(Non)Veridicality in grammar and thought.
Mood, Modality and Propositional Attitudes

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Acknowledgments

This book is the result of an intellectual journey that started in 2012 when we met in Paris. We were, at the time, independently working on two related topics: the future tense, and actuality entailments of ability modals. It immediately became apparent that we were tracking the same phenomenon of nonveridicality, and the role it played in the meaning of the future and modality in general. The impetus for our theory of epistemic modality stemmed from there, and in the years since we were excited to discover how similar modality expressions and propositional attitudes are. In this book, we present an integrated and comprehensive framework where modals have counterparts in the attitudinal domain, and where mood is also a type of modality as well as a diagnostic for nonveridicality.

No great accomplishment is a singular act, and ours is no exception. We have been fortunate to have supportive colleagues and friends accompanying us in this intellectual journey. With their curious, knowledgable and sometimes critical insights, our commentators have contributed to the birth and growth of our theory, and for this we are extremely thankful. Anastasia spent several months at Institut Jean Nicod and taught there in 2013; Alda spent two years in Chicago to closely work on the project, from 2014 to 2016. During those times, we benefited from numerous discussions with colleagues and friends such as Claire Beyssade, Bridget Copley, Francis Corblin, Paul Egré, Salvador Mascareñas, François Recanati, Benjamin Spector (Paris), and Fabrizio Cariani, Katerina Chatzopoulou, Itamar Francez, Chris Kennedy, Jason Merchant, Patrick Muñoz, Sofia Sklaviadis, Eleni Staraki, and Malte Willer (Chicago). A special thanks from Alda to all the Chicagoans for making her feel at home, and likewise from Anastasia to the Paris crowd.

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<tr>
<td>COND</td>
<td>conditional</td>
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<td>FCI</td>
<td>Free Choice Item.</td>
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<td>FUT</td>
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<td>IND</td>
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<td>Negative Polarity Item</td>
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<td>SG</td>
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Chapter 1

Truth, Veridicality, and the problem of grammatical mood

1.1 What this book is about

This book is about how the concepts of truth, knowledge and, broadly speaking, belief are reflected in the grammar of natural languages. Does language directly access the world (what is true), or does it do so via semantic representations of the world categories? The question of truth has a venerable historical pedigree, a long intellectual history that originates, in the western world, in classical Greek thought. Aristotle pioneered what can be understood as the modern empiricist view, namely that we can apply the fundamental principles of logic, systematic observation, and analysis to identify the truth in natural things and explain causes, i.e., why things occur. Plato’s idealism holds that observation of the natural world might actually be misleading; only philosophical contemplation can lead to truth. They both agree that truth lies at the foundation of what it means to think and analyze. Contemporary formal semantics and philosophy of language are truth conditional, which means that they continue in this tradition.

Since analytical contemplation is mediated by language, an additional layer of issues arises about language, specifically about whether and how language mediates to express thinking about the world. Natural languages vary in the vocabulary, form and grammatical categories they realize; yet in addressing the question of language and thought, most continental philosophy overlooks this striking variation and almost exclusively focuses on English. This focus affects negatively the set of data deemed relevant for analysis, and in effect diminishes, not to say dismisses, the role of linguistic diversity in revealing aspects of the logic needed in order to handle accurately and successfully the central questions of truth and knowledge.
In this book, we will explore the interaction between truth, knowledge, and veridicality as they interact in the grammatical phenomenon of mood choice (subjunctive, indicative) in European languages. Our main illustrators will be Standard Modern Greek, and the Romance language family with specific emphasis on Italian and French. Mood choice is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, as we shall see, involving interactions between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics; and raises a number of issues that are literally invisible if we only pay attention to English simply because Modern English lacks the morphological category of mood in embedded clauses. Despite this absence, terms such as ‘subjunctive’ and ‘indicative’ continue to be routinely by philosophers, e.g., in the discussion of English conditionals, often misleading us to think that we are dealing with a mood phenomenon. (We are not. Indicative and subjunctive conditionals are really about tense).

On the other hand, mood has been studied by traditional grammarians as a mainly morpho-syntactic phenomenon, and in this tradition very little attention is paid to the semantics of propositional attitude verbs which are responsible for regulating mood choice. Traditional analyses are mostly interested in taxonomies and labeling of the verbal classes, with reference to ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ to cover the semantics of modal verbs (must, may, can etc.) and propositional attitude verbs (such as know, believe, remember, want, persuade and the like). The intuition is that somehow the indicative signals that the sentence is true (realis), whereas the subjunctive signals that the sentence is untrue (irrealis), thus implying that language directly accesses reality. This, however, as will show, is an unwarranted assumption. Language, it will turn out, mostly encodes subjective representations of truth and reality construed by linguistic agents, i.e., the speaker or the subject of the attitude verb. In forming these representations, linguistic agents build veridicality stances, i.e., kinds of subjective judgements towards the propositional content of sentences. Crucially, we will argue, it is veridicality stances that regulate, for the most part, mood choice. We must admit, then, that language accesses reality mostly indirectly via subjective veridicality, and not directly via objective truth.

The semantics of modal expressions and propositional attitude verbs is a privileged landscape within which to observe how systematic the formation of the veridicality judgement is in the grammar of human language. Speakers rely on their own conceptualization of reality, through language, in the attempt to structure possibilities according to their knowledge, beliefs, memories, expectations, desires, and priorities. Across modal verbs, adverbs and propositional attitude verbs, language reveals that humans anchor reality not only to truth, but to their own subjective understanding of truth. Contrary to given wisdom, we will offer a unified perspective on linguistic modality and propositional attitude verbs by showing that they are quite similar. They differ in what kind of linguistic anchor they have—the speaker for modality expressions, but the attitude subject
1.2. TRUTH AND VERIDICALITY

for propositional attitudes— but the logic of, and constraints in, reasoning with modals and attitudes are essentially the same.

An important aspect, often overlooked in the discussions of modality, propositional attitude verbs, and mood choice is the interaction between the attitude and modal meaning with the tense of the embedded complement. Because of emphasis on English, research tended to focus on the finiteness distinction, i.e., the that versus to contrast. We will see that studying only this contrast prevents us from understanding that the actual culprit of many apparent meaning shifts in propositional attitudes is the tense of the complement. We will distinguish between veridical tense (which is the past and present), and nonveridical tense which is what we will call nonpast. We will show that this simple dichotomy helps substantially in uncovering dimensions in the meaning of the embedding attitudes—and it determines fully the kinds of readings speakers extract with modal verbs.

Let us start by laying out an intuitive understanding of the foundational ideas of truth and veridicality. This will allow us to ease into the phenomenon of mood, which will be our window into the study of how linguistic categories mediate in the construction of truth.

1.2 Truth and veridicality

Since its central role in classical Greek thinking, truth has been essential in the study of linguistic meaning, and has also been the foundation of axiomatization in modern scientific thought. Aristotle gives a well-known definition of truth in his *Metaphysics* (1011b25): ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true’. Very similar formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).

The Aristotelian truth serves as the foundation for the modern approach to truth—advocated by Russell, Moore, and Tarski in the early 20th century—known as the correspondence theory of truth. Truth consists in a direct relation of a sentence to reality: the sentence *Snow is white* is true if and only if snow is white. This well motivated understanding is central to natural language semantics, and is associated with metaphysical realism that acknowledges objective truth. Objective truth correlates with fact but also with time: simple positive present and past sentences such as *Ariadne arrived in Paris last night*, *Ariadne is eating breakfast right now*, are true or false objectively, which means that the sentences, if true, denote facts of the world. Future sentences, on the other hand, such as *Ariadne will go to Paris next week* are objectively false at the time of utterance (since they have not happened yet), but could or must be true — depending on the strength of prediction—at a future time.
One may ask now how truth is conceptualized in grammar. In addition to the present/past versus future distinction we just mentioned, consider the contrast between an unmodalized and a modalized sentence:

(1)  
   a. It rained in Chicago yesterday.  
   b. It is raining in Chicago right now.  
   c. It may rain in Chicago tomorrow.  
   d. It must be raining in Chicago right now.

Only the present and past sentences can be understood as factual. The modal sentences, even the one with *must*, do not make reference to actual facts. They do not entail that it is raining.

In formal logic, a sentence $S$ is true iff the valuation function $V$ assigns to the proposition $p$ that $S$ denotes the value true. It is then useful to define veridicality as the semantic property of linguistic expressions, or more generally functions $F$, that are truth bearing. Following Zwarts (1995), and Giannakidou (1994, 1998, 1999, 2013b), a function $F$ that takes a proposition $p$ as its argument is veridical if $Fp$ entails that $p$ is true, and nonveridical if it doesn’t entail that:

(2)  
   **Veridicality**: A function $F$ is veridical iff $Fp$ entails $p$.

(3)  
   **Nonveridicality**: A function $F$ is nonveridical iff $Fp$ does not entail $p$.

A function $F$ is veridical if it truth entailing, and nonveridical if it is not truth entailing. Past and present tense and adverbials, for instance, denote veridical functions: *Yesterday, Ariadne flew to Paris* entails that *Ariadne flew to Paris*. Modal expressions, on the other hand, denote nonveridical functions: *It may rain in Chicago tomorrow* and *It must be raining in Chicago right now* do not entail that is is raining, or that will actually rain. Veridicality is objective in both cases, and depends on whether the adjacent $p$ is a fact of the world, in which case $F$ is veridical, or not, in which case $F$ is nonveridical. Veridical functions, are in this view factual or, as they are sometimes called, *factive*. Veridicality, therefore, understood in reference to truth, is the formal counterpart of the traditional *realis* that we mentioned earlier.

Veridicality has also been understood as being about the existence of entities in the world (Montague 1969). Montague characterized direct perception verbs such as *see* as veridical because *I see a unicorn* entails that a unicorn exists. Veridicality entails existence: if *I see a unicorn* is true, then a unicorn exists. Giannakidou (2013a) establishes a connection between truth and existence in her study of mood choice in relatively clauses. Labels such as ‘veridicity’ (Karttunen 2005) and ‘veracity’ has also been used to refer to veridicality as a property that relates to truth. The term veridicality has been used also in psychology and cognitive science, somewhat more broadly, but still anchored to the real, external world.
In cognitive science, for instance, ‘veridicality’ can refer to the degree to which an internal representation of the world accurately reflects the external world. In psychology, ‘veridical perception’ is the direct perception of stimuli as they exist. Linguistic agents can be thought of as not simply assigning true or false to sentences, but as being engaged in a more complex judgement about the truth of sentences. They appear to form subjective stances towards the propositional content. Paul Grice in his classical paper Logic and Conversation established Quality as one of the foundational principles of co-operative conversation: rational co-operative interlocutors continuously make assumptions about each other’s beliefs and intentions, i.e., about what each believes, knows, or expects to be true. In making these assumptions, interlocutors form subjective judgements about the veridicality of sentences, that include one’s mental states of knowing, believing, remembering, and the like.

A major goal in this book will be to unpack under what conditions a linguistic agent chooses to use a modal or a propositional attitude verb, and what mood choice reveals about the attitude and the modal meaning. To start with, consider verbs of belief:

(4) Ariadne believes that Milan is the capital of Italy.

That Milan is the capital of Italy is objectively false; however, the speaker can use this sentence to report Ariadne’s contested belief, and in Greek, the speaker would have to use the indicative mood, designated below by the mood particle *oti*, which in Greek surfaces as a complementizer element (equivalent to *that*). The Greek subjunctive particle *na* is, crucially, excluded:

(5) Αriadne *pistevi* *oti*/*na* *to* Milano ine i the Ariadne believe.PRES.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Milan is the protevousa tis Italias.
capital the.GEN Italy.GEN.
‘Ariadne believes that Milan is the capital of Italy.’

The fact that indicative, and not subjunctive is used to convey this obviously false belief indicates that, despite what the speaker knows to be the case, when it comes to mood selection, grammar forces Ariadne to lay claim on the veridicality of her belief, and forces the speaker to follow suit, regardless of relation to actual truth.\(^1\) The selection of indicative with belief and doxastic verbs is observed not just in Greek, but seems to be the rule in most Romance languages (with the exception of Italian, which we discuss extensively in the book, and also some varieties of Portuguese and Spanish).

\(^1\)See also Morency, Oswald and de Saussure, 2008 who argue that whether a speaker commits to a content embedded as a report is entirely pragmatic.
Indicative extends further to other fictional classes such as attitudes of dream, imagination, and deception:

(6) I Ariadne onireftike oti/*na to Milano ine i protevousa
the Ariadne dreamt.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Milan is the capital
the.GEN Italy.GEN.
‘Ariadne dreamed that Milan is the capital of Italy.’

(7) I Ariadne ksejelastike/ fantastike oti/*na to Milano
the Ariadne was.deceived.3sg/ imagined.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Milan
ine i protevousa tis the.GEN Italy.GEN.
is the capital of Italy.
‘Ariadne was deceived that Milan is the capital of Italy.’

The use of indicative in fictional contexts and with doxastic verbs to convey objectively false beliefs forces us to distinguish truth – as a matter of fact – from the subjective construct of veridicality judgement, where truth is assessed relative to the internal cognitive states of linguistic agents. The need to appeal to ‘relative truth’ for mood choice has long been acknowledged since McCawley’s (1981) and Farkas’ (1985, 1992) work in the 80s and early 90s. Building on these pioneering works, Giannakidou (1994, 1997, 1999, 2009) used the terms relativized veridicality, and individual anchor to refer to the speaker or the attitude holder, i.e., the subject of the main sentence, as the two main anchors.\(^2\)

Embedded sentences of attitude reports, we will argue in this book, create sub-contexts that are by default anchored to the attitude holder, since it is this individual’s attitude that is being reported. With the exception of factive and what we will define here as anti-factive attitudes (corresponding to the desiderative meaning of ‘want’), doxastic verbs such as the English believe and Greek pistevo are not objectively, but subjectively veridical: the attitude holder is committed to the truth of the embedded sentence. The speaker might know the sentence to be actually false, but this is, apparently, irrelevant for indicative mood. The indicative, therefore, depends not on objective veridicality as we defined it in (1), but on subjective veridicality, built as a representation of the world by the attitude holder.

Subjective veridicality, as we just said, is very naturally understood as the speaker’s commitment to the truth of \(p\), irrespective of what actually holds in the

\(^2\)Other individuals might also have opinions about the truth of sentences, e.g. the hearer, or multiple hearers in the audience. What the hearer knows plays an indirect role in truth assessment, mostly in terms of what the speaker assumes to be part of the common ground, i.e. the knowledge shared among conversation participants. Common knowledge does not seem to affect the choice of indicative mood, but we will discuss its role when relevant.
world. When the world becomes relevant for mood choice, as will show, it does so only via knowledge.

Before we zoom into the problem of mood choice, we want to give the reader an idea of how far reaching the notion of veridicality, in both its forms, is for the study of grammar. Another linguistic dependency where we see the relevance of (non)veridicality is the distribution of polarity items such as negative polarity items (NPIs) and free choice items (FCIs). Both phenomena have been discussed extensively in previous work (Giannakidou 1994, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2011, a.o), we will therefore not expand on details here. But it is important to show the connection because we will see that crucial aspects of the polarity vocabulary will be used in our analysis of mood, and for good reasons.

NPIs and FCIs, like mood morphemes, are limited distribution expressions. They appear in nonveridical contexts only. Verical past and present sentences block NPIs and FCIs. We give here examples with the English word *any*, which has both NPI and FCI uses:

(8)  a. Did Ariadne eat any cookies?
    b. Any student can solve this problem.
    c. Ariadne didn’t eat any cookies.
    d. Ariadne will eat any cookies.
    e. Any complains must be addressed to the manager.
(9)  a. *Ariadne ate any cookies.
    b. *Ariadne is eating any cookies right now.
    c. *Ariadne believes that she ate any cookies.

As we see, *any* is excluded from the veridical past and present sentences, as well as from the subjectively veridical *believe* sentence. NPIs and FCIs, instead, require the presence of higher nonveridical operators such as modal verbs, the future, negation, and the question operator. These are all not-truth entailing in the objective, as well as in the subjective sentence as we will show. Negation, importantly, can be understood as the logical strengthening of objective nonveridicality from *not* entailing *p* to *entailing not* *p*. Following Giannakidou (1998), we call this antiveridicality:

(10) **Antiveridicality**: A function *F* is antiveridical iff *Fp* entails *¬p*.

It is obvious that antiveridicality is a subcase of nonveridicality, since if *Fp* entails *¬p*, it also does not entail *p*. Polarity items appear in the scope of nonveridical

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3Languages tend to distinguish empirically between NPIs and FCIs, and both appear in the contexts above (see extensive typological data in Haspelmath (1997), and Giannakidou (2001, 2011) for an overview.
and antiveridical functions $F$, and following standard practice, the dependency of NPIs is stated as a scope condition in terms of licensing:


An expression $F$ licenses NPIs and FCIs in its scope iff $F$ is nonveridical.

Licensing is a relation between a higher element, i.e., negation, the question operator, or a modal, which is called the ‘licencer’ in the literature, and which has a semantic property that is needed for the ‘licensee’ (i.e., the NPI and FCI) to appear. Licensing has been proposed as a condition on the semantics of the licenser: if an expression $F$ is nonveridical, $F$ will be able to license NPIs or FCIs. It can also be understood as a condition on the licensee: when we see an NPI or an FCI, we know that the context is nonveridical because it is the scope of a nonveridical operator $F$. Giannakidou (1997) schematizes the concept of licensing as follows:

(12) **NPI Licensing** (Giannakidou 1997)

$R (\beta, \alpha)$; where $R$ is the scope relation, $\alpha$ is the polarity item, and $\beta$ is a negative or nonveridical expression which serves as the licencer

Licensing requires that the NPI $\alpha$ be in the scope of $\beta$. $R$ is a scope relation, and as such it is both a semantic relation—a matching relation of semantic and morphological features (Giannakidou 1997, Zeijlstra 2004)—and a syntactic relation, specifically c-command (as it appears in various NPIs in Greek, Romance NPIs, and in many other languages.)

Nonveridicality allows unification of negative and non-negative polarity contexts as a natural class, something that no previous theory of polarity could afford.

There is much to be gained by the generalization that negation, nonveridicality, and modality form a natural class. It takes little attention to notice that the semantically driven syntactic dependency of NPIs is similar to the problem of restricted mood distribution that we will tackle. We will argue, in fact, echoing earlier formulations (Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 2009, Quer 2001, 2009, and references therein) that the two phenomena are closely related, and that the mood morphemes are subject to licensing by nonveridicality in a way similar NPIs.

Let us zoom in now on the empirical puzzles of mood.

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4Individual distributions of various NPI and FCIs paradigms can of course differ, but NPIs and FCIs will always be in the scope of nonveridical operators.
1.3 Mood selection in complement clauses: the basic patterns

Mood selection is the case where a propositional attitude verb embeds a complement that needs to appear in a particular grammatical form, called traditionally mood. Mood is a morphological category. Indicative, subjunctive, and imperative are all grammatical moods.

While the imperative is selected in main clauses and occurs in all European languages, whether a language grammaticalizes mood distinctions in embedded clauses and to what extent is subject to crosslinguistic variation. Greek, Italian, Spanish, Catalan, Serbian, Romanian, and French systematically distinguish mood in embedded clauses (i.e. complement, adjunct, and relative clauses), but English doesn’t.

English does have a form that traditional grammar labels ‘subjunctive’, but its use is not systematic, and it is almost never obligatory. We find it in clauses after verbs such as require, wish, and in the conditional protasis (see Portner 1997, and 2018 for recent discussion). Crucially, what is called subjunctive is not a specialized morphological form but a form identical to a past or bare infinitive.

(13) a. The Dean requires that we be/are on time.
    b. I wish you were here.
    c. If I were rich I would buy a boat.
    d. Eat your vegetables!

What is labelled as ‘subjunctive’ is not a designated grammatical form specific to this category; the same can be said for the English imperative, as can be seen. Morphologically, we see past tense and a bare infinitive; and while the imperative does have certain properties that grant it the status of independent mood (see Potsdam 1997 for syntactic arguments), it does not appear in embedded non-quotative contexts. The English ‘subjunctive’, furthermore, is quite limited to a handful of verbs, and it is not obligatory. We do not, in other words, find a systematic and productive pattern of subjunctive vs. indicative choice in embedding in English. It is therefore accurate to say that English lacks productive mood choice in embedded sentences; instead, English distinguishes between finiteness (that) and non-finiteness (to, -ing) in complements, a correlation that we will discuss in this book.

Greek, Latin, and its descendent Romance languages, on the other hand, employ the grammatical category of mood in a number of productive patterns with propositional attitude verbs— but also with adjuncts clauses, specifically those
meaning BEFORE and WITHOUT:\(^5\)

(14) Prin na/*oti vreksi, as pame spiti. 
before that.SUBJ/*IND rain.3sg, OPT go.1pl home. 
‘Before it rains, let’s go home.’

(15) Andiamo a casa prima che piova. 
Go.IMP.1pl to home before that rain.SUBJ.3sg. 
‘Let’s go home before it rains.’

(16) Ekane tin metafrasi xoris na/*oti xrisimpiisi 
did.3sg the translation without that.SUBJ/*IND use.3sg 
leksiko. 
dictionary. 
He did the translation without using a dictionary.

The mood pattern is systematic, as we see: the indicative particles cannot be used, 
the connectives are therefore said to select subjunctive complements.

1.3.1 Mood selection patterns in Romance and Greek

Regarding the subjunctive versus indicative contrast in complement clauses, ob-
serve the basic contrast, now in French and Italian:

(17) a. Marc sait que le printemps est/*soit arrivé. 
Marc knows that the spring be.IND.3sg/ be.SUBJ.3sg arrived. 
‘Marc knows that spring has arrived.’

b. Marc veut que le printemps soit/*est long. 
Marc wants that the spring be.SUBJ.3sg/be.IND.3sg long. 
‘Marc wants spring to be long.’

c. Le printemps est/*soit arrivé. 
The spring be.IND.3sg/be.SUBJ.3sg arrived. 
‘The spring has arrived.’

(18) a. Marco sa che la primavera è/*sia arrivata. 
Marco knows that the spring be.IND.3sg/be.SUBJ.3sg arrived.

‘Marc knows that spring has arrived.’

\(^5\)In the book, we will employ upper case letter to designate the abstract meaning of actual 
words: BEFORE, e.g. is the abstract meaning of the temporal connectives such as English before, 
Greek prin, and Italian prima. Lower case italics will always refer to the actual words in the 
various languages.
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b. Marco vuole che la primavera sia/*è lunga.
   Marco wants that the spring be.SUBJ.3sg/be.IND.3sg long.
   ‘Marc wants spring to be long.’

The verb of knowledge savoir ‘know’ is said to select the indicative, but the volitional verb vouloir ‘want’ selects the subjunctive. The indicative is the default mood of unembedded sentences, as indicated. This is a typical pattern in all European languages; and in the cases above, the mood morphemes are in complementary distribution, i.e., one mood excludes the other. 6

In French and most Romance languages the mood exponent appears on the verb, like tense and aspect. This was also the case in Ancient Greek. In contrast, mood can be realized outside the verbal form in the subordinating particle, i.e., the complementizer. The mood contrast in contemporary Greek is of that kind, as we mentioned already. All dialects of Greek have mood particles (oti, na), from Pontic Greek (spoken at the region of Pontos in Black Sea), to Cypriot Greek (Sitaridou 2014, Pavlou 2018, and references therein), to Griko, i.e., the Greek dialect spoken in Southern Italy (Lekakou and Quer 2016). Balkan languages including Romanian exhibit similar particle subjunctives (Farkas 1985, Rivero, 1994, Terzi, 1997, Giannakidou 1998, 2009, 2011, 2016, Roussou 2009, Bulatovic 2008, Todorovic 2012, among others).

Modern Greek has four mood particles that precede the tensed verb: three indicative oti, pos, pu, and the subjunctive particle na, which appear typically with volitionals and modals. The difference between oti and pos is stylistic, so we will not make much of it here. The difference with pu, however, is important: pu appears to be used with factive complements only, as is illustrated below with an emotive factive.

(19) O Pavlos kseri oti/pos/pu/*na efije i the Paul know.PRES.3sg that.oti.IND/pu.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Roxani.
    Roxani.
    ‘Paul knows that Roxanne left.’

(20) O Pavlos lipate pu/*oti/*na efije i the Paul be-sad.PRES.3sg that.pu.IND/*oti.IND/*SUBJ left-3sg the

6 Though the indicative-subjunctive pattern has been most extensively described in Indo-European languages, it is by no means restricted to these. It appears in many of the world’s languages, including native American languages (see a recent article by Matthewson 2010 for Salish, and Wiltchko 2016). The contrast between subjunctive and indicative also correlates with evidentiality, especially in languages that have only one indirect evidential morpheme (Murray 2016, Smirnova 2013).
Roxani.
Roxani.
‘Paul regrets that Roxanne left.’

(21) O Pavlos pistevi oti/pos/*na efije i Roxani.
the Paul knowPRES.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Roxani.
‘Paul knows that Roxanne left.’

(22) Thelo na/*otí kerdisi o Janis.
want.1sg that.SUBJ/IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.
‘I want John to win.’

(23) Prepi/bori na/*otí kerdisi o Janis.
must.3sg/may3.sg that.SUBJ/IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.
‘John must win./John may win.’

Pu is also the complementizer used to introduce relative clauses, as we will see later, and in this case it might actually co-occur with *na.*

There is, in addition, an optative particle *as* used in main clauses only; the subjunctive is also used in main clauses:

(24) As/Na fiji/ efevge o Janis!
OPT/SUBJ leave.NONPAST.3sg leave.IMPRF.3sg the John.
Let John leave!
I wish John had left!

(25) Thelo na/*as fiji o Janis.
want.1sg that.SUBJ/OPT leave.NONPAST.3sg the John.
‘I want John to leave.’

The optative cannot embed, like the imperative. The optative and the subjunctive are interpreted as wishes or commands. In embedding, the mood particles do not get associated with any illocutionary force.

Mood choice has been a central issue in semantics, both formal and descriptive. Since this book is not a historical overview, and because a lot of the history on the topic has been addressed in previous works—including Portner’s (2018) recent rather comprehensive survey—we will not attempt a general overview here (see also earlier overview discussions in Farkas 1982, 2003; Villalta 2008; Quer 2009, also Portner and Rubinstein 2012; Smirnova, 2014; Giannakidou 1994, 1998, 1999, 2009, 2011, 2016 specifically for Greek; Marques 2004, 2010 for Brazilian and European Portuguese; Mari 2016a, 2017a,b for Italian; Quer 1998, 2001, for Catalan and Spanish; Sarigul 2015 for Turkish, Baunaz 2015 for French; Werner 2018 for German).

Often a distinction is made between verbal mood and sentential mood (Portner 2009), with sentential mood referring to the imperative which contributes non-
assertive illocutionary force. However, Greek allows us to see that such a distinction is not essential, as the mood exponent in embedding appears on the C head without any change in illocutionary force. Certainly for embedding, illocutionary force appears to be entirely irrelevant.

One of the recurring characterizations of the subjunctive mood is that it is dependent, as opposed to the indicative which is said to be independent, and is the mood par excellence of unembedded assertions. As Giannakidou (2009: 1883) notes: "A corollary of this distinction renders the subjunctive usable only in complement clauses of verbs that share a particular semantic characteristic, and which select the subjunctive. In its strong form, the dependency thesis is not mere selection by a higher predicate, but claims that the subjunctive is triggered by certain semantic properties of the embedding context, pretty much the way polarity items (PIs) are triggered by their licensors; the subjunctive can thus be viewed as a PI of some kind."

Mood choice and polarity phenomena, as we noted before, are indeed similar in being syntactic dependencies that are motivated semantically. Just like with NPIs, the distributions of mood morphemes are constrained, and regulated by semantic properties of the higher structure. In both cases, the semantic property that plays the key role is (non)veridicality. The connection is further observed below, where we see that polarity item licensing happens in subjunctive clauses, but not in indicative ones, observation first noted in Giannakidou (1994).

(26) *O Pavlos pistevi oti idhe kanenan/opjondhipote.
    the Paul believe.3sg that.IND saw.3sg NPI/FCI.
    ‘*Paul believes that he saw anybody.’
(27) *Kseri oti agorasa kanena/opjodhipote aitokinito.
    know.3sg that.IND bought.1sg NPI/FCI car.
    ‘*He knows that I bought any car.’
(28) I Ariadne tha ithele na milisi me
    the Ariadne would.like.3sg that.SUBJ talk.1sg with
    opjondhipote/kanenan fititi.
    FC/NPI student.
    ‘Ariadne would like to talk to any student.’
(29) I Ariadne bori na milise me opjondhipote/kanenan
    the Ariadne can that.SUBJ talked.3sg with FC/NPI
    fititi.
    student.
    ‘Ariadne might have talked to any student.’

We see here that NPIs and FCIs are blocked in the indicative complements, but
are allowed in subjunctive complements. Notice also that the contrast holds in English too, and correlates with the *that* vs. *to* difference. NPIs, FCIs, and the subjunctive appear to depend on the presence of a higher expression to ‘license’ them.

Some basic questions arise at this initial stage. Why would a language exhibit dependencies such as mood and polarity? Why would Greek, French and Italian employ mood in complements and adjuncts, whereas English doesn’t? Similar questions arise with other verbal categories such as tense and agreement. Why would one language mark tense or agreement whereas another one would not? What is gained by having tense and agreement?

We will investigate closely a number of propositional attitude meanings, and show that the mood patterns are instrumental in uncovering dimensions in the meaning of the attitude verb that necessitate the subjective constructs of the veridical and nonveridical stances mentioned earlier. Mood marking, in our theory, emerges as a grammaticalization of subjective (non)veridicality, pretty much the way tense is a grammatical reflex of the notion of time, and agreement a grammatical reflex of the notion of person.

### 1.3.2 Attitudes and modal verbs

We talk about ‘strict’ selection when the mood is fixed and cannot vary. Flexible patterns, on the other hand, are observed when mood can be variable. Let us summarize the strict patterns. In Greek, we observe the following:

(30) **Indicative selecting verbs in Greek**

a. fiction verbs: *oniirevome* (dream), *fandazome* (imagine)

b. doxastic verbs: *pistevo* (believe), *nomizo* (think), *theoro* (consider), *vrisko* (find)

c. epistemic and emotive verbs: *ksero*, *gnorizo* (know), *metaniono* (regret), *xairome* (be glad)

d. assertives: *leo* (say), *dhiavazo* (read), *isxirizome* (claim), *dilono* (declare, assert)

e. memory verbs: *thimame* (remember)

f. perception verbs: *vlepo* (see), *akouo* (hear)

(31) **Indicative selecting verbs in Italian:** *sapere* (know)

In Italian, the only verb that strictly selects the indicative is *sapere* (know). Because Italian mood is considerably more flexible, it will be discussed in the next section as *mood shift*.

Here is the list of verbs classes that select subjunctive in Greek and Italian:
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(32) Subjunctive selecting verbs in Greek
   a. volitionals: *thelo* (want), *epithimo* (desire)
   b. modal verbs: *prepi* (must), *bori* (may)
   c. *try* verbs: *prospatho* (try), *dhokimazo* (attempt)
   d. directive, future oriented verbs: *protino* (suggest), *simvulevo* (advise), *promise*
   e. implicatives
   f. permissives: *apagorevo* (forbid)

(33) Subjunctive verbs in Italian
   a. volitionals: *volere* (want),
   b. directives: *ordinare* (order)
   c. modal verbs: *esseere possibile, necessario* (to be possible, necessary)
   d. permissives: *impedire* (forbid)

The two languages are very similar in the subjunctive taking classes, as we see. Implicatives in Italian select the infinitive because of obligatory control, and will be considered as part of the subjunctive class in our analysis in chapter 6.

Here are some Greek examples from the indicative class, recalled from earlier discussion:

(34) O *Nicholas* kseri oti/*na efije i Ariadne.
   the Nicholas knows.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
   ‘Nicholas knows that Ariadne left.’

(35) O *Nicholas* onireftike/ nomize oti/*na efije i
   the Nicholas dreamt.3sg /thought.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left-3sg the
   Ariadne.
   Ariadne.
   ‘Nicholas dreamt/thought that Ariadne left.’

(36) O Nicholas theori oti/*na to Milano ine i protevousa
   the Nicholas consider.3sg that.IND/SUBJ the Milan is the capital
   tis Italias.
   of Italy.
   ‘Nicholas considers Milan to be the capital of Italy.’

*Nomizo* ‘think’, *pistevo* ‘believe’, *onirevome* ‘dream’, *theoro* ‘consider’ are all doxastic and take *oti, pos* complements. It seems to be a robust generalization that, in Greek, epistemic and doxastic attitude verbs pattern on a par in selecting indicative. The doxastic verbs appear to be *solipsistic*, in that they are strictly anchored to the attitude holder’s doxastic space, ignoring what is in the common
ground and lacking entirely factual commitments.

While indicative verbs are epistemic, doxastic, or variants thereof, the subjunctive classes, on the other hand, include modal verbs (deontic and epistemic modals), verbs of volition, implicatives, and generally propositional attitude verbs with future orientation. This group of verbs appears often with the tense NON-PAST, which is also used with the future particle and enables forward shifting. Notice below the case of WANT:

(37) *I Ariadne theli na grapsi/*egrapse
     the Ariadne want.3sg that.SUBJ write.PAST.3sg/write.NONPAST.3sg
to gramma.
the letter.
‘* Ariadne wants to write the letter.’

(38) Maria vuole che Susanna sia contenta.
     Mary wants that Susan be.SUBJ.3sg happy.
‘Mary wants that Susan be happy.’

