PS 230S: Positive Political Theory
Fall 2000
Instructor: Jeff Grynaviski
E-mail: jdg6@duke.edu
Home
Phone: 919-956-8204
www.duke.edu/~jdg6
Course Description:
This
course introduces the key concepts and applications of rational choice to political
science. Rational choice refers to the
theory of the rational, utility-maximizing individual originally developed in
economics and statistical decision theory. Topics will include theories of
utility, collective action and public goods, cooperative and noncooperative
games, and social choice. By the end of the semester, students will be expected
to have sufficient background in these subjects to be able to pursue more
advanced material on their own or in future courses.
Course Schedule:
The
class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays from 9:10-10:25. Arrangements may be made to hold an
additional problem session to answer student questions about homework. Students
will also be expected to attend departmental and university seminars related to
positive political economy.
Assignments:
The
course has been divided among fifteen topics with required readings for
each. These readings have been further
subdivided into three parts. The first
component concerns the fundamental theoretical concept for the topic and should
be considered mandatory reading for each week.
The second component is an article or articles that are applications of
the topic’s central theoretical question.
They will generally be classics in the field or illustrations of the
concept that I have found to be particularly helpful. Aside from the fact that these papers are
typically more accessible reading than textbook presentations of the theory,
they should also be considered required reading for anyone who intends to pass
a preliminary exam in political economy or methods. The third, optional component of the readings
consists of a series of papers designed to question whether positive political
theory is really “positive.” That is,
these articles question whether the theoretical foundations for rational choice
are empirically sound, and if not, what implication that might have for the
utility of rational choice for understanding politics.
We
will rely heavily on three texts for the class that all students will be
expected to buy from the book store or other retailer. These texts include:
· Dixit
and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically
· Feldman, Welfare
Economics and Social Choice Theory
· Kreps,
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Copies
of these books will also be made available at the reserve desk in Perkins. All additional reading materials can be
printed from JSTOR (www.jstor.org from a Duke terminal) or will be made
available as photocopies in the graduate student lounge. It will be obvious on the reading list where
to find each source. Please note that on
the main floor in the library there are computers dedicated to printing
articles from e-reserve and JSTOR that are faster than what we have in the
computer cluster. Do not clog the print
cue in the political science computer lab with your readings assignments!
The
course is designed as an introduction to an applied methodology akin to
statistics, not as an opportunity to discuss the great works. Consequently, the bulk of class time will be
spent in lecture. This is not to say
that discussion or questions are not encouraged. I will try to reserve some time for
discussion and you are always, always encouraged to ask questions. The best questions usually takes the form of
something like, “huh?” or “I don’t understand that?” If you don’t understand, chances are others
are in the same boat, so do not be timid about asking questions.
Grades
will be based on class participation and preparation (read!), a series of ten
or so short assignments that will typically be problem sets or perhaps one page
single-spaced papers, and a final
exam. Because some students benefit more
from collective learning while others prefer to work alone, the decision of
whether to work alone or in groups of two or three on the problem sets will be
left to the discretion of the individual student. No groups larger than three will be
tolerated. The take home final exam will
contain a “timed” open book component with problems similar to those you have
already seen on your homework and an “untimed” component
in which you will be asked to answer an essay question or two similar to what
you might find on a prelim exam.
Absolutely no group work will be allowed on the final.
Course Schedule
Topic
1. Axiomatic Approaches to Politics—An
Overview
Elster, Rational Choice,
Introduction [photocopy]
Feldman, Welfare Economics and
Social Choice Theory, Introduction
Topic
2. Formal Logic and Set Theory
Theory: Nolt, Informal
Logic, Ch.5 “Deductive Arguments.” [photocopy]
Degroot, Probability and
Statistics, Ch. 1.4. [photocopy]
Marsden and Hoffman, Elementary
Classical Analysis, Introduction [photocopy]
Application: May, “A Set of Independent Necessary and
Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, Econometrica (1952): 680-684 [jstor]
Comment: Freidman, TBA
Topic
3. Foundations of Economic Man—Utility Theory
Theory: Feldman, Welfare
Economics, Ch. 1.
Kreps, A Course in
Microeconomic Theory Ch. 2.
