In his Leviathan, Hobbes explains that every man has the liberty to do whatever he reasons suitable to preserve his own life. Furthermore, he also has the obligation to avoid things which would destroy his life. It follows, then, that men act prudently who pursue agreements with each other, which, limiting their own liberties somewhat, make easier the task of protecting themselves as a whole. Hobbes describes this act as the forming of a common-wealth, the entity to which all those who author it give up the liberty to act on their own will. With such a "leviathan" defined, the interaction between it, and its authors, becomes the topic of Hobbes discussion.
Hobbes' statement that the Sovereign has, by his covenant with his subjects, absolute power in ruling the common-wealth, is initially striking to democratically oriented readers. However, through Hobbesí use of clear, precise definitions and logical arguments, which tend to minimize dangerous assumptions, we are better able to realize the truth of his statement, however limited in application. Starting with the definition which Hobbes provides for a common-wealth and with the purpose for which they create it, the subjects seem to lose all their natural rights to the sovereign, who may then do and command as he sees fit, with a few important exceptions.
"But as Men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears."(263)
"The End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy."(268)
It is the very purpose of the sovereign to consolidate decision making and hand down laws and decrees. Therefore, to further the good of the common-wealth, citizens are obliged to obey the sovereign's commands. His commands are necessarily just because all acts performed by the sovereign have their origin in its authorship by the people: "every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth(265)." It is the people themselves who have ordered things this way, establishing the sovereign to whom they pledge to listen.
Hobbes does allow subjects the liberty to disobey the sovereign as long as such disobedience does not hinder the sovereign's cause. "When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is."(269), When the sovereign gives commands which are in keeping with his purpose, we should obey to further that purpose, which we ourselves have authored. Curiously, Hobbes does not explain why a sovereign might give a command that is not essential for his purpose, nor how we are to react when we think this is happening. Hobbes says we have the liberty to disobey--but who will decide that the sovereign is out of line, and who will tell him? This calls for some understanding of the end of the sovereign. This is one of the main problems with Hobbes description of political obligation. Surely, it can be argued that no subject has the wherewithal to decide whether the sovereign's actions are appropriate, this would defeat the purpose of the consolidation of rights and powers into one being. Yet it must not be overlooked that the humanity of the sovereign will no doubt cause him to make decisions which are counter to the good of the common-wealth. This, of course, is why the American government was instituted with "Checks and Balances," but Hobbes doesn't seem to think such a thing is necessary. What ultimate trust he must have in the decision of the people as to their choice of sovereign! He takes for granted that the Sovereign will not change over the course of his rule, and will always have the best interest of the people in mind. This, he says, follows from the sovereign's fear of overthrow. That is, he knows that his own well-being depends on maintaining the state. It has been shown, however, that there are ample freaks of nature who will gladly harm themselves, who go against the laws of nature. And it is held up in courts that people otherwise sane, do on occasion act against their own interest. I propose that sovereigns do many things which are detrimental to the state, because they do not see the connection between the state's and their own well-being. Ideally, a king will fear revolt and retribution to the extent that that his behavior is aimed towards the betterment of the state. In most kings, the rationality which would make these kind of logical conclusions is overshadowed by his more temporary desires, thus the subject's liberty to disobey the sovereign's non-essential commands is removed by the difficulty in ascertaining the gravity of the situation.
The first exception is basically a reversal of the previous statement: When the sovereignís command frustrates the End for which he was ordained; there is liberty to refuse it; otherwise, there is not. If a sovereign commands that a subject not defend his own body from harm, or that a subject harm himself, that man may justly refuse, even though the sovereign acts in the benefit of the subjects themselves. This is because each individual maintains his original right of nature: to defend his own body, and hence preserve his life. Hobbes notes that "every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred." This causes an interesting problem with Hobbesí theory. He has cited a situation in which two opposing sides are both just. No doubt he has also defined that anything not just is unjust, and we are left with the dilemma of whether two just acts can have opposite ends. Perhaps subjects can not justly ěstopî the killing, but can ěresistî it. Either way, it is emphasized that even when a sovereign commands something which "frustrates the end for which he was ordained," he is still acting justly, for justice is decided by his words alone.
Hobbes says the sovereign can kill a subject justly. Is the sovereign still acting out the contract if he presumes to kill those who should be protecting? This wouldn't bother Socrates, because he took the goal of the government to be the "greater good," based on the preservation of the whole, rather than the individual. Hobbes doesn't explicitly say this, but seems to imply that indeed, individuals are expendable when the profit to the common-wealth is at stake.
The extent of political obligation has two natural boundaries. Firstly, when the Sovereign, through his laws and his representatives, is silent concerning an issue. In this case, the subjects are free to act reasonably as they chose. This follows naturally from their original right to act upon their own will, and the fact that they only give up certain defined liberties to the Sovereign. "In all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves."(264) Of course, the silence of the sovereign differs by state, so some things may be ruled unlawful in certain places which are allowable in others. For instance, in some states, it is lawful to have many wives, in others, such is forbidden. This illustrates the relativity of justice, which is dependent on the utterances of the sovereign.
Secondly, when the sovereign no longer has the power to protect his subjects, then, the subjects have no obligation to obey the sovereign, for "the end of Obedience is Protection,"(272) and without the offer of such protection, the obedience would be in vain. Hobbes clearly states that "the Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them."(272) This explanation, although precise, brings up the same problem that arose earlier. Without assuming that the sovereign is all-knowing and all-honest, who job is it to reckon when his power to protect has been overshadowed by some danger? If the sovereign claims he can still provide due protection, who is to argue against him? As I have said, this is one of the main problems with Hobbes' absolute ruler. When a potentially exceptional situation arises, who is to decide if it qualifies or not?
Further, if anyone did presume to discern this answer, based on the inaction of the sovereign, he would find that it is easy to confuse the lack of power with the lack of will. In the situation where the sovereign is has some hidden agenda, be it foreign, private, or even religious, he may act inefficiently with premeditation, rather than as the result of his incompetence. In which case, his behavior does not automatically end the contract, unless he directly harms his subjects.
Aside from the unlikelihood of every finding a sovereign to be trusted with absolute authority, there are further problems. Could such a populace exist? They would need to trust completely the decisions of their chosen sovereign if they ever wanted to live in peace. The masses tend to agree that some sort of government is necessary for their safety, but the amount of decision making that is relinquished would not please many. Personal decision making is still allowed, that which is inconsequential to the state. But to keep the people out of governmental lawmaking once and for all is a prospect not likely to meet much support.
Hobbes presents one of the most straightforward theories of political philosophy, and specifically, political obligation, but his treatise is not without problems. The lack of attention to religion is obviously balanced in part two of Leviathan, but it causes noticeable problems here. Like most philosophical documents, it is full of generalizations and abstractions which hide much of its usefulness. Yet it has been most influential, in part because it is wrought with unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, concerns.