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Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields

Concepts and applications

Edited by
Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez

1 Was Bourdieu a field theorist?1

John Levi Martin and Forest Gregg

Introduction

Field theory was introduced into the psychological social sciences in the mid-twentieth century by German psychologists and philosophers (after the war, mainly expatriates to the United States). Influenced by physics, these thinkers borrowed the distinctive features of physical field theories for application to the human realm. While this genealogy was largely extinguished within American social theory somewhere in the 1970s, as it was dying out in the United States, Pierre Bourdieu was resurrecting field theory in France, making it the heart of his own explanatory apparatus. His renown has led many current students of the social sciences to conflate field theory and Bourdieu's own writings, making it impossible even to ask whether Bourdieu was indeed a rigorous field theorist, let alone to see in what directions his ideas have contributed to the project of field theory.

In this chapter, we first outline the fundamental characteristics of field theory in the natural sciences. We then briefly discuss how this was adapted by the Gestalt theorists for the case of human behaviour. We then argue that Bourdieu was indeed a rigorous field theorist. Assuming that the outlines of Bourdieu's own work are familiar enough to our readers, we do not document Bourdieu's use of core field theoretic principles, but instead concentrate on where we believe he made important advances that will be necessary for any similar field theoretic approach. We finally discuss what we believe are the potentially problematic or confusing aspects of Bourdieu's own work considered in field theoretic terms. These are: 1 the relation between social space and particular fields; 2 the relation between capital and field position; and 3 the relation of vectors to extra-field positions or outcomes.

Essences of field theory

Some characteristics of field theory

Field theory, as an approach, developed first and most fully in the physical sciences through various attempts to comprehend how one thing could affect

another without some substantive medium. While there are a number of different fields, and theories of each have varied over the course of their development, the best model of intellectually rigorous field theory would be classical (non-relativistic) electro-magnetism, though the important features here are found in similar systems. (Newtonian gravitation has much in common with field theory, but only Einstein's general relativity actually technically gave it a field theoretic form; Hesse 1970: 226.)

Field theories really took the basic form of the fluid mechanics developed in the eighteenth century, in which equations linked a 'flow' or potential for transmitted force to spatial coordinates, but applied this form to situations where no fluid could be found; examples are motion induced by gravity, electricity, or magnetism (Hesse 1970: 181; Rummel 1975: 26; also cf Köhler 1947: 127). An examination of classical electro-magnetism suggests that field theory may be said to have the following characteristics:

- It purports to explain changes in the states of some elements (e.g. a static field induces motion in a charged particle) but need not appeal to changes in states of other elements (that is, 'causes').
- These changes in state involve an interaction between the field and the existing states of the elements (e.g. a particle of positive charge moves one way and one of negative charge another) (see Maxwell 1954 [1891]: 68; Koffka 1935: 42; Köhler 1947: 300).
- The elements have particular attributes which make them susceptible to the field effect (particles differ in the degree and direction of charge).
- The field without the elements is only a potential for the creation of force, without any existent force (Hesse 1970: 196).
- The field itself is organized and differential (Koffka 1935: 117). At any position the field is a vector of potential force and these vectors are neither randomly nor discontinuously distributed.

It is worth pointing out how utterly at odds such a conception is with the conventional understanding of causality in the social sciences. According to this conception, elements have attributes, mutually exclusive attributes often being considered instances of a 'variable'. Some of an element's variables are imagined to be linked together mechanically, such that a change in one variable must produce a change in another. While the mechanism may yet be obscure, social scientists recognize causality when a change in state in one variable of an element produced by external manipulation *impels* a change in state in another variable of that element. Causality follows a mental image of external impulsion taken from classical mechanics (basically the conception of Hobbes, though more Rube Goldberg than Minnesota Fats), but recasts this in terms of variables, as opposed to substances (see Abbott 1988).

In contrast, a rigorous field theoretic approach allows for one element's state to change without requiring that it be due to a change in state in another element (let alone a *different* change in the state in the same element).

Such a field theoretic approach was introduced into the social and behavioural sciences by the Gestalt psychologists. We go on to review the central emphasis of the Gestalt school, and then how the members formulated field theory.

The development of field theory

The non-independence of percepts

The Gestalt idea is generally attributed to Christian Ehrenfels, who had studied with Alexius Meinong at Graz. Ehrenfels (1988 [1890]: 112) pointed out not only that there are qualities that can only exist as a whole (for example, a timbre or a melody), but that we are not aware of any conscious activity whereby we generate this quality through synthesis. While acknowledging Ehrenfels's priority, the motive force in establishing an empirical school of psychology was really Max Wertheimer, who had attended lectures by Ehrenfels (Heider 1983: 44).

However, Wertheimer had also been influenced by Carl Stumpf, who had sketched the lines for the sort of phenomenology that was to turn into Gestalt psychology. Responding to the debate over the position of the 'cultural sciences' (*Geisteswissenschaften*; Dilthey 1988 [1883]: 78, 91, 97, 125, 131), Stumpf argued that more fundamental than either of the two commonly identified branches of sciences (natural and cultural) was phenomenology, a science of the structure of the phenomena with which each of these begin. (Stumpf's student Husserl was later to emphasize one version of such a phenomenological study as a form of 'pure psychology'.² This phenomenology demonstrates that our world is not the world of the Cartesians. First, in contrast to the pure, isotropic and homogenous space of geometry, the space we live in has certain relations built into it (at any time, some things 'are' to the left, say), and it has unevenness in it (and indeed, our vision has boundaries) (Stumpf 1907: 72, 9). These are characteristics of the objects we confront, not things we put into them.

Stumpf thus proposed not only an ideal phenomenology that retained the distinction between the pure visions of the natural sciences and our actual experienced world, but a version of psychology attuned to philosophical questions (as opposed to the narrower professionalism of the American model). Both these principles – an embracing of immediate experience and an engagement with philosophical questions – marked the approach of Stumpf's students who were to found the Gestalt school: in addition to Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka (Smith 1988: 12, 45; Neisser 2002: 4; Ash 1998: 118, 120, 124).³

What Wertheimer did was to seize upon one key aspect of this idea as the basis for experimental research. Both Stumpf and Ehrenfels had pointed to the importance of our capacity to hear harmonics – relations – as unities. The way to understand our actual, empirical, phenomenological experience would be to investigate how we captured such whole forms ('Gestalts') as unified

objects of experience (and not as aggregates or syntheses). In other words, Stumpf's phenomenology was inseparable from two other pre-sciences that he proposed, a science of structure and a science-of-relations, for the objects that we perceive – or at least their character as quality-bearing objects – are themselves structures, and structures are sets of relations.

