Burke's complaints about the French Revolution are many, and his explanations of the superiority of the English way abound in his Reflections on the French Revolution. It is the task of the critic to search through the historical descriptions, and fish out the meaning in Burke's endless paragraphs and pages of text. True to his own theory, Burke focuses on practical application, rather than on idealized societies or impossible leaders. Much to the satisfaction of conservative thinkers, Burke argues for the use of prejudices over abstract thinking in political thought. Whether he holds these as true outside of the French and English situations brings up a paradox of his own making, but at least for these, he feels that he has a method superior to that of the French revolutionists.
Beginning with Burke's definition, or use, of the word prejudice, we note that he refers not to racial or gender-based prejudice, as the word would often imply today, but to a tool used to great effect for decision-making. A prejudice is a notion held without direct contemplation of its truth, an idea borrowed from "the general bank and capital of nations and of ages."1<84> Its use displays a respect for the wisdom of others. Burke stresses that the French revolutionist have avoided this treasure and instead, have fallen into an inferior mode of discernment based on transient and unreliable thinking. The English, on the other hand, have stuck to established norms, even in times of change, knowing, "that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made, in morality; not many in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mould upon our presumption, and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity." <83> That is, the status quo has been held because nothing better has come along; it provides a better guarantee of truth than any individual philosopher can give: that of countless generations of wise thinkers.
He explains that English philosophers, or, "men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them,"<84> essentially serving as a confirming and stabilizing force on political thought. This model for healthy political thought can be understood through an evolutionary scenario. Biological systems, such as ecosystems and individuals, remain the same, in a state of equilibrium, until something goes wrong, causing the system to evolve or adapt to ensure its survival. Similarly, Burke finds nothing wrong with the status quo political system if it is providing a better environment than its lack could provide.
Burke notes that intellectuals "form their opinions on such grounds as such persons ought to form them. The less inquiring receive them from an authority, which thoserovidence dooms to live on trust need not be ashamed to rely on." <94> This seems to refer back to Plato's scenario in his Republic, in which the philosopher king, who knows truths through deliberation and insight, guides those without these talents. And good it is that they should trust, for "we suspect that [each man's own private stock of reason] is small,"<84> and that in general, men would do better to obey the authority made up of long-standing reasoned-out status quo ideas. It is also more convenient to rely on prejudices than to attempt to discern things at every turn, which would "leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved."<84>
Prejudice defined and promoted, Burke notes the problems with the form of political science which the revolutionists practice. Firstly, abstract thinking leads to abstract solutions, which work fine for idealized problems, but are not feasible for the complex situations which political scientists are actually faced with. Burke notes that many "simple modes of polity"<59> seem very efficient when viewed from one point of view, bu nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity." Thus, simple governments are not suitable.
Again, Burke notes that simplicity is not always a benefit. "The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false." The nature of society is that compromises are necessary, and strict rules tend to cause more problems than they fix. Plato notes in the Republic that "it has been shown that it is never right, anywhere, to injure anyone," but Burke would say that such a abstract notion is not fit for law, in which exceptions must be made for the safety of the people, and for the good of the society. "Political reason," he says, "is a computing principle; adding subtracting, multiplying and dividing, morally and not metaphysically, or mathematically, true moral denominations."<59> In addition, the speculative nature of these theorist's thought favors extremes, "for never intending to go beyond speculation, it costs nothing to have it magnificent."<61> These extreme principles are not carried out until extreme and drastic problems arise, so regarding their tendency to action, it is "a w mastery by those who study it. Even in a whole lifetime, it is impossible to gain the necessary amount of experience to practice political science as an experimental science. "It requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities, and of the things which facilitate or obstruct the various ends, which are to be pursued by the mechanism of civil institutions."<58> Therefore, it is not wise to exercise some little amount of learning on a state which otherwise works moderately well. "However sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes."<59> Philosophers desire changes which theoretically should benefit the society, but in practice, may end up being deficits: "Very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions."<58>
Against those who try to form societal systems from basic tenets held by all the philosophers of antiquity, he notes that the original rights of nature are so transformed and sacrificed for the formation of civil society that it makes no sense to try to apply them. Hence, remaining, and useful, rights come from civil society, which in turn develops over time as a build-up up conventions. To claim, then, rights which "are absolutely repugnant to" civil society, is ridiculous.<57> Burke thinks it is true and good that rights come not from the minds of backward-looking intellectuals, but rather, from the conventions of the society.
Burke feels strongly that chivalry and manners are an important part of the formation of a good society. Under the control of good manners, "vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness."<73> Thus he is dis-satisfied by a systematic theory of government which eliminates these protections and replaces them with cold, (non-prejudicial) rules. "There ought to be a system of manners in every nation, which a well-formed
Burke has achieved what the Greeks held as an ultimate goal: immortality through his works. Reading his work as a classic is a clear indication that his modes of thought have survived the centuries since his death. But more convincingly, the existence of England in a form not dissimilar to that of his day confirms his thoughts on the constancy of the English people. It is unusual in this day and age to regard prejudice as good, and in this university, to feel disdain towards abstract, political thinking, but Burke holds his argument up for us, with convincing examples, to decide for ourselves between a bloodless, guiltless revolution or a gory, national massacre.