(39) *Maria vuole che Susanna sia stata contenta.
     Mary wants that Susan be.SUBJ.PAST.3sg been happy.
‘*Mary wants that Susan had been happy.’

We find strong correlations between the tense of the complement and the semantics of the higher attitude verb, and elaborate on it in chapters 2 and 3. Tense constraints are imposed by the attitude, and it is not uncommon, as we shall see, to find meaning changes along the temporal or mood shifts.

Epistemic modal verbs, on the other hand, allow combinations with all tenses. Greek has two modal verbs— a possibility modal bori, and a necessity modal prepi (see Staraki 2013, 2017 for recent extensive discussions on the Greek modals, and for the interaction with tense Giannakidou 2012, Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b, 2018a):

(40) Prepi na/*oti vrehi.
     must that.SUBJ/*IND rain.3sg.
‘It must be raining.’

(41) Bori na/*oti vrehi.
     may that.SUBJ rain.3sg.

7While in Standard Modern Greek, na clauses can have temporal independence, some dialects, specifically Griko is said to feature only NONPAST. Lekakou and Quer (2016) take this to suggest that there is specialization of morphology in Griko for the marking of subjunctive on the verb. We will not explore the dialects of Greek here, but it should be noted that given that mood affects potentially two syntactic positions (Giannakidou 2009), grammaticalization paths may be unstable. The semantic generalizations for the verb classes, on the other hand, seem to be pretty solid.
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‘It may be raining.’

(42) Prepi na*/oti evrekse.
    must that.SBJ*/IND rain.PAST.3sg.
    ‘It must have rained.’

(43) Bori na*/oti evrekse.
    may that.SBJ rain.PAST.3sg
    ‘It may have rained.’

The non-past form creates a prediction or an interpretation as a deontic statement:

(44) Prepi na*/oti vreksi.
    must that.SBJ*/IND rain.3sg.
    ‘For all I know, it must rain (in the future).’
    ‘Given what is needed, it has to rain (in the future).

Deontic readings arise only with NONPAST. Hence we have a dependency of deontic modality to this temporal form—a dependency that doesn’t exist for epistemic modals. It is these kinds of correlations that we will find to be crucial in meaning shifts in chapters 3, 5 and 6. As can be seen in the examples above, both modal verbs require the subjunctive, but in addition, the epistemic reading is compatible with all tenses. The type of modality doesn’t seem to matter for mood choice: the above sentences are epistemic, but deontic modals also require subjunctive:

(45) Prepi na*/oti fas olo to fagito sou! (Mother
    must that.SBJ*/IND eat.NONPAST.2sg all the food yours.
to child).

    ‘You must eat all your food!’

(46) Ja na perasis ston epomeno giro, prepi na*/oti
    for that.SBJ pass.on.2sg to.the next round, must that.SBJ*/IND
    apandisis tris erotisis.
    answer.NONPAST.2sg three questions.
    ‘In order to pass on to the next round (of the game), you must answer
    three questions.’

(47) Boris na*/oti klisis tin porta.
    must SUBJ*/IND close.NONPAST.2sg the door
    ‘You may close the door.’

The past tense is excluded with deontic modality:
(48) Prepi na efage olo to fagito tou.  
    must that.SUBJ eat.PAST.3sg all the food his.  
    ‘He must eat all his food!’
    ‘He must have eaten all his food.’

With past tense, we shift to an epistemic reading. This means that the lower tense can trigger a shift in the modal base: from epistemic to circumstantial (which is the one employed with deontics). Such a shift, we show in chapter 5, is observed also with propositional attitudes, specifically the ones of persuasion and assertion—and this will encourage us to say that modals and attitudes are much closer in meaning than was previously thought.

In Italian, modal verbs are strict subjunctive selectors, like in Greek. Epistemic modal essere possibile allows past, but necessity modal essere necessario only allows future orientation, with a prominent deontic reading (and a parasitic epistemic interpretation, given uncertainty of the future).

(49) E possibile/*necessario che sia venuto.  
    Is possible/necessary that be.SUBJ.3sg come.  
    ‘It is possible that he has come.’

(50) E possibile/necessario che venga.  
    Is possible/necessary that come.SUBJ.3sg.  
    ‘It is possible/necessary that he will come.’

The foundation of any theory of linguistic modality is Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1990) and Portner (2009) where modal verbs take modal bases and ordering sources, but we build a richer system for modality in chapter 2, extending our recent work (Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b, 2018a,b). Modals, possibility as well as necessity, we will argue, are anti-knowledge markers: they indicate that the speaker lacks knowledge of $p$. When the speaker does have knowledge of $p$, she cannot use modals, as illustrated in the well known cases below:

(51) **Context: I am looking through the window and see that it is raining**  
    a. #It may be raining.  
    b. #Bori na vrex.  
    may that.SUBJ rain.  
    c. #Può piovere.  
    may.3sg rain.  
    d. #It must be raining.  
    e. #Prepi na vrex.  
    must that.SUBJ rain.  
    f. #Deve piovere.  
    Must.3sg rain.
If I see the rain, I know that it is raining, and knowledge is veridical: if I know \( p \), then \( p \) is a fact. If I see the rain, I am in a veridical state of mind, and I cannot use felicitously a modal verb, not even a necessity one. Modals are incompatible with the state of knowledge, and in choosing one when I have knowledge of the prejacent, I am saying something weaker than what I know, violating Gricean Quantity (which requires that I say as much as I know). In Giannakidou and Mari (2016a,b), we used the continuation ‘but I am not entirely sure’ as a diagnostic for the absence of knowledge (in Italian, the observation is first found noted in Bertinetto 1979; Mari 2009,2010a Giannakidou and Mari 2012b). Consider:

(52) Deve essere a casa, ma non sono totalmente sicuro.

‘He must be home, but I am not entirely sure.’

Observe the contrast with the bare positive assertion and the knowledge predicate which do not accept such continuation:

(53) a. #He is at home but I am not entirely sure.
   b. #I know he is at home but I am not entirely sure.

Lassiter (2016) offers numerous attested examples where must is followed by ‘I don’t know for sure’, and similar expressions challenging knowledge, belief, or remembering of \( p \):

(54) This is a very early, very correct Mustang that has been in a private collection for a long time. ... The speedo[meter] shows 38,000 miles and it must be 138,000, but I don’t know for sure.

(55) I don’t know for sure, sweetie, but she must have been very depressed. A person doesn’t do something like that lightly.

(56) It must have been a Tuesday (but I don’t know for sure), I can’t remember"

(57) I have an injected TB42 turbo and don’t like the current setup. There is an extra injected located in the piping from the throttle body... Must be an old DTS diesel setup but I’m not certain. Why would they have added this extra injector?

These examples support the conclusion that MUST does not entail knowledge of \( p \) (see also Goodhue 2018). The modal verbs, then, are anti-knowledge markers, and convey uncertainty. We will identify uncertainty with the concept nonveridicality in our work. Modal verbs and propositional attitudes that select the subjunctive
are all nonveridical, as it will become clear.

To summarize the mood patterns, what becomes clear by looking at the morphological exponents of mood in Greek and Romance languages is that mood affects two positions in the embedded clause: the verb (Latin, Romance languages, Ancient Greek), and the subordinator C (Modern Greek, Balkan languages, including Romanian which is a Romance language). The subordinating C can be thought to do some work related to updating with the information coming from the embedded clause. Since we have embedding, the C position can be understood as introducing a local context, and the mood morpheme as giving instructions on how to anchor the embedded proposition to the local context:

(58)

One can think of the contrast between indicative and the subjunctive particles in Greek as *that* vs. *to* complements in English, bearing also in mind that in Modern Greek all complementation is finite (the language lacks infinitives). One must ask the question of how to extend our analysis of Greek and Italian moods to a language that lacks systematic mood distinctions such as English. Baunaz (2015) in some recent work on French argues for three different subordinators *que* even though French does not mark mood in this position. French, however, does mark mood; in a language like English, which lacks mood in embedded clauses, it is possible to transfer the vocabulary in chapter 4 about the update functions of mood morphemes to the complementizers *that* and *to*.

### 1.4 Mood flexibility

Let us move on now to mood flexibility. In many cases, the speaker has a choice between indicative and subjunctive, and the phenomenon is also known as mood *shift* (Quer 2009). It is both interesting (because mood may produce a semantic effect) and challenging (because mood shift can reflect a change in the meaning of the higher verb, and this can pass by as ambiguity).

The are many well documented cases studied under the label of *optional subjunctive* (Giannakidou 2016):

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8Giannakidou (2016) further argues that the emotive C *pu* contains expressive meaning.
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(59) Optional subjunctive
   b. In relative clauses to convey uncertainty of existence (see Farkas 1985, Quer 1998, Giannakidou 1998, 2013a for recent discussion)
   d. Epistemic subjunctive in questions, equivalent to an epistemic modal (Giannakidou 2016)

In these cases, the speaker uses one mood or another for a reason. Giannakidou (2016) argues that in optional cases the subjunctive has actual meaning, which she calls evaluation. The evaluative meaning of the subjunctive is argued to be an epistemic modal in most cases.

1.4.1 Subjunctive of negation

Consider first the subjunctive after negation with doxastic verbs. This is a phenomenon attested in many Romance languages and in Greek:

(60) Dhen pistevo na erthi o Janis.
    not believe.1sg that.SUBJ come.NONPAST.3sg the John.
    ‘I don’t believe that John will come.’

(61) Dhen pistevo na irthe o Janis.
    not believe.1sg that.SUBJ came.3sg the John.
    ‘I don’t believe that John come.’

The doxastic verb pistevo ‘believe’ selects indicative, as we saw earlier, but with negation the subjunctive becomes possible. Notice that subjunctive, like in the case of epistemic modals is compatible with both past and nonpast, and the nonpast has a future oriented reading. As Giannakidou (1995, 2016) notes, in Greek the phenomenon depends crucially on first person singular. A third person subject is unable to shift to subjunctive with negation:

(62) *I Ariadne dhen pistevi na erthi o Janis.
    the Ariadne not believe.3sg that.SUBJ come.NONPAST.3sg the John
    ‘Ariadne doesn’t believe that John will come.’

(63) *I Ariadne dhen pistevi na irthe o Janis.
    the Ariadne not believe.3sg that.SUBJ came.3sg the John
    ‘Ariadne doesn’t believe that John came.’
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Romance languages are more free (Quer 2009), though the degree of flexibility varies. In Greek, when the individual anchor is not the speaker, the lexical subcategorization of the doxastic verb remains robust, i.e., selecting indicative.

1.4.2 Mood choice in relative clauses

Consider now the subjunctive in relative clauses:

(64) Theloume na proslavoume mia gramatea [pu want.1pl that.SUBJ hire.NONPAST.1pl a secretary that.SUBJ na gnorizi japonezika.] know.3sg Japanese.

‘We want to hire a secretary that knows Japanese. But it is hard to find one, and we are not sure if we will be successful. #Her name is Jane Smith.’

(65) Theloume na proslavoume mia gramatea [pu gnorizi want.1pl that.SUBJ hire.NONPAST.1pl a secretary that know.3sg japonezika.] Japanese.

‘We want to hire a secretary that knows Japanese. Her name is Jane Smith.

(#But it is hard to find one, and we are not sure if we will be successful.)’

Here we see that the subjunctive na can be licensed in a relative clause headed by pu. Farkas (1985) studied the phenomenon in Romanian and called the subjunctive in relative clauses ‘intensional’. Giannakidou (1997, 1998, 2013a) analyzed the phenomenon in Greek, arguing that the subjunctive has an epistemic anti-specificity effect. When a subjunctive is used, the indefinite nominal receives a de dicto, narrow scope reading: we do not have a particular secretary in mind, and there are worlds \( w \) where we find a secretary that speaks Japanese, but we do not know if the actual world is such a world. The subjunctive statement says: there are doxastic alternatives \( w \) such that there is a secretary in \( w \) and she speaks Japanese. But there are also doxastic alternatives \( w' \) where there is no such secretary, and it may turn out that real world is one of those. So, we don’t know, at the time of utterance, if there exists in the real world a secretary who speaks Japanese that we can hire. Because we don’t know that, the continuation Her name is Jane Smith, as indicated, is not permitted.

The indicative version, on the other hand, has a de re, wide scope, or specific interpretation, and it is about the specific person Jane Smith who we want to hire. As Giannakidou (1997, 1998, 2013a) emphasized, the narrow scope produces anti-specific reading of the indefinite nominal, while the wide scope of indica-
tive produces specific de re readings. The effect of the mood choice in relative clauses is therefore epistemic, and depends on whether the speaker knows that there exists a specific value to the indefinite or not. If a specific value is known to the speaker, indicative will be chosen. The subjunctive will be chosen when the speaker is uncertain about the value of the indefinite.

### 1.4.3 Subjunctive in questions

Now onsider the case discussed by Giannakidou (2016), where the subjunctive is licensed in questions. In this case, it is argued, the subjunctive contributes an epistemic possibility modal:

(66) Ti na theli?
    What that.SUBJ want-3sg
    ‘What might he want?’

(67) Na tou arese to fagito?
    that.SUBJ he.GEN liked-3sg the food.
    ‘Might it be the case that he liked the food?’

Rouchota (1994) called subjunctive in questions ‘dubitative’. As indicated, the subjunctive behaves as if it contains a possibility epistemic modal *might*. Similar use of the subjunctive exists in Statimcets (Matthewson 2010). Importantly, these questions are ‘weaker’ than without subjunctive: they are open ended, reflective, and may not seek an answer at all. They are questions that one can posit to oneself; Giannakidou and Mari 2019 call them, therefore *reflective*. Giannakidou argues that the subjunctive in the question is akin to a possibility modal, as indicated also in the translations. Notice that epistemic MUST is notoriously bad in questions (see Papafragou 2006, Hacquard and Wellwood 2012 for discussion and data):

(68)  a. #What must he want?
    b. #Must he be here already?

German so-called modal particles are reported to have similar reflective use in questions (the example is from Zimmermann 2011 with his translation):

(69)   Hat Hans wohl Maria eingeladen?
      has Hans PRT Mary invited.
      ‘What do you reckon: Has Hans invited Mary?’

Zimmerman says: ‘The question above is not about whether or not Hans has invited Mary, but by using *wohl* the speaker indicates her awareness that the addressee may not be fully committed to her answer.’ (Zimmermann 2011, p. 2020).
This idea is resonates with Giannakidou’s 2016 analysis just discussed of the epistemic subjunctive.
Let us now move to mood choice in complement clauses.

1.4.4 Mood shift in Italian complement clauses

Italian features mood shift for most of the classes where Greek selects the indicative (see Mari, 2016).

(70) Mood shift in Italian
a. emotive factives: essere contento, sorpreso (be happy, be surprised) mostly subjunctive, allow indicative. (71)
b. doxastic (non-factive): credere, pensare, trovare (believe, think, find) mostly subjunctive, allow indicative. (72)
c. certainty: essere certo (be certain) mostly indicative, allow subjunctive. (73)
d. consciousness: essere cosciente (be aware) mood shift (74)
e. pure assertives: dire (say) mostly indicative, allow subjunctive (89)
f. verbs of denial: negare (deny) mood shift (90)
g. fiction verbs: immaginare (imagine) sognare (dream) mood shift (77)
h. memory verbs: ricordare/ricordarsi (remember) mood shift (108)

(71) Sono contenta che siaè venuto.
Am happy that be.SUBJ.3sg/IND.3sg come.
‘I am happy that he has come.’

(72) Credo che siaè bella
Believe.1sg that be.SUBJ/IND cute.
‘I believe that she is cute.’

(73) Sono sicura che siaè bella.
Am certain that be.SUBJ/IND cute.
‘I am certain that she is cute.’

(74) Sono cosciente che siaè bella.
Am aware that be.SUBJ/IND cute.
‘I am aware that she is cute.’

(75) La gente dice che siaè bella.
The people say that be.SUBJ/IND cute.
‘People say that she is cute.’

(76) Maria nega che siaè bella.
Mary denies that Laura be.SUBJ/IND cute.
‘Mary denies that Laura is cute.’

(77) Maria immagina che Laura sia bella.
    Mary imagines that Laura be.SUBJ/IND cute.
    ‘Mary imagines that Laura is cute.’

(78) Maria ricorda che Laura sia bella.
    Mary remembers that Laura be.SUBJ/IND cute.
    ‘Mary remembers that Laura is cute.’

Apparent flexible mood within a language is challenging for almost all analyses of mood. To deal with them, most accounts (our own earlier works included) would have to say in some way or other that the verb is ambiguous or polysemous, and that the meaning changes depending on the mood chosen. The Italian data have never been systematically addressed in the literature, and since the pioneering work of Giorgi and Pianesi (1996) very little progress has been made to explain the flexibility in mood choice that this language allows. Generally speaking, Italian is a language that ‘favors’ the subjunctive, but the indicative is also allowed. The overwhelming flexibility needs a principled and unified explanation—and we will offer such an analysis in this book. Our idea will be that the Italian belief verbs are the counterpart in the domain of attitudes of the epistemic necessity MUST modal. The Italian subjunctive therefore shows clearly that attitudes and modals are a natural class semantically.

Following Mari (2016a), we propose that two mood patterns need careful differentiation. Ultimately, we will argue that with subjunctive belief in Italian there is no doxastic uncertainty. Instead, we will argue that a fundamental difference is to be tracked between knowledge and doxa. As Mari writes:

Non-factive epistemic predicates allow us to see a systematic polysemey between what we call an expressive-belief (featuring only a doxastic dimension) and an inquisitive-belief (featuring both a doxastic and an epistemic dimension conveying doxastic certainty (in the assertion) and epistemic uncertainty (in the presupposition)). (Mari, 2016a, p. 61).

We will therefore distinguish two layers. First, belief, or doxa, can be pure, and in this case we have indicative and commitment of the believer without regard of knowledge. This is the case of the Greek belief that we described earlier. But belief can be weaker when it is contrasted with knowledge. This distinction will play a central role in our theory, and we will show that it in fact generalizes across a number of doxastic attitudes, including memory, imagination, perception, and fiction. We will call the stronger construals of belief solipsistic, and the latter suppositional. Solipsistic doxastics will select the indicative, and suppositional
doxastics select the subjunctive. Italian and Portuguese (and possibly Icelandic and German) doxastic verbs are underspecified lexically as to which way they are construed.\(^9\)

Based on the proposal that the trigger for subjunctive with belief is a presupposition of epistemic uncertainty – which is a presupposition of nonveridicality, in our terms – we will propose a unified view of mood flexibility, which cuts across languages to an extent that has been only rarely noted and considered before.\(^10\) Crucially, the epistemic effect of the subjunctive shows that the category ‘preference’ is not relevant. In our earlier examples with such verbs, the subjunctive indicates conjectural stance and is thus correlated with supposition and not preference.

### 1.4.5 Doxastic verbs in Portuguese

Italian is not alone among Romance languages in allowing both moods with doxastic verbs. Marques 2010 notes that in Portuguese, belief and assumption verbs may also allow the subjunctive. Here are examples from Marques, discussed in Giannakidou (2016):

(79) Acredito que a Maria está doente.
    believe.1sg that the Maria is-IND-3sg ill.
    ‘I believe that Maria is ill.’

(80) Acredito que a Maria esteja doente.
    believe.1sg that the Maria is.SUBJ.3sg ill.
    ‘I believe that Maria is ill.’

Marques says that the selection of one or another mood is related to the ‘degree of belief’ being expressed. The indicative signals a high degree of belief, according to him, and the subjunctive a lower degree. "The concept of veridicality accounts for this case of mood variation. With the indicative, the inference follows that the relevant proposition is true (according to the subject of the main clause), contrary to what happens if the subjunctive is selected.” (Marques 2010, p. 145). The same idea is also present in Homer (2008) who identifies subjunctive with belief as a cancellable inference of uncertainty. Giannakidou comments on that by saying that when the speaker choses to utter the subjunctive version, she is making a point

\(^9\)Note that, unlike in Mari (2016a), we will not consider attitudes polysemous. Instead we argue that the notion corresponding to the predicate (and which we write in capital letters) can have different values that can be instantiated in different languages, and which are responsible for intra and cross-linguistic variation.

\(^10\)See Farkas (2003) for a theory of mood choice with multiple layers; note, however, that Farkas cannot achieve full coverage, and does not explain subjunctive with Italian belief.
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to distinguish between what she believes and what she knows for sure. "When she 
chooses the indicative version, the speaker is content with the belief ("higher degree 
of certainty"), but when she chooses the subjunctive, she seems to be aware that 
she her belief might not be justified as knowledge. The speaker, in the subjunctive 
version, has some uncertainty in her epistemic state and her commitment to Maria 
is ill is weaker, i.e. she allows for the possibility of not p." (Giannakidou 2016: 
173).

The commitment weakening of subjunctive is observed in English when we 
add a modal verb in the embedded clause:

(81)  
a. I believe that Maria might be sick.
b. I believe that Maria is sick.

Once again we find the effect of the subjunctive to be akin to that of an epistemic 
possibility modal.

Across the chapters we will study the main predicate classes. Let us now give 
a brief overview of the other verb classes that feature mood flexibility.

1.4.6  Hopes, promises, and persuasions

There are some other interesting verb classes that allow both moods crosslinguis-
tically. Consider verbs of the HOPE class. As we see, these verbs allows both 
moods in Greek and Italian:

(82)  
a. Elpizo na kerdisi/kerdise o Janis.  
    hope.1sg that.SUBJ win.NONPAST/PAST.3sg the John  
    ‘I hope for John to win/to have won.’
b. Spero che Gianni abbia vinto/vinca.  
    Hope.1sg.PRES that John have.SUBJ.3sg won/win.SUBJ.3sg  
    ‘I hope that John has won.’

(83)  
a. Elpizo oti kerdise o Janis.  
    hope.1sg that.IND won.3sg the John  
    ‘I hope that John won.’
b. Elpizo oti tha kerdisi o Janis.  
    hope.1sg that.IND FUT win.nonpast.3sg the John  
    ‘I hope that John will win.’
c. Spero che il Milan vincerà/ha vinto.  
    Hope.PRES.1sg that the Milan win.FUT.IND.3sg/has won.  
    ‘I hope that Milan AC will win/has won.’

Equivalents of ‘hope’ are also flexible in other languages (see e.g. a recent dis-
cussion of French ‘hope’ in Portner and Rubinstein 2012, Anand and Hacquard
The verb meaning PROMISE behaves similarly. Notice the exact parallel with promise to and promise that.

(84) a. I Ariadne iposxethike na fiji noris.
    Ariadne promised.3sg that.SUBJ leave.NONPAST.3sg early.
    ‘Ariadne promised to leave early.’

    b. I Ariadne iposxethike oti tha fiji
    Ariadne promised.3sg that.IND FUT leave.NONPAST.3sg
    noris. early
    ‘Ariadne promised that she will leave early.’

Only the oti version counts as a true performative, according to Giannakidou (1997). The na version does not convey the commitment of the speaker to carry out the action indicated by the oti clause. Past tense is excluded with the oti clause because of the nature of promise:

(85) #I Ariadne iposxethike oti efije noris.
    Ariadne promised.3sg that.IND left.PAST.3sg early.
    ‘Ariadne promised that she will leave early.’

The verb meaning PERSUADE pitho behaves in a parallel way:

(86) a. I Ariadne epise ton Nikola na
    the Ariadne persuaded.3sg the Nicholas that.SUBJ
    fijoun noris.
    leave.NONPAST/PAST.3pl early.
    ‘Ariadne persuaded/convinced Nicholas (for them) to leave early.’

    b. I Ariadne epise ton Nicholas oti i idea tou
    the Ariadne persuaded.3sg the Nicholas that.IND the idea his
    ine kali.
    is.PRES.3sg good.
    ‘Ariadne persuaded/convinced Nicholas that his idea is good.’

Notice the alteration in English between persuade/convince to (equivalent to na), and persuade/convince that (equivalent to oti). The English difference is discussed in a recent paper by Grano (2018). Pitho na means convince to act, but pitho oti means to make someone believe the complement proposition. This difference is brought about in Greek by the mood, in English by the to vs. that choice.

It is important to also note that both mood patterns, just like with to vs. that, feel canonical and unmarked. This holds for all HOPE, PROMISE and PER-
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SUADE. The choice of *na* and the ensuing nonpast correlates with action or thought of the future.

### 1.4.7 Verbs of saying

Here, mood choice correlates with different lexical choice of verb in English. Observe the verbs *leo*, and *arnoume* (examples from Giannakidou 2016, and Giannakidou and Staraki 2013):

(87) a. *O* Janis lei *oti* efijan noris.
   The John says that.IND left.3pl early.
   ‘John says that they left early.’

   b. *O* Janis lei *na* figoun noris.
   The John says that.SUBJ leave.3pl early.
   ‘John *wants* them to leave early.’

(88) a. *O* Janis arnithike *oti* efijan noris.
   The John denied that.IND left.3pl early.
   ‘John *denied* that they left early.’

   b. *O* Janis arnithike *na* fiji noris.
   The John says that.SUBJ leave.3sg early.
   ‘John *refused* to leave early.’

*Lei* ‘says’ with the *oti* complement has the expected reporting meaning, but with the *na* complement it acquires a volitional meaning, and we translate it as *wants*. Likewise, with subjunctive *na arnithike* means *refuse* but with indicative *oti* it means *deny*.

Verbs of assertion are also flexible in Italian, with the subjunctive version enabling a reportative interpretation.

(89) La gente dice che sia/è *bella*.
   The people say that be.SUBJ/IND cute.
   ‘People say that she is cute.’

Likewise, verbs of denial are flexible in Italian. Descriptively, with the indicative the matter is settled in the common ground, whereas with the subjunctive it is not.

(90) Maria nega che Laura siaè bella.
   Mary denies that Laura be.SUBJ/IND cute.
   ‘Mary denies that Laura is cute.’

We will show how our framework accommodates this difference in interpretation.
1.4.8 Factive verbs

Recall that Greek marks the complement of an emotive factive verb with \( pu \). With imperfective aspect, \( na \) is also allowed:

(91) a. O Janis xarike pu episkeftike ti
    The John was-happy.PERF.3sg that.IND visited.PRF.3sg his
    jaja tu.
    grandmother.
    ‘John was happy that he visited his grandmother.’

b. O Janis xerete na episkeptete ti
    The John is-happy.IMPERF.3sg that.SUBJ visit.IMPERF3sg his
    jaja tu (ala dystyxos tora teleftea den prolaveni).
    grandmother.
    ‘John is happy to visit his grandmother (but unfortunately he doesn’t
    have time to visit lately).’

Of the two sentences, only the \( pu \) version is factive: there is a fact that John visited his grandmother (hence that John visited his grandmother is true), and that fact made John happy. Notice the perfective in both the higher and the lower verb.

The \( na \) version contains imperfective on both forms, and this renders the sentence non-factive, as can be seen in the continuation that he doesn’t get the chance. Similar mood shifts with emotives are observed in many Romance languages (see Quer 2001, 2009 for recent overviews).

With emotive factives, we will ultimately establish a distinction between three types of languages:

(92) (i) Languages that require subjunctive (Spanish, French);
(ii) Languages that allow both subjunctive and indicative ((Brazilian) Portuguese, Catalan, Turkish, to a lesser extent, Italian);
(iii) Languages where emotives select indicative (Greek, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian); the emotive complement may be distinguished in some other way as in Greek.

Note the rigidity in French and the flexibility (although with a strong preference for subjunctive) in Italian.

(93) Je suis contente qu’il soit/*est venu. (French)
    I am happy that-he be.SUBJ.3sg/*IND.3sg come.
    ‘I am happy that he has come.’

(94) Sono contenta che sia/è venuto. (Italian)
    I am happy that-he be.SUBJ.3sg/IND.3sg come.
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‘I am happy that he has come.’

Mood choice can also produce change in meaning with the verb *ksero* ‘know’, becoming equivalent to a *how-to* complement in English (see Varlokosta 1994, Giannakidou 2011):

(95) O Janis kseri na kolibai.  
    The John knows.3sg that.SUBJ swim.IMPRF.3sg.  
    ‘John knows how to swim.’

Finally, the verb *ksero* ‘know’ may also combine with *pu*:

(96) O Pavlos kseri pu/oti/*na* efije i Roxani.  
    the Paul knows.3sg that.IND-pu.IND-oti.SUBJ left.3sg the Roxani  
    ‘Paul knows that Roxanne left’.

The compatibility of KNOW with *pu* should not be a surprise if, as we said, the generalization is that *pu* is the factive complementizer, selected by verbs whose complements denote facts. Crucially, *pu* can’t be used in the following context where the speaker doesn’t know *p*. Consider a context where we ask the question: How much did that book cost?

(97) Ksero *pu/oti* kostise 25 dollaria.  
    know.1sg that.*IND-pu.IND-oti cost-3sg 25 dollars.  
    ‘I know that it cost 25 dollars.’

In this context of seeking information, the person asking the question does not know how much the book costs. Hence that the book cost 25 dollars is not part of the common ground, and *pu* cannot be used. We will suggest that *pu* is a presuppositional complementizer. With indicatives, then, Greek seems to distinguish between the assertion of veridicality (indicative *oti*) and the presupposition of it (*pu*).

Finally, note that, when embedding a question, *sapere* also allows the subjunctive.

(98) Sai dov’è la macchina?  
    Know.2sg where-be.IND.3sg the car?  
    Do you know where is the car?

(99) Sai dove sia la macchina?  
    Know.2sg where be.SUBJ.3sg the car?  
    Do you know where is the car?

This is a case where, just like with negation, a higher nonveridical operator (question) triggers the subjunctive. The embedding, crucially, created nonveridicality:
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? \textit{KNOW} \(p\) does not entail or presuppose \(p\).

1.4.9 Memory and perception verbs

Verbs of perception such as \textit{vlepo} (see), and \textit{akouo} (hear) take \textit{oti} complements when they combine with past:

\begin{verbatim}
(100) O Nicholas idhe oti/*pu/*na efiye i the Nicholas saw.3sg that.IND-oti/*IND-pu/that.SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne. Ariadne. ‘Nicholas saw that Ariadne left.’
(101) O Nicholas akoue oti/*pu/*na efiye i the Nicholas heard.3sg that.IND-oti/*IND-pu/that.SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne. Ariadne. ‘Nicholas heard that Ariadne left.’
(102) O Nicholas thimate oti/*na ekleise tin the Nicholas remember.3sg that.IND/*that.SUBJ closed.3sg. the porta. door. ‘Nicholas remembered that he closed the door.’
\end{verbatim}

But when these verbs combine with PRES (imperfective non-past), \textit{na} can be used:

\begin{verbatim}
(103) O Nicholas idhe tin Ariadne *oti/*pu/na the Nicholas saw.3sg the Ariadne that.IND-oti/*IND-pu/SUBJ kleini tin porta, alla den ine sigouros. close.PRES.3sg the door, but not is sure. ‘Nicholas saw Ariadne closing the door (but he is not entirely sure)’.
(104) O Nicholas thimate na kleini ti porta, the Nicholas remember.3sg that.SUBJ close.NONPAST.3sg the door, alla dhen ine sigouros. but not is sure. ‘Nicholas remembered closing the door, but he is not entirely sure.’
\end{verbatim}

The \textit{na}-version is compatible with a context where Nicholas is not fully sure about his memory or vision, and allows some doubt. He is, thus, in a nonveridical state. The \textit{oti} clauses are incompatible with such context:
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(105) #O Nicholas thimate oti eklise tin porta, alla den ine the Nicholas remember.3sg that.IND closed.3sg the door, but not is sigouros.
sure.
‘#Nicholas remembered that he closed the door, but he is not entirely sure.’

Note the exact parallel with the English -ing clause. The that vs. ing difference is reflected in Greek with the oti vs. na distinction.

Memory verbs, finally, can also take a pu complement. In this case, just as we saw with ksero ‘know’, they can’t be used in the following context where the speaker doesn’t know p. Consider again the context that raises the question: How much did that book cost?

(106) Thimame *pu/oti kostise 25 dollaria.
      remember.1sg that cost-3sg 25 dollars.
      ‘I remember that it cost 25 dollars.’

In this context, the person asking the question does not know how much the book costs. Hence that the book cost 25 dollars is not known in the common ground. In this case, pu cannot be used. This supports our idea that pu requires that p to be part of the common ground.

(107) Thimame pu/oti to vivlio kostise 25 dollaria.
      remember.1sg that.IND the book cost-3sg 25 dollars.
      ‘I remember that the book cost 25 dollars.’

In this case, memory corresponds to common knowledge.

Unsurprisingly, memory verbs are also flexible in Italian, where the subjunctive introduces a suppositional layer, as we will extensively explain in the rest of this book.

(108) Maria ricorda che Laura sia/è bella.
      Mary remembers that Laura be.SUBJ/IND cute.
      ‘Mary remembers that Laura is cute.’

We will discuss the patterns of memory and perception along with the other doxastics in chapter 4. We will also include in that chapter a discussion of semblance predicates (SEEM, APPEAR), which are not strictly-speaking attitudinal, but share key similarities with perception verbs.

Having taken a taste of all this variation, let us proceed now to ask one of the central question to be asked in this book: what regulates mood choice?
1.5 What regulates mood choice?

1.5.1 The indicative: veridicality and commitment

We have established that the regulating factor for mood choice cannot be direct access to truth—since doxastic, dream, and fiction verbs in Greek and most Romance take indicative complements. Recall:

(109) O Nicholas nomizi otī/*na to Milano ine i protevousa to the Nicholas thinks.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Milan is the capital tis Italies.
of Italy.

‘Nicholas thinks Milan is the capital of Italy.’

(110) O Nicholas theorī otī/*na to Milano ine i the Nicholas considers.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Milan is the protevousa tis Italies.
capital of Italy.

‘Nicholas considers Milan to be the capital of Italy.’

