Online Appendix A: Question Wording and Index Formation:

Helping Hand

"Now let's talk about programs to provide [job training / welfare] to help people—many of whom are [blacks and minorities / new immigrants from Europe]—who have problems with poverty. The programs I'm talking about are specifically designed to help [people who have shown they want to work their way out of their own problems / people who have had trouble hanging on to jobs]. Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed to these programs?"

Political Information Scale

1) "Now think about where the political parties stand on this issue. Would you say that the Democrats are more in favor of spending money to reduce unemployment, that the Republicans are more in favor of it, or that they are both equally in favor of it?" (Correct answer = Democrats)
2) "Now think about where the political parties stand on this issue. Would you say that the Democrats are more in favor of reducing the income differences between the rich and the poor, that the Republicans are more in favor of it, or that they are both equally in favor of it?" (Correct answer = Democrats)
3) "When it comes to allowing students in public schools to pray or otherwise observe their religion, would you say that the Democrats are more in favor of it, that the Republicans are more in favor of it, or that they are both equally in favor of it?" (Correct answer = Republicans)
4) "Now for some factual questions. Please tell me how many members of the U.S. Supreme

Court there are?" (Correct answer = 9)

5) "And how many (four year) terms can the President of the United States Serve?" (Correct answer = 2)

Ideology

"Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much about this?"

Online Appendix B: Subgroup Analyses

First, we describe the correction to allow for the estimation of parameters. For the j^{th} of the five combinations of information and ideology, let f_{jklmn} indicate the observed frequency in the $(k,l,m,n)^{th}$ cell in the 4×2×2×2 table formed by the cross-classification of our dependent variable with the three treatments for group j. Let Y_{kj} be the number of persons in this group who give response k to the helping hand question, our dependent variable (k = 1 [strongly agree], 2 [agree], 3 [disagree], 4 [strongly disagree]), that is, $Y_{kj} = \Sigma_{lmn}\ f_{jklmn}$. Finally, let N_j the total number of valid responses from this group, that is, $N_j = \Sigma_k\ Y_{kj}$. For any cell (k,l,m,n) for this group, compute the value

$$g_{jklmn} = g_{jk} = \left(\frac{Y_{kj}}{N_j}\right)\frac{q}{r} \qquad (1)$$

where q is the number of estimated parameters linking the dependent variable to independent variables and r the total number of response patterns for any level of the dependent variable, and let k indicates the value of the dependent variable at this cell. We then create $f^*_{jklmn} = f_{jklmn} + g_{jklmn}$ and use this set of new f^*'s to estimate our parameters. Because such adjustments slightly affect the fit of the model, we use the unadjusted version of the table when making comparisons of fit; the results are unchanged if we use the adjusted version.

Table A-1 presents results from fitting a series of models using identical sets of parameters to the five subgroups of ideology and information combinations (the parameters are not constrained to be equal to one another across groups). We can use this series of models to test the effects of adding or dropping a term for any subgroup. According to conventional usage, while we cannot necessarily reject a null hypothesis if a likelihood ration chi-square (L^2) test

yields a p-value greater than .05, we would not reject the importance of a parameter if the loss of fit that comes from its removal from a model is significant at around p<.1. (The less important the parameter, the less significant the chi-square difference between models containing it and excluding it. Therefore to reject the parameter here implies a larger p-value.) That is to say, there is a lack of symmetry between hypothesis rejecting and hypothesis accepting, and when it comes to concluding that a parameter does not matter, we are likely to set a different threshold in order to be more conservative.

To make it easier to follow the progression of the modeling, we split up the sample and conduct model testing within each subgroup; however, it is important to keep in mind that, while the likelihood ratio chi-square of the overall model is equal to the sum of the likelihood chi-squares of all the subgroups and that the total degrees of freedom are also equal to the sum of the degrees of freedom of all of the subgroups, it is not the case that the sum of five subgroup models with p-values of .200 is also .200. Rather, the acceptability of the overall model according to a chi-square test will be poorer than the average acceptability of each of the submodels. We shall therefore need to test the final overall model as opposed to conducting tests for the subgroups.

