parent nodes: executive agreement | foreign relations law | NRDC v EPA | treaty interpretation
international court
The judgments of an international court are due only "respectful consideration" by the Article III courts, given the Article III courts' (relative) monopoly on judicial power within the US. Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon; but see Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon (Breyer dissenting) (pointing out that uniformity is a major goal of treaty interpretation, and that deference to the ICJ helps uniformity); compare the "great weight" accorded to executive interpretations of treaties in judicial foreign affairs deference.
Further, as a default rule, the decisions of international courts do not create binding federal law, even if the US has ratified a self-executing treaty creating that court. See Medellin v Texas (arguing that ICJ decisions bind only the parties between them, or in other words, different countries); compare Medellin v Texas (Breyer dissenting) (arguing that denying binding effect to international judgments creates a political problem, since it would require the Congress to impelement international courts' decisions one judgment at a time).
Finally, the courts, as a canon of construction, will typically regard international agreements not to create binding federal law instead of 'political commitments' that bind the US on an international level, where interpreting them as binding law would create separation of powers problems. See NRDC v EPA (holding that post-ratification 'adjustments' under the Montreal Protocol amounted to a non-binding "agreement to agree," where treating them as enforceable federal law would create nondelegation problems).
Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon
Medellin v Texas
NRDC v EPA
[alias: international decisionmaking]
[alias: international delegation]