The striking thing here is that even with an obviously false sentence the indicative is required. It therefore seems to be a robust generalization that indicative selecting attitude verbs do not care about objective truth or factuality. The indicative, rather, signals subjectively veridical commitment as suggested in previous works (Giannakidou 1994, 1997, 1998, 2009, 2011, 2013b, 2016). What does it mean for an attitude verb to be convey subjectively veridical commitment? Just to give the basic idea here, a subjectively veridical attitude verb is a verb that involves in its truth condition an information state that is veridical. Let us define the state M first:

(111) Information state of an individual anchor i (Giannakidou 2013b)

An information state M(i) is a set of worlds associated with an individual i representing worlds compatible with what i knows or believes.

M(i) is the private space of i’s thoughts, belief and knowledge; it is actually much richer than that, as we shall see. M(i) can include also one’s perceptions, expectations, memories, tastes, etc., and these different sets of worlds are determined specifically by the lexical meaning of the attitude verb. These subjective private spaces are reminiscent of Kratzer’s modal bases for modal verbs, and are key to understanding how linguistic agents make assessments about truth. The idea is that such modal bases can always be formed, and veridicality— as truth assessment— can be understood as relative to these subjective spaces. This, Gi-
1.5. WHAT REGULATES MOOD CHOICE?

annakidou argues, holds for all sentences.\textsuperscript{11}

Consider a basic sentence with no modal and no embedding. In this case, the relevant linguistic agent \(i\) is the speaker, and \(M(\text{speaker})\) is the information space determining veridicality:

\begin{equation}
\text{Efije} \quad \text{Ariadne.}
\quad \text{left.3sg the Ariadne.}
\quad \text{‘Ariadne left.’}
\end{equation}

This sentence is true if and only if all the worlds in the speaker’s \(M(\text{speaker})\) are worlds in which Ariadne left. This is a veridical information state:

\begin{equation}
\text{Veridical information state}
\begin{align*}
\text{An information state } M(i) \text{ is veridical iff: } & \forall w[w \in M(i) \rightarrow w \in \{ w' | p(w') \}] \\
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

A veridical state is \textit{homogenous}: \textit{tt} conveys certainty of the agent that the sentence is true. A veridical state, in other words, entails \(p\). In Gricean terms, a co-operative speaker, in uttering the sentence \textit{Ariadne left} follows Quality (Be truthful), and this means that she knows or believes the sentence to be true:

\begin{equation}
[[\text{Ariadne left}]]^{M(\text{speaker})} = 1 \iff \forall w[w \in M(\text{speaker}) \rightarrow w \in \{ w' | \text{Ariadne } w' \}]
\end{equation}

The requirement for a veridical state holds irrespective of mood, as can be seen, and is a prerequisite for assertion:

\begin{equation}
\text{Veridical information state as a prerequisite for assertion}
\begin{align*}
\text{A sentence } S \text{ is assertable if and only if the speaker is an veridical state about } S.
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

We will discuss this principle in length in chapter 2. For now, suffice it to note that the indicative can now be understood as by default associated with the homogeneous veridical state. Hence, the veridical state is the foundation for the speaker’s, or an individual anchor’s \textit{commitment} to a sentence. A veridical state \(M(i)\) entails \(p\) because \(M(i)\) is homogenous. Because veridicality is a prerequisite for assertion, continuations such as \textit{I don’t believe it} give rise to Moore effects (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11}Recent work shows these subjective spaces to be important in extracting truth assessment from texts; Marneffe et al., 2012) say that ‘unadorned’ declaratives like \textit{Ariadne left} convey firm speaker commitment, whereas qualified variants with modal verbs or embedded sentences ‘imbue the sentence with uncertainty’ (de Marneffe et al. 2012: 102). Trnavač and Taboada 2012, in a recent study, examine the interactions between nonveridicality and evaluative structure in corpora, and conclude that a nonveridical device ‘tampers with the evaluative content of utterances, with the result of weakening the evaluation (TT: 2012: 316)
In order to utter ‘Ariadne left’, the speaker must be in a veridical state of believing that Ariadne left; continuing by negating this belief would ascribe contradictory beliefs to the same individual. At the foundation of Moore effects, therefore, lies the need to posit veridicality as a precondition on the assertability of sentences (as we argued in Giannakidou and Mari (2016c)).

In embedding, M(speaker) is still relevant, as is the Stalnakerian common ground C, i.e. the set of mutually known propositions or commitments. But the crucial anchor now will be the attitude holder which is the grammatical subject of the attitude verb, and mood will be anchored to M(subject), suggesting tight locality of individual anchoring. Consider first a verb of knowledge. The complement of knowledge is a fact because knowledge is justified true belief:

(117) O Nicholas kseri oti/*na efiye i Ariadne.
    the Nicholas knows.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
    ‘Nicholas knows that Ariadne left.’

(118) [Nicholas kseri oti p] will be defined iff the actual world w is a p world. (factivity)
    If defined, [Nicholas kseri oti p] is true in w with respect to M(Nicholas) iff:
    \[ \forall w' [w' \in M(Nicholas) \rightarrow w' \in \{w'' | p(w'')\}] \]

KNOW thus combines an factual (objectively veridical) presupposition (that the actual world w is a p world) with a subjectively veridical assertion: the information state of the subject, M(Nicholas), is homogenous, i.e., all worlds are p worlds. Importantly, the verb of knowledge does not assert that Ariadne left; hence the choice of indicative does not depend on assertion (as argued for, e.g., in Farkas 2003). Rather, it depends on veridicality.

Unlike knowledge, belief lacks the presupposition of factivity, or any presupposition whatsoever; but it has a truth condition similar to knowledge in that it involves a veridical, homogenous, information state:

(119) O Nicholas pistevi oti/*na efiye i Ariadne.
    the Nicholas believe.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
    ‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne left.’

Whether Ariadne actually left or not is irrelevant for Nicholas’ beliefs. Also irrelevant is whether the speaker shares the belief. For the sentence to be true, it is simply enough if Ariadne left is a proposition believed by the attitude subject
1.5. WHAT REGULATES MOOD CHOICE?

Nicholas. Following the classical Hintikka treatment of belief (Hintikka 1962), then, the truth condition for a doxastic attitude verb such as ‘believe’ and its equivalents also involves a homogenous veridical state:

\[(120) \quad [\text{Nicholas pistevi/believe } p] \text{ is true in } w \text{ with respect to } M(Nicholas) \text{ iff:}
\]
\[\forall w'[w' \in M(Nicholas) \rightarrow w' \in \{w''|[p(w'')]}\]

We discuss in chapter 4 the veridicality properties of other doxastic spaces, and offer more insights into how the nature of the veridical states and solipsistic belief they impose.

We can then the following generalization as the starting point for indicative:

\[(121) \quad \text{Indicative mood and veridicality}
\]

The indicative will be licensed in the complement of a propositional attitude that is veridical objectively (i.e. factive), or subjectively.

The illusion of indicative being sensitive to assertion (Farkas 1992, 2013) is due to the fact that subjective veridicality is a prerequisite of assertion. The homogeneity of subjective veridicality allows us to say that an individual anchor is committed to a sentence, as we noted here, and we explore the tight relation between veridicality and commitment in chapter 2 where we develop our formal system.

1.5.2 Our thesis for the subjunctive: nonveridical stance

While the indicative seemed relatively easy to handle, when it comes to the subjunctive, generalizations might, as first glance, seem elusive, and the literature indeed sometimes appears pessimistic about the finding a unifying property (e.g., Witschko 2016). The subjunctive cannot be simply identified with a single label such as epistemic modality, or ‘bouletic modality’, it is said correctly, since the subjunctive used with both epistemic and dynamic modals. And the fact that the subjunctive behaves like a modal itself, as we saw, adds to the complexity.

Efforts to unify the licensing factors of the subjunctive have been made under the concepts of preference or gradability (as in Villalta 2008 for Spanish subjunctive). Such efforts are bound to fail because they overlook the fact that the subjunctive, as we showed, is licensed by attitude verbs with doxastic meaning. These are supposed to not be gradable, and they are also not preferential. Recall also that both epistemic and deontic modals select the subjunctive in Greek, and that the subjunctive has epistemic contribution in relative clauses and with questions in Greek and Romance languages. Finally, we noted that the subjunctive is used in adjunct clauses with BEFORE and WITHOUT clearly lacking a preference
Portner (2018) presents a rather comprehensive survey of subjunctive theories (see also earlier overview discussions in Farkas, 1982, 2003; Villalta, 2008; Quer 2009, also Portner and Rubinstein 2012; Smirnova, 2013; Giannakidou 2009, 2011; Marques 2004, 2010 for Brazilian and European Portuguese; Giorgi and Pianesi, 1996, Mari 2016a, 2017a, b for Italian; Sarigul 2015 for Turkish, Baunaz 2015 for French). Often a distinction is made between verbal mood and sentential mood (Portner 2009), with sentential mood referring to illocutionary force. However, Greek allows us to see that such a distinction is not essential, as we said earlier, as mood exponents appear on the sentential C level.

The association of mood with illocutionary forces is an illusion. While in main sentences a classification based on illocutionary act may indeed seem possible—e.g., the indicative comes with assertive force, the subjunctive and imperative have directive forces,—the generalization clearly breaks down in embedding: the embedded indicative is not an assertion of the sentence it introduces, i.e., it does not add that sentence to the common ground. The embedded subjunctive, likewise, is not a wish or command. And the imperative cannot be embedded. The same holds for adjunct clauses: BEFORE and WITHOUT clauses select the subjunctive, but they are in no way commands or wishes. An association of subjunctive mood with the illocutionary force of a wish or command would therefore fail spectacularly in sentence embedding.

In recent work, we have pursued individually and jointly a view of mood as having an ‘epistemic substratum’, as Giannakidou (2013a) puts it, and that subjective veridicality and nonveridicality are they key properties regulating mood distribution in complement clauses (an idea going back as early as Giannakidou 1994). These previous works will be our starting point, but we will offer a unified and quite expansive view where.

In a nutshell, we will argue that at a deep level of interpretation, the presence of a nonveridical state is the key to understanding both modality and the subjunctive mood itself. The subjunctive, embedded and unembedded, is a signal of subjective nonveridicality which is an epistemically weaker belief than the Hintikka belief we described earlier. The subjunctive sentence is epistemically weaker than the indicative one because the individual anchor is not committed to the truth of the complement, but rather expresses a nonveridical stance. What does that mean? It means that the speaker’s information space allows uncertainty, i.e., it contains both $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds:

\begin{align}
(122) & \text{ Epistemic weakening (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c)} \\
& \text{Epistemic weakening is the creation of a nonveridical information state.}
\end{align}

\begin{align}
(123) & \text{ Nonveridical information state (Giannakidou 2013)} \\
& \text{An information state } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical about } p \text{ iff } M(i) \text{ contains both}
\end{align}
1.6. ROADMAP

$p$ and $\neg p$ worlds. A non-veridical $M(i)$ does not entail $p$.

In contrast to the veridical states that entail $p$, nonveridical states have $p$ and $\neg p$ as open possibilities, and do not allow entailment to $p$. The modal bases of modals, as we will show in chapter 2, are nonveridical states, and modal verbs select uniformly the subjunctive as we saw here. Our main thesis for the subjunctive will therefore be the following:

(124) Subjunctive mood expresses nonveridical stance

The subjunctive signals the presence of a nonveridical information state.

Modal verbs, and propositional attitudes that are evaluated against nonveridical states follow, as we will propose more concretely later, the Nonveridicality Axiom (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c, 2018). The Nonveridicality Axiom, crucially, manifests itself as a presupposition of nonveridicality in the lexical entries, introducing uncertainty and therefore weakened commitment.

In sum, the subjunctive versus indicative distinction reflects not only the grammaticalization of the distinction between a veridical and a nonveridical state of mind, it also reflects the difference between what an attitude asserts and what it presupposes. Mood flexibility with attitude verbs indicates that the verb can be construed with or without the nonveridical presuppositional layer (Mari, 2016).

1.6 Roadmap

Let us give now a brief outline of what we will do in each chapter.

In chapter 2, we build the formal framework of our theory, centering around the notions of veridicality, nonveridicality, commitment, epistemic weakening, and the new concept of bias that we will define for necessity modals such as MUST. Bias gives the illusion of commitment, but a biased modal base is still nonveridical, i.e., it does not entail $p$. We use modality as the illustrating grounds for our theory. As we said here, the presence of a nonveridical epistemic modal base renders all modals nonveridical—and the presence of such a nonveridical epistemic state is the regulating factor for the subjunctive. If a lexical entry contains a nonveridical epistemic space $M$, it will be able to license the subjunctive. In the rest of the book, this simple idea will be able to explain a vast set of data concerning various classes of propositional attitudes and their mood choice properties.

In chapter 3, we discuss the correlation between mood and embedded tense. We show that there is a strong correlation between attitude meaning and the tem-
poral properties of the embedded complement— and explaining mood and lexical shifts requires that we have a solid understanding of the tense system. The present and past are veridical, but the nonpast is nonveridical, we will argue. The nonpast is the tense of future orientation, and it is the dependent tense that we find with future oriented subjunctives. This is also the tense of the bare infinitive in English, we will argue. In languages lacking productive morphological mood, the verbal correlate of mood is tense. We will offer an explicit syntax semantics of tenses in Greek and Italian that will explain also the observation about anaphoric tense in the subjunctive.

In chapter 4, we offer a detailed analysis of the mood choice with doxastic propositional attitude verbs in Greek and Italian. We use the label ‘doxastic’ to refer to verbs that express attitudes of belief, thought, consciousness, consideration, dream, imagination, fiction, and memory. These attitudes are also sometimes referred to as ‘cognitive’. As it became clear already, there are two main patterns: (a) doxastic verbs strictly select the indicative which is the pattern observed in Greek and the bulk of European languages, and (b) doxastic verbs can flexibly allow both moods, with repercussions in meaning, as is illustrated in Italian and Portuguese. We develop in this chapter our notion of epistemic and doxastic commitment of an anchor to the truth of $p$.

There are, we will see, two ways of conceptualizing doxastic attitudes: (a) as purely subjective, veridical, solipsistic attitudes with Hintikka-style truth conditions, that to do not engage with factuality and knowledge, or (b) as doxa, i.e. nonveridical suppositional states that engage with factuality and knowledge. Italian verbs are underspecified lexically, and can be construed either way, thus explaining why they are compatible with both indicative and subjunctive. Greek doxastic verbs, by contrast, are lexically specified as solipsistic beliefs and select only the indicative. Doxa is sensitive to the unsettledness of $p$ in the epistemic space of the attitude holder. By carefully distinguishing knowledge and doxa, we will argue that, just as Greek, Italian belief is strong doxa-wise but it is weak epistemic-wise.

Crucially, the flexibility in mood choice does not necessitate imposing ambiguity in the lexical entries of propositional attitude verbs. It rather shows that doxastic propositional attitudes exhibit the variability that we see typically with modals in being able to pick different modal bases. Presuppositional doxastics take two modal bases as arguments: a veridical doxastic one (assertion), and a nonveridical epistemic one (presupposition). Acknowledging flexible propositional attitude meaning offers a new way of understanding attitudinal meaning.

In chapter 4, finally, we discuss the pragmatic function of mood which is to anchor the complement proposition to the local information state. Mood is local to the anchor and her subjective information space. We distinguish between assertive indicative $oti$, which adds $p$ to $M$, and presuppositional indicative $pu$ requires that
already be present in the subjective space of the subject or the common ground. The subjunctive never adds the complement proposition to the subjective space or the common ground. The fact that Greek lexicalizes an assertive and a non-assertive indicative gives further support to our idea that the indicative mood is not isomorphic to assertability.

In chapter 5, we discuss ‘classically’ subjunctive verbs such as verbs of volition and desire. We argue that the truth conditions of these predicates require the notion of bouletic commitment, as the counterpart of doxastic commitment in the realm of doxastics. Like pure belief which can be construed solipsistically, some volitional verbs (such as those meaning PROMISE, and PERSUADE) are also construed as solipsistic desires, and can be defined on variants of bouletic models. When construed solipsistically, volitional attitudes select indicative as expected. HOPE can also be construed as having a nonveridical presupposition, in addition to the bouletic commitment. In this case, it will select the subjunctive, as expected. The suppositional and assertive layers are also featured by WANT, but WANT selects the subjunctive strictly in all languages we know, and is never compatible with indicative. Why is that? We propose that WANT is the equivalent of MUST in the realm of volition, i.e., it conveys only bias towards p in the bouletic space, not bouletic commitment (as HOPE does). In addition, WANT appears to have an antiveridical presupposition that p is believed by i to not be true at the time of utterance. This antiveridical presupposition produces anti-factivity. Anti-factivity characterizes all non-indicative moods such as the optative and imperative.

The emerging landscape of desiderative predicates shows a parallelism between doxastics and bouletics. Our semantics for pure volition is novel, and includes no preference. It is therefore quite different from the preference based semantics proposed in earlier works (including our own).

In chapter 6, we discuss implicative and ability predicates, both selecting the subjunctive. We explain why the subjunctive and infinitive are chosen with ability modals and implicative verbs in Greek and Italian (and Romance languages in general). The selection of the subjunctive is expected with ability modals since, as modals, they obey the Nonveridicality Axiom. We propose a new analysis of ability modality by treating the modal ABLE as the dispositional counterpart of epistemic MUST, entailing action to p only in the Ideal worlds. Implicatives such as MANAGE, on the other hand, appear to pose a challenge for the subjunctive because they appear to entail that p is true. We offer an analysis of MANAGE as presupposing that a volitional agent i tried to bring about p, without in fact entailing actualization of p. This presupposition alone suffices to license the subjunctive.
CHAPTER 1. TRUTH, VERIDICALITY, MOOD

Under certain circumstances, ability modals do allow entailment to \( p \), i.e., the entailment that the ability was actualized and led to \( p \). This is often labelled in the literature ‘actuality’ entailment. The actuality entailment renders the prejacent true at a past time, and depends crucially— we newly argue— on ABLE being embedded under past. We offer a thorough analysis of this phenomenon consistent with the fact that the choice of subjunctive mood is not affected, and with it the nonveridical analysis of ability. We also show that the actuality entailment does not arise with epistemic modals because these never scope under tense. In our analysis, implicative operators and ability modals in the veridical reading are not equivalent, contrary to popular claims in the literature (e.g. Bhatt 1999). The ability modal is a modal operator that lacks entirely the presupposition of trying that manage has, but MANAGE is an aspectual operator taking the eventuality as its argument, and does not convey modality or propositional attitude in any obvious sense.

In chapter 7, we consider the mood patterns observed with propositional attitudes of emotion which include (a), attitudes known as emotive such as, e.g., the English be happy, regret, be surprised, be angry, (b) attitudes that we label ‘epistemic’ emotives, such as be aware, remember, and attitudes of fear known also as verba timendi such as, e.g., the English fear, be afraid. Emotion attitudes utilize verbs and adjectives that are gradable. In dealing with emotion attitudes we articulate a precise new semantics for emotion which capitalizes on their subjective scalar nature. We propose a morphism between emotion scales and worlds which renders the emotive space nonveridical, thus sanctioning the subjunctive. Emotive predicates also have a presupposition of subjective veridicality or factivity, which is responsible for licensing the Greek presuppositional complementizer \( pu \). Languages that lack this complementizer typically resort to the subjunctive because of the nonveridical semantics of emotion. Emotion predicates will come with lexical entries that are akin to the mixed veridicality patterns of modals, bouletic attitudes, and suppositional doxastics. Verbs of awareness can also be construed as containing emotive scales, and in this case they select subjunctive, as expected. This is the case of Italian. Again as expected, Greek grammaticalizes awareness as a knowledge predicate.

We distinguish, finally, three kinds of fear attitudes: fear to, fear that, fear lest. Fear is not a monolithic emotion in our framework. We offer a new semantics for fear predicates which accounts for the variation in the mood patterns observed without appeal to expressive content (pace Yoon 2011).

Our work in this book brings together different levels of analysis— philosophical, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic— in order to develop a comprehensive theory of how (non)veridicality is reflected in grammar and thought. We use
mood choice in sentence complementation as a diagnostics for the rich and flexible semantics of modal verbs and propositional attitudes, and we develop a compositional and fully transparent analysis of various propositional attitude meanings. Our semantics has implications about other languages too, including, of course, English. We conclude with some discussion of crosslinguistic implications of our theory in chapter 8.
Chapter 2

Modalization, nonveridicality, and commitment

In this chapter, we build the formal framework of our theory, centering around the notions of veridicality, nonveridicality, commitment, epistemic weakening, and bias. We put these concepts to work in the analysis of modalization. As we alluded to in the opening chapter, the presence of a nonveridical epistemic modal base renders all modals nonveridical— and the presence of such a modal base is the regulating factor for the subjunctive. The subjunctive is used when an individual anchor \( i \) does not know that \( p \) is true, or does not believe \( p \) to be true. Epistemic modals are prototypical anti-knowledge markers. This simple idea will guide our analysis of the semantics of propositional attitudes and their mood choice properties in the following chapters.

We will uncover a number of layers in the structure of modal operators, including a layer of meta-evaluation function whose realization is a modal adverb. The notions of commitment and epistemic weakening are shown to also have implications for informativity: veridical commitment conveys maximum informativity, i.e., \( p \) is added to the common ground. But epistemically weaker sentences such as those with modal operators and non-indicatives in general are less informative about \( p \), and do not add \( p \) to the common ground.

2.1 Veridicality and commitment

The speaker has a chance to engage with truth by choosing to use a sentence without modality in the simple past or present tense, or by using a modal expression, e.g., a modal verb:

(1) a. It is raining.
b. It rained.
c. It must be raining.
d. It may be raining.

We call the sentence without a modal a ‘bare sentence’. Consider this case first. The assertion of a bare sentence requires that the speaker follows Gricean Quality, i.e., she is truthful and knows, or has grounds to believe, that it is raining or that it rained. By uttering the sentence ‘It is raining’, the speaker wants to share her knowledge with her audience. Sharing the knowledge means that the speaker intends $p$ to be added to the common ground and become public knowledge. Upon adding $p$ to the common ground, a listener might object to it if they know otherwise, e.g. if they just came back from outside and notice that it is no longer raining. But insofar as the speaker is concerned, and given what she knows at the time of utterance, it is true that it is raining. When the speaker has this knowledge, we say that the speaker is in a veridical state regarding the proposition $\text{It is raining}$. And being in a veridical state means that the speaker is fully committed to the proposition $\text{It is raining}$. 

Likewise, when the speaker asserts a negative sentence, she is committed to the truth of $\neg p$:

\[ (2) \quad \text{It is not raining.} \]

In this case, the speaker knows or believes that it is not raining; by asserting the sentence we assume that she is fully committed to $\neg p$, and proposes to add $\neg p$ to the common ground. The unmodalized negative assertion is epistemically stronger than the assertion of a modal sentence: $\neg p$ is known by the speaker, whereas the modal sentence implies that the speaker is uncertain about $p$. In both cases we talk about the speaker being committed, and in the case of $\neg p$ we can talk about negative commitment, or commitment to the falsity of $p$.

When the speaker decides to use an epistemic modal, she does so because she cannot be committed to $p$—neither positively nor negatively:

\[ (3) \quad \text{It may/must/might/could be raining}. \]

Depending on whether a possibility or a necessity modal is used, the speaker may have some or many reasons to believe that the prejacent sentence could be true; but she is still in a state of uncertainty. By embedding a proposition $p$ under a modal, therefore, the speaker signals that she cannot be fully committed to $p$, i.e., her epistemic commitment is weaker than knowledge of $p$. She still has some commitment to $\text{It is raining}$ because she is not denying it, but the speaker is not committed enough to add $p$ to the common ground.

As we see, there are two options: one is to use a possibility modal $\diamond p$ (It may
2.1. VERIDICALITY AND COMMITMENT

be raining), in which case the speaker is merely raising (or, not excluding) the possibility of \( p \). The commitment in this case is pretty weak, and we will call it trivial. If the speaker chooses to use a necessity modal, on the other hand, the commitment is stronger: the speaker has grounds to consider the prejacent \( \text{It is raining} \) likely or probable; but she still has some uncertainty, she might be aware that she doesn’t have all the facts. With a necessity modal, we will argue, the speaker is at best biased towards \( p \), but she is not fully committed to it.

When we think of this weakened commitment with modals, it is helpful to also consider questions. Modalized assertions and questions are similar, according to Giannakidou (2013),\(^1\) who called modal assertions inquisitive just like questions. Questions and modals are also similar in licensing NPIs. In this, they contrast with past or present veridical assertions, which block these items.\(^2\) Recall:

(4) a. Did Ariadne eat any cookies?
   b. At the party, Ariadne may/can talk to anybody.
   c. Any student can solve this problem.

(5) a. *Ariadne ate any cookies.
   b. *Ariadne is eating any cookies right now.
   c. *Ariadne ate any cookies.

From the perspective of the NPI-licensing diagnostic, it is clear that modals and questions pattern on a par, and contrast with bare positive assertions. Recall also that NPIs appear in subjunctive classes of modal verbs, as illustrated below with the two modal verbs of Greek, but not in indicative clauses with epistemic or doxastic attitudes, and positive assertions:

(6) *O Pavlos pistevi oti idhe kanenan/opjondhipote.  
   the Paul believe.3sg that.IND saw.3sg NPI/FCI.  
   *Paul believes that he saw anybody’.

(7) *Kseri oti agorasa kanena/opjodhipote aftokinito.  
   know.3sg that.IND bought.1sg NPI/FCI car.  
   *He knows that I bought any car.’

(8) I Ariadne prepi na milise me opjondhipote/kanenan  
   the Ariadne MUST.3sg that.SUBJ talked.3sg with FCI/NPI  
   fititi.
   student.
   ‘Ariadne would like to talk to any student.’

\(^1\)For more ongoing work on questions and modality, see Giannakidou and Mari 2019.

\(^2\)Following standard practice, we take the English present progressive to be the semantic present, or PRES; see Giannakidou (2014) and references therein and more discussion in chapter 3.
(9) I Ariadne bori na milise me opjondhipote/kanenan the Ariadne can that.SUBJ talked.3sg with FCI/NPI fititi.
student.
‘Ariadne might have talked to any student.’

(10) *I Ariadne milise me opjondhipote/kanenan fititi.
the Ariadne talked.3sg with FCI/NPI student.
‘Ariadne talked to any student.’

Giannakidou (2013) argues that non-biased information seeking questions and possibility modals convey the state of nonveridical equilibrium. The inquisitive-ness approach to questions defines questions as being of zero informativity (Ciardelli et al. 2013), and nonveridical equilibrium is the way to capture this generalization, as we will further explore here.

In earlier work, we proposed the concept of ‘commitment strength’ as a way to connect the veridicality of knowledge/belief of the speaker with the informativity of $p$. Veridicality forms the basis for commitment. When the speaker knows or believes $p$, she is in a veridical state therefore fully committed to $p$. We will call this state of full commitment epistemic commitment, e-commitment for short:

(11) Scale of epistemic commitment (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c)

\[
< p, \text{MUST} ~ p, \text{MIGHT} ~ p >;
\]

where $i$ is the speaker, $p$ conveys e-commitment of $i$ to $p$; MUST $p$ conveys partial commitment of $i$ to $p$, and MIGHT $p$ conveys trivial commitment of $i$ to $p$.

The criterion for commitment is (non)veridicality: knowledge and belief denote veridical states, as we mentioned. A veridical state commits $i$ to $p$; MUST $p$, and MIGHT $p$, on the other hand, are nonveridical and reduce the commitment. MUST $p$ is stronger that MIGHT $p$ because it entails partial commitment in Ideal worlds, and this creates positive bias towards $p$. Positive bias is weaker than knowledge or belief of $p$. Trivial commitment, finally, is simply raising the possibility of $p$.

In terms of informativity, commitment entails the following:

(12) Commitment and informativity (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c)

\[
< p \gg \text{MUST} ~ p \gg \text{MIGHT} ~ p >;
\]

where ‘$\gg$’ means ‘informationally stronger than’

Non-modalized $p$ (speaker knows $p$, $p$ added to the common ground) $\gg$ MUST $p$ (speaker does not know $p$, but is biased towards $p$) $\gg$ POSSIBLY $p$ (speaker does not know $p$, and there is nonveridical equi-

---

3The negative assertion does allow NPIs: Ariadne didn’t talk to any student.
2.2. THE FRAMEWORK: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE VERIDICALLY

librium)

Only the veridical, e-committed assertion of $p$ adds $p$ to the common ground. Introducing a modal does not add $p$ to the common ground, hence MODAL $p$ is informationally weaker than $p$. Bias towards $p$, in turn, is informationally stronger than nonveridical equilibrium but still does not add $p$ to the common ground.

In the discussion to follow, we will develop an explicit formal theory of modalization that uses the concepts above in order to explain both the semantic properties of modals as well as their mood patterns.

2.2 The framework: objective and subjective veridicality

2.2.1 Objective (Non)-veridicality, semantic tense


(13) **Objective veridicality.**

(i) A propositional function $F$ is veridical iff $Fp \rightarrow p$ is logically valid.

(ii) $F$ is nonveridical iff $Fp \nrightarrow p$;

(iii) $F$ is antiveridical iff $Fp \rightarrow \neg p$.

Objective veridicality is a property of truth entailing expressions. A factive verb such as *know* entails (in fact: presupposes) that its complement is true, it is therefore objectively veridical:

(14) I know that Nicholas brought dessert.

*Know* is veridical because *know($p$)* entails that $p$ is true. But *believe, want* aren’t objectively veridical:

(15) Anastasia believes that Nicholas brought dessert.

*Believe* is not objectively veridical because if *Anastasia believes that* $p$ is true, $p$ may or may not be true.

Temporal operators such as the present (PRES) or the past (PAST), expressed by tenses or adverbials, are objectively veridical. Consider the following:

(16) a. Yesterday, Nicholas brought dessert.
b. Right now, Nicholas is washing the dishes.

(17) Veridicality of temporal operators.
Let \( F \) be temporal function, \( t \) an instant or an interval.
\( F \) is veridical iff \( Fp \) at a time \( t \) entails that \( p \) is true at a (contextually given) time \( t' \leq t \); otherwise \( F \) is nonveridical. (Giannakidou 2002:23)

PAST/Yesterday are veridical because \((\text{PAST/Yesterday} (p)) \) at \( t_u \) entails that \( p \) was true at a time \( t' \leq t \). Likewise, PRES/Right now is veridical because \((\text{PRES/Right now} (p)) \) at \( t_u \) entails that \( p \) is true at \( t_u \). The future (FUT), however, is nonveridical because \((\text{FUT/tomorrow} (p)) \) at \( t_u \) does not entail that \( p \) is true at \( t_u \) or a time \( t' \leq t \). Temporal veridicality is thus objective veridicality anchored to \( t_u \); the criterion is whether there is a time prior to \( t_u \), or \( t_u \) itself, where \( p \) is true, and this excludes the future from the veridical realm.

Modal verbs, crucially, appear to ‘remove’ the veridicality of the tensed sentence:

(18) a. Nicholas might/must be sleeping now.
    b. Nicholas might/must have slept earlier.

(19) a. MUST (PRES/PAST (p)) does not entail that \( p \) is true at a time \( t' \leq t \)
    b. MAY (PRES/PAST (p)) is does not entail that \( p \) is true at a time \( t' \leq t \)

We discuss the interactions of modals with tense later. Here, consider simply that modal verbs are veridicality blockers: they do not entail the truth of the prejacent proposition (at a time). This holds for possibility and necessity modals, as well as the future modal. Epistemic necessity modal verbs are thus to be distinguished from alethic necessity modals, which indeed validate the principle \( T \) that guarantees veridicality: \( \text{necessarily } p \text{ entails } p \). Epistemic necessity does not validate this principle (see Giannakidou 1998, 1999, and Portner 2009).

Modals introduce uncertainty, we argue, and indicate that the speaker is taking a nonveridical stance towards the proposition. Let us unpack this.

### 2.2.2 Subjective Veridicality

Speakers and hearers form judgements about truth given what they know or what they believe (Giannakidou 1994, 1998, 1999, 2009, 2013; Harris and Potts 2010; de Marneffe et al. 2012; Mari 2015c on perspectival generics). That such relativization is needed becomes particularly visible with modals, propositional attitude verbs, and their complements; but the role of the individual in assessing truth is apparent even in unembedded sentences, as we noted, and is expressed lucidly in Harris and Potts’ assertion that "all sentences are perspectival".
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When speakers make assertions or ask questions or assess statements of others, they make veridicality judgments that are not *ex nihilo*, but rather based on their own body of information or perspective. The veridicality judgement is more complex than truth assignment: it depends on what speakers know or believe to be true, and on how they extract information from context (see especially Giannakidou 1998, 2013, Mari 2003, 2005, Giannakidou and Mari 2016c; de Marneffe *et al.* 2012 confirm this complexity with corpus data).

Generally speaking, then, we must talk about objective and relative veridicality for all sentences. Objective veridicality depends on what is true or not in the world, it corresponds to truth; but in the formation of relative veridicality judgements, an individual anchors the propositional content to their own information spaces, sometimes without regard to truth (as is the case of pure belief). For unembedded sentences, the individual anchor is always the speaker. For embedded sentences, the speaker still has an opinion, but for mood choice it is the subject of the attitude that matters, as we said and was shown in earlier work. Individual anchoring of truth should be seen on a par with other kinds of anchoring of propositional content, i.e. temporal anchoring, event anchoring (e.g. Hacquard 2006, 2010), or *Now*-anchoring, as we discuss further in chapter 3.