A phenomenology of relations

These planks were of great utility for psychologists attempting to account for the non-independence of perceptual elements, which did not square with the dominant mechanistic explanation of sight. According to this latter view, photons stimulate retinal cells which lead to neurons firing which lead to a copy of the visual field reproduced in some portion of the brain. This field is then processed according to some mental template, leading to a distinction between the psychology of perception and the psychology of judgement.

Wertheimer (1922: 48, v) called this the 'mosaic or bundle thesis' of perception and consciousness: that all higher-order elements were the sum of elemental contents constructed according to mere 'and' summation. Connections between elements were generally ascribed to 'association', a type of relation that was indifferent to the content of the elements (cf. Cassirer 1923 [1910]: 285). Those who began from this assumption had a difficult time explaining cases in which our perception of one thing (e.g. distance) is affected by something else in the visual field: they were forced to argue that these were illusions of *judgement*. Wertheimer, in contrast, began from an assumption that what we perceive is a totality of relations that far from being arbitrary expressed the nature of the concrete laws of their formal structure (Wertheimer 1922: 53). While the 'mosaic thesis' assumed that the unit percepts were primary, and the larger structures derivative of some act of mental formulation, Wertheimer argued that the whole was primary, and its structural principles as objective as anything else.

It is not, of course, invariably the case that there is such a complicity between mental and environmental structures; indeed, we can subjectively experience and scientifically study the transition whereby we bring our mental structure into alignment with the environment, a process which Köhler (1925 [1917]: 17, 99, 173ff, 190, 198; also Köhler 1938: 31) called 'insight', 'a complete solution with reference to the whole lay-out of the field'. In contrast to behaviourist theories which predicted a continuous transition between random and useful behaviour, Köhler argued that it was easy to see the discontinuity in behaviour exactly at the point in which the subject (person or animal) manages to encompass the problem as a whole, and carries out actions with steps that, taken in isolation, contribute nothing to the solution.⁴ This was a reasonable and relatively rigorous extrapolation from Gestalt studies of perception. In contrast to the mosaic thesis which imagines the perceptual field is always composed of 'parts', a Gestalt exists when any sub-set of the overall field must be understood as a *position* in reference to the set of

other positions (Metzger 1986 [1975]: 160). So, too, Köhler argued, when the animal 'gets it', we can understand any action only in terms of a position in a sequence that, as a whole and only then, provides a solution.

Gestalts and fields

Thus Gestalt theorists had argued that one could not understand how an organism sensed the environment without attention to the field of perception as a whole.⁵ Thus one reason for the transition to field theory was that the Gestalt psychologists were most interested in the field of perception (that is, the perceptual field), and they argued that there were tension relations between different parts of this field. Any one percept (bit of perception) was likely to have its meaning only in relation to others. Köhler recalled that his goal was to determine 'why percepts at a distance have an effect on one another. This is only possible, we assumed (and we followed Faraday in doing so), if the individual percept has a field and if the "field", which surrounds the percept, does not merely reveal the presence of this percept but also presents its specific properties' (cited in Mey 1972: 13ff; for a discussion of the relation of Gestalt theory to field theory, see Mohr n.d., forthcoming).

The non-independence of parts, then, was the key insight that led Gestalt psychology to see the perceptual field *as* a field, as opposed to an indifferent Cartesian space. The visual field is organized into wholes from the earliest stages of our perceptual experience. As Köhler (1947: 118, cf. 259) wrote in his classic introduction to Gestalt psychology, 'As to the statement that sensory experience is a mosaic of purely local facts in the sense that each point of a sensory field depends exclusively upon its local stimulus, I must repeat that no grounds have ever been given for this radical assumption. Rather it seems to be the expression of an a priori belief about what ought to be the nature of things, experience to the contrary notwithstanding'.

However, field theory was implied by three other considerations. One was an epistemological conviction of the importance of mutual self-organization of systems, the sorts of ideas that we would now associate with Luhmann (1995). We seem to take for granted, Köhler (1929: 107, 145) wrote, that 'the processes of nature, if they are left to their own "blind" play, will never produce anything like order'. In contrast, Köhler (1929: 112, 121) proposed that seemingly independent elements are interdependent in ways that give rise to an overall set of dynamics. Thus the field emerges from the constant reciprocal adjustments of elements in relation to one another. This, Köhler argued, was in contrast to the dominant explanatory principles in which any form of change or regularity involved external *impulsion*, which he termed the 'machine theory'. This machine theory with its emphasis on external constraint might be well and good for the case of water in a pipe, but consider a drop in the ocean, along with other drops: each one moves according to the resultant vector of forces coming from its interaction with all other drops.⁶

This technically implies a field theory, for we have a set of positions such that at any point and time, there is one resulting force at any position that can be described as a vector. 'All the resultant forces together form one texture of stresses' (Köhler 1929: 134, 139).

Köhler's illustrations of physical systems (such as water molecules) were not thrown out carelessly; he had a fundamentally unified understanding of the relationship between fields and Gestalts that spanned the smallest physical systems and the most distinctly human phenomenological experiences. In a controversial (1920) work, he had made a careful argument for the existence of Gestalts in physical systems, using as his key example the way in which a variable amount of electric charge would be identically distributed across the surface of a conductor of a particular shape. (That is, the density distribution would be the same no matter what the magnitude of total charge.) This occurred because, argued Köhler, two aspects explained the final distribution of charge: one, the topography of the conductor, but the other, the dynamic laws of interaction which were one form of a general class of dynamics that led to self-organizing stability (or instability), depending on initial conditions.

The vectors that described the movement of charged particles were, thought Köhler, not different in nature from those that were experienced in the phenomenological world. To make this mapping, Köhler carefully considered the simplest phenomenological vector known to him, that which occurs when a lighter and a darker area of the visual field about one another. We know that there is an interaction here (indeed, you are likely to see a 'border' in the form of a distinct and dark line between such areas), and Köhler argued that this was best understood as arising from the differential in potential across the two areas. There must, he argued, be some area in the brain in which two similar areas also abutted, also with some sort of potential difference.

