always be a plausible thing to do, depending on the context, and where no such plausible interpretation is available, the use of an egophor will simply sound strange, or even ungrammatical.
It is of course true that certain egophors further restrict the role of the origo, so that the origo must learn of the main eventuality of a clause from that eventuality itself, but must also play some special role in that very eventuality, or have access to it in a certain special way. As Widmer & Zúñiga (2017) show, variation in the way egophors can require the origo to occupy certain sorts of roles occurs along a Dowtian hierarchy, from more agent-like to more patient-like roles, and languages that have role-specific egophors typically contain a binary split between ‘agentive’ and ‘patientive’ egophors somewhere along this hierarchy, such that the two categories require the origo to occupy an agent-like or a patient-like role in the eventuality, respectively, according to where the split is made.

This holds also for ÚT, which in its perfective constructions contains an agentive egophor pa.yin and a patientive egophor byung: roughly, pa.yin requires the origo to be a canonical agent in the main event (and so to enact the event volitionally), while byung requires the origo to occupy some role other than that of canonical agent (experirencer, theme, patient, recipient, whatever). ÚT also contains a futurate egophor gi.yin, which requires the origo to be the canonical agent of a future event (i.e., an event that the origo currently plans on carrying out intentionally in the future). I won’t take a stand here on how exactly such egophors further restrict the role of the origo in the main eventuality: it may be that they encode notions of ‘proto-agentivity’ and ‘proto-patientivity’ primitively, or it may be that there is some other notion they encode (say, of participating in distinct parts of an eventuality, its beginning versus its result), or something else.

But the important point is to note that for these ‘role-specific’ egophors, the origo still must occupy a role in the main eventuality: these egophors simply enforce stricter requirements, so that their use when the origo does not occupy such a specific role is outright ungrammatical (cf. Garrett (2001: §4.4)). But they are perfectly compatible with the broader picture of egophoricity given here: egophoricity itself only requires the origo to occupy some role in the main eventuality, and some egophors go further, requiring the role to be of a certain sort. I take it as a good sign that the notion of egophoricity explored here is so closely tied to playing a participatory role
in the main eventuality, given that some egophors overtly encode specific kinds of role.

What, then, does an egophor ultimately mean? According to the above, the crucial contribution of the egophor is that the origo knows about the eventuality denoted by a clause because that very eventuality is also one of the egophor learning about it: and this in turn means that the egophor is itself a participant in that eventuality. Therefore, to know about the existence of an eventuality egophorically is to know about it because one is a participant in it. With this gloss in hand, we can ask how the less canonical perlocutionary performatives fare.

3.3 Perlocutionary performatives

It’s now time to offer the account of perlocutionary performatives in ÜT, using the construal of egophors as simplex markers of learning above. In brief, the idea is that egophors can yield performative readings where the origo is construed as occupying the role of causer of the eventuality that constitutes the perlocutionary effect of the performative speech act. I’ll approach this conclusion in a couple of steps, first by showing how egophors in ÜT allow for the origo to be construed as occupying various peripheral roles in an eventuality, then by showing how it can be construed as the causer in particular, and finally by showing how this yields the performative readings.

Given the above account of egophors, a picture emerges as to where the use of an egophor is licensed: the use of an egophor implies that the evidential origo knows about the relevant eventuality in virtue of being a participant in it. While we saw in section 3.2 above that this means that canonical uses of egophors occur in clauses that have an overt argument to the verb that denotes the origo, there are other circumstances in which an egophor can be used as well, because the origo can be construed as playing a role in the eventuality even in the absence of such an overt argument. This is possible not only in cases of pro-drop – where an overt argument is optional, and so when it’s left unpronounced it can be construed as denoting the origo – but also in more marginal cases.