Notice that we do not talk about relative truth, but relative veridicality. Truth is objective and independent of individual anchors— it can therefore not be relativized. What is relativized is an individual’s assessment of truth, which relies on the formation of subjective information states of various kinds. Expressions such as ‘my truth’ and ‘your truth’, which are sometimes used carelessly, can only be understood as shorthands for *i*’s veridicality judgement or *i*’s perspective on truth, not as referencing truth itself.

Giannakidou (1994, 1997) was the first to offer a system of relativization of veridicality. She used the term ‘models of evaluation’ and the letter $M$ to refer to the subjective private information states of individual anchors; Giannakidou 2013 uses the term ‘information state’ to refer to these. The models of evaluation are sets of worlds, relative to the individual anchor *i*, corresponding to what *i* believes, knows, dreams, imagines, remembers, wants and the like, depending on the lexical meaning of the propositional attitude verb. Giannakidou (1999:45) calls these models also epistemic states.

We will refer to the subjective private information states of individual anchors as ‘information states’, and continue to use $M$ following Giannakidou’s work. The basic definition is as follows:

---

4The relation between assertion and belief is complex, and currently under close scrutiny (see Lauer 2013; Krifka 2015; Mari 2017a,b). We will take up this question in chapter 4.

5With sentences containing predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 2007) veridicality is determined not by knowledge but by taste or experience, and the individual anchor is called the *judge*. The experiential judge is just one case of anchor in our theory.
\(20\) **Information state of an individual anchor** \(i\) 
An information state \(M(i)\) is a set of worlds associated with an individual \(i\) representing worlds compatible with what \(i\) knows or believes in the context of utterance.

We can think of \(M(i)\) broadly as a private space encompassing \(i\)'s worldview. It is a non-trivial, non-singleton set that encompasses \(i\)'s beliefs and knowledge about the world (as well as memories, perceptions, desires, expectations, etc). Another way of thinking about these private states as mental states. As our analysis develops in this book, we will see that there are many kinds of private states that are relevant for propositional attitudes, and some of them really look like cognitive states such as memory, perception, awareness, emotion.

Given \(M(i)\), we can now identify (non)veridicality subjectively, relative to \(M\) as follows:

\(21\)  

**Subjective Veridicality**

i. A function \(F\) that takes a proposition \(p\) as its argument is veridical with respect to an individual anchor \(i\) and an information state \(M(i)\) iff \(Fp\) entails \(p\) in \(M(i)\).

ii. \(Fp\) entails \(p\) in \(M(i)\) iff \(\forall w'[w' \in M(i) \rightarrow p(w')]\).

Subjective, or relative, veridicality is entailment within \(M\). It reflects knowledge or belief of \(i\) that \(p\) is true, and requires homogeneity of the entire \(M(i)\). This is crucial. When all worlds in \(M(i)\) are \(p\) worlds, \(M(i)\) is a veridical state, and \(p\) is entailed in \(M(i)\).

\(22\)  

**Veridical information state**

An information state \(M(i)\) is veridical about \(p\) iff it is homogenous: \(\forall w[w \in M(i) \rightarrow w \in \{w' \mid p(w')\}]\).

From the definition of subjective veridicality we can now derive e-commitment as a property that characterizes the individual anchor when she knows \(p\) to be true:

\(23\)  

**E-commitment of** \(i\) **to a proposition** \(p\)

i. An individual anchor \(i\) is e-committed to \(p\) iff \(M(i)\) contains worlds compatible with what \(i\) knows, and \(M(i)\) is veridical, i.e., if \(M(i)\) entails \(p\).

ii. In other words, an individual anchor \(i\) is e-committed to \(p\) if \(i\) knows \(p\).

The veridical commitment state conveys settledness of \(p\) in the epistemic space of knowledge \(M\). Things that are known are settled.

The requirement for a veridical state can now be understood as a prerequisite for assertion:
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Veridicality as a prerequisite for assertion

A sentence S is assertable by the speaker i if and only if M(i) is veridical, i.e., if M(i) entails p; where p is the denotation of S.

The above means that the speaker i can assert a sentence S only if i is e-committed to its proposition p. Hence we have a definition of epistemic commitment that underlies an assertion; for example:

Flavio is a doctor is assertable by speaker i if and only if ∀w′[w′ ∈ M(i) → doctor(Flavio)(w′)].

The co-operative assertion of an unmodalized unembedded positive sentence relies on the speaker’s belief or knowledge of p.

If the prejacent sentence is negative, in a parallel manner, assertability relies on the speaker’s commitment to ¬p:

Giacomo is not a doctor is assertable by speaker i if and only if ∀w′[w′ ∈ M(i) → ¬doctor(Giacomo)(w′)].

Again we have entailment in M: all worlds in M(i) be ¬p worlds. We can therefore say that the assertion of unmodalized sentences, positive or negative, require homogenous states of e-commitment of i to the prejacent, be it a p or its negation ¬p. In the case of negation, we talk about e-commitment to ¬p:

E-commitment of i to a ¬p (Subjective Antiveridicality)

An individual anchor i is e-committed to ¬p iff M(i) entails ¬p.

Commitment to p is subjective veridicality, and commitment to ¬p is subjective antiveridicality. Recall that objectively antiveridicality is the property of entailing ¬p irrespective of M:

Objective antiveridicality A function F is antiveridical iff Fp entails ¬p.

At this point, it is useful to relate veridicality and antiveridicality to epistemic settledness:

Epistemic settledness in M(i)

i. M(i) is epistemically settled about φ, where φ is p or ¬p iff (∀w′ ∈ M(i)p(w′)) ∨ (∀w′ ∈ M(i)¬p(w′))

ii. M(i) is positively settled iff ∀w′ ∈ M(i) : p(w′)

iii. M(i) is negatively settled iff ∀w′ ∈ M(i) : ¬p(w′)

The notion of epistemic settledness is useful to understand the implications of veridicality and homogeneity for entailment: when all worlds are p worlds, the
epistemic state is positively settled and entails \( p \); when all worlds are \( \neg p \) worlds, the epistemic state is negatively settled and entails \( \neg p \). When \( M(i) \) entails \( p \), we can say that \( M(i) \) supports \( p \) (a term that we used in earlier work). When \( M(i) \) entails \( \neg p \), \( M(i) \) supports \( \neg p \). When \( M(i) \) supports \( p \), we will say again that \( i \) is e-committed to \( p \); when \( M(i) \) entails \( \neg p \), \( i \) is said to be e-committed to \( \neg p \). E-commitment to \( \neg p \) is rejection of \( p \). Asserting \( p \) and rejecting \( p \) both reveal homogenous, settled, commitment states.

We know want to discuss factivity. Verbs of knowledge such as know, ksero, gnorizo, sapere and their equivalents (KNOW) have the following truth condition:

\[
[\text{Nicholas kseri \}/know p] \text{ will be defined iff the actual world } w \text{ is a } p \text{ world. If defined,}
\]

\[
[\text{Nicholas kseri oti } p] \text{ is true in } w \text{ iff:}
\]

\[
\forall w'[w' \in M(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \{w'' \mid p(w'')\}], \text{ and}
\]

\[
\forall w'[w' \in M(\text{speaker}) \rightarrow w' \in \{w'' \mid p(w'')\}]
\]

KNOW is objectively veridical since its complement is a fact, i.e. true in the actual world \( w \), hence KNOW \( p \) entails \( p \) in \( w \). At the same time, KNOW reflects common, i.e., shared knowledge between speaker and subject, which means that it entails \( p \) in \( M(\text{Nicholas}) \) as well as \( M(\text{speaker}) \). KNOW is therefore both objectively and subjectively veridical. Giannakidou (1998, 1999) calls KNOW for this reason strongly veridical.

Factivity emerges as an objective veridicality presupposition:

\[
\text{Factivity as a presupposition of objective veridicality}
\]

A propositional function \( F \) is factive iff \( Fp \) presupposes that \( p \) is true.

In other words, an objectively veridical \( F \) can simply entail \( p \) (like past tense or yesterday), or presuppose it like KNOW, in which case \( F \) is factive.

Subjective veridicality does not entail factivity or objective veridicality. For instance, Nicholas believes that Ariadne is a doctor reflects a veridical epistemic state (with respect to Nicholas = \( i \) and Nicholas's belief state = \( M(i) \)), but the sentence Ariadne is a doctor can be objectively false, i.e., Nicholas might have a false belief:

\[
[\text{Nicholas believes that } p] \text{ is true in the world of the utterance context } w \text{ iff:}
\]

\[
\forall w'[w' \in \text{Dox}(\text{Nicholas}, w) \rightarrow p(w')]
\]

Here we are using Dox to refer specifically to a doxastic state. The truth condition of believe does not entail actual truth. However, (32) renders believe subjectively veridical, because the whole \( M(\text{Nicholas}) \) entails \( p \). As we shall see in this book, other non-factive verbs denoting private spaces such as dream, imagine are subjec-
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Tively veridical because they denote variants of Dox that entail \( p \) in them, without entailing actual truth.

Subjective veridicality, then, and not objectively truth or veridicality is the prerequisite property for the licensing of the indicative mood. This is why verbs of belief and knowledge both select the indicative. Our thesis will be the following, as can be recalled from chapter 1:

\[(33) \text{ Indicative mood and veridicality} \]

The indicative will be licensed in the complement of a propositional attitude that is veridical (objectively or subjectively).

Verbs of negative assertion, which we briefly mentioned in chapter 1, are also veridical and select the indicative:

\[(34) \text{ O} \ Nicholas \text{ arnithike} \text{ ot}/*\text{ na} \text{ i} \text{ Ariadne} \text{ ton} \text{ voithise.} \]

\[ \text{DENY} \ p \text{ does not entail } \neg p; \text{ but it express commitment to } \neg p, \text{ and it therefore selects indicative:} \]

\[(35) \text{ [Nicholas denied that } p\text{]} \text{ is true in the world of the utterance context } w \text{ iff:} \]

\[\forall w' [w' \in M(Nicholas, w) \rightarrow \neg p(w')] \]

In other words, if \( i \) denies that \( p \), then \( i \) knows or believes \( \neg p \) to be true. Hence, entailment and homogeneity in \( M \) explains why we get indicative with even negative assertives.

Let us move on now to define subjective nonveridicality, which is the defining property of modalization and the licensing property of the subjunctive mood.

2.2.3 Subjective nonveridicality

Nonveridicality is a property of uncertainty functions. Uncertainty functions \( F \) do not imply that \( i \) knows or believes \( p \) to be true. In this case, \( i \) cannot be fully committed to \( p \); rather, \( i \) is undecided, or as we said earlier, \( i \) is only weakly committed, which means partially or trivially (with possibility) committed. With a subjectively nonveridical function, therefore, \( M(i) \) does not entail \( p \). We define subjective veridicality as follows:

\[(36) \text{ Subjective veridicality} \]

A function \( F \) that takes a proposition \( p \) as its argument is subjectively
nonveridical with respect to an individual anchor \( i \) and an epistemic state \( M(i) \) iff \( Fp \) is does not entail \( p \), i.e., iff \( \exists w' \in M(i) \ p(w') & \exists w'' \in M(i) \neg p(w') \).

A subjectively veridical function creates a space where both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are open possibilities. The nonveridical state is partitioned:

\[ (37) \quad \text{Nonveridical epistemic state} \]

An epistemic state \( M(i) \) is nonveridical about \( p \) iff \( M(i) \) contains both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds.

Nonveridical epistemic states \( M(i) \) are non-homogenous, containing both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds. They are therefore epistemically unsettled, not entailing \( p \). A veridical state expresses weaker commitment to \( p \) than a veridical state, which is full commitment (homogeneity).

Modal function, as we will show in this chapter, are nonveridical functions. Inquisitive spaces such as questions also denote nonveridical epistemic states, as we said (see also Giannakidou 2013). We will move on to examine the nonveridicality of modal expressions next, but before we do that let us summarize below the typology of modal spaces (sets of worlds) that we just talked about:

\[ (38) \quad \text{Veridicality of modal spaces and commitment} \ (\text{Giannakidou 2013}) \]

a. A \textit{veridical} modal space is fully committed: \( \forall w'(w' \in M \rightarrow p(w')) \)
b. An \textit{antiveridical} modal space is fully committed: \( \forall w'(w' \in M \rightarrow \neg p(w')) \)
c. A \textit{nonveridical} modal space is weakly committed: \( \exists w', w'' \in M (w' \neq w'' \land (p(w') \land \neg p(w''))) \)

A nonveridical space is thus epistemically weaker than the veridical space or antiveridical space which entail the prejacent proposition \( p \) or \( \neg p \), if the prejacent is negated. The nonveridical \( M \) conveys weakened commitment of \( i \) to \( p \). We say that the commitment is weakened, and not that there is no commitment, because the possiblity of \( p \) still conveys commitment albeit \textit{trivial}, as we characterized it.

In terms of informative content, a homogenous veridical or antiveridical state corresponds to a move by \( i \) to add the \( p \) or \( \neg p \) to the common ground (or to private grounds, as we show in chapter 4). Following Giannakidou (2013), we call this ‘full informativity’. Positive and negative bare assertions are fully informative in that they allow addition of the prejacent to the common ground:

\[ (39) \quad \text{Fact: Homogeneity and informativity} \]

Homogenous (veridical and antiveridical) information states are fully informative.
Homogenous states contrast with nonveridical states which are partitioned \((p\text{ and } \lnot p)\) thus preventing addition of \(p\) to the common ground. Non-indicative assertions—— assertions with modals, questions, optatives, imperatives—— all convey nonveridical states and therefore do not add \(p\) to the common ground.

We are now going to show that modal verbs as a natural class, no matter how ‘strong’ they might initially give the impression to be, are epistemically weaker than the unmodalized assertions because their modal bases are nonveridical states. By having such modal bases, modal operators do not entail knowledge or belief of \(p\). When a speaker uses a modal, in other words, she does so because she wants to signal that she does not have knowledge or belief of \(p\) and can therefore not be committed to it. The subjunctive, we argue, will be licensed in precisely this situation. It is, in other words, the mood of nonveridicality and uncertainty.

2.3 Modal operators and the subjunctive: possibility

The notions of possibility and necessity are already at the core of the Aristotelian Categories. Contemporary possible world semantics and modal logics build systems based on Kripke’s (1972) and Lewis’s (1973) pioneering works. Our base framework here will be Kratzer’s (1977, 1981, 1990) and Portner’s (2009)’s theory of linguistic (that is, non-aleithic) modality. In this theory, modal verbs are restricted quantifiers that take modal bases and ordering sources as arguments, determining to a large extent what kind of modality we have—— i.e., epistemic, deontic, teleological, ability, bouletic, dynamic—— as well particular flavors of modality (e.g. must, should, ought). Portner 2009 offers a very clear and comprehensive introduction to Kratzer’s theory and refines it in many ways; we refer the reader to that excellent work for a detailed presentation of the framework of linguistic modality.

In our earlier works (Giannakidou (1998, 1999, 2013b), Mari (2015a, 2016b) and Giannakidou and Mari (2012a,b, 2013, 2016c)), we add the Nonveridicality Axiom to the Kratzer/Portner theory of modality. The Nonveridicality Axiom says that non-alethic modal expressions are require their modal bases to be non-veridical spaces, i.e. they containing \(p\) and \(\lnot p\) worlds.\(^6\) Modals are signals that the speaker does not know or believe \(p\) to be true. Modals, of course, are also objectively nonveridical as was shown earlier, since no version of MODAL \(p\) entails \(p\). Modals are uncertainty, anti-knowledge operators.

By ‘modals’, we intend to refer to expressions that denote the necessity or

\(^6\)Beaver and Frazee (2016) follow suit and adopt nonveridicality as a defining property of modality, and Condoravdi (2002) posits a similar ‘diversity’ condition for modal bases
possibility operators of modal logic, regardless of grammatical category. Modals thus can be verbs, adverbs, adjectives, tenses, and particles:

(40) a. Flavio *may/must/might/should* be at home. (modal verbs)
    b. Flavio is *probably/maybe/perhaps* at home. (modal adverbs)
    c. It is *possible/probable* that Flavio is at home. (modal adjectives)

Notice that modals can be ambiguous: Flavio *must/should be at home* can be epistemic or deontic (or teleological, or other fine grained distinctions one wishes to make). The key factor for the apparent ambiguity is the modal base the modal verb has as its argument: with an epistemic base we get epistemic modality, with a deontic base we get deontic modality. Kratzer discusses this meaning flexibility at length, and proposes that it is not ambiguity but underspecification of the modal base. Flavio *might be at home*, on the other hand, is not flexible but strictly epistemic, hence we need to allow for modals such as *might* which lexically select their modal base. In our theory of propositional attitudes, we find, likewise, flexible and non-flexible attitudes— and we will argue, like Kratzer, for underspecification rather than ambiguity. The relation between modal verbs and propositional attitudes is, as we shall see, strikingly close.

The future modals and tenses are also epistemic necessity operators, just like MUST, we have argued in Giannakidou and Mari (2018b).

(41) a. O *Janis tha ernerthi spiti.* (Greek modal future particle)
    ‘John will come home.
    b. Gianni *arriverà domani.* (Italian modal tense)
    ‘John will arrive tomorrow.’

In the discussion below, when we use MUST we refer to the future modal too.

The epistemic subjunctive used with questions in Greek (recall the data from chapter 1) is a possibility modal in the semantics (Giannakidou 2016). Modals come in different shapes (particles, tenses, or verbs), and modal flavors, as we said. A classic distinction is between epistemic and deontic modality, but Portner talks about *priority* modality to include teleological, bouletic and ability modality. In this chapter, we focus mainly on epistemic modals, but we will discuss the deontic, priority modality and ability in chapter 6.

Modal verbs as a class, it must be recalled, require the subjunctive:
2.3. **MODAL OPERATORS AND THE SUBJUNCTIVE: POSSIBILITY**

(42) a. Prepi na/*oti vrehi.
    must that.SUBJ/*/IND rain.3sg.
    ‘It must be raining.’

b. Bori na/*oti vrehi.
    may that.SUBJ/*/IND rain.3sg.
    ‘It may be raining.’

c. Prepi na/*oti evrekse.
    must that.SUBJ/*/IND rain.PAST.3sg.
    ‘It must have rained.’

d. Bori na/*oti evrekse.
    may that.SUBJ/*/IND rain.PAST.3sg.
    ‘It may have rained.’

The infinitive is allowed in Italian, but is impossible in Greek. Greek has two modal verbs— a possibility modal *bori*, and a necessity modal *prepi*. Staraki (2013, 2017) offers extensive discussions on the Greek modals, including further interactions with tenses (see also Giannakidou 2012, Giannakidou and Mari 2016c, 2018b). As can be seen in the examples above, both modals require the subjunctive. The type of modality also doesn’t seem to matter: the above sentences are epistemic, but deontic modals also require subjunctive:

(43) Prepi na/*oti fas olo to fagito sou! (Mother to child)
    must that.SUBJ/*/IND eat.2sg all the food yours.
    ‘You must eat all your food!’

(44) Ja na perasis ston epomeno giro, prepi na/*oti
    for subj. pass.on.2sg to.the next round, must that.SUBJ/*/IND
    apandisis tris erotisis.
    answer.2sg three questions.
    ‘In order to pass on to the next round (of the game), you must answer
    three questions.’

(45) Boris na/*oti klisis tin porta.
    must that.SUBJ/*/IND close.2sg the door.
    ‘You may close the door.’

Deontic modality requires the subjunctive, as we see, even when used for rules, definitions, etc. In Italian, subjunctive is also the pattern, along with infinitive. Modal verbs never select the indicative.

Every modal has an epistemic modal base as its argument, which we will designate as $M(i)$. In our framework, $M(i)$ is the set of propositions known by the speaker $i$ at $t_u$ (the utterance time). $w_0$ is the world of evaluation, by default the actual world:
Epistemic modality is, therefore, by default ‘subjective’ (Lyons 1977), and knowledge changes with time. Epistemic modality is parametric to knowledge at $t_u$, as is often acknowledged in the literature (see Portner 2009, Hacquard 2006, 2010, Giannakidou and Mari 2016c).

When a speaker chooses to modalize, she chooses to take a nonveridical stance. If she knows $p$ to be true, it is odd to modalize. The modal base, therefore, is a nonveridical space and contains both $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds and does not entail $p$. Following Giannakidou and Mari (2016c, 2018b), we formulate nonveridicality as a precondition on modalities in the form of the axiom below:

\[(47) \text{Nonveridicality Axiom of modals}\]

\[
\text{MODAL } (M) \ (p) \text{ can be defined if and only if the modal base } M \text{ is non-veridical, i.e., } M \text{ contains both } p \text{ and } \neg p \text{ worlds.}
\]

The modal base is therefore a weakened commitment space, with $p$ and $\neg p$ being open possibilities. Non-aleithic modalities (possibility and necessity, epistemic, deontic, bouletic, etc) obey this principle, and therefore come with partitioned, unsettled modal bases.\(^8\) Unmodalized assertions express full commitment, and are therefore stronger than modalized sentences.

In agreement with the common analysis of epistemic possibility, we take it that epistemic possibility modals are existential quantifiers and that they lack ordering sources.\(^9\) The absence of ordering sources with epistemic possibility renders $p$ and $\neg p$ equal possibilities revealing that the assessor is in a state of non-veridical equilibrium which Giannakidou 2013 calls ‘true’ uncertainty (see also Giannakidou and Mari 2016c, 2018b):

\[(48) \text{Nonveridical equilibrium (Giannakidou 2013)}\]
2.3. MODAL OPERATORS AND THE SUBJUNCTIVE: POSSIBILITY

An information state $M$ is in nonveridical equilibrium iff $M$ is partitioned into $p$ and $\neg p$, and there is no bias towards $p$ or $\neg p$.

Nonveridical equilibrium conveys the weakest commitment in merely not excluding the possibility of $p$. Possibility modals and unbiased polar questions (*Did Ariadne win the race?*) are in nonveridical equilibrium, in a state of balanced indecision where both $p$ and its negation are equally plausible options and $i$ has no reason to prefer one over the other (see Kang and Yoon 2018 for some more discussion of the concept of equilibrium as it applies to certain question particles in Korean). Giannakidou (2013) argues that ‘inquisitive’ and ‘nonveridical’ describe the same state of possibility and questions.

The bare truth condition of epistemic possibility is the following, considering also the explicit contribution of tense and focussing on the present and past cases. We use MIGHT as an umbrella for epistemic possibility modals:

\[
[MIGHT (PRES (p))]_{M,i,S}^t \text{ is true iff } \exists w' \in M(i) : p(w', t_u)
\]

\[
[MIGHT (PAST (p))]_{M,i,S}^t \text{ is true iff } \exists w' \in M(i) : \exists t' < t_u \land p(w', t')
\]

This truth condition will be enriched later, but we give it here as a basic truth condition. By choosing a possibility modal, the speaker $i$ conveys trivial commitment. Recall, indeed, that as a modal, MIGHT is nonveridical, hence the modal base contains $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds. The inference that all worlds are $p$ worlds cannot thus arise. Nonveridical equilibrium and the ensuing trivial commitment come with very low informativity about $p$, again comparable to that of information seeking questions.

Before moving on, and given that all modals select the subjunctive, it seems reasonable to formulate the following licensing condition of the subjunctive:

\[
\text{Licensing condition of subjunctive mood}
\]

An expression $F$ licenses the subjunctive mood in its scope iff $F$ is nonveridical.$^{10}$

We propose this condition as a sufficiency condition (on the semantics of the licensor, i.e. the modal verb). The possibility modal is nonveridical objectively and subjectively, it can therefore license the subjunctive mood.

---

$^{10}$We will make clear later on that $F$ must be nonveridical in one of the meaning dimensions, which include the presupposition.
2.4 Epistemic necessity: nonveridicality with bias

We move on now to epistemic necessity modals. By using this label we mean to indicate, in the present work, modal verbs meaning ‘must, should’, as well as the future modal and morphemes (FUT). We will use upper case MUST to refer to such expressions jointly, and refer to Giannakidou and Mari (2018a) for detailed arguments that FUT are epistemic necessity modals. Necessity modals obey the Nonveridicality Axiom, but now the modal base favors the worlds where \( p \) is true. We will call this ‘positive bias’ towards \( p \), and we will propose a theory of how exactly that happens (building on Giannakidou and Mari 2013, 2016c, 2018a,b).

In his seminal work, Kartunnen (1972) claims that English must is ‘weak’. Recall that just like the possibility modal, Greek and Italian select the subjunctive. From the perspective of mood licensing, therefore, one could never be led to believe that MUST is anything but weak. We start by offering evidence that MUST expressions are not compatible with knowledge of \( p \). In making this argument, we will refute Kartunnen’s thesis that the weakness of must has to do with a requirement that evidence be indirect. It is not directness or indirectness that matter, but whether there is knowledge or not of \( p \). If \( i \) knows \( p \), \( i \) is in a veridical state, and in this case MUST cannot be used. After we establish this, we discuss the property of positive bias.

2.4.1 MUST is incompatible with knowledge

Kartunnen (1972) held that the weakens of MUST is intimately related to the weakness of the source of information: when the speaker has indirect evidence that the prejacent is true, she uses MUST to signal that she is uncertain. Giannakidou and Mari 2016c argued that the epistemic weakening is not due to the fact that knowledge is indirect, but to the fact that knowledge is partial. Von Fintel and Gillies (2010:361) also challenge Kartunnen: ‘Weakness and indirectness are not two sides of a single coin at all. They are just different’. Their claim is that the epistemic modal must presupposes indirect evidence, but it is nevertheless ‘strong’. We have addressed von Fintel and Gillies in earlier work, and consider here only what appears to be their strongest argument, which concerns deductive contexts.

Let us proceed to offer arguments showing that is not indirect evidence that sanctions MUST but lack of knowledge. Direct visual perception contexts are famously cited as evidence for need of indirect evidence:

\[(52) \quad \text{Context: } i \text{ is standing in front of the window and sees the rain} \]

a. #It must be raining.
2.4. EPISTEMIC NECESSITY: NONVERIDICALITY WITH BIAS

b. #Tha vrexi.  
   FUT rain.  

c. #Piovera.  
   rain-FUT.3sg.  

d. #Prepi na vrexi.  
   must that.SUBJ rain.  

e. #Dovrà piovere.  
   Must.FUT.3sg rain.  

MUST is infelicitous here because, Karttunen’s argument goes, it requires indirect evidence but if see the rain the evidence is direct. However, and this is important, if I see the rain, I know that it is raining, and knowledge, as we said, is veridical. MUST is excluded not because the evidence needs to be indirect, as Karttunen argued, but because evidence is a reliable path to knowledge. MUST, we must conclude from the sentences above, is incompatible with knowledge of p.

Giannakidou and Mari (2016c) note that MUST statements can be continued by ‘but I am not entirely sure’ (as first noted in Bertinetto 1979; Mari 2009, Giannakidou and Mari 2012b):

(53) Deve essere a casa, ma non sono totalmente sicuro.  
    Must.PRES.3sg be at home, but not be.PRES.1sg entirely sure.  
    ‘He must be home, but I am not entirely sure.’

Veridical assertions do not accept such continuation:

(54) a. #He is at home but I am not entirely sure.  
    b. #I know he is at home but I am not entirely sure.

For English, Lassiter (2016) offers a plethora of attested examples where must is modified with ‘I don’t know for sure’, and similar expressions challenging knowledge of p:

(55) a. This is a very early, very correct Mustang that has been in a private collection for a long time. ... The speedo[meter] shows 38,000 miles and it must be 138,000, but I don’t know for sure.
    b. I don’t know for sure, sweetie, but she must have been very depressed. A person doesn’t do something like that lightly.
    c. It must have been a Tuesday (but I don’t know for sure), I can’t remember"
d. I have an injected TB42 turbo and don’t like the current setup. There is an extra injected located in the piping from the throttle body... 

*Must be an old DTS diesel setup but I’m not certain.* Why would they have added this extra injector?

These examples support the conclusion that MUST does not entail knowledge of \( p \) by the speaker \( i \). MUST, rather, allows inference to \( p \) based on a number of premises and potential gaps (see also recent discussion in Goodhue 2018).

Giannakidou and Mari (2016c) offer new arguments against indirectness. We summarize two arguments here and add two more. Consider, first, the contrast between the veridical context we presented before where I see the rain, and the following case (56), where I only see a wet umbrella.

(56) Context: I see a wet umbrella.

a. It must be raining.

b. Tha/Prepi na vrexi. (Greek) FUT/Must that.SUBJ rain.

c. Deve star piovendo. (Italian) Must be raining.

d. Pioverà. rain.FUT.3sg.

e. Deve star piovendo, ma non sono sicura. ‘It must be raining, but I am not sure.’

f. Deve probabilmente star piovendo. ‘It must probably be raining.’

In this context, I see a wet umbrella, but I don’t see the rain, therefore I do not *know* that it is raining. The wet umbrella is an indication of rain, and can support ‘It is raining’ in a subset of M. But M can contain also worlds in which the umbrella got wet in some other way — and these worlds could be considered by me more likely, for instance in a context such that when I left the house this morning the weather was sunny and the forecast predicted no rain. Continuation with ‘I am not sure’ is allowed here, as we see.

Auditory perception is compatible with MUST, but hearing is as direct as seeing:

(57) Context: I am in a room with no windows, but I hear sounds of rain on the roof.

a. It must be raining.

b. Tha vrexi. FUT rain.
2.4. EPISTEMIC NECESSITY: NONVERIDICALITY WITH BIAS

If I only hear something that sounds like rain, I do not know that ‘it is raining’, I only have the sound of something that could be rain. The stimulus is direct, but inadequate for knowledge. What I hear might be caused by something other than the rain. Auditory perception is nonveridical (as we will discuss further in chapter 5), while visual perception is veridical; recall that the first discussions of veridicality in linguistics come from Montague’s (1969) analysis the verb *see* as veridical. Overall, perceptions can of course be deceiving, and just because something *looks like* or *sounds like* it has the property P doesn’t mean that it does. Semblance verbs— as will be shown in chapter 4— can be construed as nonveridical. (Semblance, like belief, it turns out, can be construed both as commitment as well as supposition in which case it is contrasted with knowledge).

Now consider the case where I see, but my vision is not clear. In this case, I can use MUST:

(58) **Context:** I am looking through the window, and it is foggy and dark. I don’t fully trust what I am seeing:

a. Prepi na vrex. (Greek MUST)
   ‘It must be raining.’

b. Tha vrex. (Greek, epistemic future, equivalent to MUST)
   ‘It must be raining.’

Clearly, then, MUST does not depend on direct perception, but on how reliable I take the sensory information to be in establishing knowledge. If my vision is unclear and it’s foggy, I do not trust my senses fully as a source for knowledge, I can therefore not be committed to ‘it is raining’. von Fintel and Gillies and Karttunen cannot predict the contrast between this example with improved MUST and the classical one that motivated the indirectness argument. In both cases perception is direct.

As an additional argument, consider the following case, reproducing an example from Smirnova (2013). Here we see a contrast between MUST and the Bulgarian indirect evidential which is fine in the reportative context.

(59) **Reportative context:** you and your sister were out of touch for a couple of years. Today she calls you on the phone to catch up. She tells you that her daughter Maria plays the piano. Later, you tell your husband:
a. Maria svirela na piano.  
   Maria play.EV on piano (Smirnova 2013:2)
b. #I Maria tha/prepi na pezi piano.  
   #Maria must play the piano.
c. #Maria deve suonare il piano.  
   #Maria must.3sg play the piano.
d. Mary must play the piano.

MUST is blocked here because the speaker has knowledge of p provided by her sister’s utterance. Most of the knowledge we acquire, in fact, comes from hearing and reading sources that we trust. If the speaker trusts the source of the report Maria plays the piano, i.e. her sister, and has no reason to doubt her, then upon hearing the information that Maria plays the piano, the speaker knows that Maria plays the piano. This is a classical veridical exchange, and MUST is ruled out. This example, therefore, clearly shows that it is not indirect evidence that matters but knowledge. If one has knowledge of p, even if this knowledge is indirect, one cannot use a modal, not even MUST.

In other words, the apparent evidential indirectness effect of MUST is due to the fact that with modals we have reasoning with uncertainty. But the inadequacy of the indirectness approach is deeper than this. It is indeed possible to show that the same evidence can lead to two different types of statements — bare veridical assertion indicating knowledge, or universal modal statement— depending of the epistemic state of the speaker (see also Goodhue 2018). Consider a context where I am preparing dinner, and ask my son to switch off the oven when the alarm rings.

(60) Context: the oven alarm rings.  
   Mom: The dinner is ready.  
   Son: The dinner must be ready.

Since my son does not know what his mom has in mind, it would be infelicitous for him to utter ‘The dinner is ready’. The bare assertion is instead felicitous when uttered by the mom, as she has the dinner plan in mind. Here, direct evidence, does not block MUST: the MUST sentence, uttered by the son, is felicitous because his knowledge state is that of only partial knowledge. Note that here the son has direct evidence (the alarm ringing), but is still lacks knowledge; hence lack of knowledge is compatible with direct evidence, as in the case of the foggy window.

Reversely, as indicated in earlier reported conversation example, the indirectness does not always trigger MUST. We will use again an example modeled after Smirnova (2013). You and your sister were out of touch for a couple of years. Today you visit her for the first time. As she shows you around her apartment, you see that there is a piano. Later, you tell your husband:
2.4. EPISTEMIC NECESSITY: NONVERIDICALITY WITH BIAS

(61) a. I Maria tha pezi/prepi na pezi piano.
    the Maria FUT play/must subjunctive play piano.
b. Maria deve suonare il piano.
   Maria must play the piano.
c. Maria must play the piano.

Here we have a piano, but we don’t actually see Maria playing it, and there is no report that she does. The speaker, knowing her sister and husband do not play the piano, infers that their daughter Maria plays the piano. Again, it is not a matter of indirectness but of knowing. Another way to state this is that MUST relies on an inference ad peiorem where several conclusions are possible, only some but not all supporting p.