The final verdict is still out on some of these issues, but Köhler was overly optimistic in his assumptions as to the simplicity of his neurological model. However, while it seems that differences in the visual fields do not map as neatly onto differentials between locations in the visual cortex as he thought, the overall logic remains sound. For, just as Köhler argued, neurons fire precisely because of an electrochemical potential building up along an axon. Further, as he emphasized, neurons are unshielded cables, meaning that it is not that a pulse travels 'inside' the neuron, but that one travels inside while the inverse charge proceeds on the outside.⁷ This suggests that brain processes (unlike computer processes) are physically interdependent and themselves have field-like properties. Other scientists basically bracketed this not because Köhler's argument was wrong (the logic is fine as far as it goes, although there actually is a fair amount of insulating shielding of at least motor-system neurons), but because it was too complex to think about. Our default model of the brain in the social sciences still falsely assumes neurons as perfectly insulated wires.

In sum, one could be brought to a field theory from elementary considerations of neurology as well as from general epistemic considerations, but

Köhler also argued that the phenomenology of primate behaviour pointed us towards a field theoretic exploration of behaviour. Most famously, in his early work with apes, Köhler (1925 [1917]: 14, 89, 180, 182; also Köhler 1938: 95) had described their movement in some cases using a metaphor of traversing one of the 'lines of force' that Faraday saw emerging from magnets. One example was the inability of an animal near a desired object to move away in order to take a successful indirect path around an intervening obstacle, this inability increasing the closer the animal came to the object, such that an animal beginning on an insightful, indirect path might be drawn helplessly to the object if he came too near it, and would end up abandoning the successful initial plan. In such cases, the animal's action would be better explained by proposing that the object had a gravity-like pull than by attempting to explain the animal responding to differential stimuli from the environment.

Such phenomena are to be seen in humans as well as apes. Köhler gives the hypothetical example of a kindly boss trying to upbraid an underling. 'You may see him walking up and down before the other, as a magnetic needle swings in the field of force ...' The boss can say the *nice* things while looking into the other's eyes. 'Social forces are not opposed to that; on the contrary, they operate precisely in that direction. But try to look into another's eyes, i.e., toward what we experience ... as the center of the other man's personality, and tell him what obligates you to be less friendly ...' (Köhler 1929: 254). 'Just as this man feels his intentions bending around and his words avoiding the socially decisive step, his visible behavior appears to us as persistently deflected from the main direction, which is toward the other, and especially the visible center of his personality, i.e., his eyes' (Köhler 1929: 255).

In sum, we may see field phenomena as observers, and resulting descriptions of the behaviour of the ape or the boss that invokes the fields of force anchored by certain objects (the bananas, the eyes of the underling) will be parsimonious and generative of predictions, but this external observer-based invocation of field theory has its direct counterpart in the lived experience of actors. The forces are not merely convenient ways of summarizing complex data (as they are in physics), but are (as Durkheim continually emphasized) felt by each of us. When one feels a fright, said Köhler (1929: 381, 390), along with the fright there arises 'a vehement impulse to move away from the locus of that event'. 'In dynamics such a tendency toward increasing the distance between two things or events is called a field of force'.⁸

In sum, the field theory developed by the Gestalt theorists, in addition to fulfilling the general requirements of any field theory, had three characteristic dualities. The first was that the emphasis on the non-independence of elements was coupled with an equally strong emphasis on the generation of overall order through local dynamics. The second was that the topographic representation of the motion of actors mapped on to regularities in the phenomenological experience of actors, for the vectors that characterize the field are potentials for the subjective states of wilful actors. The third is that the relational nature of these vectors means that the same experiences that tell us

the qualities of objects, tell us about our own position (Köhler 1947: 297; this was more emphasized by the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson 1986 [1979]; cf. Mannheim 1940: 212ff).

All of these dualities are characteristic of Bourdieu's approach, and indeed are key to its field theoretic status. Perhaps for this reason, they have been the focus of criticism, as unfamiliarity with a rigorous field theory has frequently led to confusion as would-be critics imagined that Bourdieu's account must be deterministic in some way, or involve a two-stage engine whereby objective and subjective 'causes' politely take their turn. Rather than these being slip-pages in Bourdieu's logic, they stem from the inherent characteristics of any field theory. The reason for these parallels with the Gestalt school, we argue, is not direct influence, but the inner logic of a coherent field theoretic approach.

From Köhler to sociology

Köhler's ideas were quite influential in psychology for a time, but they entered into the social sciences as well. The most important transmission was in the work of Köhler's friend and colleague Kurt Koffka, who tried to defend and extend Köhler's field theory. A second important route came in the United States, as the psychologist Edward Tolman attempted to smuggle ideas of purposiveness and meaningful wholes from Gestalt theory into American behaviourism; Tolman (1954) went on to contribute a field theory of psychology for the Parsons and Shils volume *Toward a General Theory of Action*.

In addition, there were a few uses of field theory in German social sciences, the first (of which we are aware) being Karl Brandt's (1952) use in economics (though also see Geiger 1949: 51ff).⁹ Friedrich Fürstenberg (1969 [1962]) then applied field theory to occupational stratification in an illuminating and enlightening way, anticipating many of the key arguments later made by Bourdieu.

However, it was Lewin, a colleague of Köhler and Wertheimer at the Psychological Institute (see Marrow 1969: 13), who put field theory on the map in social psychology. While Lewin (1951: 240) claimed to find his inspiration for his conception of field in Einstein, his definition of a field as 'a totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually dependent' is clearly derived from the Gestalt emphasis on totality, and the analytic direction of 'the way from above to below'. Lewin also continued Köhler's emphasis on a coherent phenomenological grounding of behaviour in the qualitative experience of the organism, as well as the ontological complicity of the mind and the world.

Lewin's own attempts to push field theory in a new direction were less successful scientifically than they were professionally – because he enjoyed making topological diagrams of every particular argument he wanted to make, and Americans took more kindly to pictures than abstractions (and we must not deny Lewin's own interpersonal charisma), his idiosyncratic and somewhat

flatter version of field theory became the focus of attention in sociology, while Köhler turned his thoughts more to philosophy than sociology. Thus there was little sustained attempt to develop a rigorous field theory of behaviour (with the exception of the ecological psychologists; pursuing this would take us too far afield).

