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Education

Ph.D., Economics, The University of Chicago 2010 to present

Thesis: "Toward an Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility"

Expected Completion Date: June 2017

References:

John A. List (chair)

The University of Chicago
(773) 702-8176
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Brent R. Hickman

The University of Chicago
(773) 702-3578
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Austan Goolsbee

Booth School of Business
(773) 834-1050
goolsbee@chicagobooth.edu

M.S., Economics, Lund University, Sweden 2009

B.S., Economics, Lund University, Sweden 2008

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary fields: applied microeconomics, labor, and experimental economics

Secondary fields: econometrics, behavioral economics, machine learning

Teaching Experience

Lecturer:

Structural Models and Field Experiments, The University of Chicago SIFE 2016

Econometrics, The University of Chicago 2016

Intermediate Microeconomics, The University of Chicago 2013

Intermediate Microeconomics, The University of Chicago 2012

Teaching Assistant:

Platform Competition. A. Goolsbee, Booth XP Program	2016
MBA Game Theory. E. Kamenica, Booth School of Business	2016
MBA Competitive Strategy. N. Mahoney, Booth School of Business	2016
Social Choice Theory. M. Penn, The University of Chicago	2016
MBA Microeconomics. R. Dizon-Ross, Booth School of Business	2016
MBA Competitive Strategy. T. Covert, Booth School of Business	2016
Machine Learning. R. McCulloch, M. Kolar, Booth School of Business	2015
MBA Platform Competition. A. Goolsbee, Booth School of Business	2015
MBA Microeconomics. O. Zidar, Booth School of Business	2015
Platform Competition. A. Goolsbee, Booth XP Program	2015
PhD Econ of Communication. M. Gentzkow, Booth School of Business	2015
MBA Game Theory. E. Kamenica, Booth School of Business	2015
MBA Econ of Tech and Media. A. Goolsbee, Booth School of Business	2015
MBA Intermediate Microeconomics. L. Stole, Booth School of Business	2014
Game Theory. E. Kamenica, Booth XP Program	2014
College Microeconomics. V. Lima, The University of Chicago	2014
College Labor Economics. J. Elias, The University of Chicago	2014
College Microeconomics, G. Tsiang, The University of Chicago	2014
College Industrial Organization. G. Aryal, The University of Chicago	2014
American Economic History. D. Galenson, The University of Chicago	2014
PhD Experimental Economics. M. Price, The University of Chicago	2013
College Econometrics. B. Hickman, The University of Chicago	2013
College Econometrics. B. Hickman, The University of Chicago	2012
College Microeconomics. R. Van Weelden, The University of Chicago	2012

Honors, Scholarships and Fellowships

Dr. Tech. Marcus Wallenberg Stipend	2016-2017
IHS Humane Studies Fellowship	2012-2013, 2015-2016, 2016-2017
Charles Koch Foundation Dissertation Fellowship	2015-2016
Theodore W. and Esther Schultz Economics Fellowship	2015-2016
University of Chicago Social Sciences Division Summer Grant	2015
IHS Hayek Fund for Scholars Stipend	2015
Department of Economics Fellowship	2012-2015
Sherwin Rosen Award	2011
Sweden-America Foundation Stipend	2010
Wallander-Hedelius Stipend	2010

Professional Activities

Invited Conference Presentations:

Economic Science Association Annual Meeting, Tucson, AZ	November 2016
Advances with Field Experiments Conference, Chicago, IL	September 2016
Science of Philanthropy Initiative Conference, Chicago, IL	September 2015

Other:

Summer Institute for Field Experiments, Chicago (lecturer)	2016
NYU Shanghai Neuroeconomics Summer School (participant)	2015
Santa Fe Institute Complex Systems Summer School (participant)	2015

Computer and Language Skills

Computer Skills:

Python, C++, R, Stata, Matlab, LaTeX, HTML, Javascript

Language Skills:

English (fluent), Swedish (native), German (basic), Spanish (basic)

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Who Needs Cream and Sugar When There Is Eco-Labeling? Taste and Willingness to Pay for "Eco-Friendly" Coffee. PLoS ONE (2013). (With P. Sorqvist, M. Holmgren, A. Haga, and L. Langenborg.) (Link to paper: <http://bit.ly/2dNHhoA>.)