In particular, it’s long been noted that many egophors cross-linguistically are felicitous if it’s possible to construe the origo as playing a more peripheral role in the eventuality denoted by a clause, even if the clause’s verb doesn’t typically project an argument related to that role, and in some cases even if the language itself has no canonical means (using arguments, adjuncts,
or applicatives) by which to encode that role overtly alongside the verb. This has been noted several times for patientive egophors, which require the origo to occupy a patient-like role in the relevant eventuality: these can often be used without any overt first-person material in assertions, to imply that the origo is the beneficiary or maleficiary of that eventuality.\(^\text{29}\)

(23) \(alu\) \(ki\text{-}ma\text{-}ti\text{-}s\)
    \(\text{rain do\text{-}COMP\text{-}PST\text{-}PAT\text{-}EGO}\)
    ‘It rained [on me].’
    [Awa Pit. \textit{Curnow (2002: 620, ex. 20)}]

(24) \(ya^{35} j'o^{35} c'i^{53} \ u'e^{35} \ t'f'h a^{33} pa^{53} pu^{35} \ c'y^{35}\)
    \(I\ \text{just home come.PST rain fall.PST PAT\text{-}EGO}\)
    ‘Just as I came home it started raining [on me].’
    [Pingwu Baima. \textit{Chirkova (2017: 452, ex. 21)}]

This also occurs in ÚT, whose patientive past perfective egophor \textit{byung} can allow for beneficiary readings, even when it attaches to clauses that overtly show no first-person beneficiary, and contain verbs which don’t typically reserve a place for an overt beneficiary.\(^\text{30}\)

\(^{29}\)For (23): Curnow’s own gloss for the egophor refers to it as a ‘conjunct undergoer’ marking, where ‘conjunct’ roughly means ‘egophoric,’ and ‘undergoer’ roughly means ‘patientive’ in my terminology. I put the gloss in my terms here. Curnow also adds a gloss for a plausible context, ‘I was on by way to bathe...’ Note that the reading is \textit{not} that it rained ‘on’ the speaker in a directional sense (that water got on the speaker), but rather that it rained ‘on’ the speaker in an ethical dative or maleficiary sense. For (24): Chirkova’s gloss on the egophor refers to it as ‘receptive,’ which is the same as ‘patientive’ in my terminology, with the slight difference that she takes being receptive also to cover motion towards the origo. It’s not clear if this notion is to be subsumed into the notion of patientivity in egophors, or if it’s distinct. I’ve added the ‘on me’ gloss.

\(^{30}\)In the ÚT case, things are a little more ambiguous, since beneficiaries can often be overtly added as completely optional adjuncts using the oblique particle \(la\) / \(- r\), which means that an overt \(nga\ la\ /\ ngar ‘for me’ can make a first-person beneficiary explicit. The Awa Pit example in (23) is one for which \textit{Curnow (2002: 620)} makes a stronger claim, that there really isn’t any natural way to overtly encode the maleficiary. Nevertheless, the egophor can cause the origo to be placed in a maleficiary role. This shows, I take it, that egophors have access to event structure in a different way than the syntax does. Note that the first-person genitive in (25) can’t license the use of the egophor, because this is incompatible with the patientive \textit{byung}, and so it is the beneficiary reading licensing the egophor here.
What sorts of participatory roles can be construed in this way for the origo by egophors, and which sorts of egophors and constructions can allow for these roles to be construed, is an open question, and so far as I know poorly understood. There will of course be limits set if one uses a patiencive egophor as in (23)-(25), for example, since when these are used the origo must be construed as being in some appropriately patiencive role, but it isn’t clear why beneficiary and maleficiary interpretations specifically are the ones that tend to occur in these cases.

Likewise, the origo typically won’t be construed as occupying some peripheral role in agentive egophoric constructions, since these require the origo to be the agent, and in such cases the verb of the clause typically projects a syntactic slot for something denoting the agent to occupy. Nevertheless, in ‘neutral’ egophoric constructions like the ÚT gi.yod, it’s not obvious what the range of peripheral roles that might be construed for the origo is, or in what contexts those construals are appropriate.

Rather than addressing this broader question, I want to point out another peripheral role that is often construed for the origo in certain copular constructions in ÚT, which are ‘neutral’ constructions as to the role the origo has to occupy (that is, they have no agentive or patiencive requirements). It’s possible in ÚT, in these copular constructions, to construe the origo as the causer of the state denoted by the clause, where there is no argument to the copula that is reasonably construed as denoting the origo, nor any other overt material denoting the origo. This tendency to a causer reading of egophors in ÚT is something that Garrett (2001) noted, and he’s given some examples of it.\footnote{For (27), I’m told the example sounds better if an adverb of time modifies the first clause meaning ‘Tashi’s daughter is beautiful.’ I suspect this is because it solidifies a ‘perfective’ reading of the predication, to make it mean that there’s a specific span of time at which she’s (particularly) beautiful, which the origo can therefore be causally responsible for, not as an intrinsic open-ended property of the subject. Here the origo is a plural individual including the speaker, but this is typical: what an egophor requires is only that the origo be included in the plural individual that’s the implicit causer of the first clause, and the overt agent of the second.}
(26) \textit{bkra.shis} \textit{la} \textit{pa.sang} \textit{gi} \textit{deb} \textit{yod}  \\
Tashi \textit{LOC} Pasang \textit{GEN} book \textit{be(loc).EGO}  \\
‘Tashi has Pasang’s book(s) [I gave them to him].’  \\
[Garrett (2001: 185, ex. 96)]  \\

