Marbury v Madison

Marbury v Madison

Facts
Marbury given appointment as judge by previous administration, but the Secretary of State (Marshall) doesn't actually deliver a commission
New administration refuses to seat Marbury
Marbury brings petition for mandamus to Supreme Court to take his position

Applicable Law
Article III, section 2: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."

[Judiciary Act], section 13: the Supreme Court is authorized to "issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."

Analysis

Article III lists the entire range of cases and controversies over which the judicial power can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Article III, section 2 expressly lists in which cases the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction; thus, by implication, Article III allows the Supreme Court only appellate jurisdiction in other cases.

Marbury has a legal right to the commission because the commission was completed on the president's signature. A writ of mandamus would be the appropriate remedy for Marbury, given that every right should have a remedy.
The power of the president to appoint a particular person is discretionary and cannot be questioned by the courts, but only by the political branches. There is thus a nondiscretionary duty to seat Marbury. Note that this argument anticipates the political question doctrine with the argument that, for example in the case of Article I officers, that "where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion . . . their acts are only politically examinable."

But to issue a writ of mandamus directly would be to exercise original jurisdiction. Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act thus attempts to expand the Supreme Court's subject matter jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III.

"It is emphatically the province of the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marshall uses the Supremacy Clause, the fact that the constitution is written, the judicial (and government-wide) oath to uphold the constitution, and an interpretation of the judicial power as a power to interpret to argue that the judiciary can definitely declare whether a particular act can confict with the legislative. The court thus can and does rule that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act is in conflict with the Constitution. In order that the Constitution have effect, "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." Thus, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act is void, and as a result the Court has no power to issue a writ of mandamus to Marbury.

Note that this case effectively establishes both the power of judicial review over legislative acts.

See also Capron v Van Noorden (court has duty to establish jurisdiction)

i.Two views of Marbury (currie):
1.Strong Marbury—Judicial Guardian Idea: Strong view of judicial review as crucial in checks and balances. USSC is intended to enforce the Constitutional limitations on other branches. Not a byproduct of the business of deciding cases. It’s one of the crucial checks and balances intended by the framers. USSC Must exercise judicial review as important check on leg. (and exec.) action.
2.Weak Marbury—Clean Hands Notion: Judges must obey the Constitution in the case before them; i.e., judges can’t act unconstitutionally. They can’t enforce unconstitutional laws so must decide if law is unconstitutional. USSC must have power to decide case/controversy before it and must follow Const/law of US when doing so.