Bourdieu

Bourdieu and his predecessors

While Bourdieu in his early work made references to Lewin (see Swartz 1997: 123 n.15) and takes an epigraph from him in (Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 177, also 181), he generally did not highlight the connections of his approach to other field theorists (e.g. Bourdieu 1985b); when asked (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97), he seemed to prefer to emphasize (with perfectly good reason) the joint influence on both himself and Lewin of Cassirer. It is quite likely that Bourdieu's exposure to other Gestalt theorists came indirectly (most certainly through Merleau-Ponty, who was closely in dialogue with the results of the Gestalt psychologists, but also via Sartre, who used some of Lewin's ideas in his work on the emotions and also in *Being and Nothingness*¹⁰). The homomorphism of Bourdieu's work with that of the Gestalt/field theorists is indicative not of borrowing, but of the internal consistency of the approach.

Because the reader is likely to be able to see that Bourdieu's field theory not only satisfies but highlights the particular aspects we have noted as fundamental to any field theory,¹¹ and to note the parallels to the work of Köhler, rather than focus on an exhaustive documentation of this, here we wish to emphasize Bourdieu's distinct contribution to field theory. Thus we are not interested in the temporal process whereby Bourdieu's ideas developed, but rather how his most decisive interventions contribute to the wider project of field theory. Further, we emphasize that such a project requires rational reconstruction as opposed to fundamentalism in our understanding of Bourdieu's writings – we are not only permitted but required to surgically remove other aspects of his work before concentrating on his field theory, and indeed to establish the inner consistency of this theory if necessary even against Bourdieu himself.

Our argument is not the weak one that Bourdieu 'was a field theorist' (and certainly not that he was merely 'another' field theorist), nor even that he revived a slumbering tradition, but that he was responsible for key breakthroughs that are necessary for any further progress in the field theoretic tradition. Most importantly, Bourdieu's emphasis on the habitus, far from being an idiosyncratic addition, turns out to be a necessary component of a social field theory, and solves the gravest problem with the Gestalt theory, namely its reliance on naïve realism. The Gestalt theorists, Köhler in particular, went from the (defensible) major premise that the phenomenological world of

experience is as real as worlds get to the (more problematic) argument that we could in any and all case(s) barring psychosis treat the qualities of someone's experience as 'in' the things experienced. Such naïve realism is fine as far as it goes, but it doesn't go very far in the social sciences, where we are used to antithetical qualitative experience (one man's meat is another man's poison¹²). It is one thing to say that to the hungry rat, the cheese beckons because the cheese *is* good, but does the cello piece by Xenakis beckon for the same reason?

Bourdieu emphasized that a plausible theory of practice had to have a component in which we become the sort-of-beast that we are: that is, that we develop that particular set of responses and dispositions to the world that allow the world's properties to be meaningful *to us* (Bourdieu 1969 [1966]: 182). (A more complete discussion of the relation of habit and habitus to field theory will be found in Martin 2011.) In classical magnetism, the process whereby a substance is made to generate the field effect is known as 'hysteresis' and Bourdieu understood the importance of its place in any social field theory. It is perhaps significant that this sort of developmental account is now being proposed (quite independently) in ecological psychology for the same reasons (Chemero 2009).

Second, from his relatively early work (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]) to later (e.g. Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 10), Bourdieu argued that it is no mixed metaphor to consider a field both a field of forces and a field of struggle that has game-like aspects to it. Although one might argue that Köhler's understanding of dynamics already implied this notion of the game, Bourdieu made what is almost certainly the correct linkage of this abstract question to the nature of human social action, namely that the dynamics involve expectations, expectations that may be violated, as social contestation is often a poorly policed game.

Finally, as Bourdieu has often emphasized, his use of correspondence analysis as a core analytic technique is certainly rigorously related to a relational perspective (Bourdieu *et al.* 1991 [1968]: 254; 1988 [1984]: 23f; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96) and most probably it has physical field theoretic interpretations that have an analogous interpretation for the application to social science.

However, Bourdieu's field theoretic approach has some potential problems. Note that here we do not consider as problematic all those aspects of Bourdieu's work that are not tightly coupled to the field theoretic aspects (for Bourdieu's theory is not only a field theoretic one). Rather, we point to aspects of Bourdieu's field theory that, understood *as* field theory, raise certain issues. We will tend to use as our main illustration Bourdieu's analysis of the literary field, which is perhaps his most orthodox application of core field theoretic principles (see Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 9 where he ties the field in physics to the phenomenological field and, quite true to Köhler, notes that the motion is due not only to the forces in the field but also the objects' initial inertia¹³).

Space and homology

One potential area of confusion pertains to the relation between the different fields and the underlying social space. In a rigorous field theoretic treatment, space can be treated in one of two ways. It can be the empty and neutral positions of Newtonian/Cartesian space, in which case fields are things that can occur *in* space (with their vectors pointing to positions in this space), or it can be the warped space of Einstein, meaning that it is inseparable from fields. Bourdieu usually seems to go in the first direction: his space is one that is generally proposed as an analytic simplification (a bird's-eye view), yet one that maps onto fields with their different dimensionality and different sets of positions. However, at other times Bourdieu treats the space as itself having the same properties as a field (as in Bourdieu 1985a: 724), and speaks of an overall 'social field' (later, e.g. Bourdieu 1996a [1989], the 'field of power' seems to fulfil a similar function with similarly confusing results).¹⁴

Related to this issue is the question of the reasons for the homology between fields. We will here distinguish between two types of homology: substantive and formal. Two fields are substantively homologous if there is a mapping of a position in one to a position in the other based on transposable characteristics of the position (which includes likely characteristics of occupants). Thus we may speak of a homology in the field of dance to the field of music if certain dance and certain music is 'light' and 'pretty' while other dance and other music is 'difficult' and 'intellectual'. So too we might speak of a homology if the same distribution of persons is found across the fields (thus in both fields, say, elementary school teachers are together and separated from clerical workers). The simplest substantive homology occurs when the dimensions of social space are recognizable in the positions that actors take in the field.

We would say that two fields are formally homologous when we can identify similar formal principles across the fields, although the positions, the persons, or the types of persons are not similarly distributed in the two fields. For example, the field of calligraphy and the field of grass track motorcycle racing may be formally homologous in that the key differentiation pits (in this imaginary example) purists against challengers, but there are no substantive similarities across positions (thus in one field the purists may be older while in the other they are younger, in one field the purists may be more educated while in the other less so, and so on).