(27) \textit{bkra.shis} \textit{gi} \textit{bu.mo} \textit{snying.rje.po} \textit{yod} \ldots \textit{ga.re.yin.zer.na}  \\
Tashi \textit{GEN} daughter pretty \textit{be.EGO} because  \\
\textit{nga.tsho} \textit{dkar.po.dmar.po} \textit{byugs pa.yin} \textit{we makeup apply.PST AG.PFV.EGO}  \\
‘Tashi’s daughter is pretty, because we put makeup on [her].’  \\
[Garrett (2001: 185, ex. 95)]  \\

In (26), there is no overt first-person material, nor any obvious way to construe any first-person material that might otherwise be added to the clause to make sense of it. The use of the egophoric locative copula here (used for statements of possession) therefore defaults to construing the origo (=speaker) as being personally causally responsible somehow for Tashi having Pasang’s books. The most obvious interpretation is that the speaker gave Pasang’s books to Tashi (though the sentence apparently has another intriguing interpretation, which I’ll comment on below).

In (27), the first clause is felicitous with the egophoric copula saying that Tashi’s daughter is pretty, despite the lack of any first-person material, because the second clause clarifies that a group containing the speaker is personally causally responsible for this, because they’ve applied makeup to Tashi’s daughter. In other words, the makeup applicers are the causer of Tashi’s daughter being (looking) particularly pretty at the moment, and their construal as such makes the egophor felicitous.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32}Another example of a causer reading of an egophor is found in DeLancey (1986: 206, ex. 5a):

(i) \textit{gza.spen.pa} \textit{la} \textit{chogs.dus yod}  \\
Saturday \textit{LOC} meeting \textit{be(loc).EGO}  \\
‘We have a meeting on Saturday.’

DeLancey notes that an example like this is appropriate where the speaker was present at, and participated in, the planning of the meeting, that is, if they are in part causally responsible for the meeting existing. I think that all this is correct, but the example has to be used with caution, since independently of the causer reading, the egophor is licensed in this sentence in a very ordinary way, by making the origo among the possessors of the meeting (existence and possession use the same copular construction in ÚT): hence there’s the gloss available of ‘

\textbf{We} have a meeting on Saturday’ regardless of the further causal implication.
I’ve also come across this causer interpretation of egophoric copulas several times, and can adduce some of the examples I’ve seen, which involve both simple predications and locatives:

(28)  
\[
\text{kha.lag 'di zhim.po yod}  
\text{food this delicious be.\text{EGO}}  
\]
‘This food is delicious [I made it].’

(29)  
\[
\text{bkra.shis thab.tshang la yod}  
\text{Tashi kitchen LOC be(loc).\text{EGO}}  
\]
‘Tashi’s in (the) kitchen  
[I put him there / I’m in charge of him being there].’

(30)  
\[
\text{cog.rtse brtan.po yod}  
\text{table sturdy be.\text{EGO}}  
\]
‘(The) table is sturdy [I fixed it?]’

(28) has the origo being causally responsible for the food’s being delicious: this could mean, for instance, that the origo is the one who made the food (or seasoned it, or whatever). (29) has the origo being causally responsible for Tashi’s being in the kitchen: a scenario offered for this reading is that the speaker is in charge of a restaurant at which Tashi is a chef in her employ, and she is in charge of scheduling, or has told Tashi to be in the kitchen. (30) reports on the state of a table: a causal interpretation offered for this is that the speaker has personally ensured that the table is sturdy, e.g. by propping it up or fixing it, and making sure it can sustain weight.