In Giannakidou and Mari (2016c), we summarized our conclusions in the following:

(62) Evidential component of Universal Epistemic Modals (UEMs): partial knowledge
    a. UEMs can only effectively weaken a proposition p, if the speaker’s knowledge that supports p is not complete.
    b. Complete knowledge is knowledge of all the relevant facts for p. More technically, it is a set of propositions that entails p.
    c. All other knowledge is partial.

The generalizations that we establish MUST are very relevant for the discussion of evidentiality, especially in languages that have indirect evidential morphemes but do not mark direct perception (e.g. Native American languages such as Cheyenne, Murray to appear, and Turkish, Bulgarian, Smirnova 2013). The ‘direct’ evidential is typically an unmarked past or present, and the marked form is the so-called indirect evidential, which indicates that the source of information is not first hand knowledge of the speaker. The indirect evidential—like MUST in English, Greek and Italian—is a nonveridical marker that marks the reduced commitment of the speaker to p. Direct perception and reliable reports, on the other hand, as we discussed, entail full knowledge, veridicality, and e-commitment.

Before we move on to the technical part of our analysis, we want to consider an argument for ‘strong’ must put forth by von Fintel and Gillies 2010. The argument comes from deductive contexts. Consider:

(63) The ball is either in A, B or C. It is neither in A nor in B. It must be in C.

In this case, MUST indeed entails that the speaker knows p. But is this truly epistemic MUST? Giannakidou and Mari (2016c) claim that MUST in this case is not epistemic but aleithic. How do we know? Alethic MUST, we want to suggest,
can be distinguished from epistemic MUST by means of focus. Aleithic MUST can bear focus, but epistemic MUST cannot. Consider how odd it is to focus must in inferential context:

(64) Context: I see a wet umbrella.
# It MUST be raining.
# PREPI na vrexi.

(65) The ball is either in A, B or C.
   a. The ball is neither in A nor in B. It MUST be in C.
   b. Dhen ine sto A oute sto B, ara PREPI na ine sto C. (Greek)
   c. La palla è in A o in B. Non è né in A, né in B. DEVE essere in C. (Italian)

The von Fintel and Gillies example, then, involves an aleithic use of MUST which obeys veridicality and is therefore indeed strong— but has no bearing on the discussion of epistemic MUST.

2.4.2 MUST: Ideal and Non-Ideal worlds

Epistemic MUST (and specifically Italian dovere (see also Giorgi and Pianesi 1997, Portner 2009) and Greek prepi), associates with an epistemic modal base M(i) which is the set of propositions known by the speaker i at tu (the utterance time). w0 is the world of evaluation, by default the actual world:

(66) M(i) (tu)(w0) = λw′(w′ is compatible with what is known by the speaker i in w0 at tu)

The epistemic modality is, as we said earlier, ‘subjective’, and knowledge changes with time. Epistemic modality is therefore parametric to knowledge at tu, as is often acknowledged in the literature (see extended discussion in Portner 2009 and references therein). We also assume that the domain of M(i) is restricted and possibly finite, following the usual assumption of domain restriction with quantifiers.

Given what the speaker knows, the modal base of epistemic MUST is non-veridical, i.e., it does not entail p and contains both p and ¬p worlds. To derive the truth conditions of MUST we assume with the literature (see e.g. Portner 2009) that MUST uses a set of propositions S which describe shared stereotypical/normalcy conditions. Such conditions have most notably been discussed in relation to genericity (see Asher and Morreau 1995), progressives (Dowty 1979; Landman 1992; Portner 1998), but appear also as inertia (Dowty, ibid.), stereotypicality (Portner 2009), and reasonability (Landman ibid., Portner 1998; Mari
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They seem to apply well-beyond epistemic modality to linguistic categories that appeal to inferencing and causal reasoning more broadly.\(^{11}\)

The Kratzer/Portner semantics posits an ordering source \(\text{Best}\) which ranks worlds according to how close they are to the stereotypical ideal. Our account encodes that the modal base is partitioned into stereotypical and non-stereotypical worlds, but we dissociate stereotypicality from ranking. This allows us to capture possibility modals as undergoing the initial partition between stereotypical and non-stereotypical worlds without necessary ordering. Ranking in our system is expressed via a meta-evaluation which ranks the two sets of worlds produced by the initial partition.

In the epistemic modal base \(M(i)(t_u)(w_0)\), we define \(\text{Ideal}_S\) as a function over \(M(i)(t_u)(w_0)\), still in the spirit of Portner 2009. The output \(\text{Ideal}_S\) is a subset of \(M(i)(t_u)(w_0)\):

\[
(67) \quad \text{Ideal}_S(M(i)(t_u)(w_0)) = \{w' \in M(i)(t_u)(w_0) : \forall q \in S(w' \in q)\}
\]

So defined, \(\text{Ideal}_S\) delivers the worlds in the epistemic modal base, a subset of \(M(i)\), in which all the propositions in \(S\) are true. \(S\) is a set of propositions that corresponds to common ground norms.\(^{12}\) The set \(\text{Ideal}_S\) is also parametric to time. Unless otherwise stated, we consider that \(\text{Ideal}_S\) is determined at the actual world and at the utterance time (this will be indeed always the case in the reminder of this book). As we can see, there is no ranking.

The overall modal structure looks like this:

\[
(68)
\begin{array}{c}
\text{ModalP} \\
\text{Must} \quad M(i) \\
\text{TP} \\
\end{array}
\]

This structure has the following basic truth condition requiring that \(p\) is true in the Ideal set of \(M(i)\). Tense comes from below (a semantic present or past; see Giannakidou and Mari (2018a) for discussion of tense); recall that \(t_u\) is the utterance time. From now on, we assume that, by default, \(M(i)\) is projected at the time of utterance in the actual world. Given a set \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and the utterance time \(t_u\),

---

\(^{11}\)Stereotypicality appears related to the concept of stereotype studied in social psychology. In psychology, however, stereotypes tend to be beliefs about people’s attributes relying on social norms, whereas in modality stereotypicality is about expectations of outcomes based on what is expected under normal circumstances. Stereotypically therefore functions as a constraint for rational outcomes and is not about building categories.

\(^{12}\)Since only those worlds are considered in which all the propositions in \(S\) are true, the function \(\text{Ideal}_S\) determines a cut-off point.
(69) \([prepi/devere/must (PAST (p))]^{M,i,S}\) is defined only if \(M(i)\) is nonveridical and is partitioned into \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds. If defined, \([prepi/devere/must (PAST (p))]^{M,i,S} = 1\) iff \(\forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S \ : \exists t' \prec t_u \land p(w', t_u)\)

(70) \([prepi/devere/must (PRES (p))]^{M,i,S}\) is defined only if \(M(i)\) is nonveridical and is partitioned into \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds. If defined, \([prepi/devere/must (PRES (p))]^{M,i,S} = 1\) iff \(\forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S \ : p(w', t_u)\)

Echoing Giannakidou and Mari (2016c) and Knobe and Szabo 2013, we can think of \(\text{Ideal}_S\) as the ‘inner’ domain of MUST, and \(M(i)\) as the ‘outer’ domain. The outer domain is a nonveridical epistemic space that does not as a whole support \(p\); but the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) space is veridical: all worlds are \(p\) worlds. In other words, MUST is nonveridical with respect to \(M\), but veridical with respect to \(\text{Ideal}_S\). It is, in other words, both weak and strong. This accounts for why we say that MUST expresses partial commitment: it expresses commitment to \(p\) in the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) subset of \(M(i)\). This makes it stronger than MIGHT, and grants MUST mixed veridicality status. Because of the nonveridical \(M(i)\), MUST satisfies the licensing condition for the subjunctive we posited, and this explains why the complement appears in the subjunctive.

The partition between Ideal and Non-Ideal worlds is not based on ranking of the worlds (as in Portner or Kratzer), but as we show next, the two sets are indeed ranked by a meta-evaluation function. This additional step produces, we argue, positive bias.

### 2.4.3 Positive bias of necessity modals

We will now derive positive bias following the analysis in Giannakidou and Mari (2018b). As we just said, the partition between Ideal and Non-Ideal worlds is not based on ranking; rather, the two sets, i.e., \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\), are ranked according to an ordering source \(O\). It is not uncommon to assume secondary ordering sources (von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008; Rubinstein 2014, Portner and Rubinstein 2016); but given that our initial partitioning into \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds does not depend on ranking, \(O\) is not a secondary ordering. It is the primary ordering source, a ‘meta-evaluation’ that compares \(\text{Ideal}_S\) to its complement in \(M(i)\).

In everyday life, we constantly evaluate whether the actual world follows stereotypical rules. What counts as normal or reasonable outcome depends on one’s knowledge and experience, and human agents make use of expectations relying on knowledge and experience when they reason. Normalcy and reason-
ability manifest themselves as domain restriction with quantifiers, or ignoring exceptions with generic statements, to mention just two well known examples. Of course, actual outcomes do not always conform to what is expected under normalcy conditions, and expectation of not conforming to what it is ‘normal’ determines often our uncertainty (besides not having complete knowledge). We propose the meta-evaluation $\mathcal{O}$ as a way to capture the speaker’s confidence in normalcy effects. $\mathcal{O}$ contains those propositions that allow $i$ to evaluate the relative ranking of stereotypical as better possibilities than non-stereotypical worlds.

Consider the case of John who is invited to a party. He is leaving from Place de la Sorbonne and needs to reach the Louvre. We know that he takes the metro. We also know that usually the metro works well in Paris. Ideal$_S$ creates a partition $M(i)$ in which John arrives on time (these are worlds in which the metro worked well) and worlds in which he does not arrive on time (these are worlds in which the metro breaks down). Now, how likely are the worlds in which John arrives on time in comparison with those in which he does not? Usually, we believe, they are very likely, one of the propositions in $\mathcal{O}$ being ‘I trust the metro system more than the car.’ Stated otherwise, stereotypicality triggers high confidence in (thus more commitment to) one’s conclusion, and this seems to be something basic about the way humans draw conclusions inductively. One will have a tendency to rank the stereotypical worlds as more reliable than the non-stereotypical ones. In this case one would probably utter something like (71-a) or even (71-b).

\[(71)\quad\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{John must be at the Louvre.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{John must definitely be at the Louvre.}
\end{align*}\]

Notice here the co-occurrence of MUST with definitely— an apparent ‘redundancy’, which we revisit in section 6. Higher ranking of stereotypical worlds over non-stereotypical ones is a kind of natural inclination based on human reasoning and the fact that we usually domain restrict, therefore devalue or exclude non-stereotypical cases as perhaps non-relevant.

Sometimes, however, one can evaluate the situation in a different manner. Based on one’s pessimistic personal inclinations, or convinced that public transportation is not as unreliable as expected, one can draw a different conclusion. $\mathcal{O}$ will be different in this case, including ‘I do not trust the metro system.’ In this case, in a language like Italian, one would probably utter something like the following sentence, where the MUST combines with a possibility modal:

\[(72)\quad\begin{align*}
\text{Deve forse essere a la Louvre.} \\
\text{Must maybe be at the Louvre.}
\end{align*}\]

This combination is perfect in Italian, and illustrates that while the dependency between stereotypicality and $\mathcal{O}$ reveals trust in the normalcy conditions, the de-
pendency can be fragile because \( O \) is subjective, and may not rely on shared rules like the initial \( \text{Ideal}_S \) partition. Cases like the above show that \( O \) is a negotiable (Rubinstein, 2014, Portner and Rubinstein 2016) meta-evaluation of how confident \( i \) is about \( \text{Ideal}_S \) being a better possibility than \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \). In this sense, \( O \) can change as more arguments are added in the conversation.

Importantly, languages differ in the negotiability of the meta-evaluation. Languages like Greek disallow occurrence of \( \text{MUST} \) with a possibility adverb.

(73) Prepei malon na ine giatros.
    must probably that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
    He must probably be a doctor.

(74) #Prepei isos na ine giatros.
    must maybe that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
    ‘He must perhaps be a doctor.’

Greek appears to be more rigid that Italian or English in this regard—though it is conceivable that Greek patterns may change over time. (A corpus study could actually shed light). Importantly, lexical items encode whether \( O \) is empty or not, that it is to say, whether stereotypicality triggers ordering or not. \( \text{MUST} \), we claim, lexically encodes a default preference for a non-empty \( O \), but epistemic possibility tends to encode an empty \( O \).

Let us now consider further bias is produced. In our semantics, \( \text{MUST} \) quantifies universally over the \( \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds. In the specific case of the positive assertion, all \( \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds are \( p \) worlds. \( O \), in addition, reveals \( i \) confidence towards the prejacent; it does so indirectly by determining an ordering between the \( \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds where the prejacent is true and \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds. With universal epistemic modals, \( O \) ranks \( \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds as better possibilities (in the sense of Kratzer’s work) than \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \) worlds. We encode this below as positive bias:

(75) Positive bias of epistemic necessity modals.
    \( \text{Ideal}_S \) is a better possibility than \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \), relative to \( M(i) \) and \( O \).

According to (75), there is no \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \) world in \( M(i) \) which is not outranked by an \( \text{Ideal}_S \) world. And since, by the truth condition of \( \text{MUST} \), all ideal worlds are worlds in which the prejacent is true, \( O \) is responsible not just for positive bias towards \( \text{Ideal}_S \), but also towards the prejacent itself. Crucially, (75) states that worlds that are compatible with what the speaker knows in the actual world \( w_0 \) (recall that \( M(i) \) is projected from the actual world) are ideal thus better ranked. This means that, according to the speaker, the actual world is more likely to be a world where the prejacent is true.

We can now build on the connection between weak necessity and better possibility (see Portner 2009:70), we restate (75) as in (76).
Positive bias of epistemic necessity modals (weak necessity).
Ideal$_S$ is weak necessity with respect to $\neg$Ideal$_S$, relative to M(i) and $\mathcal{O}$.

As we noted earlier, authors have generally acknowledged a need to ‘discriminate’ between the two options in the modal base with necessity modals (e.g. Rubinstein 2014, Portner and Rubinstein 2016). Our own implementation proceeds in two steps, determining a partition based on stereotypicality and then evaluating the relative ranking of the two subsets. And recall again that the preference for Ideal$_S$ relies on a (potentially fragile) connection between stereotypicality and confidence of $i$ that the actual world behaves in a stereotypical way.

Existential modals, as we said, are in nonveridical equilibrium which we defined as follows:

(77) **Nonveridical equilibrium** (Giannakidou 2013)
An information state M is in nonveridical equilibrium iff M is partitioned into $p$ and $\neg p$, and there is no bias towards $p$ or $\neg p$.

Nonveridical equilibrium, as can be recalled, conveys the weakest stance to $p$ in merely not excluding the possibility of $p$, which means that the $p$ or $\neg p$ worlds are not evaluated further. Epistemic possibility modals are generally taken to not have ordering sources (although there is variation across types of existential modals, see discussion in Portner 2009). We can thus identify nonveridical equilibrium with an empty $\mathcal{O}$. Section 5 offers more discussion, and in Section 6.2, we see that the default preference can sometimes be overwritten.

Since Ideal$_S$ is the set of worlds in which the prejacent is true, in ranking the Ideal$_S$ worlds as higher as the $\neg$Ideal$_S$, $\mathcal{O}$ reveals $i$’s confidence that the prejacent is true. Recall that MUST does not convey full commitment: its modal base is nonveridical. However, it conveys partial commitment, and the set Ideal$_S$ in which the prejacent is true is ranked as higher by $\mathcal{O}$. In order to successfully convey partial commitment towards the prejacent, the Ideal$_S$ set must be homogeneous and contain only those worlds in which the prejacent is true. Indeed, if the Ideal$_S$ set were not homogeneous, the sentence would convey that the speaker is equally committed towards the prejacent and its negation and the sentence would become uninformative about the speaker’s stance towards the prejacent.

This leads us to formulate the following:

(78) **Homogeneity constraint on Ideal$_S$.**
$\mathcal{O}$ requires that Ideal$_S$ be homogeneous as far as the prejacent of MUST is concerned.

So, $\mathcal{O}$ requires that, by the time it is computed, all Ideal$_S$ worlds are $p$ worlds or that all Ideal$_S$ are $\neg p$ worlds. This constraint is not merely a stipulation. As
just said, if the Idealₜ set contains both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds, this would reveal partial commitment towards both the prejacent and its negation. This situation of triviality is to be avoided, and, as the reader can foresee (and shown further in Section 6), it also proves instrumental when we consider the effect of negation.

It is important to note that when \( S \) is non-empty, the bias will be necessarily positive, and the reader can already anticipate, that, in virtue of using \( O \), the necessity modal will not be able to express negative bias.

2.4.4 Summing up: (Non)veridicality, bias, equilibrium, and commitment

At this point, it is helpful to go back to the ground issues about veridicality and commitment, and show how the key pieces of the analysis we unfolded so far for possibility and necessity come together. The driving idea has been that veridicality and nonveridicality are the criteria for commitment.

Following the literature, we adopted an analysis of epistemic possibility modals as existential quantifiers lacking ordering sources (as opposed to deontic possibility modals may use a circumstantial modal base and a deontic ordering source, Portner 2009). The absence of ordering sources with epistemic possibility renders \( p \) and \( \neg p \) equal possibilities revealing that the assessor is in a state of non-veridical equilibrium which Giannakidou 2013 calls ‘true’ uncertainty (see also Giannakidou and Mari 2016c, 2018b):

\[
\text{Nonveridical equilibrium (Giannakidou 2013)}
\]

An information state \( M \) is in nonveridical equilibrium iff \( M \) is partitioned into \( p \) and \( \neg p \), and there is no bias towards \( p \) or \( \neg p \).

Nonveridical equilibrium conveys the weakest commitment in merely not excluding the possibility of \( p \). Possibility modals and unbiased polar questions (Did Ariadne win the race?) are in nonveridical equilibrium, in a state of balanced indecision where both \( p \) and its negation are equally plausible options and \( i \) has no reason to prefer one over the other. Giannakidou (2013) argues that ‘inquisitive’ and ‘nonveridical’ describe the same state of possibility and questions.

Epistemic necessity, on the other hand, while being nonveridical, is stronger than mere possibility in that it conveys bias towards \( p \). Our analysis of epistemic necessity involves three ingredients: (i) a nonveridical modal base \( M(i) \), (ii) a partition of \( M(i) \) into \( \text{Ideal}ₜ \) and a \( \neg\text{Ideal}ₜ \) subsets, relying on stereotypical assumptions, and (iii) a meta-evaluation \( O \) producing bias towards \( p \) by ranking the \( \text{Ideal}ₜ \) worlds as better possibilities than \( \neg\text{Ideal}ₜ \) worlds in \( M(i) \) (positive bias). The preference for higher ranking of \( \text{Ideal}ₜ \) is lexically specified, and MUST and MIGHT differ in their lexical preferences: both use \( S \), but higher ranking of \( \text{Ideal}ₜ \) is only
2.4. EPISTEMIC NECESSITY: NONVERIDICALITY WITH BIAS

a feature of MUST. This analysis explains why MUST gives off the impression of strength while it remains weak in not entailing \( p \) in the nonveridical modal base.

We can now rank modals along a scale of epistemic commitment and contrast them with the bare sentence which implies a veridical state of knowledge or belief of \( p \). The bare sentence expresses the highest commitment \( i \). Modal verbs produce express weakened commitment to \( p \), as we said. Weakened commitment means that the modal base \( M \) is nonveridical. MUST expresses partial commitment and is therefore stronger than mere possibility which expresses nonveridical equilibrium and trivial commitment. Recall form our earlier discussion:

(80) Veridicality and nonveridicality of modal spaces and commitment

a. A veridical modal space is fully committed: \( \forall w'(w' \in M \rightarrow p(w')) \)

b. A nonveridical modal space is weakly committed: \( \exists w', w'' \in M (w' \neq w'' \land (p(w') \land \neg p(w''))) \)

A nonveridical space is thus epistemically weaker than the homogenous veridical space which entails the prejacent proposition \( p \). Nonveridicality, by creating a partition, weakens the \( M \), therefore also the commitment of \( i \) to \( p \).

Looking now into the contrast between MUST \( p \) and MIGHT \( p \) these two can be ranked: MUST \( p \) is stronger than MIGHT \( p \) because it supports \( p \) in the Ideal worlds, whereas MIGHT is in nonveridical equilibrium.

(81) Scale of commitment and veridicality (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c)

\(<p, \text{MUST } p, \text{MIGHT } p>\); where

i. the veridical \( p \) conveys the strongest full commitment of \( i \) to \( p \); biased MUST \( p \) conveys partial commitment, and nonveridical equilibrium MIGHT \( p \) conveys trivial commitment; and

ii. Order is from strongest to weakest

The categories of equilibrium and bias are central to defining two types of modality, we have been arguing—and are better descriptors than anything else we know of what counts as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ within modality. They key piece is that within the nonveridical stance, individuals can take a weaker (possibility) or a stronger (necessity) position; but the stronger position is at best bias, and never commitment to the prejacent. The correlation between veridicality, nonveridicality and commitment is not exclusive to modals, of course. We offer it as a tool for the understanding and analysis of various other structures that involve subjective truth assessment. In recent work, Liu 2019 proposes the concept of elastic veridicality in her analysis of commitment of \( i \) in conditional sentences, and we think of this work as a promising development.

The degree of commitment, finally, correlates also with how informative the
sentence is. As we said earlier, a veridical state expresses maximal informativity, biased state of MUST expresses medium informativity about \( p \), and equilibrium conveys minimal informativity about \( p \):

\[
\text{(82) Commitment and informativity (Giannakidou and Mari 2016c)}
\]
\[
\langle p \gg MUST p \gg MIGHT p \rangle; \text{ where } \gg \text{ means ‘informationally stronger than’}
\]
Non-modalized \( p \) (speaker knows \( p \), \( p \) added to the common ground) \( \gg \) MUST \( p \) (speaker does not know \( p \), but is biased towards \( p \)) \( \gg \) POSSIBLY \( p \) (speaker does not know \( p \), and there is nonveridical equilibrium)

Only the veridical, e-committed assertion of \( p \) adds \( p \) to the common ground. Introducing a modal does not add \( p \) to the common ground, hence MODAL \( p \) is informationally weaker than \( p \). Bias towards \( p \), in turn, is informationally stronger than nonveridical equilibrium but still does not add \( p \) to the common ground.

Having clarified these core conceptual connections, we can move on now to explore further the interaction of modal verbs and adverbs, and the related property of positive polarity of MUST modals.

### 2.5 Necessity modals and positive polarity

In this section, we will consider the co-occurrence of modal verbs with modal adverbs, and argue that the latter are the realization of \( \mathcal{O} \). The modal structure is follows:

\[
\text{(83) AdverbP}
\]
\[
\mathcal{O}: \text{Modal Adverb} \quad \text{ModaP}
\]
\[
\text{Must} \quad S \quad \text{TP}
\]

We propose that, by default, there is a covert adverb meaning ‘probably’:

\[
\text{(84) } [0]^\mathcal{O,M,i,S} = \lambda q. \text{ Ideal}_S \text{ is a weak necessity with respect to } \neg \text{Ideal}_S \text{ relative to } M(i) \text{ and } \mathcal{O} \& q
\]

The complete lexical entry for MUST is thus the following:
2.5. NECESSITY MODALS AND POSITIVE POLARITY

(85) $[[\emptyset \text{MUST (PRES ($p$))}]^{O,M,i,S}]$ is defined only if the modal base $M(i)$ is nonveridical and it is partitioned into $\text{Ideal}_S$ and $\neg\text{Ideal}_S$ worlds. If defined,

$[[\emptyset \text{MUST (PRES ($p$))}]^{O,M,i,S}] = 1$ iff: $\text{Ideal}_S$ is a weak necessity with respect to $\neg\text{Ideal}_S$ relative to $M(i)$ and $O \& \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : p(w', t_u)$

In Giannakidou and Mari (2018), we motivated the above structure by studying modal spread which also explained the positive polarity behavior of necessity modals.

2.5.1 Modal Spread

Modal spread refers to examples such as the following:

(86) a. John must probably/certainly be sleeping.
    b. John may possibly be a doctor.

Here we see must and may co-occurring with probably/certainly and possibly, respectively. Lyons 1977 talks about ‘harmony’ in these cases— the idea being that there is a concord running through the clause which results in the double realization of a single modality (Lyons 1977: 808; see also Willer 2013), on a par with other cases of concord such as negative concord, person or gender agreement. This observation, namely that there is one modality in these cases, is stable in most of the analyses of the phenomenon (Geurts and Huitink 2006, Huitink 2012, 2014, Grosz 2010, a contrario Anand and Brasoveanu 2010). Syntactically, if we admit one modality in these cases, we are saying that there is no embedding of one modal operator to the other, and the two work together to produce a single modal structure. This situation is distinct from true embeddings:

(87) It may turn out that Ariadne must give her speech this afternoon.

This is a genuine case of must embedded under may; notice also the clause boundary (that). Embedding can also happen within one clause, of course, as in Ariadne may have to give her speech this afternoon. Note that the modals have different flavors as in (87) where we have a necessity modal in the scope of a possibility one.

What is the semantic contribution of the adverb in modal spread? In more philosophical works it has been claimed that "iterating epistemic possibility operators adds no value in the semantics" (Yalcin 2007:994), or "embedding an epistemic modal under another epistemic modal does not in general have any interesting semantic effects" (Willer 2013:12). Though these statements were mostly made for embeddings, they reveal a concord-like perspective where some of mul-
multiple exponents of modality are semantically vacuous (just like, e.g., multiple exponents of negation in negative concord). Huitink (2012) and Moss (2015), on the other hand, argue that the multiple exponents of modality have a semantic role, and Huitink in particular argues that the adverb lexicalizes the ordering source of the modal. Our analysis is similar in acknowledging that the adverb has a semantic role.

In understanding modal spread, it must also be acknowledged that we are not always dealing with concord, and this fact by itself serves as an argument that the use of the adverb is contentful. As we briefly mentioned earlier, modal verbs and adverbs with apparently opposing forces can co-occur with a single modality reading, as (88) shows for Italian dovere co-occurring with forse ‘maybe’.\(^{13}\)

\[(88)\quad \text{Le luci sono accese. Gianni deve forse essere a casa.} \quad \text{The lights are switch-on. Gianni must maybe be at home.}\]

‘The lights are on. John must (#maybe) be at home.’

Below is an attested example (see also Cui 2015 for a corpus study of modal concord). The discussion is about an archeological reconstruction of the town Castel Nuovo, near Naples.

\[(89)\quad \text{Il vaso, che costituisce uno dei premi guadagnati dagli atleti negli agoni panatenaici di Atene, deve forse fare parte del corredo di una sepoltura ubicata non lontano dall’area di Castel Nuovo.} \quad \text{‘The jar, which constitutes one of the prizes earned by the athletes in the pan-athenians olympics of Athens, must maybe belong to the kid of a burial located not far from the area of Castel Nuovo.’}\]

Sentences like these have, to our knowledge, rarely been discussed in the literature (see Moss 2015), and every theory of modal concord would claim that they do not have a single modality reading. We will argue here, however, that they do, and this is why we use the neutral term ‘modal spread’ instead of ‘concord’ (or ‘harmony’). Huitink (2012) states that conditions on the adverbs "really can only be decided on a case to case basis" (Huitink 2012:30), but we aspire to show that there are some general principles that delimit the set of possible interactions.

\(^{13}\)Although very marginally, we also find some attested examples of the combination of epistemic must with maybe in English (see discussion in Lassiter 2014).

\(^{14}\)Source: http://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/ L/IT/IDPagina/1425/UT/systemPrint
Apparent harmonic uses seem to be pervasive in Greek and Italian:

(90) a. Prepi malon/oposdhipote na ine giatros.
    Must probably/definitely that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
    ‘He must probably/definitely be a doctor.’
   b. Deve probabilmente/sicuramente essere un dottore.
    Must.PRES.3sg probably/certainly be a doctor.
    ‘He must probably/definitely be a doctor.’

(91) a. Prepi malon/oposhipote na efije noris.
    must probably/definitely that.SUBJ left.3sg early.
   b. Deve probabilmente/sicuramente essere partito presto.
    Must.PRES.3sg probably/certainly be left early.
    ‘He must have probably/definitely left early.’

We see here the modal adverbs malon/probabilmnte (probably), oposdhopote/certamente (definitely), etc. co-occur with the necessity modals prepi/dovere/must. In Greek and Italian, modal spread is very common and unmarked. We offered combinations with present and past tenses, to illustrate that the phenomenon is tense independent. We find the co-occurrence also with the future, see (92) (Bertinetto 1979, Mari 2009,2010 Giannakidou 2012, Giannakidou and Mari 2012a, 2013):

    Arrive.FUT.3sg certainly/probably at 4.
    ‘John will definitely/probably arrive at 4.’
    the John FUT come.3sg certainly/probably at 4 pm.
    ‘John will definitely/probably arrive at 4.’

In Greek strong adverbs cannot co-occur with possibility bori/may/might. In Italian and English, on the other hand, weak modals can co-occur with strong adverbs just as strong modals can co-occur with weak adverbs:

(93) a. *Bori malon/oposdhipote na efije noris.
    May probably/definitely that.SUBJ left.3sg early.
   b. Può probabilmente essere partito presto.
    Can.PRES.3sg probably/certainly be left early.
    ‘He may have probably/definitely left early.’

(94) a. *Bori malon na ine giatros.
    May probably that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
   b. Può probabilmente essere un dottore.
    May.PRES.3sg probably/certainly be a doctor.
    ‘He may probably be a doctor.’
In Italian, the co-occurrence of existential modality with a strong adverb is not rare. In (95), we can be certain that the existential modal is epistemic insofar as it embeds a stative which cannot be coerced into an eventive giving rise to the abilitative or circumstantial interpretation of potere (might). We also see in the second sentence (‘no matter how the facts were settled’) that the truth is not established and that the first sentence is described as expressing a conjecture. In this attested example, potere combines with probabilmente (probably). Notice a similar combination in English:

(95) ... e a questa circostanza può probabilmente essere dovuto il fatto che egli fosse arrivato al nono compleanno. Comunque stessero le cose, in ogni modo, era il suo nono compleanno. ‘and the fact that he reached his ninth birthday might probably be due to these circumstances. No matter how the facts where settled, in any case, it was his ninth birthday.’

(96) In some cases, however, the psychosis might definitely be due to anxieties and conflicts associated with the pregnancy.

On the other hand, the possibility adverb is grammatical only with possibility modals in Greek, Italian and English.

On the other hand, the possibility adverb is grammatical only with possibility modals in Greek, Italian and English.

(97) a. Bori isos na efi je noris. may maybe that.SUBJ left.3SG early.
    b. Può forse essere partito presto. Can.3sg.pres maybe be left early. ‘He may have possibly left early.’

(98) a. Bori isos na ine giatros. may maybe that.SUBJ be.3SG doctor
    b. Può forse essere un dottore. Can.3SG.PRES maybe be a doctor. ‘He may possibly be a doctor.’

We can summarize the facts above in the following three generalizations:

1. Modal matching appears to be the general case, attested in all three languages (Greek, Italian, English), as well as Dutch (Geurts and Huitink 2006,
2.5. NECESSITY MODALS AND POSITIVE POLARITY

Huitink 2012, 2014), and German (Grosz 2012).

2. Modal spread also allows non-matching. It appears to be a more restricted option, a fact that needs to be explained.

3. Languages are subject to variation with respect to whether they allow non-matching (Italian does, but Greek doesn’t; English shows some of the flexibility of Italian).

We are now ready to address the interaction with negation.

2.5.2 MUST, the adverb, and negation

Recently, the interaction of modal verbs with negation has been rekindled (e.g., Iatridou and Zeijlstra 2013, Rubinstein, 2014, Homer 2015, Zeijlstra to appear). A core observation is that necessity modals such as must scope above negation, but possibility modals scope below:

(99) a. Ariadne must not be a doctor. (= It must be the case that Ariadne is not a doctor).
    b. Ariadne must not eat meat. (Ariadne is a vegetarian).

(100) a. Ariadne cannot be a doctor.
     b. Ariadne cannot talk to Dean.

(101) a. Ariadne doesn’t have to be a doctor (to apply for this job).
     b. Ariadne doesn’t need to spend a lot of money (for Jason’s birthday gift).

The English modal must, in both epistemic and deontic use, is interpreted with scope above negation. Can, on the other hand, takes scope inside negation, on a par with modals such as have to, need. These scope constraints are reminiscent of polarity, and van der Wouden (1994) proposed indeed that need is a negative polarity item (NPI), identifying similar NPI modals in Dutch (hoeven) and German (brauchen). If the necessity need is an NPI, then its counterpart must must be a positive polarity item (PPI), since it escapes the scope of negation.

This basic polarity contrast of English has been reproduced in a number of languages, and though the data are not always exactly parallel (in part depending on what the actual modal verb system is in each language), the general tendency is that a necessity modal which is not an NPI will tend to scope above negation. Below are the relevant data from Greek and Italian:

(102) a. Gianni deve essere malato.
     b. John must be ill.
‘John must be ill.’

b. Gianni non deve essere malato. MUST > NEG
   John not must be ill.
   ‘John must not be ill.’

(103) a. I Ariadne dhen prepi na einai eggyos. MUST > NEG
   the Ariadne not must. that.SUBJ be pregnant.
   ‘Ariadne must not be pregnant (based on what I know).’

b. I Ariadne dhen xreiazete na ine eggyos. NEG > MUST
   the Ariadne not need.3sg that.SUBJ be ill.
   ‘Ariadne need not be pregnant (to be eligible for this leave).’

