agency adjudication

agency adjudication

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish...
Article III
Article I

Far more adjudication is done by Article I agencies than by Article III federal courts. Congress may distrust the policy preferences of Article III judges, as in the creation of NLRB tribunals to combat perceived anti-labor bias by judges. Second, administrative tribunals may have more specialized knowledge than Article III generalist judges, such as the FCC. Third, administrative tribunals may perform faster where the stakes are relatively low.

Public v Private rights

In an apparent analogy to sovereign immunity, cases involving the government involve "public" rights and need not be tried in Article III courts. [Crowell v Benson] (holding that worker's compensation dispute involved a "private right," as it involved an injury similar to tort); see also [FRC v GE] (Congress may not grant a court the power to award a radio license because awarding licenses is an "administrative" function that Article III does not grant to the judicial power). Note that Congress doesn't have to adjudicate public rights at all; it could decide the issues presented itself, or delegate such issues for executive non-adjudicatory decision. However, even in issues of "private" right, questions of fact need not be heard in Article III courts. [Crowell v Benson]. The only exception is for "constitutional facts" and "jurisdictional facts," described below. Note generally that more recent decisions have rejected any "talismanic" public-private distinction and focused instead on whether Article I adjudication presents a "threat to the separation of powers," that is, to what extent the "essential attributes of judicial power" are preserved in the Article III courts. [CTFC v Schorr].

An agency may also exercise something like federal supplemental jurisdiction of a "private" right that is ancillary to a larger proceeding in which Article I adjudication is appropriate. [CTFC v Schorr] (allowing agency to hear state law counterclaim against a public-right proceeding). Additionally, a private right that has been created by Congress may be tried outside an Article III court, in comparison to rights under common law. [Thomas v Union Carbide] (arguing that statutory right created by Congress for pesticide makers to determine how much to pay each other for information was private). Alternatively, courts may argue that Congress doesn't have to create rights at all.

Judicial review of agency adjudication

The Court in [Crowell v Benson] implicitly conditioned the lawfulness of Article I courts on the opportunity to have judicial review by Article III courts. The implicit standard of review is that Article III requires that courts be able to review any question of law de novo, and to decide whether the facts found by the agency are "reasonable." For modern doctrine on this issue, note the Chevron v NRDC doctrine for review of agency decisions of law and the substantial evidence test for factfinding in formal APA proceedings.

Constitutional or jurisdictional facts

Article III courts, must specifically able to decide "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts, or facts that are "a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme." [Crowell v Benson] (allowing Article III de novo trial of issue, originally decided in agency adjudication, whether agency properly exercised admiralty jurisdiction). For examples of jurisdictional facts, see [Ng Fung Ho v White] (habeas corpus to determine whether deportee was a citizen); [Ohio Valley Water Co v Ben Avon Borough] (Amendment V takings claim).

Jury trial rights

The Amendment VII right to a jury trial may affect the availability of agency adjudication. However, agency cases, which rest on statutory rights, may not be like common-law cases such as Amendment VII protects. An administrative agency could also go to federal court in some cases, for example to enforce a civil fine, without necessary recourse to jury trial. If Congress creates a statutory right without an administrative tribunal, so that people can sue each other in federal court, jury trial might be available by analogy to the "right" and "remedy" created. [Curtis v Loether], thus creating a possible problem for administrative adjudication.

The Court later directly tied the Amendment VII question to the question of Article III jurisdiction. If Congress may constitutionally delegate adjudication of an issue to an Article I court, then Amendment VII does not apply. [Granfinanciera SA v Nordberg] (rejecting jury trial claim in bankruptcy trial).

Cases

[Crowell v Benson] (upholding decree of NLRB administrative court, on grounds that matters involving "public rights," or "those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive and legislative departments," may be constitutionally decided by Article I judges, by reference to the use of masters in equity cases, while reserving judicial power on questions of law, as well as de novo judicial review of "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts, which are facts that serve as a necessary condition to the operation of the statutory scheme; see also Brandeis dissenting, arguing that there was no need for an Article III court to build an entirely new fact record just to review the agency's determination of fact de novo, and pointing out that federal subject matter jurisdiction is not mandatory in the first place)

[FRC v GE] (Congress may not grant a court the power to award a radio license because awarding licenses is an "administrative" function that Article III does not grant to the judicial power)

[Northern Pipeline Construction v Marathon Pipe] (Congress may not grant bankruptcy courts, which are not Article III courts, jurisdiction over all "civil proceedings arising under" bankruptcy law or "arising in or related to" bankruptcy proceedings, on the grounds that article I judges may only exercise jurisdiction over territorial courts, courts martial, and administrative agencies "involving public rights," that is, rights arising "between the government and others," noting that the government need not create public rights at all, and that a state law contract claim in the bankruptcy proceeding was a private right, not a public right, but that Congress may also assign federally-created private rights to Article I judges, compared to common law private rights)

[CTFC v Schorr] (upholding challenge to CTFC adjudication by person who lost in CTFC proceeding then tried to bring federal court proceeding, where plaintiffs could bring claims either in CTFC proceeding or in federal court, on the ground that the "purposes underlying the requirements of Article III" were determinative, that the guarantee of Article III serves to protect "personal" rather than "structural" interests, that the plaintiff waived his right to an Article III proceeding by chosing the CTFC tribunal, that the other side's state law counterclaim, although "private," did not void the CTFC proceeding, given that the distinction between "public" and "private" rights was not "talismanic," that here "there is no substantial threat to the separation of powers" given that the CTFC tribunal was voluntary, and that the method was useful to determine facts "particularly suited to examination and determination" by an administrative agency)

[Thomas v Union Carbide] (upholding delegation to EPA to adjudicate controversies between pesticide makers, given that the right was "private" but created by Congress)

[alias: constitutional fact]
[alias: jurisdictional fact]
[alias: Article I court]