I want to be clear that these causal readings are not the only way of interpreting (28)-(30): rather, the use of the egophor triggers a range of possible interpretations, some of which have other semantic effects, e.g. signaling possession of one of the arguments (e.g. that the food or table in question belongs to the speaker), or signaling a more general long intimate familiarity with the relevant situation that doesn’t necessarily have a clear causal reading (see section 4 below for a brief comment on both these additional kinds of egophoric readings). (28) in particular has a range of possible meanings, among which is one implying that the origo has long familiarity with the taste of a certain kind of food, thus construing the origo as a sort of \textit{dativus iudicantis}, representing their knowledge of the deliciousness of that kind of food due to long-held experience or opinion.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33}This ‘opinion-holder’ reading of (28) is very different from the ‘taster’ reading achieved
The same can be said of Garrett’s example in (26): other interpretations can be offered for the egophor here, such as that the origo is keeping Pasang’s books with Tashi. All this is generally in line with the comments made in section 1 about how the use of an egophor with no overt material with which the origo can identify does not converge on a single possible reading, but rather is a matter of conversational participants reconstructing a possible reading, given the versatile semantics of the egophor itself where no clear first-person material is available. What is true, however, is that one salient reading that is often offered spontaneously in response to these copular clauses construes the origo as causer of the eventuality.

But this is in line with the semantics for egophors provided in section 3.2 above: they do not have any intrinsic semantics that associate the origo with the causer of an eventuality. Rather, they only require that the eventuality in question also be one of the origo learning about it, and so the origo must be a participant in that eventuality. Where no other obvious candidates are available, the origo can then be construed as a causer to make the use of the egophor acceptable. These, for instance, would be the commitments attending an assertion using (28), where $f$ is the food:

$$(31)\textbf{ Commitments on }kha.lag \ 'di \ zhim.po \ yod:\textbf{\quad a.} \text{At-issue proffered content:}$$
$$be \ - \ delicious'(e) \land th'(e, f) \land t \subseteq \tau(e)$$

$$\textbf{b.} \text{Not-at-issue content:}$$
$$\text{LEARN}(e, e, t, \odot)$$

In uttering (28) in an assertion, the speaker commits to: (i) there being an eventuality $e$, which is a state of the food being tasty; (ii) the origo

with a perceptual copula, as in $kha.lag \ 'di \ zhim.po \ 'dug \ ‘This \ food \ is \ delicious,’$ using the perceptual copula ‘dug. Here the clear implication is that the origo is referencing a specific tasting event: if they refer to a kind of food, then an event of tasting food of that kind (and liking it), and if they refer to a specific instance of that kind, then they commit to having tasted that specific dish or piece of food (and liking it). An egophor would be inappropriate in reference to a specific tasting event, or in reference to new knowledge of the taste of food by tasting it ‘on the fly,’ where the perceptual (or ‘revelatory’ red.bzhag) is especially appropriate.

34It’s actually not clear to me that this is distinct from the causal reading: that the origo is keeping Pasang’s books with Tashi, and that the origo gave Pasang’s books to Tashi, are not always easy to truth-conditionally distinguish. It may be that the ‘keeping with’ reading is again a benefactive one: ‘Tashi has Pasang’s books for me.’ Garrett’s other example (27) is deliberately constructed to point only toward a causal reading, and so it doesn’t easily receive others.
(=speaker) having learned this from the state itself. Since as detailed above, this requires the origo to be a participant in e, some role must exist in the state for the origo to occupy. But the only role overtly projected by the copula for predication is that of the theme, or the individual existing in the state. Since the food occupies this and not the speaker, the speaker must occupy some other role, and the candidate chosen on the causal reading is that it’s the causer of the state of the food being tasty. And so nothing about the semantically-encoded commitments in (31) actually mentions a causer, but the construal of the origo as causer is a way to make both commitments hold, and so to make the egophor’s contribution as a simplex marker of learning appropriate.