The question is how we can explain this behavior. Does it follow form the semantics we gave thus far for MUST and the adverb? Our answer is yes, it does. Observe below the truth conditions for MUST (we only consider here the PRES option for simplicity), which contains the default adverbs PROBABLY:

\[
[\text{PROBABLY MUST (PRES (p))}]^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff: Ideal}_S \text{ is a weak necessity with respect to } \neg\text{Ideal}_S \text{ relative to } M(i) \text{ and } O \& \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : p(w', t_u)
\]

MUST presupposes a nonveridical modal base and a non-empty \(O\); it universally quantifies over the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds. When we add negation, we have the truth conditions below:

\[
[\text{PROBABLY MUST NOT (PRES (p))}]^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff: Ideal}_S \text{ is a weak necessity with respect to } \neg\text{Ideal}_S \text{ relative to } M(i) \text{ and } O \& \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : \neg p(w', t_u)
\]

The adverb ranking, which remains intact along with the nonveridicality presupposition, will again rank as higher the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds than the \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) ones. Only now the Ideal worlds will be \(\neg p\) worlds.
In Greek and Italian negation is preverbal, and appears directly preceding the modal verb (Zanuttini 1992, Giannakidou 1998):

(107) AdverbP
     /             \
    Modal Adverb   NegP
          /         \
         Neg        ModalP
             /       \
            Must     M(i)

The adverb appears above negation and can never intervene between negation and the modal:

(108) a. *Dhen malon prepi.
       Not probably must.

b. *Non probabilmente deve.
   Not probably must.

We observe the same distributions for the existential.

(109) a. Isos dhen bori.
       Maybe not can.

b. Forse non può.
   Maybe not can.

(110) a. *Dhen isos bori.
       Not maybe can.

b. *Non forse può.
   Not maybe can.

Hence the adverb must be above the negation syntactically. Crucially, the adverb can never appear lower than negation, even in English, as we noted in Section 1, repeated here:

(111) #Ariadne must not probably/definitely be at home.

Only a metalinguistic negation reading is acceptable here, which is irrelevant. In other words, scoping of modal adverbs under negation seems to be generally prohibited in languages. In English, must precedes negation (must not) anyway, and the constraint on the adverb not scoping low also holds, (111).
Now, what would it mean for the structure to be interpreted with negation scoping between the adverb and the modal verb as given in the apparent surface structure of (107)? The corresponding truth conditions would be as in (112):

\[
\text{[PROBABLY NOT MUST (PRES (p))]}^{O,M,i,S} \text{is defined only if the modal base } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical and it is partitioned into Ideal}_S \text{ and } \neg\text{Ideal}_S \text{ worlds. If defined, }
\]

\[
\text{[PROBABLY NOT MUST (PRES (p))]}^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \iff \text{Ideal}_S \text{ is a weak necessity with respect to } \neg\text{Ideal}_S \text{ relative to } M(i) \text{ and } O \& \neg\forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : p(w', t_u)
\]

The default adverb retains the content that Ideal$_S$ is a weak necessity relative to $O$, but Ideal$_S$ now is targeted by negation and can be non-homogenous. This means that the homogeneity constraint on Ideal$_S$ is not satisfied (recall the constraint in (78)), and this leads to infelicity. To repair the infelicity the negation is interpreted below the modal.

Crucially, the low scope of negation is not a stipulation, but a consequence of the analysis we offered. Recall that in the ranking of the Ideal$_S$ worlds with respect to $\neg$Ideal$_S$, $O$ is intended to capture $i$’s confidence in the truthfulness of the prejacent. In order to successfully establish this comparison between Ideal$_S$ and $\neg$Ideal$_S$ worlds and express confidence towards the prejacent, Ideal$_S$ needs to be homogeneous insofar as the prejacent is concerned. $O$ cannot produce a well-formed ranking if the Ideal$_S$ set is itself partitioned, as this imply confidence in both $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds. The sentence would become uninformative about the speaker’s stance towards $p$. Hence, the positive polarity property of MUST is derived as a result of its semantics that includes the ranking of Ideal$_S$ worlds as better possibilities than $\neg$Ideal$_S$ worlds, which itself forces homogeneity on the Ideal$_S$ set.

As regards NPI-universals like need, hoeven, xreiazete (which are typically deontic), our theory would have to say that they have an empty $O$. That would be a lexical feature of them which sets them apart from epistemic PPI universals. The two necessity modals would thus differ by lexical properties.

### 2.5.3 Existential epistemic modality: nonveridical equilibrium

Our analysis of epistemic possibility modals treats them as existential quantifiers lacking ordering sources. The absence of ordering sources renders $p$ and $\neg p$ equal possibilities revealing that the assessor is in a state of indecision, or as we said, ‘true’ uncertainty. We call this nonveridical equilibrium, and rephrase it in the following way:

\[
\text{Nonveridical equilibrium revisited}
\]
2.5. **NECESSITY MODALS AND POSITIVE POLARITY**

A partitioned space \( M(i) \) is in nonveridical equilibrium if the ordering \( O \) is empty.

Nonveridical equilibrium implies that \( \text{Ideal}_S \) and \( \neg \text{Ideal}_S \) are not compared to one another; \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are equal possibilities, none is privileged over the other. Recall that, in addition to possibility modals, information questions are also in nonveridical equilibrium. We take equilibrium to be the default for epistemic possibility—though this may be subject to variation.

We assume, as before, that a silent adverb, this time MAYBE, hosts the default preference for equilibrium of \( \text{bori/potere/might} \):

\[
[0 \text{ MIGHT (PRES } (p))^{O,M,i,S} \text{ is defined only if } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical and partitioned into } \text{Ideal}_S \text{ and } \neg \text{Ideal}_S \text{ worlds. If defined,} \\
[0 \text{ MIGHT (PRES } (p))^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } O \text{ is empty } \& \text{ } \exists w' \in M(i)p(w', t_u)
\]

\[
[0 \text{ MIGHT (PAST } (p))^{O,M,i,S} \text{ is defined only if } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical and partitioned into } \text{Ideal}_S \text{ and } \neg \text{Ideal}_S \text{ worlds. If defined,} \\
[0 \text{ MIGHT (PAST } (p))^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } O \text{ is empty } \& \text{ } \exists w' \in M(i)\exists t' < t_u \wedge p(w', t')
\]

The covert adverb adds the presupposition that \( O \) is empty. The existential quantifier operates on the entire modal base \( M(i) \) and not on one of the subsets created by \( S \) (and \( \text{Ideal}_S \) in particular). This amounts to stating that the quantifier unrestricted, i.e., blind to stereotypicality conditions, as it typical for existential quantifiers also in the nominal domain. Note also that there might be \( p \) worlds which are not in the set \( \text{Ideal}_S \). Stereotypicality conditions, however, as we will show, might in some cases trigger a non-empty \( O \) for possibility in some languages.

Just as the presence of stereotypicality conditions with universal modals triggers positive bias (i.e., higher ranking of the \( \text{Ideal}_S \) over non-\( \text{Ideal}_S \)), the absence of stereotypicality conditions with existential modal does not produce any ranking. In virtue of this, the most straightforward combination which we find in all languages is \( \text{MAYBE + MIGHT} \).

\[
(116) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. Bori isos na efije noris.} & \quad \text{may maybe that.SUBJ left.3sg early} \\
\text{b. Può forse essere partito presto.} & \quad \text{Can.3sg.pres may be left early. 'He may have possibly left early.'}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
(117) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. Bori isos na ine giatros.} & \quad \text{may maybe that.SUBJ be.3SG doctor.}
\end{align*}
\]
b. Può forse essere un dottore.
   ‘He may possibly be a doctor.’

When we add MAYBE (possibly, maybe, perhaps, and their crosslinguistic equivalents) we obtain (119)-(118). The combination maintains the default, which now is nonveridical equilibrium. With possibility modals, MAYBE has no effect on the equilibrium, since it does not provide ranking. For any proposition \( p \) and the utterance time \( t_u \),

\[
\begin{align*}
[\text{MAYBE MIGHT (PRES } (p)\text{)}]^{O,M,i,S} & \text{ is defined only if } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical and is partitioned into Ideal}_S \text{ and } -\text{Ideal}_S \text{ worlds. If defined, } [\text{MAYBE MIGHT (PRES } (p)\text{)}]^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \iff O \text{ is empty } \& \exists w' \in M(i)p(w', t_u) \\
[\text{MAYBE MIGHT (PAST } (p)\text{)}]^{O,M,i,S} & \text{ is defined only if } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical and is partitioned into Ideal}_S \text{ and } -\text{Ideal}_S \text{ worlds. If defined, } [\text{MAYBE MIGHT (PAST } (p)\text{)}]^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \iff O \text{ is empty } \& \exists w' \in M(i)\exists t' < t_u \land p(w', t')
\end{align*}
\]

Possibility modals are not forced to scope above negation; nonveridical equilibrium is compatible with both scopes. Empirically, possibility modals tend to scope below negation crosslinguistically. In *John cannot be at home*, the possibility is denied that John is at home.

The reason for this preference, we want to suggest, seems to be that low scope with negation appears to be the general case with all kinds of existentials: *Ariadne didn’t see any student/ a student/ one student* all scope below negation. If this is a general tendency of existential quantifiers, possibility modals simply follow this systemic pattern. (There do appear to be PPI existentials like *some*— *Ariadne didn’t see SOME student*— but note that this use is marked; Giannakidou 2011)). It is an open question whether PPI possibility modals can be found in languages. Our analysis predicts, in any case, both scopes.

### 2.5.4 Manipulations of \( O \) by the adverbs

We have up to here built our theory on the assumption that the adverbs are in harmony with the modal verbs. Researchers, as we said earlier, indeed talk about ‘harmony’ or ‘modal concord’.\(^{18}\) Yet some languages allow combinations of opposing forces. We did note earlier that Italian and English are more flexible than Greek, and here we will consider some more cases. Let us begin with MUST.

\(^{18}\)On a different analysis of the adverbs as contributing at a non-at-issue level, see Mayol and Castroviejo, 2013 and Giannakidou and Mari 2017. See Giannakidou and Mari 2018a for a criticism.
languages allow strengthening of the bias from ‘probably’ to ‘definitely’. In this case, the bias of weak necessity is strengthen to necessity:

\[(120)\]

a. Prepi malon/oposdhipote na ine giatros.
   must probably/definitely that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
   ‘He must probably/definitely be a doctor.’

b. Deve probabilmente/sicuramente essere un dottore.
   must probably/certainly be a doctor.
   ‘He must probably/definitely be a doctor.’

\[(121)\]

[DEFINITELY MUST (PRES \(p\))]^{O,M,i,S}_\\ is defined only if the modal base \(M(i)\) is nonveridical and it is partitioned into \(\text{Ideal}_S\) and \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds. If defined,

[DEFINITELY MUST (PRES \(p\))]^{O,M,i,S}_\\ = 1 iff: \(\text{Ideal}_S\) is a necessity with respect to \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) relative to \(M(i)\) and \(O \land \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : p(w', t_w)\)

This combination reveals that the speaker is very highly biased towards \(p\). Note, however, that, no matter how strong the bias is, it remains a commitment within a subset in the modal base, and it is now equivalent to knowledge of \(p\), since the modal base is veridical.

Consider now opposing forces for the adverb and the modal verb in Italian and English. Here below, we see the combination of MUST and a weak adverb.

\[(122)\]

Il vaso, che costituisce uno dei premi guadagnati dagli atleti negli agoni panatenaici di Atene, deve forse fare parte del corredo di una sepoltura ubicata non lontano dall’area di Castel Nuovo.

‘The jar, which constitutes one of the prizes earned by the athletes in the pan-athenians olympics of Athens, must maybe belong to the kid of a burial located not far from the area of Castel Nuovo.\(^{19}\),

\[(123)\]

So there must perhpas be some glitch somewhere along the line or something that makes this happen. I am sure is a cache or technical glitchup.\(^{20}\)

Recall that opposing forces are impossible in Greek.

\[(124)\]

#Prepi isos na ine giatros.
   must maybe that.SUBJ be.3sg doctor.
   ‘He must probably/definitely be a doctor.’

\(^{19}\)Source: http://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/1425/UT/systemPrint

\(^{20}\)Source: https://www.blackhatworld.com/seo/ogads-com-mobile-cpa-cpi-incent-network-mobile-content-locker-high-cr.704909/page-26. We thank Paul Portner for pointing this to us.
In Italian and English, then, the adverb can be used to weaken the default bias. We get the following interpretations:

\[(\text{MAYBE MUST (PAST } (p)\text{)})^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } O \text{ is empty } \& \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : \exists t' < t_u \& p(w', t')\]

The manipulation is that now, because \(O\) is empty, there is no ranking of the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) worlds over the \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) ones. This is, then, a weaker MUST than the one with PROBABLY, and the effect is due entirely to the manipulation by the adverb. When a weak adverb combines with a strong modal, the bias of the modal is weakened, reduced to no ranking.

Conversely, Italian and English allow strengthening the default with existential epistemic modals. Once again, Greek is a strict language that forbids this combination.

\[(\text{PROBABLY MIGHT (PAST } (p)\text{)})^{O,M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } \text{Ideal}_S \text{ is a weak necessity with respect to } \neg\text{Ideal}_S \text{ relative to } M(i) \text{ and } O \& \exists w' \in M(i) \exists t' < t_u \& p(w', t')\]

The adverb PROBABLY ranks now the \(\text{Ideal}_S\) set over the \(\neg\text{Ideal}_S\) set, but quantification is over \(M(i)\). This creates a strengthened MIGHT, combining the ex-
pected hesitation of the speaker about the truthfulness of \( p \) (given that a possibility modal is used), with an ordering of the \( p \) possibility as better. This is a strengthening that overrides the equilibrium. For this reason, such uses are generally discouraged, but as we see are not impossible. As a general tendency, the combinations of different forces will be dispreferred because they go against the natural inclinations of the modals and the adverbs. But as we showed, manipulations are possible—a fact that supports our idea that ranking is independent of the modal verb itself.

Note, finally, that the partition between \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds in the modal base and the partition between Ideal \( S \) and \( \neg \text{Ideal} S \) worlds are orthogonal. The \( \neg \text{Ideal} S \) sets are ranked as higher, however, it is not guaranteed that quantification happens over the worlds in the Ideal \( S \) set.

## 2.6 Conclusion: nonveridicality, modalization and bias

In this chapter, we developed a theory where the logical properties of veridicality and nonveridicality serve as the foundation for modeling the commitment of individual anchors \( i \) to the truth of a proposition \( p \). We made the following central distinctions:

1. When the speaker \( i \) makes the choice to use a modal expression, she decides to take a nonveridical stance towards a proposition. A nonveridical stance means that \( i \) cannot be fully committed to \( p \) because \( i \) lacks evidence to support knowledge of \( p \). We proposed the Nonveridicality Axiom, i.e., a presupposition that the modal bases allow both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds as open possibilities. Nonveridicality imbues the modal base with uncertainty.

2. Veridicality and non-veridicality characterize information states of individual anchors that are homogenous (veridical) or non-homogenous (non-veridical). The veridical state is the basis for full commitment, and a prerequisite for assertion.

3. Possibility modals express nonveridical equilibrium: \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are equal options in the modal base, and the speaker has no reason to prefer one over the other. Questions are also in nonveridical equilibrium (and this is why possibility modals, but not necessity ones, are good in questions, Giannakidou and Mari 2019).

4. The illusion of strength with necessity modals comes from the fact that necessity modals come with non-empty meta-evaluation \( O \), which produces
positive bias, namely that the Ideal worlds are better possibilities than the non-Ideal ones.

5. The categories of equilibrium and bias are central to defining two types of modality, and are better descriptors of what counts as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ within modality. Within the nonveridical stance, individuals can take a weaker (possibility) or a stronger (necessity) position; but the stronger position is at best bias, and never commitment to the prejacent.

6. The use of subjunctive with modal verbs supports the generalization that the subjunctive is sensitive to the nonveridical presupposition.

The correlation between veridicality, nonveridicality and commitment is not exclusive to modals, of course. We offer it as a tool for the understanding and analysis of various other structures that involve subjective truth assessment. We will demonstrate how this system works and how far it can reach in the rest of this book.
Chapter 3

Mood and tense in complement clauses

Our goal in this chapter is to offer a thorough analysis of the interaction between mood and tense morphemes in complement clauses. There is a three-way correlation between the higher propositional attitude verb, the mood exponent, and the embedded tense. The choice of mood correlates not with finiteness, but with a choice of embedded tense: the indicative complement, specifically, is incompatible with NONPAST, but the subjunctive of volitional and directive verbs requires it. NONPAST, and not the subjunctive or future, is responsible for future orientation. We articulated explicit syntax-semantics compositions to illustrate how the anaphoric (NONPAST), or independent (past, present) tense of the embedded tense are derived in Greek and Italian.

The tense of future orientation is the NONPAST (Giannakidou 2009, Giannakidou and Mari 2016c, 2018a), and it is the dependent tense that we find with future oriented subjunctive clauses. Key to understanding the dependent property of NONPAST is the fact that this tense needs to be anchored to the utterance time. We propose a Now-anchoring rule that is operative also in the bare infinitive in English. Our claim will be further that in languages lacking productive morphological mood, the verbal correlate of mood is tense. The apparent finiteness distinction in English and other Germanic languages distorts this correlation.

3.1 Greek subjunctive in main and embedded clauses

Typologically, we find morphological distinctions such as indicative, subjunctive, optative, imperative, conditional mood; of these, only the former two appear in complement clauses. Greek, recall, has imperative, as well as an optative particle as, both only appearing in main clauses. The subjunctive particle na also appears
in main clauses:

(1) a. Na/ As fiji/ efevge o Janis.  
    SUBJ/ OPT leave.NONPAST.3sg/ PAST.3sg the John.  
    John may go/Let John go.  
    John could have left.  

b. Thelo na/*as fiji o Janis.  
    I want that.SUBJ/ OPT leave.NONPAST.3sg/ PAST.3sg the  
    John.  
    John may go/Let John go.  
    John could have left.  

(2) a. Fige Jani!.  
    leave.imperative.2sg/ John.  
    John, go!  

b. *Thelo fige Jani!  
    want.1sg leave.imperative.2sg/ John.  
    * I want John, go!  

In main clauses, the subjunctive na appears equivalent to as and the imperative in producing permissions, requests, or wishes. Giannakidou and Staraki (2017) call the main clause subjunctives ‘hybrid’ imperatives. It is often assumed that, as in the case of the imperatives, there is an illocutionary force operator in C in main clauses. The subjunctive particle na can then be argued to move to this position, again as the imperative morpheme has been argued to do (Rivero and Terzi 1994, Giannakidou 1997, 1998). One can also hypothesize that the subjunctive remains in Mood phrase and that it behaves as a possibility modal—a position that receives support from the fact that na itself appears with other illocutionary forces, e.g. in questions, as we have mentioned in chapter 1. In this case, the subjunctive is equivalent to a possibility modal:

(3) Pjos na kerdise?  
    who that.SUBJ win.PERF.PAST.3sg  
    ‘Who might have won?’  

Here we have a question, and the presence of the subjunctive particle does not turn the question into a command or a wish. It must then be understood that na does not have illocutionary force by itself, but appears in the scope of other forces. We schematize this discussion below:
3.1. GREEK SUBJUNCTIVE IN MAIN AND EMBEDDED CLAUSES

In a main *na* permission or request, we can either assume that there is a covert imperative operator in C, or that *na* denotes a deontic modal. The hybrid imperative cases are interesting as they allow a modal analysis of what appears to have an imperative force, therefore supporting approaches to imperatives such as Kaufmann 2012 who treats the imperative itself as a deontic modal (of necessity). Unlike Kaufmann, the default force of deontic *na* appears to be possibility, as can be seen in questions. *Na* also appears with modal adverbs of possibility, but not necessity (Giannakidou 2012, 2016c):

\[ (5) \]
\[
\begin{align*}
a &\text{ Isos na efije o Janis.} \\
&\text{maybe that.SUBJ leave.PAST.3sg the John.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{‘Maybe John left.’}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
b &\text{ *Mallon na efije o Janis.} \\
&\text{probably that.SUBJ leave.PAST.3sg the John.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{‘#Probably John might have left.’}
\]

*Na* is therefore a possibility modal, as Giannakidou has argued. And in that use, it combine with both past and non-past:

\[ (6) \]
\[
\left[ [\text{Na}_{\text{main}} (\text{PRES} (p))]^{M,i,S} \text{ is true iff } \exists w' \in M(i) : p(w', t_u) \right]
\]

\[ (7) \]
\[
\left[ [\text{Na}_{\text{main}} (\text{PAST} (p))]^{M,i,S} \text{ is true iff } \exists w' \in M(i) : \exists t' < t_u \land p(w', t') \right]
\]

In the context of our theory in chapter 2, the subjunctive *na* indeed appears to be the modal head, with the modal adverb of possibility appearing in the meta-evaluation position O. A necessity modal is at odds with *na* because in Greek we only have agreement patterns, i.e. the modality needs to be matched, as we illustrated in chapter 2. Hence, though a particle, the Greek subjunctive behaves on a par with a modal verb in main clauses. Crucially, when co-occurring with modal adverbs, Greek *na* cannot be argued to be higher than Mood, obviously. In embedded clauses, on the other hand, *na* has a life as a subordinator, and for this reason it is often characterized as a complementizer.

The syntactic characterization of the Greek mood particles in embedded clauses has been the subject of study in many works since the early 90s. The main question has been: are the Greek particles Mood exponents or complementizers? Clearly, *na* is the realization of Mood, as we argued (heading MoodP; we follow Philippaki-Warburton 1994, 1998, Philippaki-Warburton and Veloudis 1984,
Another approach claims that *na* is a complementizer C (Agouraki 1991, Tsoulas 1993, and Roussou 2000, who uses an extended C-domain in the spirit of Rizzi 1997). Giannakidou (2009) offers detailed discussion of both approaches, and concludes that *na* is a Mood head that moves to C in embedded clauses because it is also a subordinator, hence the tree looks as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Embedded CP} & \\
C: na/oti/pos/pu & \text{MoodP} \\
& \text{V+Mood morpheme}
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, in embedded clauses, the mood particles—both subjunctive and indicative—are subordinators, and this explains why in embedding there is no meaning contribution. *Na* is both a subordinator and a modal, in main clauses; *oti*, on the other hand, is only a subordinator, just like *that* and cannot be used in main clauses. The same holds for *pu*.

Here we will take the above structure as the point of departure for both Greek and Italian. Giannakidou (1998, 2009) considers also cases where *na* appears under an actual subordinator, e.g. in relative clauses mentioned in chapter 1, with temporal connectives (*prin na, xoris na* ’before’, ’without’), and in purpose clauses:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I Ariadne irthe gia na mas di.} & \\
\text{the Ariadne came.3sg for that.SUBJ us see.3sg.} & \\
\text{‘Ariadne came in order to see us.’}
\end{align*}
\]

When *na* appears with complementizers it seems reasonable to treat it as composing with these; *na* is, after all, a clitic. For Italian, we can adopt Bauanaz’s (2015) and Todorovich’s (2012) position that, despite the fact that we have no lexically distinct complementizers, there are nevertheless different: a subjunctive *que* that appears with nonpast, and an indicative one that appears with present and past. In these analyses, the subjunctive correlates with tense, in a way that we will make precise below. In main clause, as we said, *na* itself functions as an epistemic modal, but in embedding there is no evidence that it adds modality to the embedded clause.

What becomes immediately clear by looking at the morphological exponents of mood in Greek and Romance languages is that mood affects three positions in the embedded clause: the Mood/verb (Latin, Romance languages, Ancient Greek), the subordinator C (Modern Greek, Balkan languages, including Romanian which
is a Romance language), and the embedded tense. Following Giannakidou (2009, 2016), we will show that in Greek there is a strong correlation: the subjunctive combines typically with a nonpast and has future orientation, whereas the indicative is freer, i.e., it combines with past and present, or with future. Yet the nonpast is never compatible with the indicative in Greek and Italian.

Let us proceed now to examine in more detail the correlation between mood and embedded tense. In doing so, we will revisit some of the selection patterns and identify the main propositional attitude classes that are relevant for mood choice. In order to understand the role of tense, we give first some necessary background on tense and aspect in Greek.

### 3.2 Morphological and semantic tenses in Greek

Tense and aspect are always reflected morphologically on the Greek verb. The grammars (Holton et al. 2007) describe the morphological opposition between past and non-past, and the aspectual distinction is perfective vs. imperfective. The morphological combinations create three semantic tenses (Giannakidou 2009, 2014): a present (PRES), a past (PAST), and a NON-PAST, which is the tense used for prediction and future orientation. In our discussion in this book, the uppercase names of tenses will refer to the semantic tenses, and the lower case to the morphological forms.

We start with the morphological non-pasts. Consider first the imperfective nonpast.

(10) graf-o. (Greek imperfective nonpast: creates write.IMPFV NONPAST.1sg.

PRES)

‘I am writing (right now).’
‘Write’ (generally).

The morphological imperfective nonpast is semantically the present tense (PRES) in Greek (Giannakidou 2014), comparable to English present progressive. The Greek form also has a generic, habitual reading because of imperfective aspect. The combination of these two readings is very common with imperfective forms crosslinguistically.

The perfective nonpast is a dependent form, ungrammatical by itself as indicated. It does not occur on its own, it needs the subjunctive, future, and conditional particles to be grammatical.
The perfective nonpast has no English equivalent, and it is in fact quite rare to find grammatical perfective non-pasts in languages (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997). Romance languages certainly do not exhibit a morphological perfective non-past, and retain the aspectual distinction only in the past paradigm. Holton et al. (1997) and Giannakidou (2009) call this form the verbal dependent. This is the form used for prediction and future orientation, in combination with modal particles including the future (FUT), the subjunctive and optative.

We analyze this form as a semantic NONPAST in the next subsection. NONPAST is also the tense of the infinitive, as we illustrate with Italian. We also claim that this is the tense of the infinitive in English. In Russian and other Slavic languages morphological perfective nonpasts are able to future-shift on their own, unlike the Greek form (see e.g., Bulatovic 2002 for Serbian). This suggests to us that these forms lexicalize as semantic futures and not NONPAST.

The past is marked typically in Greek with the presence of the augment -ε-, and we have again two options, perfective and imperfective. The imperfective past is the equivalent of preterite in Romance languages. The preterite is a combination of a semantic past plus habitual or progressive aspect, both typical readings with this morphological form:

The perfective past, on the other hand, is called the aorist and denotes a single (usually completed) event in the past. It is interpreted as a default simple past in English:

This form is a simple semantic PAST. Giannakidou (2004) offers discussion of why this form is not telic, but tends to be—as a form of implicature, perhaps,
since the perfective past instead of the imperfective is used.

For future, Greek has the modal particle *tha* that we are by now familiar with. Italian has a future tense. They both combine with all of the above tenses. Notice first the combinations of FUT with the PRES (imperfective nonpast in Greek, gerund plus stative in Italian):

\[(15) \quad \text{a. I Ariadne tha troi tora. (Greek)} \]
\[
\text{the Ariadne FUT eat.IMPF.NONPAST.3sg now.} \\
\text{‘Ariadne must be eating now.’} \\
\text{b. Giacomo ora starà mangiando. (Italian)} \\
\text{Giacomo now be.FUT.3sg eat.GERUND.} \\
\text{‘Giacomo must be eating now.’} \\
\]

As shown above, FUT plus PRES does not have a predictive reading, and is equivalent to an epistemic MUST modal statement. In Italian, as we discussed in Giannakidou and Mari (2018a), Aktionsart plays the role that aspect plays in Greek. (The role of Aktionsart in connection with modal interpretation has been studied across languages and categories, see Condoravdi 2002; Laca 2008; Copley 2009; Mari 2015a,b,2018a). Combinations of FUT with a lower PAST (an aorist in Greek), also receive epistemic non-predictive readings:

\[(16) \quad \text{a. I Ariadne tha itan arrosti xthes (ji’afto dhen irthe).} \\
\text{the Ariadne FUT be.PAST.3sg ill yesterday (for-this not come).} \\
\text{‘Ariadne must/#will have been ill yesterday (that’s why she didn’t come).’} \\
\text{b. Giovanni sarà stato malato ieri (per questo non è venuto).} \\
\text{Giovanni now be.FUT.3sg been ill yesterday (for this not has come).} \\
\text{‘Giovanni must/#will have been ill yesterday (that why he didn’t come).’} \\
\]

\[(17) \quad \text{a. I Ariadne tha eige xthes. (Greek)} \]
\[
\text{the Ariadne FUT leave.PERF.PAST.3sg yesterday.} \\
\text{‘Ariadne must have left yesterday.’} \\
\text{b. Gianni avrà parlato ieri. (Italian)} \\
\text{Gianni have.FUT.3sg spoken yesterday.} \\
\text{‘Gianni must/#will have spoken yesterday.’} \\
\]

Pietrandrea (2005), Mari (2009) and Giannakidou and Mari (2018a) call these ‘epistemic futures’. (Note that English *will* does not combine with the past; for
differences between Greek/Italian FUT and will see Mari, 2015b,2018; Giannakidou and Mari 2018b; French future is similar to will Mari, 2015b,2018).¹ These uses, crucially, are quite common and do not feel in any way marked or exceptional. The readings are equivalent to the combinations of MUST with the exactly the same tense combinations:

(18) a. I Ariadne prepei na itan arrosti xthes
    the Ariadne must that.SUBJ be.PAST.3sg ill yesterday
    (ji’afto dhen irthe).
    (for-this not came.PERF.PAST.3sg.
    Ariadne must have been ill yesterday (that’s why she didn’t come).
    b. Giovanni deve essere stato malato ieri (per questo
    Giovanni be.FUT.3sg be been ill yesterday (for this non venuto).
    not come).
    Giovanni must/#will have been ill yesterday (that why he didn’t come).

(19) a. I Ariadne prepei na efige xthes.
    the Ariadne must that.SUBJ leave.PERF.PAST.3sg yesterday.
    ‘Ariadne must have left yesterday.’
    b. Gianni avrà parlato ieri.
    Gianni have.FUT.3sg spoken yesterday.
    ‘Gianni must/#will have spoken yesterday.’

For the sake of completeness, consider that with PAST, we do not obtain a future of a past reading in either language (Giannakidou and Mari 2018a). To obtain a future of a past, Italian uses the conditional (Mari, 2015d), and Greek the imperfective past (Giannakidou 2012:21):

(20) Gianni sarebbe arrivato più tardi.
    Gianni be.COND.3sg arrived more late.
    ‘Gianni would arrive later.’

(21) I Ariadne tha efevge argotera.
    the Ariadne FUT leave.IMPF.PAST.3sg later.
    ‘Ariadne would leave later.’

_Tha_ plus imperfective past is argued to be the Greek equivalent to conditional mood (Iatridou 2000, Giannakidou 2012), a position that we adopt here.

Before we move on, let us remind the reader that the perfective nonpast is the

¹See Tasmowski and Dendale, 1998; Dendale, 2001; de Saussure et Morency, 2011 on the differences between French MUST and FUT.
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form used in embedded subjunctive clauses:

(22) Thelo na ftasi noris o Janis.
     I-want that.SUBJ arrive.PERF.NONPAST.3sg early the John.
     ‘I want John to arrive early.’

(23) Bori na ftasi noris o Janis.
     maybe that.SUBJ arrive.PERF.NONPAST.3sg early the John.
     ‘John might arrive early.’

As can be seen, temporal reference shifts to the future. On the other hand, the
perfective nonpast never occurs with indicative oti:

(24) *Pistevo/ksero oti ftasi noris o Janis.
     I-believe/know that.IND arrive.PERF.NONPAST.3sg early the John.
     ‘I believe John to arrive early’./ ‘I know John to arrive early.’

(25) *Pistevo/ksero oti ptani noris o Janis.
     I-believe/know that.IND arrive.PERF.NONPAST.3sg early the John.
     ‘I believe John to arrive early./ I know that John arrives early.’

Hence, we have a robust correlation between the NONPASTand the subjunctive,
on the one hand, and the indicative and PAST, PRES on the other. The correlation
is harder to see in English, but very easy to see in Greek. Recall that the PRES
and PAST are the veridical tenses:

(26) Veridicality of temporal operators.
    Let $F$ be temporal function, $t$ an instant or an interval.
    $F$ is veridical iff $Fp$ at a time $t$ entails that $p$ is true at a (contextually
given ) time $t' \leq t$; otherwise $F$ is nonveridical. (Giannakidou 2002:23)

    PAST/Yesterday are veridical because (PAST/Yesterday ($p$)) at $t_u$ entails that
    $p$ was true at a time $t' \leq t$. Likewise, PRES/Right now is veridical because
    (PRES/Right now ($p$)) at $t_u$ entails that $p$ is true at $t_u$. The future (FUT) and
    NONPAST, however, are nonveridical because: FUT/tomorrow ($p$)) at $t_u$ does not
    entail that $p$ is true at $t_u$ or a time $t' \leq t$; likewise, as we will see next, for the
    NONPAST. Temporal veridicality is objective veridicality anchored to $t_u$, and we
discuss next the centrality of $t_u$ in the interpretation of NONPAST.

    As in our earlier work, we will assume that the morphological tense and aspect
combinations map onto semantic tenses PRES (imperfective nonpast), PAST (per-
fective past) and NON-PAST (perfective non-past), designated with upper case.
The imperfective past is a compositional combination of PAST and PROGRES-
SIVE or GEN (Giannakidou 2009). The syntax we adopt for Mood and Tense,
following Giannakidou (2009), is the following:
The modal and temporal information are dissociated in the Greek clause. The tensed verb appears in T. Modal particles are heads above TP in what we can call Modal particle P, or MoodP, as we have been calling this position so far. We assume that the differentiation of tense and modality is true also for Italian, and holds perhaps even universally. In any case, the transparency of modality and tense in the Greek clause allows us to see the clear contribution of each component, and the interaction between mood/modal particle and tense.

