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**PLSC The Politics of International Trade**  
**Fall 2011**  
**Pick 506 Tuesday 9:00AM-11:50AM**

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**Instructor:** Prof. Jong Hee Park  
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Office Hours: Wed 4 - 5 PM or by appointment

### Course Outline

This class explores the politics of international trade in a broad sense. We will discuss microeconomic theories of international trade, the formation of individual preferences on trade, the linkage between modern welfare states and economic openness, the role of domestic institutions on trade policy making, and the effect of international institutions.

### Discussion Leadership

All students are required to serve discussion leadership once during the course. Discussion leaders need to present one required reading during class and turn in a critical review on all the required readings after class. The review should arrive no later than the end of the week.

### Grade Policy

10% Class participation  
30% Discussion leadership and critical review essay  
60% Final research proposal

### Books to buy

- Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld. 2006. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. Addison-Wesley.
- Ian M. Destler. 2005. *American Trade Politics*, 4th edition. Institute for International Economics.
- Dani Rodrik. 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Institute for International Economics.
- Fionna McGillivray. 2004. *Privileging Industry*. Princeton University Press

### Redeaings and Course Plan

1. **Class Introduction (9/28)**
2. **Overview (10/5)**

- Helen Milner, 1999, "The Political Economy of International Trade." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2: 91-114.
- Geoffrey Garrett, 1995, "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy" *International Organization* 49(4): 657 – 687.

- Dani Rodrik, 2011, “Bretton Woods, GATT, and the WTO: Trade in a Politicized World” in *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (W. W. Norton & Company), pp. 67 – 88.

### 3. The Heckscher-Olin-Samuelson Model vs. the Specific Factor Model (10/12)

- Jeffrey A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview.” *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner. Cambridge University Press. pp. 25-47.
- Ronald Rogowski. 1989. Ch. 1 and 2 of *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Michael J. Hiscox, 2002. Ch. 1, 2, and 3 of *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

### 4. Trade and Domestic Institutions 1: The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (10/19)

- Ian M. Destler. 2005. “Ch. 1. The Root Problem: Political Institutions” and “Ch. 2. The 1934 System: Protection for Congress.” *American Trade Politics*, 4th edition.
- Michael A. Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry. Weingast. 1997. “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy.” *World Politics* 49(3): 309-338.
- Irwin, Douglas and Randall Kroszner. 1999. “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley.” *Journal of Law and Economics*, 42(2): 643- 673.
- Michael J. Hiscox. 1999. “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization.” *International Organization* 53(4): 669-698.

### 5. Trade and Domestic Institutions 2: Democracy and Electoral Institutions (10/26)

- Ronald Rogowski, 1987, “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,” *International Organization*, 41.
- Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review*. 94(2): 305-322.
- Fiona McGillivray. 1997. “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 117 - 146.

### 6. Trade and the Welfare State (11/2)

- David Cameron, 1978, “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis” *American Political Science Review* 72(4): 1243 - 1261.
- Robert H. Bates, Philip Brock and Jill Tiefenthaler, 1991, “Risk and trade regimes: another exploration” *International Organization*, 45(2): 1-18.
- Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2001. “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.” *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 875-893.
- Alcia Adser and Carles Boix, 2002, “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness” *International Organization*, 56 (2): 229-262.

### 7. Trade and International Institutions (11/9)

- Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade,” *International Organization* 61: 3767.

- Joanne S. Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94." *World Politics*, 57(4): 453-478.
- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, 2007. "Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements" *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 403-432.

8. **Trade, Finance, and Linkage (11/16)**

- Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin, 2009, "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?" NBER Working Paper
- David H. Bearce, 2007, *Monetary Divergence: Domestic Policy Autonomy in the Post-Bretton Woods Era*. University of Michigan Press.

9. **No Class: Thanksgiving Holiday (11/23)**

10. **Paper Presentation (11/30)**

11. **Final Paper Due (12/7)**

**ADA Accommodations:** Any student who, because of a disability, may require special arrangements in order to meet course requirements should contact me as soon as possible to make necessary arrangements.