parent nodes: adverse possession | evidence | evidentiary procedure
burden of proof
See generally evidence
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
Rule 301
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law.
Rule 302; see generally governing law
Burdens of persuasion and production are typically allocated to serve substantive policy concerns, to recognize what is most likely to be true, to place burdens on the party most likely to have access to the necessary proof, and to help resolve cases where definitive proof is unavailable.
Burden of production
To meet the burden of production—that is, to survive adverse summary judgment—a plaintiff must show enough evidence so that a reasonable finder of fact could rule in his favor. Note that an assessment of whether a burden of production has been met involves no assessment of credibility. [St Marys Honor Center v Hicks].
Most courts agree that "cogent and compelling" evidence is enough to shift the burden of production to the defendant, although the burden will not be shifted if the jury could disbelieve the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses. "Cogent and compelling" evidence shifts the burden of production because the plaintiff has shown evidence so that a reasonable jury could only find in his favor.
Burden of persuasion
The burden of persuasion is the standard a party must meet in order to actually convince the trier of fact. For example, in a summary judgment motion the plaintiff would have to show that no reasonable jury could not find against him.
The elements of the burden of persuasion are often dictated more by custom than by reason. For example, a contract plaintiff must typically show mutual assent, consideration, performance, breach, and damages.
The burden of persuasion in most cases is the preponderance of the evidence; note, however, that clear and convincing evidence is required for plaintiffs alleging fraud or seeking [civil commitment
Additionally, in criminal cases the due process clauses of Amendment V and Amendment XIV require every element of a crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [In re Winship]. As a result, presumptions do not operate in criminal trials as they would in civil trials, so that for example there would be no directed verdicts against a defendant. However, the burden of persuasion for an affirmative defense may constitutionally be placed on the defendant. See [Patterson v New York] (rejecting claim that insanity defense, or the defense of emotional disturbance rendering murder into manslaughter, must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state). Whether an issue is an "element" of a crime or an "affirmative defense" appears to depend on the phrasing of the statute. Compare [Mullaney v Wilbur] (invalidating on due process grounds a murder conviction, where murder was defined as killing in the absence of provocation, and where the defendant was required to prove that he was in fact provoked) with [Patterson v New York] (placing burden to prove EED on defendant, where defense of EED appeared separately from definition of murder); see also [Patterson v New York] (Powell dissenting) (arguing that the state should have to prove the absence of EED because, like the "heat of passion" in earlier doctrine, it made a "critical difference" how the defendant would be punished).
See also [Sandstrom v Montana] (invalidating jury instruction that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts").
Note that there remain open questions about the use of presumptions in criminal cases.
Presumptions
In civil cases, the burden of production might be shifted by a presumption that some fact is or is not the case unless the party bearing that burden shows otherwise. Presumptions help further policy justifications and are particularly appropriate where the presumed issue escapes normal proof (ex. many situations in family law). For example, in cases involving bailments courts typically presume that the chattel in question was in good shape when turned over to the bailee. See problem 10A (claim against piano mover that piano was damaged; plaintiff seeks jury instruction that they must find defendant liable if the piano was delivered undamaged; plaintiff shows some evidence that piano in good condition when delivered, but defendant provides evidence that piano in bad condition beforehand; the defendant's evidence affects how the jury will draw the instructed inference, but does not destroy the presumption itself). Note that telling the jury about the policy justifications of a presumption creates a real danger of confusing or prejudicing the jury's decision.
Note also that statutes might define "irrebutable presumptions" which, as their name implies, cannot be rebutted by evidence; these presumptions are more axioms of substantive law than evidentiary procedures. For example, estate tax law presumes that if two spouses die in a common accident, each spouse survived the other, even if such is logically impossible.
At common law, if the party who did not bear a presumption met its burden of production, the burden of persuasion shifted to the party against whom that presumption operated. For example, a bailor would lose automatically if the bailee offered evidence that fire damaged the bailed chattel. Thus, any evidence against the presumption would destroy that presumption, often destroying the plaintiff's case, even if the finder of fact disbelieved that evidence.
FRE 301 partially abandons the common law rule, so that a party against whom a presumption operates must meet the burden of production to meet or disprove that presumption, but the burden of persuasion remains on the party who originally held that burden. See, for example, [St Marys Honor Center v Hicks] (prima facie case of racial discrimination shifts burden of production in Title VII case to defendant to show alternative explanation for why plaintiff was fired besides intentional discrimination, but Rule 301 does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant once the plaintiff makes his prima facie case, so that the court should not instruct the jury to presume racial discrimination and assess damages if it disbelieves the defendant's alternate explanation). The fact that a jury doesn't believe the defendant's attempts to defeat a presumption doesn't necessarily mean that the jury would be accurate in assuming the rightness of the plaintiff's claim; for example, in Hicks, the jury may be biased against the alternative explanation that an employer provides so that maintaining the presumption would tend to err on the side of finding employers liable. At the same time, with such a presumption it may be particularly difficult for the plaintiff to show covert discriminatory intent; disproving the pretextual explanation of an employer may be the best the plaintiff can do. Note that it is unclear to what extent the Court is interpreting Rule 301 in Hicks, or simply interpreting Title VII in particular.
Note that presumptions based on probabilistic evidence are more likely to be "burst" if the defendant meets its burden of production, so that juries can sort the whole mess out; in comparison, such bubbles are less likely to be burst in presumptions based on policy justifications.
Inferences
Normally, the finder of fact is free to draw inferences from the substantive evidence before it. A "prima facie case," however, may either require or allow that the finder of fact draw certain inferences from the evidence.
In certain cases, though, the judge may explicitly draw the jury's attention to a particular inference it may draw, effectively inviting the jury to draw such an inference. This is known as "permissive inferences." One such example is res ipsa loquitur, where the judge effectively invites the jury to infer that the defendant was negligent. A judge may also instruct a jury on conditional inferences, telling the jury that it must accept a certain presumption as true if it finds certain underlying facts leading to that presumption.
If the adverse party does not rebut a certain presumption, the finder of fact must find that such presumption is true; however, the adverse party is typically allowed to rebut the presumption, again by "cogent and convincing evidence," so that the presumption drops out of the case.
Examples of allocated burdens
People holding a burden of proof:
people claiming title through adverse possession
bailees of [bailments]
people who intentionally cause confusion of [chattels]