

# MARIS GOLDMANIS

Department of Economics • Royal Holloway, University of London • Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX  
+44 740 130 9945 • [maris.goldmanis@rhul.ac.uk](mailto:maris.goldmanis@rhul.ac.uk) • <http://home.uchicago.edu/~mgoldma>

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EDUCATION	Ph.D. Economics M.A. Economics B.A. Mathematics (with honors)	University of Chicago University of Chicago University of Chicago	2010 2004 2003
EMPLOYMENT	Senior Lecturer Researcher	Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia	2010–present 1999–present
FIELDS OF INTEREST	<i>Primary:</i> <i>Secondary:</i>	Microeconomic Theory (pure and applied) and Industrial Organization Computational Economics, Natural Resources Economics, and Finance	
JOB MARKET PAPER	<b>Until Death Do Us Part? The Marriage Model with Divorce</b> (with Korok Ray and Erik Stuart) We extend the two-sided matching model with search frictions by allowing agents to continue searching for an upgrade while already matched. Numerous previous studies have shown that when matches are permanent and matched agents exit the market, the steady-state equilibrium exhibits a counterintuitive and inefficient phenomenon known as “block segregation.” We show that this pathological equilibrium is not sustained when at least one side of the market can choose to dissolve the match. In particular, when both sides are allowed to upgrade, quite weak conditions on payoffs and search technology ensure that the steady state converges to perfect positively assortative matching, which is globally optimal with supermodular payoffs. When one side of the market has the ability to upgrade, higher quality agents match to sets of agents of strictly increasing quality. Allowing agents to separate increases the efficiency of matching.		
OTHER PAPERS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>A Model of Exploration and Site Development in the Petroleum Industry</i> Doctoral Dissertation</li><li>• <i>E-Commerce and the Market Structure of Retail Industries</i> (with Ali Hortaçsu, Chad Syverson, and Önsel Emre) June 2010, <i>The Economic Journal</i> 120: 651-682.</li><li>• <i>Efficient Cost Allocation</i> (with Korok Ray) Revise and resubmit</li><li>• <i>Learning to Snipe: An Investigation of Strategy Learning on eBay</i> Work in progress</li></ul>		
REFeree	International Journal of Industrial Organization		
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<b>Lecturer at U. of C.:</b> <i>Topics in Economics</i> , M.Sc. in Financial Mathematics program, 2008–2010 <i>Theory of Auctions</i> , Undergraduate, Spring 2010 <b>Teaching Assistant at U. of C. (undergraduate courses):</b> <i>Introductory Game Theory</i> , Prof. H. Sonnenschein, Fall 2008 <i>Elements of Economic Analysis</i> , Lecturer G. Tsiang, Fall 2007 <b>Teaching Assistant at U. of C. (Ph.D. courses):</b> <i>Advanced Industrial Organization</i> , Prof. A. Hortaçsu, Winter 2009 <i>Price Theory I, II, and III</i> , Profs. D. Neal, G. Becker, K. Murphy, P. Reny, R. Myerson, and H. Sonnenschein, 2005–2006		
AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS	Margaret G. Reid Memorial Fund Dissertation Fellowship, University of Chicago George G. Stigler Endowment Fund Dissertation Fellowship, University of Chicago Century Fellowship, University of Chicago Phi Beta Kappa Honors Society		2008–2009 2007–2008 2003–2007 2003
COMPUTER SKILLS	Matlab, Stata, SPSS, Mathematica, LaTeX, SQL, MS Office		
REFERENCES	Ali Hortaçsu Korok Ray Niels Nygaard	University of Chicago Georgetown University University of Chicago	<a href="mailto:hortacsu@uchicago.edu">hortacsu@uchicago.edu</a> <a href="mailto:kr268@georgetown.edu">kr268@georgetown.edu</a> <a href="mailto:nielsov@hotmail.com">nielsov@hotmail.com</a>