parent nodes: federal habeas jurisdiction | judicial power
INS v St Cyr
Facts
St Cyr, a lawfully admitted alien, convicted of crime
St Cyr would be eligible for waiver of deportation at time
Removal procedures don't begin until after AEDPA is passed
AEDPA removes discretionary waiver of deportation
St Cyr sues, claiming that the waiver-rule changes don't apply, since they happened after his arrest
Issues: Does the court have jurisdiction over St. Cyr's appeal?
Analysis
Congress must provide a "clear statement" to strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction. [Ex parte Yerger]. The writ is available "at a minimum" as it existed in 1789. Executive detention is the core of the 1789 writ, and is available to nonenemy aliens as well as citizens. Such habeas relief for deportees is "required by the Constitution."a To remove that protection would raise a Suspension Clause problem.
As a result, the Court will construe a statute to avoid constitutional difficulties; § 1252(a)(c), which says that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against a (removable) alien," is not sufficient to bar habeas jurisdiction under § 2241.
The Court points out that § 1252(a)(c) might acceptably bar habeas jurisdiction if "the question of law (about St Cyr's removal) could be answered in another judicial forum." For example, Congress could provide an adequate habeas substitute through the courts of appeals. But since no other forum is available, the statute must not be read to bar habeas jurisdiction over St Cyr's claim.
Finally, because Congress must make a "clear statement" in order to make a statute retroactive, and because Congress has not so clearly stated, AEDPA does not apply to St. Cyr. As a result, the Court grants the writ.
Scalia dissenting argues that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is meant to "effectuate, not subvert, congressional intent . . . (so as to) conform with Congress' presumed intent not to enact" unconstitutional measures.
But the Suspsension Clause only protects against suspension of the writ, not changes of its scope. Congress cannot be said to "suspend" the writ any time it changes the grounds that lead to habeas relief, or else the Constitution would require a "one-way ratchet" for the writ. The Suspension Clause protects against suspension of the writ as a whole, not "any particular habeas right;" Scalia points out in comparison that equal protection guarantees equally protective laws, and not any particular protective law.
The Suspension Clause, rather, guarantees the 1789 writ, which had no provision for discretionary release. As a result, Congress did not "suspend" the 1789 writ by denying St. Cyr the chance for discretionary relief, so that St. Cyr should not be granted the writ.
federal habeas jurisdiction; judicial power