There are good reasons to expect both sorts of homologies. Regarding the former, we must acknowledge that the processes that pertain to the formation of habitus tend to be early and hence associated with a fundamental position in social space. After all, we are not raised in the field of photography, but in a lower middle-class provincial neighbourhood, say. Field experience may indeed alter habitus, but associations between varieties of habitus and field positions are more likely to arise by those of different habitus having different reactions to the field effect than by the habitus internalizing different field trajectories.¹⁵

Thus given that fields recruit from the same social space (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]), and given that aspects of habits that are predictably related to position in social space are also relevant for field dynamics, we would certainly expect some sort of non-independence across position in fields. However, Bourdieu clearly believes that this sort of gross substantive homology is necessarily limited.

For one, Bourdieu emphasizes that all fields have their own autonomous lawfulness (Bourdieu 1969 [1966]: 161ff; Bourdieu 1990: 389; Bourdieu 1993: 72). There may indeed be transposable aspects of position in social space, but these must be translated into the specific logic of each field in order for them to become operative. Although this vision of autonomy is logically compatible with complete homology, it does not seem that Bourdieu would accept this conclusion. It is true that eggheads are eggheads (and meatheads are meatheads) when they listen to music, and also when they dine, and also when they read books, and so on, and so we might expect them to sort themselves out in similar fashion across fields. However, if even in intricate and involuted worlds like those of music composition, philosophy or haute couture, we were only to find the usual suspects in the same positions but wearing different hats, no one would seriously embark on a field theoretic account.

There may also be good reason for formal homologies, at least in certain types of fields. Perhaps the single most fundamental formal homology would have to do with one's total amount of capital – in every field, some are on top, some on the bottom; some dominant, some dominated. Such homologies then could lead to some sort of shared experience and perhaps explain sympathetic relations across fields or to social space in general – even though the lower-upper class may be more like the upper-middle class in economic terms, in experiential terms they may feel more like the lower-middle class given their experience of being relatively dominated in their social world (cf. Abbott 2001: 183ff). This could account for Bourdieu's argument not only that the dominated fraction of a cultural field has an inclination to *speak* to those dominated overall (Bourdieu 1985a: 73–5–36), but that there is a more fundamental mapping between certain cultural fields and 'the field of power or the social field in its entirety' (Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 205, also see 164, 250; also see Bourdieu 1993: 143ff).

We may proceed further on these lines and propose a general second dimension. Consider a 'well-defined field' with only a single axis of internal stratification in which a dominant position means nothing other than the capacity to consecrate others (and to have been so consecrated)¹⁶. Others will struggle not only to attain the capital of this field, but to adapt the rules so that whatever capital they are most likely to be able to attain is most likely to be the capital of the field. Adopting Sartre's formula, we might say that a field is a game whose game is in question.

This suggests a differentiation between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, which, perhaps crossed with a second dimension of total volume of capital, could be

found across fields. Indeed, this is one aspect of the homology that Bourdieu often discusses. Yet there is a second formal homology which is somewhat different. We might imagine that in many fields we find a core differentiation that pertains to the degree of commitment to the inherent logic of the field and a correlative dispersion of strategies and trajectories (e.g., Bourdieu [1992] 1996: 161). Some buy in to the 'illusio' without reservation and pursue the stakes of the field with total commitment, only looking for the approval of those who are approved of by other insiders (what Lang and Lang [1988] and Lena [2010] call 'recognition'). In contrast to these 'buy ins' are the 'sell-outs' – those who, even if they too are susceptible to the special magic of the field, still seek a 'renown' in Lang and Lang's terms that is bought through whoring their goods to outsiders. Although this might be a form of heterodoxy, it is not the same as the heterodoxy that is compatible with purity. Indeed, we might imagine the orthodox being challenged by the impure popularizers on the one hand, and the young Turks on the other. Hence an autonomous orientation appears as pure and a heteronomous as impure, which would suggest a stable formal division ... were it not for the fact that there can be fierce debate as to what the inner principles of the field actually *are* (an important point to which we return below).

Bourdieu makes few global statements about homology, but he seems to shift among these three types of homology (one substantive, two formal) depending on the case, and perhaps gives more of an impression of an overarching logic of homology than is warranted. (His key method of correspondence analysis does not uniquely identify dimensions; these are interpretations proposed by the analyst. Homology is then in many ways an assumption, not a finding.) Further, we have the sense that were a committed Lévi-Straussian to attempt to work out the binary oppositions underlying Bourdieu's own thought, she would determine that Bourdieu tends to associate the opposition of purity:impurity with culture:economy and, at least in cultural fields, with endogenous:exogenous and hence autonomous:heteronomous.¹⁷

That is, Bourdieu not only tended to assume (especially in Wacquant 1993: 24) the overriding importance of the division within the ruling class pointed to by Marx and Engels (1976 [1845]) between the active rulers (on the one hand) and the ideologues who make up the illusions of the class (on the other), but its ubiquitous microcosmic analogues, precisely because the fields he tended to find interesting were those in which these dynamics were at play. Thus it may seem that at least in cultural fields, there is a homology with social space because of the separation between endogenously generated reputation as opposed to exogenously generated renown. One would not, of course, expect this homology to appear in the same form in the field of financial physics, or that of venture capital, or perhaps even that of top 40 pop music.

So the confidence with which those inspired by Bourdieu go about looking for a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy may be an overly optimistic one – for in most cases, this is not a formal characteristic

of fields but an evaluative overlay at best, and an ideological obfuscation at worst. While perhaps winners do not always get to write all the history books and make the losers those who 'started the war,' still, the inner principles of today's field is likely to be determined by tomorrow's configuration of positions. That the *eigengesetzlichkeit* of a field is nothing other than the consecration of contingency, however, in no way forbids a science of regularities.

This issue of homology is related to the question of whether there is some inherent difficulty in what to consider as 'a' field. Most field theorists dismiss this as an irrelevancy stemming from an incomplete grasp of the nature of field theory: fields are not defined nominalistically, by the analyst forcing a cookie cutter on the material, but rather are defined by the real, experienced, mutual orientation of sets of actors. However, if one makes a claim as to the general existence of a homology to social space, where one draws the boundaries may make quite a difference. There may indeed be (as Bourdieu shows) a homology between social space and the choice of various activities, including sports to play, not only for amateurs, but even for professionals. But there is no single 'field of sport' in the sense of a set of professionals or aficionados pursuing a single stakes as there might be in the field of gymnastics.¹⁸

Were there such a global field – that is, not only might gymnastics might appeal to those with one capital composition and rugby to those with a different one, but there would be meaningful trajectories from gymnastics to rugby and vice versa as all were oriented to the same prizes – we might expect the same sort of homology to social space that one sees in terms of choices of sports to watch or participate in. Absent such a field, it is not clear how we should establish homology to social space *within* the actual fields. Would the field of professional gymnastics be homologous to the sub-portion of social space from which those attracted to gymnastics tend to come? Would it still be a microcosm for the larger space? Or would it merely have similar axes, and thus possess analogy but not homology?