Before applying this explanation to the perlocutionary performative cases, a couple things are worth mentioning about the distribution of these causal readings. That the causal readings are a genuine phenomenon distinct from other possible readings of non-canonical egophors is shown by the fact that certain constructions readily suggest them, while others don’t. In particular, as noted above, I’ve only managed to elicit causal interpretations of egophors with copulas, as opposed to full verbal constructions. Further, even in copular constructions, the examples like the ones offered in this section tend only to be accepted with the egophoric copula yod, which is used for existential-locative-possessive constructions and in predication with adjectives; for these sorts of examples, the egophoric copula yin, which is used for predication with nouns and adjectives, as well as with equative statements of identity, tends not to suggest causal readings (though importantly, yin does sometimes suggest causal readings, which is important for the distribution of perlocutionary performatives).35

In other words, I wasn’t able to draw a causal reading out for examples like the following, where the egophor is typically simply odd, but if interpreted to be acceptable, results in a vaguer reading that the speaker is intimately familiar in some way with the described eventuality:

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35In fact, there appear to be cases of semantic minimal pairs here, because either yin or yod is appropriate for some adjectival predications, and in these cases yod is preferred for the causal readings: I encountered this with the example (30), which was offered with a causal reading using yin, and was rejected in favor of the use of yod to make the causal reading acceptable. These kinds of differences in adjectival predication are to my knowledge poorly understood, though Dugdak & Hill (2019) offer some comments, regarding the use of yag.po ‘good’ with various copulas.
The idea behind (32) is that someone might say this after ordering Tashi to run, or if someone is in general causally responsible for him running (say, his coach). The idea behind (33) is that the person who hired the teacher (and so is causally responsible for their being a teacher) might say this, maybe as a way to remind them of who gave them their position – or perhaps it could have a performative reading, as a way of hiring someone into the position. However, neither interpretation was offered spontaneously, and both were rejected when suggested explicitly (recall from section 1 that (33) does have a performative reading, when someone is chosen to play the role of teacher in a play or game). Causal readings have a limited distribution, though I don’t know the exact way in which it’s limited.36

So it’s an open question, as far as I’m concerned, why causal readings are bad in certain constructions and good in others, though I could imagine many possible explanations. For instance, verbal constructions like in (32), where a volitional verb like rgyug ‘run’ is involved, might project a place for the agent as their syntactic subject, and it might be that there cannot be a causer of an event distinct from its agent: if this is so, then the role is always occupied by the subject (here, Tashi), and so the origo cannot occupy it. Perhaps then non-volitional verbs might yield a different result. Or

36The reason I had hope for the verbal causal egophors is because there’s an example from the literature which seems to hint at their existence, and is found in Häsler (2001: 15, ex. 35)’s discussion of Dege Tibetan, where jiː: is an egophor:

(i) kēkēː tʃɑʔsʰʔtsʰ ɑː- ɡa jiː kē tʃiː-tɕʰki tɕʰ-la ɑː- ziːː jiːː
teacher.ABS students.DAT letters.ABS lead-NML-GEN reason come-IPFV be
‘The teacher has come to lead the students in their studies.’
[cited from Kraft & Heng (1990: 52.13)]

Häsler comments (ibid.) that it “…can be said only in special contexts, for example, if the speaker is the school director and is responsible for the teacher’s coming…” I can’t say exactly what’s going on in this example without knowing more about the language, but a causer reading of the egophor is plausible given the gloss.
perhaps there is simply something different about the kind of eventualities introduced by verbal versus copular constructions, or copular constructions using *yin* versus *yod*, that makes the construal of the origo as playing a causal role possible in one but not the other. I can’t resolve these questions here: all I require is the observation that in certain constructions, these causer interpretations are robustly available.

This insight can be used to treat perlocutionary performatives, if we take another clue from Garrett (2001: 150-151), who notes that there’s a relation between performativity and the role of the origo as causer: that is, where the origo successfully performs a performative speech act, it has by mere ‘say-so’ (along with the accompanying appropriate intentions and felicity conditions) made it so that whatever is being asserted is true. The origo is therefore the causer of the eventuality in this kind of performative, because they cause the eventuality to obtain in virtue of making the performative utterance.

Perlocutionary performatives can then be treated as nothing more or less than a subset of the causal interpretations of egophors that we independently know to be available in the language. We can then recast all of the examples we saw in section 1 in terms of egophors as simplex markers of learning, as follows:

(34)  
\[
\text{deb} \quad ’di \quad \text{khyed.rang} \quad \text{la} \quad \text{yin} \\
\text{book} \quad \text{this} \quad \text{you} \quad \text{for} \quad \text{be.ego} \\
‘\text{This book is for you [...I’m giving it to you].’}
\]

