[The following is a wretched paper that I wrote for my hum class. I was extremely tired at the time. At least I can laugh about it now (I wouldn't be posting it otherwise). Actually my grade was not as low as you might imagine, and I got to rewrite it. Also I should add that this is not a full-length paper: the assignment was just to write a short thing on Kant's Foundations on the Metaphysics of Morals.]

Jens Jensen
Human Being and Citizen
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April 12, 2004

Inclinations Not Inherently Good

In the Foundations, Kant begins the First Section with a discussion of good will. Through this discussion, leading logically one step at a time, Kant leads the reader to the conclusion that inclinations are not inherently good, and so we should not respect them. As with almost everything having to do with Kant, I believe his reasons for thinking this about are the result of rationality.

The first step that Kant takes occurs very near the beginning: ". . . But they can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good" (p 9). Here Kant is talking about personal qualities. He suggests that there is no quality which is by its very nature good.

". . . Regarded for itself, [good will] is to be esteemed as incomparably higher than anything which could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination or even of the sum total of all inclinations" (p 10). Here Kant is just phrasing his belief that inclinations should not necessarily be respected. It does not matter what good will is able to accomplish; it is superior simply because it is good in itself.

Kant suggests that the actions of a rational being, if its purpose were happiness, would be best dictated by instinct rather than by rational thought. Understanding brings about unhappiness.

It is here where Kant ultimately states why inclinations should not be accorded respect: "As nature had elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they are to perform, reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and not one good merely as a means, since for the former, reason is absolutely essential" (p 12).

Kant throws duty into the mix, mentioning "duty." Duty here seems to be what a person discovers he ought to do if he thinks rationally about a situation. "But benefice from duty, even when no inclination impels it and even when it is opposed by a natural and unconquerable aversion . . . resides in the will and not in the propensities of feeling . . . and it alone can be commanded" (p 15).

Finally, Kant says he can never have respect for an inclination because whereas duty is the necessity to do something, one can have an inclination to do something, but that something is not an activity of the will. This is again tied into rationality.

Inclinations should not be respected because they do not lead humans to have a good will. Humans must use their capability to think rationally instead of their natural instincts or inclinations. As Kant says, ". . . I can have no respect for any inclination whatsoever, whether my own or that of another; in the former case I can at most approve of it and in the latter I can even love it" (p 16).