Again, if one considers 'wrestling' in entire, one might well find that there are obdurate social distinctions between those who only follow college wrestling and those who only follow (contemporary) 'professional' wrestling, let alone *lucha libre* or midget professional wrestling within this. But as even those few college wrestlers who go on to post-college professional careers in martial arts do so not under the WWF but under some other aegis, it seems implausible to bundle these as 'a' field. And if we separate them, it seems unlike that within either college or professional wrestling one could replicate the *Rules of Art* and establish a close homology between field position and position in social space.

It seems very likely that the only solution to this problem will be a de-emphasis on the study 'of' fields as entities in favour of an exploration of fundamental field theoretical *processes*. This conclusion is supported by our consideration of a second possible problem with Bourdieu's analysis.

Capital and position

This pertains to the status of 'capital'. It is not entirely clear whether in the strictest sense there is any need for capital as a distinct theoretic term, if one also has field position. To make this point, we must clarify our language. We may see two analytic choices regarding the usage of the word 'capital,' the first being whether capital is by definition strictly correlative to a specific field or not, and the second being whether capital is inherently a relation (as is 'being to the left of'), or whether it is a non-relational resource (that is, something like 'mass' that might be used to *establish* relations such as 'heavier than' but is independent of other entities). Of the four resulting combinations, one strikes us as the most consistent with field theory, which is a relational and field-specific definition of capital; contrapositively it seems quite unlikely that anyone would use the idea of capital to denote field-independent resources.

The question, then, is whether there is reason to allow 'capital' to cover either field-specific resources or generalized relational advantages. Along the lines of the first option, one might propose that anything that facilitates the pursuit of the goal of a field should be considered a 'capital,' perhaps especially if it has a tendency towards its own cumulation. This can happen even for a non-relationally defined resource – for example, upper body strength makes it easier to do the exercises that build upper body strength, even if one is the only human alive. Indeed, we believe that in casual employment of Bourdieu's terminology there is often this substitution of resource for capital.

Yet we believe that this interpretation is not only anathema to Bourdieu's project, but inconsistent with field theoretic principles. Regarding the first, it seems clear that Bourdieu used 'capital' in what we must consider a Marxist/scientific, and not a bourgeois/ideological, way (we will defend this seemingly archaic terminology). That is, for Marx, capital is relationally defined; a heap of wood, a set of machines, fuel, and so on, are not capital; they only become so as part of the relation that involves private appropriation and expropriation. When we explain the profit made by the furniture company as a natural result of 'the capital,' we mystically imagine that the wood and machines have a tendency to rush about and turn themselves into money. One might as well begin one's understanding of economics by waiting for elves to help out the shoemaker at night. Rather, it is because of the particular social relations associated with wage labor that the surplus time accumulates in one area of the production relation in the form of profit.

So, too, to consider capital non-relational would be to risk fetishizing and naturalizing that very endogenous product of field-situated struggle that we seek to explain ('Why, he is the poet laureate because of his very high *word/smithing capital!*'). In other words, to make capital into resource is to remove it from the explanatory power of the field, and to do that is necessarily to also fix the *stakes* of the field – to make this in effect exogenous. But the conception of the goal of action in the field as endogenously defined is, we hold,

another of the key aspects of Bourdieu's work that constituted a coherent advance in his field theory over that of his predecessors.

Now this does not mean that it cannot be possible to maintain that there is a relational definition of capital that is not fully-field dependent (our other possibility), in the sense that we might see capital-relations outside of a field. But if our previous reasoning is correct, this could only indicate a stage or site of the organization of relations that falls short of a true field. There can be artistic capital before there is a coherent art field, but once there is a field, there can be no artistic capital not in relation to this field. Such anomalous situations of relational but not field-specific capital, then, are outside of the scope of field theory, and need currently be considered no longer.

In sum, it seems that capital must be understood as a field-specific constellation of relations. But in that case, it seems hard to imagine how there could be any capital other than field position. For example, an artist might indeed have high fine motor coordination, but if no one in the field of drawing believed that she was an accomplished draughtsman, it seems that it would be incorrect to say something like 'despite the fact that she has a low field position, she has high artistic capital', which confuses resource and capital, and places the capital outside the field's range of effective consecration. Accepting such a usage would be equivalent to making capital a *resource* as opposed to a *relation*. If we insist that the field is not simply the set of recognized positions but the distillation of all sets of relations that have implications for the production and experience of relations, it seems that capital is redundant with field position.¹⁹

But there is a second problem with 'capital' that leads us to draw back from an immediate resolution. And this is that 'capital' tends not only to bleed into *position*, but at other times, it seems to shade off into position's subjective counterpart, *habitus* (for an example where Bourdieu sees the two as fundamentally consubstantial, see Bourdieu 1993: 86). Indeed, it seems that in cases of 'bodily capital' (e.g. Desmond 2007; Martin and George 2006; Wacquant 2004), the two might even be coterminous – or at least, the *habitus* functions as capital in some fields.

Certainly, we could also defensibly retain 'capital' as the actor's theory of the field; that is, capital is how actors think of field position. However, this would still imply that we should prefer theoretical accounts that dispense with capital as an axis of stratification (much like Bourdieu's correspondence analyses, in which positions are defined wholly relationally, and 'capital' is only a rough interpretive overlay). More importantly, this would imply that it is not a pressing concern to identify particular species, sub-species and sub-varieties as different 'capitals' as if this taxonomic work had a strong theoretical implication.

