parent nodes: Article III | standing

Allen v Wright

Facts

IRS is required to deny tax-exempt status to schools that discriminate on race
P alleges that IRS is failing to deny tax-exempt status where it should, and that such failure is (1) causing stigma to persons denied entry to discriminating schools (2) effectively subsidizing and encouraging racially discriminatory private schools

Applicable law

Article III requirements for standing: Analysis

Claim (1) lacks standing because it is too abstract, given how potentially anybody could bring this suit claiming an abstract "stigmatic" injury. Claim (1) is effectively a claim to have the government obey the law, which is too diffuse to give any individual a claim under Article III against the government.


Claim (2) lacks standing because the causal chain between the Goverment's action and the claimed injury is too "attenuated," especially given how an intervening actor (the discriminatory schools) is in between the IRS' action and the claimed injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to allege that a successful suit against the IRS would actually do much to redress the stigma of racially discriminatory schools or the subsidization thereof. And since the courts should not monitor the "wisdom" of Executive Branch actions.

Stevens, J., dissenting argues that the court is confusing standing analysis — which is supposed to ask whether an individual has a sufficient stake in litigation — with justiciability analysis, which asks broader questions about whether the exercise of judicial power in this case would violate the constitutional separation of powers. He points out that mistakenly granting discriminatory schools tax-exempt statuts effectively subsidizes their operation. Furthermore, Stevens argue that redressibility is not an issue here because the plaintiffs claim that the IRS has failed to pursue a specific legal duty. The court, Stevens argues, has power under Marbury v Madison to interpret "what the law is" and whether the IRS is following that law.