(35)  
\[
\text{khyed.rang} \quad \text{gi} \quad \text{ming} \quad \text{rdo.rje} \quad \text{rnam.rgyal} \quad \text{yin} \\
\text{you} \quad \text{gen} \quad \text{name Dorje} \quad \text{Namgyal} \quad \text{be.ego} \\
‘\text{Your name is Dorje Namgyal [...I’m naming you].’}
\]

(36)  
\[
’di \quad \text{khyed.rang} \quad \text{gi} \quad \text{ja} \quad \text{yin} \\
\text{this} \quad \text{you} \quad \text{gen} \quad \text{tea} \quad \text{be.ego} \\
‘\text{This is your tea [...I’m giving it to you].’}
\]

So, using the now-familiar schema: (34) requires that (i) there is a state of the book being intended for the addressee; (ii) the origo knows about this because of the benefactive state itself, and so the origo is a participant in that state, here as the causer, which is so if the speaker is performatively making it so that the addressee has the tea with this utterance. Likewise, (35) requires that (i) the addressee’s name is Dorje Namgyal, and (ii) on
this reading, that the origo causes him to bear this name in virtue of the utterance; and (36) requires that (i) there is a state of the tea belonging to the addressee; and (ii) the origo causes this to be so, in virtue of the utterance. Similar glosses can be given for all the other examples provided in section 1.

If this is right, then in principle nothing more needs to be said about these examples: they follow from the general account of egophors outlines above. We also see now why, as noted in section 1, performative effects arise despite the fact that egophors have nothing intrinsically performative about their semantics: it is because they have nothing intrinsically causer-related about their semantics, either, but as simplex markers of learning, they require a role in the eventuality to be construed for the origo.

A couple comments regarding this conclusion, first about how it interacts with the pragmatic phenomenon of performativity, and second about how it interacts with the distribution of causal readings of egophors. As to the former, I take it as uncontroversial that enacting performatives by stating perlocutionary effects is possible, and in fact common, and so take no particular stand on how pragmatically this occurs. All that’s required for the present is that a successful perlocutionary performative has the speaker causing a state of affairs to come about by means of an utterance.

As to the latter, I noted in section 1 that the examples of perlocutionary performatives I’m aware of all make use of the copula yin, while the examples of non-performative causer readings given in this section tend to be licensed by the copula yod. However, as hinted at above, this isn’t a universal generalization, and interestingly, it’s precisely where perlocutionary performatives are possible that causer readings of yin that are not performative also occur.

Thus, for instance, we mentioned that (34) might convey only that the speaker made the tea for the addressee. It might also convey that the speaker assigned possession of the tea to the addressee prior to the conversation: these are causer readings, since in both cases the origo is personally causally responsible for the addressee having the tea, but they are not performative, since the assignment of possession was decided prior, by the origo’s decision, or purchase, etc., and not by the speech act. The same is true of all of the performative examples in section 1: while they all have performative

\[37]\text{Indeed, it’s just as easy, regardless of whether a language has egophoric marking or not, to give someone some tea by saying } \text{This is your tea} \text{ as it is by saying } \text{I’m giving you this tea. Egophoricity itself has nothing to do with the pragmatics itself: egophoric marking only highlights the perlocutionary performative reading because of its unique relation to causer readings.} \]
readings, they all also allow interpretations on which the origo has caused the state to come about prior, by some previous action or decision. The performative readings fall out as a special limiting case of these causer readings, where the causation is bound up with the utterance itself (as is perhaps most appropriate with the naming example, where the presence of a ceremony makes this obvious).

And so whatever one says about the distribution of causer readings and performatives, what must hold for the present account to work is that wherever a performative reading is possible, a causer one is, too: and I haven’t found any exceptions to this rule. The reverse is of course not true, since a causer reading might be possible, while a performative one is not, since the eventuality reported by the assertion might not be one that can be brought about performatively: one cannot, for example, make a table sturdy or keep Pasang’s books with Tashi ‘by say-so.’

4 On the typology of egophoricity

That’s the account of ÚT perlocutionary performatives, then. It points in a couple of interesting directions. First, it might shed light on the nature of performativity, by showing how it can target perlocutionary effects as opposed to illocutionary force (which strikes me as a fairly common performative strategy), and by suggesting that speakers associate the performer of speech acts with the causer of an eventuality. Second, it might have something to say about event structure and participatory roles: if egophors really do access the roles that an origo can occupy in an eventuality, then the use of egophors might offer a window into what sorts of roles exist, in a way that’s in principle distinct from the syntactic behavior of the predicates that introduce them.