### 3.3 The semantic NONPAST: future orientation

In Greek, the modal particle is separated from the tense system as we saw, and appears above the tensed verb (TP). The first key observation is that the indicative particles are incompatible with perfective nonpast. Recall:

(28) Thelo na kerdisi o Janis.
    want.1sg that.IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.
    ‘I want John to win.’

(29) *O Pavlos kseri oti kerdisi i Roxani.
    the Paul knows-3sg that.IND win.NONPAST.3sg the Roxani.
    ‘Paul knows that Roxanne left.’

(30) *O Pavlos lipate pu kerdisi i Roxani.
    the Paul is-sad-3sg that.IND win.NONPAST.3sg the Roxani.
    ‘Paul regrets that Roxanne left.’

The incompatibility of the perfective nonpast with the indicative mood particles suggests a correlation between mood and embedded tense—and both correlating with (non)veridicality. The past and present tenses, as we said in chapter 2, are veridical, but the future is nonveridical (objectively, i.e., metaphysically, as well as epistemically; Giannakidou and Mari 2018a). This correlation maps directly onto the mood distinction, and appears also in non-complement clauses, as shown below with the temporal connective BEFORE prin:

---

2Similar patterns are found in typologically unrelated languages such as Gitksan with prospec-tive aspect under a modal (Matthewson 2012), and Hindi (Kush 2011), where the mood is also dissociated from tense.
3.3. THE SEMANTIC NONPAST: FUTURE ORIENTATION

(31) O Nicholas irthe prin (na) figi the Nicholas came.3sg before (that.SUBJ) leave.PERF.NONPAST.3sg o John.
the John.
‘Nicholas came before John left.’

(32) *O Nicholas irthe prin efige o Janis.
the Nicholas came.3sg before leave.PERF.PAST.3sg the John.
‘Nicholas came before John left.’

Giannakidou and Zwarts (1999) were the first to discuss this basic property of Greek BEFORE in selecting the perfective nonpast as well as, optionally, the subjunctive (see also Xherija 2015 for more recent discussion and corroborating data from Albanian). Given that the prin ‘before’ clause is nonveridical (Sanchez-Vanencia et al. 1993) and denotes a relative future with respect to the main clause, the use of nonpast generalizes as a nonveridical tense. The perfective nonpast is also used with the conditional an and the temporal otan ’when’, always producing for future orientation (see Giannakidou 2009 for details):

(33) An figi o Janis, tha
if leave.PERF.NONPAST.3sg the John, FUT
figoume ki emeis.
leave.PERF.NONPAST.1pl and we.
‘If John leaves, we will leave too.’

(34) Otan figi o Janis, tha
when leave.PERF.NONPAST.3sg the John, FUT
figoume ki emeis.
leave.PERF.NONPAST.1pl and we
‘When John leaves, we will leave too.’

(35) Otan efige o Janis, figame ki emeis.
when left.3sg the John, left.1pl and we
‘When John left, we left too.’

The perfective nonpast is responsible for the prospective orientation consistently in all cases. Giannakidou 2009 derives this property by arguing that the morphological perfective nonpast denotes a semantic NONPAST:

(36) Morphological perfective nonpast in Greek denotes NON-PAST (Giannakidou 2009):

\[ [\text{NON-PAST}] = \lambda P \lambda t \lambda w (P(t, \infty)(w)) \]

(Following standard practice, we use "(" in the left interval to show that \( t \) is ex-
cluded from the interval, hence \( P \) will be true at a time later than \( t \). NON-PAST introduces a prospective interval, like Abusch’s 2004 WOLL, a work Giannakidou draws on; but unlike WOLL and other morphological non-pasts that can forward shift by default, the left boundary \( t \) of the Greek NON-PAST is dependent variable, like the variable many NPIs have, i.e., in need of binding. This means, Giannakidou argues, that the NON-PAST is a temporal polarity item, and needs to be licensed. Licensing here means that \( t \) must be identified with \( t_u \). Hence \( n \) needs to be introduced in the syntax. The modal particles occupy the higher structure, and because they all have \( t_u \) as a parameter of evaluation (as we saw modal operators do in chapter 2), they satisfy the licensing requirement and supply \( t_u \).

Licensing of NONPAST requires anchoring to \( t_u \), and following Giannakidou and Mari (2018a), we will call it Now-anchoring. How is Now-anchoring done? There are two possible implementations. One way is to say that the modal particle actually adds \( t_u \) in the syntax, as suggested by Giannakidou (2009). If we take that view, then we must concede that \( t_u \) is added also by the other particles that appear in MOD, namely the subjunctive and the optative, as well as IF, BEFORE, WHEN what we mentioned earlier. But if we say that, we end up saying that the modal particles and the connectives as a class all denote \( t_u \). Such a claim is not adequately justified. Consider also that, when combining with PAST, \( t_u \) would be redundant, and we would have to somehow cancel it (which is what Giannakidou 2009 does).

The other way of understanding Now anchoring would be to treat it as a substitution rule for free variables. (This was the spirit of Abusch’s rule for WOLL: "In the substitution operator, \( t \) is a bound variable that corresponds to the tense argument of WILL. For a top-level occurrence of WILL, the effect is to substitute \((n, \infty)\) for \( n \)." (Abusch 2004: 39)). We can thus posit the following rule:

\[
(37) \quad \text{Now-anchoring rule, triggered at MOD}
\]

\[
\text{Substitute any free variables } t \text{ in TP with } t_u
\]

This rule will be triggered only if there are free variables in TP, and it will not apply to lower PAST, for instance, as we will show soon. The rule will enable the free variable \( t \) of NON-PAST to be identified with \( t_u \). As a result, the interval provided by NON-PAST will then be anchored to \( t_u \), which is what we want. The advantage of having this rule is that it allows us to keep the semantics of modality clear of time— and it avoids the undesirable position that all modal particles introduce \( t_u \), and that \( t_u \) is dually present both as a parameter of evaluation and

\(^3\)Giannakidou (2009) claims that the particles denote \( t_u \), thus rendering them temporal operators. In Giannakidou and Mari (2018a), we modified that analysis, and argued that \( t_u \) is introduced syntactically in Greek in the higher structure by default, without being temporal itself. It is this formulation that we rely on here.
3.3. THE SEMANTIC NONPAST: FUTURE ORIENTATION

an argument of FUT. Introducing \( t_u \) appears to be a property of the higher structure, therefore positing the *Now*-anchoring rule seems to be the better option. The analysis for the future sentence (38) is provided below (following Giannakidou and Mari 2018a)

(38) O Janis tha kerdisi.
the John FUT win.PERF.NONPAST.3sg

‘John will win.’

(39)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{FUTP} \quad & \quad \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S \\
& \quad \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w') \land e \subseteq (t_u, \infty)]
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{FUT: tha;} \\
\text{Now-anchoring: } t_u \text{ replaces } t \\
\lambda p_{(st)} \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S : p(w')
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{TP} \quad & \quad \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land e \subseteq (t, \infty)]
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{T}^0: \text{NON-PAST} \\
\lambda P_{(i,st)} \lambda t \lambda w. (P(t, \infty)(w))
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{AspectP} \quad & \quad \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land e \subseteq t]
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{VP} \quad & \quad \lambda P_{(i,st)} \lambda t \lambda w. \lambda t \lambda w. \text{win}(t,j,w) \\
& \quad \exists e[P(e,w) \land e \subseteq t]
\end{align*}
\]

Meaning is represented explicitly at LF, and semantic composition is limited to function application, variable binding, and type raising. Starting from the bottom, perfective aspect applies yielding a statement that there is a winning event. Following Giannakidou (2009), PERF and NON-PAST are modifiers: their input is a property \( P \) and give back the same property with the addition of the event argument, and replacement of \( t \) by \((t, \infty)\). PERF introduces the event argument and existentially closes it (as in Giannakidou 2002, also Hacquard 2009). This event has to be located at \( t \), which itself must be placed within the interval provided by NON-PAST. At TP, the \( t \) variable remains unbound. At FUT, the *Now*-anchoring rule applies, resulting in identifying the \( t \) provided by NON-PAST with \( t_u \). The interval at FUTP is set to \((t_u, \infty)\). The modal meaning can be thus properly com-
Our analysis of nonpast embedded under FUT is very similar to the idea of a prospective marker under FUT, found in recent literature in Kush (2011), and Matthewson (2012) for Gitksan which actually has overt prospective aspect marker $dim$, see (40).

(40) $da’akxw$[-i]$’y$ $dim$ $ayee=hl$ $bax$’$y$ (Gitksan)
    circ.poss[-tra]-1sg.II PROSP go.fast=CN run-1sg.II.
    ‘I can run fast’.

We want to make clear that Greek does not have a prospective aspect, but a morphological and semantic NON-PAST. Kush (2011), further, (ibid.) studies the Hindi modal particle $gaa$, which, like FUT, shows a flexibility between epistemic and predictive readings. The future reading arises with the bare verb (no tense or aspect) (41), and the epistemic with perfective (past) (42-a) or progressive aspect (42-b) (examples and glosses from Kush, ibid., ex. (5)-(6a)-(6b)):

(41) $ve$ $bacce$ $do$ $din=m\dot{e}$ $aa-\dot{e}$-$gee$. (Hindi)
    dem.3pl child.m.pl two day=in come-SUBJ.PL.MOD.m.pl
    ‘Those children will come in two days.’

(42) a. $ve$ $log$ $ab^{h}i=tak$ $pah\dot{u}c^{h}$-$ee$
    dem.3pl people now=by arrive-PFV.PL
    h\dot{o}-\emptyset$-gee. (Hindi)
    AUX.SUBJ.PL.MOD.m.pl
    ‘They must have arrived by now.’

b. $ve$ $log$ $ab^{h}i$ $naac$ rah$-ee$
    dem.3pl people now dance.PROG.m.pl aux-SUBJ.MOD.m.pl
    h\dot{o}-\emptyset$-gee. (Hindi)
    ‘They must be dancing now.’

Kush analyzes $gaa$ as a modal operator, but posits metaphysical modality for the future reading. Future/metaphysical modal base arises with no tense in Kush’s account, and the epistemic reading relies on as aspect: "from the ungrammaticality of auxiliaries in Future constructions we can conclude that Tense is absent." (Kush 2011: 417).

Given the Greek system we outlined above, we cannot say that tense is absent with morphological non-past. Morphologically, nonpast is a tense in Greek. So, when FUT selects a perfective non-past, it selects a tense/aspect combination, which is assigned the denotation of NON-PAST. At the same time, the non-predictive epistemic reading in Greek and Italian rely on PAST and PRES, and this creates a parallel with Hindi; but, unlike Kush (2011) and Giannakidou and
Mari (2013), we do not claim that there is a shift in modal base, as FUT uniformly quantifies over epistemic alternatives in our account. Overall, and this is worth emphasizing, looking at Kush and also Matthewson (2012), we find that modality and tense/aspect are dissociated, and the modal particle scopes above tense/aspect. Therefore the data from Greek, Italian, Gitksan, and Hindi jointly suggest that future modals at least in these languages are not mixed modal-temporal operators (pace Condoravdi (2002)).

### 3.4 The subjunctive and NONPAST

The derivation with the subjunctive will proceed in similar steps. Consider first the main subjunctive. Here is the derivation from Giannakidou (2009:63):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{CP} \\
&\quad \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \\
&\quad \text{C: } \text{na} \\
&\quad \lambda p!p \quad \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \\
&\quad \text{Mood} \\
&\quad \lambda t \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (t, \infty)] \\
&\quad \text{TP} \\
&\quad \text{kerdisi o Janis} \\
&\quad \text{‘John wins’}
\end{align*}
\]

In current terms, we can actually assume, as we suggested at the beginning, that \text{na} is a deontic possibility modal:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{[na (NONPAST (p))]_{M,i,S} \text{ is true iff } \exists w' \in M(i) : \exists e [\text{win}(j, e, w') \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)]}; \text{ where } M(i) \text{ is set of worlds corresponding to what is allowed}
\end{align*}
\]

Now anchoring will be triggered at Mood, just like with FUT in the case of the future particle. This derives exactly the same wish reading meaning, without assuming illocutionary force. In the present work, we want to keep the analysis unified, and since there is no necessity for illocutionary force in the embedded CP—I and the deontic effect can be derived from deontic modality of \text{na}—we do not need to posit an illocutionary operator. The modality maybe understood also as teleological or bouletic, and in any case it is not epistemic.

Consider now the epistemic case:
(45) O Janis isos na kerdisi.  
the John maybe that.SUBJ win.PERF.NONPAST.3sg.  
‘John might win.’

(46) Pjos na kerdise (araje)?  
who that.SUBJ win.PERF.PAST.3sg question particle.  
‘Who might have won?’

In the question, there is arguably a question operator. But with the adverb, the structure is as below. The subjunctive and the adverb would enter a modal spread relation, as outlined in chapter 2; we omit the details here and spell out the modality on the higher, adverbial layer. The two denote one single modality.

(47)

When it comes to complement clauses, it is important to remember that there is neither illocutionary force or modality by na itself. Again $t_u$ is introduced by the Mood head, which is the hosting na; but na moves to C in embedded clauses as a subordinator (Giannakidou 2009). (There is no need for this movement in C because there is no embedding; and recall that na appears lower than the complementizer). Embedding now identifies the left $t$ of the NON-PAST with the time
of the higher verb, which can be present or past (or even future). If the attitude verb is in the present tense, \( t \) of the NONPAST will be identified with \( t_u \), as in the unembedded clauses. If we have a past tense attitude verb, the complement now will denote an event to be located at the time \( t \) through infinity, but now \( t \) is in the past, just as the attitude verb:

(48) Ithela na kerdisi o Janis.
    wanted.1sg that.SUBJ win.PERF.NONPAST.3sg the John.
    ‘I wanted John to win.’

(49) Volevo che Gianni vincess.
    Want.IMPF.1sg that John win.IMPF.SUBJ.3sg.
    ‘I wanted John to win.’

A common observation for the embedded subjunctive tense (going back to Kempsicky 1981) is that it is anaphoric. Anaphoric means dependent on the attitude tense. With the past tense \textit{ithela}/\textit{volevo} ‘wanted’, the top \( T \) contributes a time \( t \) prior to now, a past. We get a reading where I wanted in the past that there be an event of John’s winning that is not in the past, but in the interval that starts at my wanting time and looks forward, to times possible after \( t_u \):

(50) \[
\begin{align*}
\text{TP} & : \text{want} (j, t_2 < t_u, \lambda n \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)]) \\
\text{T: wanted} & : \text{ithela} \\
& \quad t_2 < n \\
\text{CP} & : \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \\
\text{C: na} & : \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \\
\text{MoodP} & : \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)] \\
\text{Mood} & : n \\
\text{TP} & : \lambda t \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (t, \infty)] \\
\text{TP}^0: \text{nonpast: kerdisi} & : \lambda PMP((t, \infty)) \\
\text{AspectP:} & : \lambda t \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (n, \infty)]
\end{align*}
\]
When na is a subordinator, there is no modality of its own, since it leaves the Mood phrase.

My desire in this reading is expressed in the following paraphrase: the time \( t_2 \) of my wanting is located in the past, and the time \( t \) of John’s winning is located in the future interval that starts at \( t_2 \). That interval, then, would be the one that starts at the internal now of the attitude (which can be identified with \( t_2 \)) and moves forward to include the actual utterance time and times after that. Hence, when embedded, the lambda bound \( n \) of na cannot refer to the utterance time, but to the relative \( n \) of the attitude. If the attitude, on the other hand, is anchored to the present, the interval will be \( [t_u, \infty) \), thus identical to the main occurrence of subjunctive.

\[
\text{(51)} \quad \text{want} (j, t_u, \lambda n \exists e [\text{win}(j, e) \land e \subseteq (t_u, \infty)] )
\]

Hence, the embedded interpretation of nonpast with na is follows compositionally from the meaning of NON-PAST and Now anchoring. The tense anaphoric-ity is thus a temporal dependency between the time of the higher attitude and the time of the complement, and is enabled by the NONPAST, which can be identified with \( t_u \) or a time prior to it if the attitude needs it.

To sum up: the Mood position triggers the Now anchoring rule; na is a subordinator moves to C and has no modal meaning. The temporal information comes from nonpast just like with the FUT. The inherent modality on na surfaces only in main clauses and it can be deontic or epistemic.

### 3.5 Subjunctive with a lower PAST

Let us now provide the analysis for modal particle with PAST. We illustrate first with FUT as the simple case without embedding. We distinguish a morphological perfective and a past layer.

\[
\text{(52)} \quad \text{o Janis tha kerdise.}
\text{the John FUT win.PERF.NONPAST.3sg}
\quad \text{‘John must have won.’}
\]

Here, the embedded time is a PAST which is deictic, therefore it denotes the anteriority relation wrt \( t_u \): \( t' \prec t_u \). The Now anchoring rule does not apply since there are no free variables.

\[
\text{(53)}
\]
3.5. SUBJUNCTIVE WITH A LOWER PAST

FUTP
\[ \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S \exists e[\text{win}(e, j, w') \land \exists t'[t' \prec t_u \land e \subseteq t']] \]

FUT \(tha\):
\[ \lambda p_{(st)} \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S : p(w') \]

Now-anchoring: \(t_u\) replaces \(t\)

TP
\[ \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e, j, w) \land \exists t'[t' \prec t_u \land e \subseteq t']] \]

\(T^0\), PAST
\[ \lambda P_{(i,st)} \lambda w. \exists e[t' \prec t_u \land P(t')(w)] \]

AspectP
\[ \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e, j, w) \land e \subseteq t] \]

Asp\(0\): PERF
\[ \lambda P_{(i,st)} \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[P(e, w) \land e \subseteq t] \]

VP
\[ \lambda t \lambda w. \exists [\text{win}(t,j,w)] \]

FUT thus does not provide tense. With a lower NON-PAST we get future orientation and a prediction, but with a lower PAST, the FUT sentence is equivalent to a MUST sentence with embedded PAST. The temporal information, in both cases, comes form the tense below FUT. Incidentally, PAST is also possible under the Dutch and German futures:

(54) Hij zal wel slecht geslapen hebben! (Dutch)
He FUT.3sg particle bad slept have.
‘He must have slept really bad!’ (Giannakidou and Mari 2018a)

(55) Ich habe meinem Freund letzte Woche einen Brief geschrieben; er wird ihn sicher schon bekommen haben. (German)
‘I wrote a letter to my friend last week; he must surely have already received it.’ (Lederer 1969, p.98, ex. 584).

Morphologically, a present perfect appears in Dutch and German, just as in English \emph{must have slept}, and not a simple past *\emph{must slept}. The simple past is thus excluded in the infinitival with must. This can be taken to suggest, in agreement with what we said earlier, that the default tense of the infinitive is NON-PAST. This, as Giannakidou and Mari (2018a) suggest, necessitates the use of a NON-
PAST auxiliary resulting in the apparent present perfect.\textsuperscript{4} Greek, on the other hand, lacks infinitives and the modal embeds a tensed clause which can be a simple past or a nonpast. The sentences above, in any case, show that a future morpheme can combine with lower PAST, and when this happens the predictive reading disappears. The future reading requires a lower NONPAST.

(56) O Janis isos na kerdise.
    the John maybe that.SUBJ win.PERF.PAST.3sg.
    ‘John must have won.’

(57) Elpizo na efije o Janis.
    hope.1sg that.SUBJj left.3sg the John.
    ‘I hope that John left.’

\textsuperscript{4}McCawley 1988 notes that in nonfinite contexts, past tense and the perfect are equivalent; for recent discussion see Arregi and Klecha 2015).
3.6 Syntax-semantics of tense and mood of Italian

We now extend this analysis to Italian, by using the modal future to maintain the parallelism.

3.6.1 From Greek to Italian

In Italian, futuro appears on the verb (58-b), like present (58-a) and simple past (58-c).

b. Arriv- erà. (Italian) Arrive FUT.3sg. ‘He will arrive.’
c. Arriv- ò. (Italian) Arrive SIMPLE.PAST.3sg. ‘He arrived.’

We propose that abstractly the structure is similar to Greek, with FUT being expressed higher than TP. The order of application of the semantic functions is the same as in Greek - and it is merely a morphological fact that future is a Tense, and must therefore stay within the V-form in Italian. In Greek, FUT is a particle and stays outside the V. In other words, in Italian there is a mismatch between the function of futuro (modal) and its status as a verbal category. The same, by the way, holds for subjunctive, which in Italian, unlike Greek, also appears on V.

The main difference between Italian and Greek, is that, in Italian, Aktionsart determines the aspectual information - since in Italian there is no grammatical aspectual distinction. We note with previous literature (and most notably Bertinetto 1979), that, in Italian, the eventive/stative distinction plays a role, just as in a variety of other languages (see Cipria and Roberts 2000; Condoravdi 2002; Copley 2002; Laca 2008; Mari, 2015a,b). With eventive predicates embedded under present (59-b) or future (60-b), the time of evaluation of the prejacent is forward-shifted— unlike with stative predicates (59-a)-(60-a). Such data can be replicated for English, and extend beyond present and future (e.g. see Copley 2009).

(59) a. Gianni è malato. ((Italian) stative, present reading) Gianni be.PRES.3sg ill. ‘John is ill.’
b. Gianni arriva. (eventive, future reading) Gianni arrive.PRES.3sg.
‘John will arrive immediately.’

(60)  
(a) Gianni sarà malato. ((Italian) stative, present epistemic reading)  
Gianni be.FUT.3sg ill.
‘John must be ill.’  
(b) Gianni arriverà. (eventive, predictive reading)  
Gianni arrive.FUT.3sg  
‘Gianni will arrive.’

Condoravdi (ibid.) notes the same pattern for modals (see (61)) and proposes an account that relies on aspectual differences between statives and eventives, from which it follows that the time of evaluation of the prejacent is forward-shifted only with eventive ones.5

(61)  
(a) John might be ill (stative, present orientation)  
(b) John might become ill (eventive, future orientation)

According to Condoravdi (ibid.) the modal itself bears the temporal information and provides a forward-shifting interval. We cannot adopt this view here, since forward-shifting with eventives is independent of modal embedding, see (59-b). Our proposal builds on a parallelism between grammatical and lexical aspect, according to which lexical statives are standardly imperfective, whereas eventives are perfective unless they are marked by a progressive verb form (see Smith 1991; Boogaart and Trnavac 2011). In this line of thought, lexical eventives provide aspectual information – perfectivity – and perfectivity, in absence of PAST, triggers futurity (NON-PAST, λPλtλw(P(t, ∞)(w))). Aspect is thus contributed in the VP.

Note that, just as in Greek morphological perfectivity combines with either nonpast or past to produce PERF, NON-PAST and PERF PAST, in Italian lexical perfectivity is also compatible with PAST or NON-PAST leading to PERF PAST and PERF NON-PAST, as is the case here to produce the predictive reading.6

Above the VP, the derivation in Italian is parallel to the one in Greek. We see that, by being parametric to the time of utterance, FUT provides Now-anchoring in Italian as well.7 Consider (62).

---

5When the prejacent is stative (and the time of evaluation is not forward-shifted), the modal has an epistemic interpretation. According to Condoravdi (2002) the modal has a metaphysical interpretation in (61-a).

6As often noted, forward-shifting is observed with statives too, e.g., as in ‘Domani sarà malato’ (Tomorrow he will be ill), see Giannakidou and Mari (2018a) for details.

7Why in nonpast environments the perfective triggers futurity has been the object of much study— but there is no final answer (Copley 2009, Mari 2015a, Boogaart and Trnavac 2011). Here
3.6. SYNTAX-SEMANTICS OF TENSE AND MOOD OF ITALIAN

(62) Flavio vincerà.
    Flavio win.FUT.3sg.
    ‘Flavio will win.’

(63) Flavio vincerà.
    Flavio win.FUT.3sg.
    ‘Flavio will win.’

As for the so called ‘anterior future’ in Italian we observe what follows.

(64) Gianni sarà andato al cinema ieri.
    Gianni be.FUT.3sg gone to-the theatre yesterday.
    Gianni must have gone to the theatre, yesterday.

Recall that the corresponding sentence is a a simple past, i.e. past perfective, in Greek. In Italian, FUT is in complementary distribution with a variety of auxiliaries bearing different tenses (65), thus entering apparent Perfect constructions (see de Swart, 2007).

we tend to align with Boogaart and Trnavac (ibid.) who espouse the classical view from Comrie (1976): “a perfective verb form instead presents a situation, ‘from the outside’, as a completed whole, thus including both its starting point and endpoint.” Perfectivity thus establishes a distance between the boundaries of the event and the perspectival point, which in the case of future is $t_u$. For this reason perfectivity can combine with past or non-past, but does not provide PRES.
We decompose the perfect component as a combination of PAST and PERF, as in Greek. PERF provides the temporal boundaries of the eventuality; the PAST expresses anteriority. But given the possibility of combining with a variety of tenses, we must concede that the PAST we are positing is not deictic as in Greek but relative (Verkuyl, 2011, Broekhuis and Verkuyl 2014): it does not express anteriority with respect to \( t_u \) but with respect to a time \( t \) which is a free variable TP. This triggers the Now-anchoring rule. The derivation of (66) follows in (67).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(66) } & \quad \text{Flavio avrà vinto.} \\
& \quad \text{Flavio have.FUT.3sg won.} \\
& \quad \text{‘Flavio must have won.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(67) } & \quad \text{FUTP} \\
& \quad \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land \exists t'[t' \prec t_u \land e \subseteq t']] \\
& \quad \text{FUT: } futuro; \\
& \quad \text{Now-anchoring: } t_u \text{ replaces } t \\
& \quad \lambda P_{[st]} \forall w' \in \text{Best}_S : p(w') \\
& \quad \text{TP} \\
& \quad \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land \exists t'[t' \prec t_u \land e \subseteq t']] \\
& \quad \text{TP: } PAST \\
& \quad \lambda P_{[st]} \lambda t \lambda w. \exists t'[t' \prec t \land P(t')(w)] \\
& \quad \text{AspectP} \\
& \quad \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land \exists t'[t' \prec t \land P(t')(w)] \\
& \quad \text{Asp0: PERF} \\
& \quad \lambda P_{[st]} \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land e \subseteq t] \\
& \quad \text{VP} \\
& \quad \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land \exists t'[t' \prec t \land P(t')(w)] \\
& \quad \text{Asp0: PERF} \\
& \quad \lambda P_{[st]} \lambda t \lambda w. \exists e[\text{win}(e,j,w) \land e \subseteq t]
\end{align*}
\]

We can thus generalize that, regardless of whether the embedded PAST under FUT is a simple past or a perfect, the anteriority relation is expressed— only in the case of the simple past (Greek) it makes reference to \( t_u \), but in the case of the perfect (Italian, English, Dutch, German) we have relative anteriority and reliance on the Now-anchoring rule. What is important is that the anteriority relation is in
3.6. SYNTAX-SEMANTICS OF TENSE AND MOOD OF ITALIAN

the scope of FUT. This analysis of Italian can be extended to cover Dutch, German and English apparent perfects under FUT and MUST.

3.6.2 Mood and T in complement clauses

As we illustrated with Greek, the very same analysis can be extended to Italian embedded mood. In embedding, Mood does not provide anchoring to \( t_u \) necessarily. In (69) we have a future of a past, where the future component is provided by the imperfective embedded under belief and the past relative to which the futurity is calculated is provided by the time on the main verb, to which mood is anaphoric (the counterfactuality is also provided by the imperfect, see Ippolito, 2005).

(68) a. Crede che Flavio vinca.
   Believes that Flavio win.PRES.SUBJ.3sg.
   ‘He believes that Flavio will win.’

b. Crede che Flavio abbia vinto.
   Believes that Flavio have.PRES.SUBJ.3sg won.
   He believes that Flavio has won.

(69) Credeva che vincessese.
Believe.3sg.IMPF that win.IMPF.SUBJ.3sg.
He believed that he would win.
As we see, all modal particles introduce a perspectival time. Mood is no exception to this. When embedded, it functions as a mirror of the tense of the attitudes upon which it is dependent, i.e. it becomes anaphoric, and the left boundary \( t \) will now be the time of the attitude, as mentioned in the discussion of Greek.

Having clarified the tense and mood interaction, let us revisit now some core patterns illustrating how attitude verbs restrict the temporal orientation of the complement.

### 3.7 Temporal constraints imposed by the selecting verb

#### 3.7.1 Verbs selecting the indicative: no NONPAST

Recall the relevant attitude classes, starting with the indicative in Greek:

\[(71)\]  
Indicative verbs in Greek (oti/pos, pu)  
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{epistemic factives: } ksero, \ gnorizo \text{ (know)} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{emotive factives: } xerome \text{ (be glad), metaniono \text{ (regret)}} \\
\text{c.} & \quad \text{doxastic (non-factive): } pistevo \text{ (believe), nomizo \text{ (think), theoro \text{ (consider), vrisko \text{ (find)}}) \\
\text{d.} & \quad \text{certainty: ime sigouros \text{ (be certain), ime pepismenos \text{ (be convinced)}}}
\end{align*}\]
3.7. TEMPORAL CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE SELECTING VERB

- Consciousness: *exo epignosi* (be aware)
- Pure assertives: *leo* (say), *dhiavazo* (read), *isxirizome* (claim), *dilono* (declare, assert)
- Verbs of denial: *arnoume* (deny), *ksexno* (forget)
- Fiction verbs: *onirevome* (dream), *fandazome* (imagine)
- Memory verbs: *thimame* (remember)
- Perception verbs: *vlepo* (see), *akouo* (hear)

These attitudes, specifically doxastic, epistemic, certainty, memory, and dream fiction verbs select indicative across a number of languages including French (as we saw earlier: Baunaz 2015, Puskas 2017), Spanish, Catalan (Quer 1998, 2001, Villalta 1998), Portuguese (Marques 2010, 2014), Serbian (Todorovich 2012), and Romanian (Farkas 1992), among others. They pose no restrictions on the tense of the complement, and appear with present and past. Here are some examples from Greek:

(72) O Nicholas kseri oti/*pos/na efije i Ariadne.
the Nicholas knows.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left. 3sg the Ariadne.
‘Nicholas knows that Ariadne left.’

(73) O Nicholas ine sigouros oti/*na efije i Ariadne.
the Nicholas s.3sg certain that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘Nicholas is certain that Ariadne left.’

(74) O Nicholas ine pepismenos oti/*na efije i Ariadne.
the Nicholas is.3sg convinces that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne left.’

(75) O Nicholas pistevi oti/*na efije i Ariadne.
the Nicholas believe.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne left.’

(76) O Nicholas exi epignosi oti/*na i Ariadne ton
the Nicholas has awareness.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him
vothise.
helped.3sg
‘Nicholas is aware that Ariadne helped him.’

(77) O Nicholas onireftike oti/*na efije i Ariadne.
the Nicholas dreamt.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘Nicholas dreamt that Ariadne left.’

(78) O Nicholas theori oti/*na i Ariadne ine omorfi.
the Nicholas consider.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne is beautiful
‘Nicholas considers Ariadne to be beautiful.’
\(\text{O Nicholas vriskei oti/*na i Ariadne ine omorfi.}
\)
\(\text{Nicholas find.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne is beautiful.}
\)
\(\text{Nicholas considers Ariadne to be beautiful.}\)

Since the indicative is an indicator of commitment and veridicality, its use after verbs of knowledge, belief, and certainty is expected—given the premises of our theory in chapter 2. Doxastic attitudes involve an individual anchor’s, in this case, the main clause subject’s cognitive mental state which relies on knowledge, belief, awareness, memory, perception, or imagination. In the doxastic attitude we include verbs like \textit{vrisko} ‘find’ and \textit{theoro} ‘consider’, which in Greek take finite complements only.

Here are examples from other languages illustrating the stability of the pattern of indicative with knowledge, belief, certain, and imagination:

\(\text{Jean croit/est certain/imagine que Marie est partie.}
\)
\(\text{John believes/is certain/imagines that Mary is left.}
\)
\(\text{‘John believes/is certain/imagines that Mary left.’}\)

These verbs, as we mentioned already do not combine with non-past, but they do allow future reference with FUT in their complements:

\(\text{Nicholas is certain that Ariadne will leave.}\)

\(\text{Nicholas believes that Ariadne will leave.}\)

In other words, future orientation is not excluded from the doxastic complement, but it is blocked by the use of indicative which is incompatible with the NONPAST and therefore necessitates the use of future.

Purely assertive verbs select the \textit{oti}-indicative in Greek, and behave like epistemics and doxastics:

\(\text{Nicholas announced that Ariadne left.}\)

Verbs like \textit{anakinose} ‘announce’ are purely assertive and do not alternate with
3.7. TEMPORAL CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE SELECTING VERB

Finally, verbs of negative assertion (mentioned in chapters 1 and 2) also select the indicative:

(84) O Nicholas arinthike oti/*na i Ariadne ton voithise. the Nicholas denied.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him helped.3sg. ‘Nicholas denied that Ariadne helped him.’

At first, the indicative appears striking given that DENY \(p\) does not entail \(p\). But—as we said in chapter 2—if we view these verbs as subjectively veridical, e-committed to \(¬p\), it makes sense that they select indicative:

(85) \([\text{Nicholas denied that } p]\) is true in the world of the utterance context \(w\) iff:

\[
\forall w'[w' \in M(Nicholas,w) \rightarrow ¬p(w')]
\]

In other words, if \(i\) denies that \(p\) and \(i\) is truthful, then \(i\) knows \(¬p\) to be true. The condition might be weakened to \(i\) believes \(¬p\) to be true. Regardless of which version we chose, the point here is that homogeneity of antiveridicality explains why we get indicative with even negative assertives. The tense, again, is variable and there are no particular constraints.