We tend to believe that accepting this implication would be beneficial for field theoretic work. To abuse Marx's terminology, we may say that one of the unintended consequences of Bourdieu's theorizing has been a dramatic acceleration of the 'self-expansion of capital' – the incentive for researchers to

demarcate new fields by sticking the explorer's flag in the virgin territory of an unclaimed form of capital.²⁰ Should each field theory prove successful, the likely resulting overcrowding would force us to admit ever more precise forms of capital (not only truck drivers' capital used in the field of trucking, nor even interstate truck drivers' capital used in the sub-field of interstate trucking, but tandem interstate container truck drivers' capital, and so on). Although a field theoretic account may indeed shed light on sociological questions pertaining to this or any other activity, and the specification of the stakes and organization of this field would prove necessary for this project, this does not mean that the mere naming of any field and its attendant capital can be considered an advance. Thus although a rich description of the phenomenologies of different realms of organization, as well as their interdependencies, is indeed a worthy task, absent an investigation of processes that are common (or vary interpretably) across cases, if not the arrangement of cases in an interpretable structure, a fractal and futile exploration of fractioning fractions that leads only to a Linnæan taxonomy is no advance.

Vectors and Positions

The final issue, one pertaining to the relation between vectors and position, is perhaps not a problem in Bourdieu, but the consistency of his approach for a field theory may not have been made clear. In a classic field, the vector associated at one position points (or so it seems) to a second position. At every position there is a single vector, and the force induced in an object is indifferent to the past. Some difficulties in assimilating Bourdieu's perspective might arise from the following: that the pulls and pushes Bourdieu describes have to do with practices and not positions; that Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of history; that Bourdieu indeed often considers trajectory itself a fundamental (usually third) dimension in his investigations.

Regarding the first, Bourdieu (1996b [1992]: 231) gives the formula 'the space of positions tends to govern the space of position-takings', (at other times, 'the space of positions' and 'the space of dispositions') which seems to imply the necessity for two dually linked spaces. However, we believe that Bourdieu's insight is more compatible with a simple field account than this makes clear. Bourdieu sometimes preferred catchy recombinations of basic words or roots, seemingly believing that the conjunction of dualities would induce enlightenment in the reader (as well as providing a new generation of jump rope rhymes for children of academics). However, it might be more accurate to say that what the space of position governs are the taking of *strategies* (practices that are objectively strategic) and that in field theoretic terms these are best understood as *directions*. Further, the wonderful thing about a field is that the fact that at one position there is a vector pointing in a certain direction in no way implies that an object (even one beginning at this position with no velocity) will proceed in that direction. The cascaded local interactions that lead to a field tend to produce continuously curving 'lines of

force' in all but the simplest (single point-mass) cases. Thus (as Faraday demonstrated) at any point the vector is a tangent to the curve of force. There is no reason for agents to think about their strategies in terms of the positions they 'point to', for our local sense of 'where to go' is not where we are likely to end up.

Second, Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of history, because it is only experience that, for one thing, makes some of us susceptible to the magnetism of a particular field by developing its particular 'ibido' (for example, Wacquant's (2004) description of being drawn into the field of prizefighting), and experience that, to some extent, re-shapes our bodies. This is indeed a point of difference from most other field theoretic accounts, but as we have noted in our discussion of Bourdieu's use of the habitus, this seems a necessary emendation for the application of field theory for the social sciences.

Finally, we have noted some of the complexity that arises because Bourdieu treats trajectory as a dimension, but we must be sympathetic, because what Bourdieu is grappling with is something handled previously by Köhler (1938), and this is that a field is a field of *forces* – not momentums or velocities. Thus at any instant, two objects in the same position are indeed subject to the exact same force, but that does not mean that we will find them in the same position at another instance. We must take into account the initial velocities that bring the objects to this position. Thus when Bourdieu emphasizes that there is a strict duality between position and dispositions (Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 265), he is being somewhat inexact. His use of a third dimension of trajectory is the proper reminder that positions are places where paths cross, which means, as Rosanne Barr noted, you meet the same people on your way down whom you met on the way up (so be nice to them the first time!).

Conclusion

Pierre Bourdieu's field theory is more than a set of metaphors, for field theory is a coherent explanatory approach, one particular form of relationalism that was developed by psychologist-philosophers and which made a few appearances in the social sciences. This field theory is consonant with field theories in the physical sciences, although that in itself might not be of importance, given that field theory in the social sciences, despite being compatible with various mathematical techniques, is itself not mathematized. Field theory in the social sciences therefore must be understood as a general explanatory framework. However, it is not circular, silly, pathological, or in flagrant contradiction with what we know about human beings, which is not something that can be said of all general explanatory approaches in the social sciences. Further, our field theory has an advantage in that our elements can give us reports regarding the experiential analogues to the forces used in analytic accounts.

Pierre Bourdieu's work, though not all field theoretic (as there are other aspects of his work and claims that we do not treat here) is an exemplary use

of field theory in the social sciences. As such, his work necessarily shares fundamental explanatory principles with those of earlier field theorists, most importantly Wolfgang Köhler. However, Bourdieu's integration of habitus solves the problem of Köhler's reliance on naïve realism, which worked reasonably well for the Gestalt theorists' studies of vision but less well when it came to social action. Thus his work indicates the possibility of theoretical progress, and there is, one is happy to note, still room for additional progress within the field theoretic tradition.

Notes

- 1 We are extremely grateful for comments and criticism from Matt George, Mathieu Hlgers, Ben Merriman, and especially Lotic Wacquaint.
- 2 Husserl made many of the same points as the Gestalt theorists in contradistinction to conventional psychology, most importantly that we must refrain from attempting to argue that what something 'is' is different from how it appears in the intuition, and a general criticism of what he called the 'modern nominalism' of *conceptualism*, confusing concepts of things with things themselves in experience. In contrast to most philosophies of consciousness, he also stressed the apt nature of our evolved system for developing ideas (Husserl 1970 [1900]: 204, 268). However, Husserl's anti-empirical take (see, e.g. Husserl 1997 [1927]) led him to stress a disjunctantion (bracketing) of experience that cut against the directions of the Gestalt school. (As Merleau-Ponty (1962: xiiif) said, Husserl objected to investigations that explored how we make use of our relation to the world – Husserl preferred just to be 'filled with wonder at it'; cf. Köhler 1938: 45, cf. 68.) Or as Stumpf (1907: 35) said, Husserl only explored the genetic, and not the descriptive, tasks of a fundamental psychology. When Husserl's approach finally made its way into the social sciences via Schutz (1967 [1932]: xxxi), every connection to empiricism had been severed and phenomenology equated with 'the most rigorous philosophical reflection'.
- 3 Koffka, Köhler and Kurt Lewin all studied under Stumpf; Wertheimer did not but spent a number of years at Stumpf's Berlin institute (Heider 1983: 105; Ash 1998: 34, 105).
- 4 Köhler (1925 [1917]: 18, 206) also pointed out that the behaviourist tradition placed its rats in mazes in which, according to design, it was impossible to get a vantage point of the whole, a largely unnatural situation, though one compatible with the assumption that since the rat understands nothing, it is 'poor, exhausted chance' that 'has to do all the work that the animal is unable to do directly'.
- 5 While they adopted the idea of 'field' from the visual field, it is interesting to note that Maxwell (1954 [1891]: ix) also saw field theory as holistic – he commented that 'Faraday's methods resembled those in which we begin with the whole and arrive at the parts by analysis, while the ordinary mathematical methods were founded on the principle of beginning with the parts and building up the whole by synthesis'.
- 6 Further, the principle of 'tenseless' (*Prägnanz*), used to explain why we parse the visual field into fewer simple structures (even if occluded or overlapping), seems to have been connected in Köhler's mind with an idea like that of surface tension. He wrote that 'in contrast to the indifferent mosaic of sensations assumed in older theory, this order of the field shows a strong "predilection" for certain general kinds of organization as against others, exactly as the formation of molecules and the working of surface forces in physics operates in certain definite directions' (Köhler 1929: 158).