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38 This is true even if somehow the example is construed so that one’s saying that something is so makes it so, as if by magic: a genie who utters, ‘Tashi has Pasang’s books!’ and thereby magically makes it so is still not enacting a performative, because in this case the genie’s utterance does have causal powers, but not of the special sort required for the completion of a speech act. The latter requires illocutionary uptake, and so a Gricean response by the addressee(s) on the basis of the speaker’s perceived intentions. Which assertions allow for performative readings is therefore highly restricted, to those that assert the existence of states that can be brought about by illocutionary uptake, like assigning possession, granting roles or names, and so on. I do predict, however, that ‘genie readings’ should be possible for more general causer uses of egophors.
But where it’s most interesting is what it might have to say about the typology of egophoricity: in trying to offer an account of egophoricity as a whole, which covers even the marginal uses of egophors, there arise some suggestions as to where we should expect to find perlocutionary performatives of this kind. Namely, since they require construing the origo as causer:

- They shouldn’t ever appear in agentive or patientive egophoric constructions, because the latter require the origo to occupy a patientive role, and hence not to be the causer of the eventuality, while the former require the origo to be the agent, which will typically be denoted by an argument projected by the verb itself.

- More generally, they should appear where and only where causal readings of egophors are possible (and more narrowly, only in such cases where a performative effect can pragmatically be achieved by the utterance).

This would make performative egophors quite rare, and indeed we should expect some egophoric systems (such as those that include only agentive markings) to rule them out altogether. They might be particularly rare if, as the initial examples suggest, causal readings are confined only to copular constructions, since copular egophors are a rarity in of themselves. Are there examples beyond ÜT of perlocutionary performatives? I’m aware of one other example cited in the literature, which comes from Sandman (2018)’s discussion of Wutun:

(37) modo je ni-de hai-yek
    motorcycle this you-ATTR EQU-EGO

    ‘This is your motorcycle [...I’m giving it to you].’
    [Wutun. Sandman (2018: 183, ex. 15b)]

This is heartening, but it says little about how such egophors might appear in non-Tibetan-style evidential systems, since Wutun has adopted a Tibetan-style egophoric system due to long areal contact in the Amdo Sprachbund. I look forward to seeing in the future where else these performative uses might exist, and what they can tell us about the nature of egophoricity more broadly.

Finally, we might ask if the present account of egophoricity allows for any explanation of the uses of egophors that I didn’t discuss in this paper.
In particular, egophors in many languages, including ÜT, are also usable where the origo is apparently not a participant in the main eventuality, but rather a possessor of one of the participants, as in (38), or when the origo is simply intimately familiar with the eventuality in some difficult-to-specify way (39).

(38) nga’i bu deb bklags yod
    I.GEN son book read.PST PRF.EGO
    ‘My son has read (the) book.’
    [Agha (1993: 99)]

(39) bkra.shis bu yag.po yin
    Tashi boy good be.EGO
    ‘Tashi’s a good boy [...]as I know by long familiarity with him?’

It’s not obvious to me that the present account can handle such examples – one can imagine how it might, but it’s not guaranteed. If these sorts of readings of egophors are the result of the semantic nature of egophoricity more generally, then a treatment of the phenomenon that can’t capture them is suspect, and it might be that some other construal of egophoricity is needed to capture all of its uses, including the perlocutionary performatives and these more difficult cases. My hope is that continued work on the typology of egophoricity will show to what extent a proposal like the present one is generally successful.

Abbreviations

ABS = absolutive; AG = agentive; ATTR = attributive; COMP = completive; DAT = dative; EGO = egophor; EQU = equative copula; ERG = ergative; GEN = genitive; HON = honorific; IPFV = imperfective; LOC = locative; NML = nominalizer; OBL = oblique; PAT = patientive; PER = perceptual evidential; PFV = perfective; PRF = perfect; PST = past.

Ü-Tsang Tibetan examples are transliterated into Roman characters from the Tibetan script using the Wylie system. Spaces represent syllable breaks that correspond to breaks in glossing; periods represent syllable breaks that don’t correspond to breaks in glossing, except in g.yag, where the period represents that the y is not subscripted to the g. Other authors’ ÜT examples are re-transliterated into this format; examples from all other languages are kept as the authors originally displayed them.
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