ark   //   research and teaching
 

(please email me for more information on current and future research projects.)
 

/ dissertation /

is a unipolar world peaceful? the conventional wisdom answers yes. but there is no good reason to expect unipolarity to lead to peace. in fact, unipolarity will generate significant conflict, regardless of the preponderant power's strategy. three grand strategies are available to the preponderant power. first, a strategy of domination will make the preponderant power focus on minor powers, which do not possess the capability to deter it. these minor powers, in turn, will try to acquire such capability (e.g., by developing nuclear weapons). conflict will follow, as deterrence breaks down due to the low credibility of the minor powers' deterrent threats. second, given uncertainty about other states' intentions, a strategy of defense of the status quo will still prompt minor powers to acquire a deterrent capability. the preponderant power, however, is unlikely to accept such a change in the status quo. conflict will result from deterrence breakdowns due to the lack of credibility of the preponderant power's deterrent assurances. finally, a strategy of disengagement leaves regions other the preponderant power's own to their own devices. in the case of unipolar regions, conflict will result from the dynamics described above. in case other regions are either bipolar or multipolar, conflict is likely to result from the several mechanisms described by theories about such structures. in sum, for the world as a whole, unipolarity makes conflict likely. and although it may minimize the constraints imposed on the preponderant power, it hardly allows for the peaceful conversion of its power into favorable outcomes.
 

/ dissertation-related articles /

i am also working on three articles related to my dissertation.

the first is devoted to deterrence, and makes two main points. first, conditions of power imbalance bring to the fore the role of assurances in deterrence. through a simple mathematical model, i show how deterrence is easier between states with equal capability to inflict costs on each other. an imbalance of power, even when favoring the deterring state over the deterrence target, makes deterrence less likely to succeed, particularly when the object of dispute is perceived by the target as bringing about large benefits. this is the case with actions that would significantly bolster its future ability to deter other states' eventual aggressive designs. second, the article argues that the credibility of deterrent efforts -- i.e., of both deterrent threats and assurances -- is determined by both power and reputation. power establishes the baseline of credibility, determining the minimum level of threat-credibility and the maximum level of assurance-credibility. but reputation can both bolster the credibility of threats made by less powerful states and undermine the credibility of assurances made by more powerful states. the piece lays out the particular ways in which these two insights make unipolarity prone to conflict.

i am also writing a summary piece of my main argument on unipolar conflict, laid out above. finally, i am working on a shorter essay on the problem of unipolar assurances and u.s. foreign policy, targeted at a policy audience, and emphasizing consequences for counter-proliferation efforts.
 

/ collaborative projects /

i have just concluded an article on "ir and the false promise of philosophical foundations," which tries to put an end to the foundational debate in ir. throughout a long history of attempts to legitimate the field as "scientific," ir scholars have put forth multifarious positions in the philosophy of science (pos) as the proper way to ground ir in an unshakable foundation. alas, no such unshakable foundation exists. the pos is itself a contested field of study, in which no consensus exists on the proper foundation for science. therefore, by importing irresolvable foundational divisions into ir, the "ology-schmology" debate has created many problems and solved none. not only has it divided the discipline into contending factions; it has justified the absence of dialogue between them. the article builds on work in the pos itself that suggests we should move beyond the sisyphean quest for foundations, thus dissolving (rather than solving) foundational debates in ir. we argue that ir scholars should support an "attitude towards" rather than a "position in" the foundational debate, and specifically embrace an attitude of "foundational prudence," which precludes the deployment of foundational arguments in attempts to legislate what consists legitimate ir. in sum, the piece aims at clearing the meta-theoretical underbrush in order to foster theoretical and methodological pluralism and a question-driven ir, while de-escalating intra-disciplinary politics.
 

/ teaching /

next spring quarter, i'll be teaching an undergrad seminar here at the university of chicago on "the politics of unipolarity". here's the syllabus.
 
 

(updated: october 2008)