- 7 'To be "the electropositive side" of such a physical system is no less a *gestalt property* in a definite electrochemical whole than to be "the dark side" is a *gestalt property* in a sensory pair' (Köhler 1929: 219).
- 8 This experienced impulse must, assumed Köhler, be dual to a neurological impulse in the brain and hence in the brain field we must also be having such a field of force.
- 9 Even earlier, Lundberg (1939: 103, 260, 311) had, drawing upon Gestalt theory, incorporated aspects of field theory into his system, but they were merely one minor part of a conglomerate theory that lacked simple coherence (though many aspects are still impressive today).
- 10 Lizardo (2010: 682 n.18) points out that Richard Nice's translation obscured Bourdieu's use of Lewin's idea of hodological space, a term also adopted by Sartre.
- 11 For example, in one terse summary of his commitment to a field theoretic approach, Bourdieu (1982, cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96 n.48; see also Bourdieu 1993: 21) says, 'To think in terms of field demands a conversion of the whole ordinary vision of the social world which fastens only on visible things [i.e. the individual and the group] ... In fact, just as the Newtonian theory of gravitation could only be constructed against Cartesian realism which wanted to recognize no mode of action other than collision, direct contact, the notion of field presupposes a break with the realist representation which leads us to reduce the effect of the *environment* to the effect of direct action as actualized during an interaction'.
- 12 Or in terms of the 'conflict of the faculties' that are likely to polarize sociology departments between symbolic interactionists at one extreme and mathematical sociologists at the other, 'One man's Mead is another man's Poisson'. This is an old joke as well as a bad one, but in danger of becoming extinct because, due to the loss of knowledge of what mead was (and of its sometimes toxic nature), the phrase is changing to 'meat', and there were no symbolic interactionists with the name 'Meat'.
- 13 Also see the wonderful comparison of actors to iron filings in Bourdieu 1996b [1992]: 58, also 19.
- 14 Then there are times in which fields are spaces: thus Bourdieu (1993: 72) writes that fields are 'structured spaces of positions ... whose properties depend on their position within these spaces'. We do not address the idea of the 'field of power' here, as it seems to us to be an attempt to forcibly weld Bourdieu's field theory into a larger substantive theory by abusing terminology, somewhat akin to the confusing parsimony gained by considering Grand Central Station another 'rail line'.
- 15 There is also the question of whether there might be some fields that cannot be combined for reasons no one would predict – say, it turns out that because of the musculature and neural organization of the human body, one cannot successfully embody the capital necessary for both the field of painting and the field of lawn bowling, although print making and lawn bowling go quite well together.
- 16 Note that we consider that, by definition, dominance means the power of consecration of *persons* (and not the establishment or validation of rules); while in some cases there may indeed be rules or such not, these are strictly secondary both analytically and practically. In its most general form, 'rules' are the theories that the non-dominant form to account for consecration with the (partially justified) hope that one can go from such accounts to recipes. Of course, as Liebertson (1985) argues, the thing about ruling is that you get to write the rules that allow you to change the rules so that you get to keep on writing the rules. Thus college essays were introduced to allow elites to continue consecrating their own young; when others studied the resulting outcomes they came up with 'rules' that can be used in Princeton Review classes, but would not strictly binding on the decisions of elites (not that these are still in control of – or even recognizably present in – admissions organizations). In our merito-bureaucratic age, we must beware of taking the *a posteriori* results of consecration struggles as a priori rules.
- 17 Thus in the wonderful diagram of the space of the arts and social science faculties in *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu 1988 [1984]: 276), tastefully placed as the final appendix, one cannot deny that the vertical dimension tends to correspond to age (and perhaps renown), while horizontal indeed reflects those of different types of universities. Yet the arrangement paralleling Bourdieu's other graphs seems strongly to suggest that those like Pierre Grappin (ex-resistance member, member of the Légion d'honneur, a Germanist at Nanterre who seems most notable for his German-French dictionary) who possess high institutional power are akin to the uncouth nouveau riche, while those like Claude Lévi-Strauss (who after a disorganized career as an exile received a chair at the Collège de France) not only have more intellectual renown, but correspond more to the 'autonomous' cultural pole. (Bourdieu himself sits exactly where young Turks are expected.)
- 18 Allowing a 'field of sport' simply because of its predictable homologous mapping to social space would imply just as well allowing an even more encompassing 'field of recreation' (say, in some areas of social space all sports are rejected in favor of other pursuits such as ham radio) and indeed a 'field of hedonic action' (why ignore those workaholics who prefer not to have any hobbies?) and eventually a 'field of everything.' This does not mean that at one point when 'sports' as such were being introduced there could not have been a relatively undifferentiated field of sport (see DeFrance 2013).
- 19 More technically, we might imagine capital as a reduction of the multidimensional vector indicating field position to a scalar; thus for any field, we might imagine drawing a set of contours showing people of equal capital, as Bourdieu's charts of social space have a total capital volume as a dimension.
- 20 This is not meant as a dismissive dig, as one of us has participated in this sort of effort (Martin and George 2006). Further, we note that this is a somewhat tendentious translation of Marx, but as it has become widely accepted, we leave things at that.

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