Application: Neufeld, Hausman,
and Rapoport, “A Paradox of Voting: Cyclical
Majorities and the Case of Muscle Shoals,” Political Research Quarterly 1993
[photocopy]
Comment: Tversky, “Intransitivity of
Preferences,” Psychological Review 31-48 [photocopy]
Topic
4. Behavior of Economic Man—Optimize, Optimize, Optimize
Theory: Feldman, Welfare
Economics, Ch. 2-3
Kreps, A Course in
Microeconomic Theory Ch. 2.2-2.3
Application: Niskanen, Bureaucracy
and Representative Government [photocopy]
Comment: Simon, “A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1955 [jstor]
Topic
5. Market Failures—Collective Action, Externalities, and Public Goods
Theory: Feldman, Welfare
Economics, Ch. 5-6.
Application: Olson, The Logic of Collective Action,
Chapters 1 and 2 [photocopy]
Conybeare,
“International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights,” IO 1980
Comment: Arrow, “The Rationality of
Self and Others in an Economic System,” in Rational Choice, ed. Hogarth and Reder 1986
[photocopy]
Topic
6. Expected Utility Theory
Theory: Kreps,
A Course in Microeconomic Theory Ch. 3.
Application: Riker and Ordeshook, “A Theory of the
Calculus of Voting,” APSR 1968 [jstor]
Comment: Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,”
Science 1974 [photocopy]
Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect theory: An analysis
of decision under risk,” Econometrica 1979 [jstor]
Topic
7. Introduction to Strategic Interaction and Game Forms
Theory: Kreps, A Course
in Microeconomic Theory Ch. 11.1-11.3
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, Introduction and
Chapter 1.
Comment: Arrow, “Methodological Individualism and
Social Knowledge,” AER 1994 [jstor]
Topic
8. Dominant Strategies, Nash Equilibrium, and Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
Theory: Kreps, A Course
in Microeconomic Theory Ch. 12.1-12.6
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, Finish Part I.
Comment: Robert Aumann,
“Correlated Equilibria as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,” Econometrica
1987 [jstor]
Topic
9. Refinements of Nash
Theory: Gibbons, “A Survey of Applicable Game
Theory,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 1997 [jstor]
Kreps, A
Course in Microeconomic Theory Ch. 12.7
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, Part II.
Comment: Kreps, Game
Theory and Economic Modelling, Ch. 5 and 6
[photocopy]
Topic
10. Repeated Games and Folk Theory
Theory: Axelrod, The
Evolution of Cooperation excerpts [photocopy]
Campbell, Incentives, Ch. 4.5-4.6 [photocopy]
Application: Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, Part III.
Comment: Kreps,
A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Ch. 14.1-14.2
Topic
11. Instability of Majority Rule—Black, Downs, and McKelvey
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch. 9.
Feld and Grofman, “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a
Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric
Approach,” AJPS 1987 [jstor]
Application: Miller, “Pluralism and Social Choice,” APSR
1983 [jstor]
Comment: Stokes, “Spatial Models of
Party Competition,” APSR 1963 [jstor]
Topic
12. Arrow’s Theorem
Theory: Feldman, Welfare
Economics, Ch. 10.
Application: Barry and Hardin ed., Rational
Man and Irrational Society excerpts [photocopy]
Comment: Buchanan, “Social Choice,
Democracy, and Free Markets,” JPE 1954 [jstor]
Topic
13. Strategy Proofness—Strategic Voting and Truthful
Revelation of Preferences
Theory: Feldman, Welfare Economics, Ch. 11.
Application: Baron and Ferejohn, “Bargaining in
Legislatures,” APSR 1989 [jstor]
Comment: Krehbiehl
and Rivers, “Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration,” JOP 1990 [jstor]
Topic
14. The New Institutionalism
Theory: Aldrich, Why Parties?
Ch. 1-2 [photocopy]
Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” AJPS 1984
Application: Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements an Equilibrium in
Multidimensional Voting Models,” AJPS 1979 [jstor]
Comment: Riker, “Implications from
the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” APSR 1980 [jstor]
Topic
15. Rational Choice Theory as Cumulative Science?
Aumann, The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law ed.
Newman 1987.
Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of
Rational Choice excerpts
Lalman,
source TBA
Friedman ed., The Rational Choice Controversy Reconsidered excerpts