

# ANDREI KOVRIJNYKH

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<b>EDUCATION</b>	Ph.D. Economics	University of Chicago	Expected June 2008
	M.A. Economics	CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic	2001
	B.A. Economics	Novosibirsk State University, Russia	1998

**FIELDS** Primary: Labor Economics, Microeconomic Theory  
Secondary: Growth, International Macroeconomics

**JOB MARKET PAPER** **"Career Uncertainty and Dynamic Incentives"**  
Career concerns are known to provide incentives even when performance-based compensation is not feasible. However, empirical importance of career concerns may seem dubious because in practice individuals can escape bad reputation by changing their careers. I analyze the setup where careers can be changed and show that career uncertainty does not necessarily weaken reputational incentives. The chance of changing the career makes collection of reputational rewards less likely, and dampens incentives. However, I show that the wage becomes more sensitive to the reputation: the market anticipates the workers with good career matches to exert more effort. This effect countervails the direct incentive-weakening effect of career uncertainty. In fact it may be so strong that the expected marginal return on the reputation increases and the worker with less certain career prospects exerts more effort as a result. I also show that the timing of information release affects incentives: delaying the release of performance data weakens the incentives and can help avoiding excessive effort supply early in the career.

**OTHER PAPERS** "Growth and Trade in a Model with Investment-Specific Technological Change," June 2005  
"Specialization under Uncertainty," May 2004, joint with Natalia Kovrijnykh

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE** **Teaching Assistant, University of Chicago:**  
Introduction to Mathematical Methods in Economics (B. Szentes, graduate, 2004-2007), International Comparative Organizations (C. Prendergast, graduate, 2007), Managing the Workplace (C. Prendergast, graduate, 2007), Price Theory II – Game Theory, General Equilibrium (H. Sonnenschein, P. Reny, graduate, 2005, 2006), Price Theory III – Economics of Information (P. Reny, R. Myerson, graduate, 2005, 2006), Introduction to Micro Theory (A. Sanderson, undergraduate, 2004-2006), Introduction to Macro Theory (A. Sanderson, undergraduate, 2005), Intermediate Micro (P. Fevrier, undergraduate, 2003)  
**CERGE-EI:** Public Economics, (A. Austin, graduate, 2000), Game Theory (K. Janda, 2000)

<b>FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS</b>	University of Chicago fellowship	2003-2007
	CERGE-EI performance stipend	2000
	Novosibirsk State University performance stipend	1995-1998

**OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE** Research Assistant to L. Zingales (2006, Chicago GSB) and K. Ray (2005, Chicago GSB)  
Research Fellow, A Project on Network Economics, University of Kiel, Germany (2001)  
Accounting Analyst, ZAO META, Russia (1997-1998)

**REFEREE** Journal of Political Economy

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	Robert Shimer	(773) 702-9015	shimer@uchicago.edu
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