Research Papers

Toward an Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility **[JOB MARKET PAPER]**

With J. List and B. Hickman. Latest version here: <http://jmp.danielhedblom.com>.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been on the business landscape for more than half a century. Advocates of CSR argue that such activities can increase long-term profits and social well-being, while critics argue that CSR serves as a major distraction. Social scientists and business scholars are largely divided on the value of CSR, with most of the focus on the demand side. We develop a theory and a tightly-linked field experiment to explore the supply side impact of CSR. Our natural field experiment, in which we created our own firm and hired actual workers, generates a rich data set on worker behavior and responses to CSR incentives. We use these data to estimate a structural principal-agent model with three dimensions of worker heterogeneity: productivity, work quality, and value of time. This allows us to answer a variety of questions related to treatment effects (on existing employees' behaviors) and selection effects on the pool of applicants from CSR. We find strong evidence that when a firm convinces its workers that their efforts make the world a better place (as opposed to just making money) it will attract workers that are more productive, produce higher quality work, and have more highly valued leisure time. We also find an economically significant treatment effect of CSR on improving work quality of existing employees as well. Our research design may serve as a framework for causal inference on more general forms of non-pecuniary incentives in the workplace.

Two-Sided Incentives in Fundraising

With A. Leibbrandt, J. List, and M. Price. Status: Working Paper.

We conduct a field experiment that explores how to effectively use upfront money when financing a public good. Our approach is novel in that we consider incentives for both the supply and demand side. On the demand side, we use worker bonuses to explore how those affect fundraising success. On the supply side, we leverage both conditional and unconditional matching of donations. The field experiment produces a wealth of data and answers many interesting questions. But the bottom line is that using the upfront funds on the demand side raises the most amount from donors, but more of the public good is provided if you use the upfront funds on the supply side. This is because supply upfront funds are actually used for the public good whereas the demand side upfront funds are given to workers.

Complex Politics: A Quantitative Semantic and Topological Analysis

With S. Gurciullo, M. Smallegan, M. Pereda, F. Battiston, A. Patania, S. Poledna, T. Oztan.
Status: Working Paper. Latest version here: <http://bit.ly/2e54D89>.

This study is a first, exploratory attempt to use quantitative semantics techniques and topological analysis to analyze systemic patterns arising in a complex political system. In particular, we use a rich data set covering all speeches and debates in the UK House of Commons between 1975 and 2014. By the use of dynamic topic modeling (DTM) and topological data analysis (TDA) we show that both members and parties feature specific roles within the system, consistent over time, and extract global patterns indicating levels of political cohesion. Our results provide a wide array of novel hypotheses about the complex dynamics of political systems, with valuable policy applications.

Work in Progress

Non-Pecuniary Incentives and Altruistic Behavior

Do non-pecuniary incentives and the perceived social value associated with a given job affect altruistic behavior? In particular, if an individual perceives that they are providing social value through their work, they may be less inclined to use the earnings for altruistic purposes like giving to charity. Evidence from a pilot lab experiment provides preliminary support for this conjecture. In the experiment, subjects work with a real effort task under different contextual frames. In one treatment, subjects are informed about the identity of the firm serving as client for the task. In the other treatment, subjects are informed that the client is a charity organization run by the same firm. After completion of the task, subjects participate in a dictator style game with the earnings. Giving rates appear to differ across treatments in the sense that people who worked under non-pecuniary incentives tend to claim a larger share for themselves in the subsequent dictator game. A field experiment is being designed to test the hypothesis in a larger scale setting.