First of all, let us consider the model that allows the experimental conditions to affect response within each information/ideology category, while <u>forbidding</u> any interaction between them. This is model 1 in Table A-1. Model 1 in Table A-1 is identical to model 2 from Table 1, though here we partition the chi-square by the different subgroups to serve as a benchmark for further testing. Even though this model says nothing about the interaction between political information and ideology—for example, it is possible for the effect of an experimental manipulation to increase with political information for liberals but to decrease with political

information for conservatives—the model fits poorly (L^2 = 79.88 at 57 degrees of freedom), telling us that there are interactions between the experimental conditions.

<<Table A-1 about here>>

The next two sets of models (models 2 and 3, Table A-1) introduce the special interaction terms for the assumed scenario for conservatives and that for liberals, called CELL 1 and CELL 2 respectively. We can see that the effects of introducing the first effect are more significant for conservatives than for liberals, while the effects of the second are more significant for liberals than for conservatives. The test of the significance of the liberal assumed scenario is 13.48 – 6.84 at 12 – 10 df, or 6.64 for 2 df, for low-information liberals (highly significant at p = .036); the results are basically identical 11.36 – 4.89 = 6.47 at 2 df for high-information liberals. (By contrast, the test for including the conservative assumed scenario for liberals leads to a L^2 of only 5.36 at 5 df for low-information liberals and one of .53 at 2 df for low-information liberals, both insignificant [p = .374; p = .767].)

For conservatives, the tests for the addition of the conservative assumed scenario are 20.72 – 13.29 = 7.43 at 3 df for low-information conservatives (p = .059), and 16.18 – 7.48 = 8.70 at 2 df for high-information conservatives (p = .013). Neither case allows us to confidently ignore the parameter, but the test is more significant for high-information conservatives. The tests for adding the liberal assumed scenario, while similar to the effects of adding the conservative assumed scenario for low-information conservatives (7.35 at 2 df; p = .025), are insignificant for high-information conservatives (1.9 at 2 df; p=.387).[1]

In sum, we find good evidence for our claim that the interaction in the experimental conditions is due to assumed scenarios that are different for conservatives and liberals. But what of moderates? The test of adding the liberal scenario to moderates leads to a L^2 of 4.68 at 3 df (p

= .197), and that for adding the conservative scenario is 4.16 at 3 df (p = .245), both insignificant. In other words, the effects of adding the liberal category or the conservative category parameter are basically equal for moderates and are ignorable. We therefore find support for our claim that these scenarios are the product of ideology: moderates do not have the assumed scenario that ideologues possess.

The last models include assumed scenarios but drop an effect of race for all other combinations of treatments. (Model 4 has the conservative scenario, and model 5 the liberal scenario.) High-information ideologues, but not low-information ideologues, are indifferent to the race of the recipient. For high-information conservatives, we can compare model 4 to model 2, which gives a chi-square of .30 (7.78 –7.48) at 3 degrees of freedom, obviously insignificant (p = .960). For high-information liberals we can compare model 5 to model 3 which gives a chi-square of 9.35 – 4.89 = 4.46 at 3 df; p = .216. Thus for high-information ideologues, the effect of race is inseparable from the assumed scenario as a whole.

Table A-1: Models for Table with Unadjusted Frequencies

1: ABC Only

	Chi-Square	Df	Prob
Low Liberal	13.48	12	.335
High Liberal	11.36	9	.252
High Moderate	18.14	12	.111
Low Conservative	20.72	12	.055
High Conservative	16.18	12	.183
SUM	79.88	57	

2: ABC + CELL1

	Chi-Square	Df	Prob
Low Liberal	8.12	7	.322
High Liberal	10.83	7	.146
High Moderate	13.99	9	.123
Low Conservative	13.29	9	.150
High Conservative	7.48	10	.679

3: ABC + CELL2

	Chi-Square	Df	Prob
Low Liberal	6.84	10	.740
High Liberal	4.89	7	.674
High Moderate	13.46	9	.143
Low Conservative	13.37	10	.204
High Conservative	14.28	10	.160

4: AC+ CELL1

	Chi-Square	Df	Prob
Low Liberal	29.14	12	.004
High Liberal	13.40	10	.202
High Moderate	24.45	12	.018
Low Conservative	28.00	12	.006
High Conservative	7.78	13	.858

5: AC + CELL2

	Chi-Square	Df	Prob
Low Liberal	37.49	13	.000
High Liberal	9.35	10	.499
High Moderate	30.23	12	.003
Low Conservative	33.94	13	.001
High Conservative	17.09	13	.195