Let us move on now to the subjunctive verbs.

3.7.2 Subjunctive verbs: NONPAST

In Greek, the following verbs select subjunctive:

(86) Subjunctive verbs in Greek

a. volitionals: *thelo* (want), *skopevo* (plan)
b. directives: *dhiazzo* (order), *simvulevo* (advise), *protino* (suggest),
c. modal verbs: *prepi* (must), *bori* (may)
d. effort verbs: *prospatho* (try)
e. permissives: *epitrepo* (allow); *apagorevo* (forbid)
f. implicatives: *katorthono* (manage), *anagazo* (force)

The very same classes select subjunctive in Italian too:

(87) Subjunctive verbs in Italian

a. volitionals: *volere* (want),
b. directives: *ordinare* (order)
c. modal verbs: *è necessario* (it is necessary), *è possibile* (it is possible), *bisogna* (it is needed).
d. permissives: *impedire* (forbid)
Here are some examples with volitional verbs in Greek and Italian (88).

(88) a. Thelo na/*oti kerdisi o Janis.
    want.1sg that.SUBJ/*IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.
    ‘I want John to win.’

b. Voglio che Gianni vinca/*IND.
    Want.1sg.SUBJ that John win.3sg.SUBJ.
    ‘I want John to win.’

Volitional verbs are future oriented and select the NONPAST, as mentioned earlier:

(89) Mas protinan na/*oti milisoume me ton Jani.
    us suggested.3pl that.SUBJ/*IND talk.NONPAST-1PL with the John.
    ‘They suggested to us that we talk with John.’

(90) Mas simvulepsan na/*oti milisoume me ton Jani.
    us advised.3pl that.SUBJ/*IND talk.NONPAST-1PL with the John.
    ‘They advised us to talk with John.’

(91) Skopevoun na/*oti milisoun me ton Jani.
    plan.3pl that.SUBJ/*IND talk.NONPAST-3PL with the John.
    ‘They suggested to us that we talk with John.’

We observe here again the correlation of *na* plus lower nonpast and future orientation. Notice the parallel with the *to*-infinitival or the subjunctive in English (which is, as we said, a bare infinitive). Epistemic modal verbs are independent in their lower tense:

(92) a. Bori/Prepi na/*oti kerdise o Janis.
    Can/Must that.SUBJ win.PAST.3sg the John.
    ‘It is possible that he has won.’

b. È possibile che abbia vinto.
    Be.3sg possible that have.SUBJ.sg won.
    ‘It is possible that he has won.’

(93) a. Ine pithano na/*oti kerdisi.
    is.3sg possible subj win.nonpast.3sg.
    ‘He may win.’

b. È possibile che vinca.
    Be.3sg.IND possible that win.3sg.SUBJ.
    ‘He may win.’

As we saw in chapter 2 and in earlier discussions (Giannakidou and Mari 2016a, 2018), epistemic modals appear with all three tenses. The constrain for NON-PAST concerns more narrowly the volitional class, which we discuss further in
chapter 5.

It is also important to note verbs of effort like TRY, and implicatives like MANAGE patterns with volitional verbs and require NONPAST:

(94) O Flavio prospathise na/*oti milisi me ton the Flavio tried.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND talk.NONPAST-3sg with the John.

‘Flavio tired to talk with John.’

(95) O Flavio katafere na/*oti milisi me ton Milisi talk.NONPAST-3sg with the John.

‘Flavio tired to talk with John.’

(96) *O Flavio prospathise na/*oti milise me ton Milisi talk.PAST-3sg with the John.

(97) *O Flavio katafere na/*oti milise me ton Milisi talk.PAST-3sg with the John.

We will discuss what the temporal constraints with this class of verbs mean in chapter 7. For now, we note the fact that verbs of effort and implicatives require nonpasts.

3.8 Conclusion

Our main findings in this chapter were three. First, the choice of mood correlates not with finiteness, but with a choice of embedded tense: the indicative complement, specifically, is incompatible with NONPAST, but the subjunctive of volitional and directive verbs requires it. NONPAST, and not the subjunctive or future, is responsible for future orientation. We articulated explicit syntax-semantics compositions to illustrate how the anaphoric (NONPAST), or independent (past, present) tense of the embedded tense are derived in Greek and Italian. Recall that the PAST and PRES are objectively veridical tenses (chapters 1,2), but the NONPAST is an unspecified time.

Second, we offered a syntax of subjunctive na where where na is a modality head generated in Mood and contributes possibility modality in main clauses—deontic or epistemic. In subordinate clauses, na functions as a subordinator and moves to the C position. In that position, it cannot contribute modality. The Italian subjunctive remains in Mood in embedded clauses. The anaphoric property of the subjunctive, we showed, is due to the anchoring rules that are triggered in MoodP and the dependency to the higher tense of the attitude verb.
Finally, we found that within the subjunctive class there are further restrictions: some verbs strictly require NONPAST (volitionals), but others are flexible (modals). We will discuss the temporal properties of each class in our specific discussions in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 4

Mood choice with doxastic propositional attitudes

In this chapter, we implement our theory developed in chapters 2 and 3 to discuss the indicative versus subjunctive choice with doxastic propositional attitude verbs, i.e. attitudes of belief, thought, certainty, memory, dream, imagination and the like. Unlike verbs of knowledge, belief verbs are not objectively veridical—but the do select the indicative mood. There are, in fact, two main patterns: (a) doxastic verbs strictly select the indicative, a pattern observed in Greek and most Romance languages, and (b) doxastic verbs are flexible and allow both moods, such as in Italian and to some extent Portuguese. Our main ideas will be following.

1. Doxastic verbs that select the indicative are subjectively veridical: they have what we call ‘solipsistic’ Hintikka belief-style truth conditions, i.e., they express the attitude holder’s id(oxastic)-commitment to the complement proposition, with no regard of what is actually the case (i.e., truth). Greek doxastic verbs express d-commitment and select the indicative. Italian verbs can be construed solipsistically too, and in this case they follow the Greek pattern and select indicative.

2. The subjunctive is triggered when the doxastic verb is construed suppositionally. Suppositional belief means ‘believe but not know’ (Mari, 2016a). In this case, the doxastic predicate takes a nonveridical epistemic modal base M as an additional argument, just like the modal verbs, and obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom. When this happens, subjunctive will be selected, as is the case with modal verbs.

3. There are, therefore, two ways of conceptualizing doxastic attitudes (see also Mari, 2016a): (a) as veridical, solipsistic attitudes that do not address
the actual world or knowledge, and lack any presuppositions, or (b) as non-veridical suppositional states that engage with knowledge. Italian verbs are underspecified lexically, and can be construed either way, and this explains why they are compatible with both indicative and subjunctive. Greek doxastic verbs, on the other hand, are lexically specified as veridical Hintikka beliefs and select only the indicative. By carefully distinguishing knowledge and doxa, we will argue that, just as Greek, Italian belief is strong doxa-wise but it is weak epistemic-wise.

4. The flexibility in mood choice does not necessitate imposing ambiguity in the lexical entries of propositional attitude verbs. Our account offers a new way of understanding mood shift by acknowledging the similarity between propositional attitudes and modals.

5. The embedded mood has a pragmatic function: it anchors the complement proposition to the local attitude holder’s M(i). We define an assertive indicative *oti* which adds $p$ to M(i), and the presuppositional indicative (*pu*) which requires that $p$ already be present in M or the common ground. The subjunctive introduces nonveridical update and does not add the complement proposition to M(i) or the common ground.

### 4.1 Veridical belief, and doxastic commitment

In the discussion that follows, we will use the label ‘doxastic’ to refer to verbs that express attitudes of belief, thought, consciousness, consideration, dream, imagination, fiction, perception, and memory. These attitudes are also sometimes referred to as ‘cognitive’.

Let us start by recalling that the epistemic and doxastic classes select indicative:

(1) Indicative verbs in Greek (*oti*/pos, *pu*)
   a. epistemic factives: *ksero, gnorizo* (know)
   b. emotive factives: *xerome* (be glad), *metaniono* (regret)
   c. doxastic (non-factive): *pistevo* (believe), *nomizo* (think), *theoro* (consider), *vrisko* (find)
   d. certainty: *ime sigouro* (be certain), *ime pepismenos* (be convinced)
   e. consciousness: *exo epignosi* (be aware)
   f. pure assertives: *leo* (say), *dhiavazo* (read), *isxirizome* (claim), *dilono* (declare, assert)
   g. verbs of denial: *arnoume* (deny), *ksexno* (forget)
   h. fiction verbs: *onirevome* (dream), *fandazome* (imagine)
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i. memory verbs: *thimame* (remember)

j. perception verbs: *vlepo* (see), *akouo* (hear)

Let us focus first on ‘pure’ doxastics, i.e., verbs that indicate belief, certainty, conviction, and dream/fiction. Here are some core examples from Greek repeated from earlier discussion:

(2) O Nicholas kseri oti/pos/*na* efije i Ariadne.

Nicholas knows.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas knows that Ariadne left.’

(3) O Nicholas ine sigouros oti/*na* efije i Ariadne.

Nicholas s.3sg certain that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas is certain that Ariadne left.’

(4) O Nicholas ine pepismenos oti/*na* efije i Ariadne.

Nicholas is.3sg convinces that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne left.’

(5) O Nicholas pistevi oti/*na* efije i Ariadne.

Nicholas believe.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne left.’

(6) O Nicholas exi epignosi oti/*na* i Ariadne ton

Nicholas has awareness.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him

voithise.

helped.3sg.

‘Nicholas is aware that Ariadne helped him.’

(7) O Nicholas onireftike oti/*na* efije i Ariadne.

Nicholas dreamt.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas dreamt that Ariadne left.’

(8) O Nicholas theori oti/*na* i Ariadne ine omorfi.

Nicholas consider.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne is beautiful.

‘Nicholas considers Ariadne to be beautiful.’

(9) O Nicholas vriskei oti/*na* i Ariadne ine omorfi.

Nicholas find.3sg that.IND the Ariadne is beautiful.

‘Nicholas considers Ariadne to be beautiful.’

Recall the initial puzzle: what do all these verbs have in common that renders them indicative selectors like knowledge verbs? Unlike knowledge which is grounded on objectively veridicality, i.e., truth, these attitudes are purely *subjective*, and some may even lack completely a factual dimension. Imagining or dreaming do not address or care about what is the case in the actual world; they nevertheless select the indicative, just like knowledge verbs. And even verbs of disputable
beliefs, such as those meaning find, consider are indicative selectors in Greek and the bulk of Romance languages.

In our earlier discussion, we established that the indicative is the mood of objective or subjective veridicality, and that subjective veridicality is a precondition on assertion. We said that for the co-operative speaker to utter the sentence \( p \), she must be commitment to \( p \), which means that she is in a state of subjective veridicality, i.e. she knows or believes \( p \) to be true. Recall the definition of subjective veridicality:

\[
\text{(10) Subjective veridicality}
\]

i. A function \( F \) that takes a proposition \( p \) as its argument is subjectively veridical with respect to an individual anchor \( i \) and an information state \( M(i) \) iff \( M(i) \) entails \( p \).

ii. \( M(i) \) entails \( p \) iff \( \forall w \left[ w \in M(i) \rightarrow w \in \{ w' \mid p(w') \} \right] \).

Subjective veridicality implies \( p \)-homogeneity of the entire \( M(i) \). When all worlds in \( M(i) \) are \( p \) worlds, \( p \) is entailed in \( M(i) \). This is a state of full commitment to \( p \), and following Gricean quality (Be truthful), as we said, it is a precondition on assertion. If \( p \) is negated, in a parallel manner, the sentence expresses the speaker’s commitment to \( \neg p \):

\[
\text{(11) O Giacomo dhen ine giatros/ Giacomo is not a doctor is assertable by}
\]

speaker \( i \) if and only if \( \forall w' \left[ w' \in M(i) \rightarrow \neg \text{doctor}(\text{Giacomo})(w') \right] \).

Again we have universal commitment, this time all worlds in \( M(i) \) be \( \neg p \) worlds. We can therefore say that an unmodalized positive or negative sentence, expressed full commitment of the speaker to \( p \) or \( \neg p \). For this reason, the use of negation in a main clause never triggers the subjunctive.

When we look at doxastic verbs, we will argue that it is necessary to differentiate between two kinds of commitment: \( e(pistemic) \)-commitment and \( d(oxastic) \)-commitment. Doxastic commitment is subjective veridicality in an individual’s doxastic space. Depending on the propositional attitude, we will identify several doxastic spaces in our discussion below, namely belief, imagination, thought, memory, and consciousness states. These states are anchored to the subject of the propositional attitude since it is her or his attitude that the sentence reports. The system we will develop in the next few chapters follows the earlier typology of propositional attitudes and models proposed in Giannakidou (1997, 1998, 1999, 2009), as well as some more recent work on Italian doxastics by Mari (2016a, 2017a,b). Here we develop a comprehensive, integrated system that will address the various classes of attitudes we identify as doxastic.

Recall the case of knowledge verbs such as \( ksero, gnorizo, sapere, know \). The truth condition for knowledge is the following:
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(12) \[ \text{[Nicholas kseri /knows } p \text{]} \text{ will be defined iff the actual world } w \text{ is a } p \text{ world. If defined,} \\
\text{[Nicholas kseri oti } p \text{]} \text{ is true in } w \text{ with respect to } M(\text{Nicholas}) \text{ iff:} \\
\forall w'[w' \in M(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \{w'' | p(w'')\}]\]

KNOW that, or as we will call it, indicative knowledge combines an objective veridicality presupposition with a subjectively veridical assertion: the information state of the subject, M(Nicholas), is homogenous, i.e., all worlds are p worlds.\(^1\)

Factivity is the objective veridicality condition that \( w \) is a \( p \) world.

(13) **Factivity**

A propositional function \( F \) is factive iff \( Fp \) presupposes objective veridicality, i.e., that \( p \) is true.

Crucially, indicative knowledge is factive, but knowing an answer to a question is not. This is the case of KNOW whether, which appears with a different complementizer— i.e. whether, Greek an— indicating that the complement is a question. In this case, we might also have a wh-complement:

(14) a. O Nicholas kseri an eftase to treno stin ora tu. 
the Nicholas know.3sg if arrived.3sg the train on time its 
Nicholas knows whether the train arrived on time.

b. O Nicholas kseri pote eftase to treno stin ora tu. 
the Nicholas know.3sg when arrived.3sg the train on time its 
Nicholas knows when the train arrived on time.

In this case, the complement of KNOW is not a true proposition, i.e., a fact, but a question. This KNOW is not factive, and must be distinguished from veridical factive KNOW. An embedded polar question introduces both possibilities, \( p \) and \( \neg p \), it therefore does not entail \( p \). Knowing the answer to a question is a different state than knowing that, which is the case of prototypical knowledge which is veridical, i.e., justified true belief.

Veridical functions need not be factive like indicative KNOW. Subjective veridicality simply requires that the individual anchor is in a state M that supports \( p \), regardless of whether \( p \) is actually (i.e. objectively) true. For instance, Nicholas believes that Ariadne is a doctor reflects that Nicholas is in a veridical belief state, but the sentence Ariadne is a doctor can be objectively false, i.e., Nicholas might have a false belief:

(15) \[ \text{[Nicholas believes that } p \text{]} \text{ is true in the world of the utterance context } w \text{ iff:} \]

\(^{1}\)For these reasons, Giannakidou (1998, 1999) called knowledge verbs strongly veridical.
\[ \forall w'[w' \in \text{Dox}(\text{Nicholas}, w) \rightarrow p(w')] \]

Here we are using \textit{Dox} to refer specifically to a doxastic state, and separate it from the epistemic space of knowledge.

(16) \textit{Belief state of an individual anchor} \textit{i}

A belief state \textit{Dox(i)} is a set of worlds associated with an individual \textit{i} representing worlds compatible with what \textit{i} believes.

The truth condition of \textit{believe} does not entail actual truth. However, following Hintikka’s classical analysis, (16) renders \textit{believe} subjectively veridical, because the whole \textit{M(Nicholas)} entails \textit{p}. We will generalize here that the class of verbs denoting private doxastic spaces are subjectively veridical because they denote variants of \textit{Dox} that entail \textit{p} without entailing actual truth. This disregard for actual truth renders belief states under the classical Hintikka analysis that we adopt solipsistic.

Looking at languages following the Greek pattern, we must say that solipsistic belief verbs lack the objective layer of meaning, and make no connection to the actual world. The truth condition is purely subjective, and does not require the actual world to be a member of \textit{Dox}. For the evaluation of an embedded \textit{p} ‘\textit{i} believes that \textit{p}’, the subject might even have just an opinion. An opinion seems more contestable than a belief: when one expresses an opinion they usually do so knowing that there is a plurality of opinions or that an opinion can be controversial:

(17) O Nicholas theori/pistevi oti i ji ine epipedi the Nicholas consider/believe.3sg that.IND the earth is flat.
‘Nicholas believes/considers earth is flat.’

(18) O Nicholas vriski oti to omo psari ine nostimo. the Nicholas finds.3sg that.IND the raw fish is tasty
‘Nicholas finds raw fish to be tasty.’

People can have controversial opinions or personal tastes (which we take to be kinds of opinions), and may also believe false things; but this doesn’t seem to affect the choice of indicative mood. For belief and opinion, the truth condition requires subjective veridicality only. The use of indicative is therefore a sign of solipsistic belief, namely that \textit{Dox(subject)} entails \textit{p} while ignoring \textit{Dox(speaker)}, the actual world, and the common ground.

We proceed with zooming on Greek where belief is this kind pure solipsistic doxa, and lacks connection to knowledge, fact, or common ground. We then turn to Italian, where belief is a composite attitude with the veridical assertion of doxa and the nonveridical presupposition of not knowing.
4.2 Solipsistic doxastic attitudes: the indicative

In this section, we focus on the various doxastic classes, and show how they can be construed solipsistically as denoting veridical, d-commitment states. In section 3 we illustrate that Italian allows also a non-solipsistic construal of belief.

4.2.1 Attitudes of certainty, opinion, awareness, and memory

Consider first attitudes of certainty, which tend to appear as combinations of BE with an certainty adjective:

(19) O Nicholas ine sigouros oti/*na efije i Ariadne. the Nicholas us.3sg certain that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas is certain that Ariadne left.’

(20) O Nicholas ine pepismenos oti/*na efije i Ariadne. the Nicholas is.3sg convinced that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas is convinced that Ariadne left.’

The cognitive states of certainty and of being convinced can be thought of as variants of belief. Dox therefore is the relevant model here. The attitude subject is d-committed to the truth of the complement, i.e., Dox entails p:

(21) [Nicholas ine sigouros (BE CERTAIN) oti p] is true in w iff ∀w'[w' ∈Dox(Nicholas) → w' ∈ {w'' | p(w'')}}

(22) [Nicholas ine pepismenos (BE CONVINCED) oti p] is true in w iff ∀w'[w' ∈Dox(Nicholas) → w' ∈ {w'' | p(w'')}}

Doxastic commitment is thus defined exclusively on Dox as follows:

(23) D(oxastic) commitment of i
i. An individual anchor i is d-committed to a proposition p iff Dox(i) entails p.
ii. An individual anchor i is d-committed to a proposition ¬p iff Dox(i) entails ¬p.

(24) D(oxastic) commitment and entailment
i. For an individual anchor i, Dox(i) entails p iff all the words in Dox(i) are p-worlds.
ii. For an individual anchor i, Dox(i) entails ¬p iff all the words in Dox(i) are ¬p worlds.

Doxastic commitment in embedded sentences is specifically tied to the subject of the main clause attitude verbs. But in a main sentence, d-commitment is tied
to the speaker. If the speaker reasons with pure belief, then it is d-commitment that satisfies veridicality for assertability, and not knowledge. In most cases the speaker reasons with a mix of knowledge and belief, and they both form the foundation for subjective veridicality. When we have embedding under attitudes knowledge and doxa typically get separated and depend on the lexical meaning of the attitude verb.

From now on, we will differentiate between plain $M$ and $Dox$ to refer to a purely epistemic space (what one knows) and a doxastic space respectively. In the complements of the sentences above, ‘Ariadne left’ is anchored to the subject’s $Dox$(Nicholas). The truth condition requires that $Dox$(Nicholas) be a d-commitment $p$-state. There are no non-$p$ worlds in $Dox$(Nicholas). Both ‘be certain’ and ‘be convinced’ denote doxastic states, but they differ from BELIEVE in that they might allow inference to previous states of non-belief. E.g., we may hypothesize that to be convinced of something means that you came to be believe it from a previous state of not believing it. Likewise, if you are certain of $p$, this means that you have considered, and rejected, the possibility of not $p$. This adversarial component, however, is not part of the truth condition, and it is most likely an implicature:

(25) O Nicholas ine pepismenos i Ariadne ton agapai, ke the Nicholas is.3sg convinced that.IND the Ariadne him love.3sg, and pote dhen skeftike oti afoi bori na min ine alithia. never not thought that this might that.subj not be.3sg true. Nicholas is convinced that Ariadne loves him, and he never thought that this might not be true.

(26) O Nicholas ine sigouros oti i Ariadne ton agapai, ke the Nicholas is.3sg certain that.IND the Ariadne him love.3sg, and pote dhen skeftike oti afoi bori na min ine alithia. never not thought that this might that.subj not be.3sg true. Nicholas is certain that Ariadne loves him, and he never thought that this might not be true.

With verbs of memory such as *thimame* ‘remember’, we are looking at a set of worlds that we will call $Mem$ (subject), that it to say, the set of propositions that are remembered by the attitude holder:

(27) Memory state of an individual anchor $i$
A state of memory $Mem$ ($i$) is a set of worlds associated with an individual $i$ representing worlds compatible with what $i$ remembers.

\[2\text{This kind of contrarianism appears also with adverbs such as totally, as has been argued by Beltrama (2016), who posits that they have a nonveridical presupposition.}\]
4.2. SOLIPSISTIC DOXASTIC ATTITUDES: THE INDICATIVE

The lexical entry for the generic predicate REMEMBER is as follows:

(28) \([i \text{ REMEMBER } p]^{w,Mem(i)} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in Mem(i)(p(w''))\).

What one remembers is a combination of knowledge and belief, so we can think Mem (i) as a mixed space. One can have memories that do not correspond to true episodes in the world, however, one may even embellish or dramatize reality and construct memories, as is well known. People often have false or imagined memories. Memory is therefore highly doxastic and it can even be understood as imaginative. A memory verb, on the other hand, can also be construed factively as remembering a fact, and this will result in allowing the factive complementizer pu. We will revisit memory verbs later when we discuss flexible mood patterns.

Consciousness attitudes, finally, such as those meaning be aware are belief or knowledge based too. Without entering into unnecessary (for the purposes of mood) debates, we assume, with the linguistics literature on the matter, that the set of worlds representing consciousness is a subset of worlds of the belief space (eg. Franke and Jäger 2011). It is generally assumed that one can hold beliefs without being conscious about them. We thus define a function Con that returns those worlds of Dox(subject) that are the worlds compatible with the attitude holder’s conscious beliefs. Con(Dox(subject)), as a result, is a veridical d-commitment state. In addition, awareness attitudes are factive, as we see:

(29) **Consciousness state of an individual anchor i**

A consciousness state Con(Dox(i)) is a set of worlds associated with an individual i representing worlds compatible with what i is conscious about.

(30) \([i \text{ IS AWARE that } p]^{w,M,i,Con,Dox} \text{ is defined iff } w \in p\).

If defined \([i \text{ is aware that } p]^{w,M,i} = 1 \text{ iff: } \forall w'' \in Con(Dox(i)(p(w'')), \text{ and } \exists w' \in Dox(i) : \neg p(w')\).

Attitudes with this meaning be aware will select the indicative in Greek. But they allow both subjunctive and indicative in Italian.

(31) O Nicholas exei epignosi oti/*na i Ariadne tou leei the Nicholas has awareness that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him says psemata.

lies.

Nicholas is aware that Ariadne is lying to him.

(32) Sono consciente che Anna è/sia a casa.

Be.1sg.PRES.IND aware that Anna be.3sg.IND.SUBJ at home.

‘I am aware that Ann is home.’
We will discuss the reasons behind this variability later, and again in chapter 7. As a preview, consider that while $\text{Con}(\text{Dox(\text{subject})})$ is a $d$-commitment veridical state, $\text{Dox}$ itself isn’t since, as indicated, $\text{Dox}$ contains worlds where the subject is not aware of $p$.

To sum up, with attitudes of certainty and awareness the truth condition is anchored to variants of $\text{Dox(\text{subject})}$; in the case of awareness a subset or $\text{Dox(\text{subject})}$ that contains conscious beliefs. With memory predicates, the relevant state of veridicality and commitment in the state of memory. Certainty, awareness, and memory states are solipsistic in that they all have subjective veridicality in their truth condition and lack presuppositions or engagement with the common ground, both of which could result in weakening commitment.

### 4.2.2 Attitudes of thought and opinion

Consider now attitudes of thought and so-called ‘personal taste’ (Lasersohn 2005):

(33) O Nicholas nomizi oti/*na efije i Ariadne. 
the Nicholas thinks.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.  
‘Nicholas thinks that Ariadne left.’

(34) O Nicholas theori oti/*na i Ariadne ine omorfi. 
the Nicholas believe.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne is beautiful.  
‘Nicholas considers Ariadne to be beautiful.’

(35) O Nicholas vriski oti/*na i Ariadne ine omorfi. 
the Nicholas find.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne is beautiful  
‘Nicholas finds Ariadne to be beautiful.’

Nomizo ‘think’, theoro ‘consider’ and vrisko ‘find’ are doxastic verbs; and in Greek, theoro ‘consider’ and vrisko ‘find’ take finite oti complements, unlike English. The English verbs have been discussed extensively, and are known to favor predicates of personal taste in their complements which create faultless disagreement (Lasersohn 2005). They are therefore impossible to combine with ‘objective’ predicates such as wooden:

(36) O Nicholas nomizi oti/*na to trapezi ine xylino. 
the Nicholas thinks.3sg that.IND/*SUBJ the table is wooden.  
‘Nicholas thinks that the table is wooden.’

(37) #O Nicholas theori oti to trapezi ine xylino. 
the Nicholas considers.3sg that.IND the table is wooden.  
‘Nicholas considers that the table is wooden.’

(38) #O Nicholas vriski oti i Ariadne ine eksipni. 
the Nicholas find.3sg that.IND the Ariadne be smart.
‘Nicholas believes that Ariadne is smart.’

We called verbs such as theor, vriski, consider, find verbs of opinion earlier. This explains why they require complements that contain disputable properties such as those meaning BEAUTIFUL and reject predicates like WOODEN which cannot be disputed. Having an opinion presupposes non-singularity of perspective, i.e., that the matter is not objectively settled. There are differences of opinion on whether an entity is beautiful, but there are no differences of opinion in what counts as WOODEN. There is an objective criterion for WOODEN. ³

When it comes to mood choice, for the Greek counterparts of FIND and CONSIDER engagement with the possibility of not p doesn’t seem to matter. The Greek opinion verbs behave solipsistically as pure beliefs when it comes to mood choice. For Greek, specifically, it becomes clear the vrisko FIND and theor CONSIDER complements behave like belief complements in selecting indicative. Their truth condition is identical to that of pistevo ‘believe’:

\[(39) \quad \left[ \text{Nicholas vriski/theori (finds, considers) oti p} \right] \text{ is true in } w \text{ with respect to } \text{Dox(Nicholas)} \text{ iff: } \forall w' [w' \in \text{Dox(Nicholas)} \rightarrow w' \in \{w'' | p(w'')\}]\]

Greek theor ‘consider’ and vrisko ‘find’ are thus classical Hintikka beliefs when it comes to mood choice, and although the verbs differ from pistevo in that the subject is indeed aware that there may be opposing views, the verbs remain nevertheless solipsistic. The subject hold on to their, albeit, disputable belief. The lexical entry contains no uncertainty. The intended counterstance may be just an implicature (pace Kennedy and Willer 2016) because it can be cancelled:

\[(40) \quad \text{Just like everybody else, I find Maria to be quite beautiful.}\]

If there is dispute, it is not Dox(subject) but someone else’s space. Examples like these show both commitment in the doxastic space and the weakness of the contrarian component of FIND.⁴

³The expanding literature on predicates on personal state predicates such as tasty, modern, beautiful is divided broadly into contextualists (Stephenson 2005, 2006, 2007; Glanzberg 2007, Stojanovic 2008, Saeb 2009, Kennedy and Willer 2016), and relativists (Lasersohn 2005, 2015; Egan 2007, MacFarlane 2007, 2014). Both sides posit a categorical distinction in adjectives between evaluative/subjective and non-evaluative/objective type: the former have, and the latter lack, a judge argument or parameter, it is argued. The English verb find, consequently, has been argued to combine only with judge-taking adjectives (Saeb 2009), and this is built as a presupposition, most prominently in Kennedy and Willer’s ‘(radical) counterstance’ presupposition. FIND and CONSIDER are argued to differ from BELIEVE in having the (radical) counterstance presupposition, which says that the property they embed must be disputable. We can think of counterstance as as the adversarial inference we mentioned earlier.

⁴Let us also note here that recent studies of English taste predicates show systematic gradations in the intuitions about faultless disagreement: disagreements about delicious, disgusting are
The verb THINK is similarly construed as a belief verb:

\[(41) \quad \text{[Nicholas nomizi (thinks) oti } p\text{] is true in } w \text{ with respect to } \text{Dox}(\text{Nicholas})\]

\[\text{ iff } \forall w'[w' \in \text{Dox}(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \{w''|p(w'')\}]\]

Hence, it seems to be a robust generalization that, in Greek, attitudes of thought and personal taste pattern solipsistically and select indicative.

### 4.2.3 Dream and fiction attitudes

The last class we consider is dream and fiction verbs such as *dream* and *imagine*. In this case, we do not have a doxastic model in the sense of expressive beliefs about the world, but a fictional model, comprising the set of worlds compatible with the subject’s dream or imagination, hallucination, etc. Giannakidou designated such models as $M_{\text{dream}}$ (see also Giorgi and Pianesi 1996, $M_{\text{imagination}}$, but we will use $Fic$ to refer to the various such imaginative and dream states:

\[(42) \quad \text{Dream state of an individual anchor } i \text{ (Giannakidou, 1999 (45))}\]

A dream state $Fic_{\text{dream}}(i)$ is a set of worlds associated with an individual $i$ representing worlds compatible with what $i$ dreams.

\[(43) \quad \text{Imagination state of an individual anchor } i \text{ (Giannakidou, 1999 (46))}\]

An imagination state $Fic_{\text{imagination}}(i)$ is a set of worlds associated with an individual $i$ representing worlds compatible with what $i$ imagines.

\[(44)\]

\[a. \quad \text{Nicholas onireftike oti/\#na efije i Ariadne.}\]

The Nicholas dreamt.3sg that.IND/\#SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

\[b. \quad \text{Nicholas has sognato che Ariadne è andata via.}\]

Nicholas has dreamt that Ariadne be.3sg.PRES.IND gone away.

‘Nicholas dreamt that Ariadne left.’

\[(45) \quad \text{Nicholas fandastike oti/\#na efije i Ariadne.}\]

The Nicholas imagined.3sg that.IND/\#SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.

‘Nicholas imagined that Ariadne left.’

\[(46) \quad \text{[Nicholas dreamt that } p]\]^{w,Fic_{\text{dream}}(\text{Nicholas})} \text{ is 1 iff:}\]

\[\forall w'[w' \in Fic_{\text{dream}}(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \{w''|p(w'')\}]\]
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(47)  
\[ \text{Nicholas imagined that } p \] \[ w, \text{Ficimagination}(\text{Nicholas}) \text{ is 1 iff:} \]
\[ \forall w'[w' \in \text{Ficimagination}(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \lambda w''\{w'' | p(w'')\}] \]

When someone dreams or imagines something, the relevant private space is the set of dream or imagination worlds. The dream space is, according to Giorgi and Pianesi 1996, a prototypical private space. What one dreams entails nothing about the real world. This is something expressed also in Farkas (1985, 1992) who states that ‘fictional reality replaces the actual one’. A dream or imagination state, as can be seen, fully supports \( p \), it is therefore committal and subjectively veridical. \( Oti \) anchors \( p \) to \( M_{\text{dream}} \) (subject), we will say, and adds the embedded proposition to it.

Hallucinations are similar:

(48)  
\( \text{Nicholas hallucinated that Ariadne left.} \)

(49)  
\( \text{Hallucination state of an individual anchor } i \) (Giannakidou 1999: (45))
A hallucination state \( \text{Fic hallucination}(i) \) is a set of worlds associated with an individual \( i \) representing worlds compatible with what \( i \) hallucinates about.

(50)  
\[ \text{Nicholas hallucinated that } p \] \[ w, \text{Fic hallucination}(\text{Nicholas}) \text{ is 1 iff:} \]
\[ \forall w'[w' \in \text{Fic hallucination}(\text{Nicholas}) \rightarrow w' \in \lambda w''\{w'' | p(w'')\}] \]

The fiction, dream, and hallucination states are entirely dissociated from the actual world, and are therefore private in the strictest sense. \( \text{Fic} \) is an alternative to \( \text{Dox} \), representing belief that is dissociated from reality: \( \text{Fic} \), unlike \( \text{Dox} \) does not contain beliefs about the world, but rather sets up an entirely fictional reality. The prerequisite for indicative is veridicality in \( \text{Fic} \). All doxastic states we defined, \( \text{Dox}, \text{Mem} \) and \( \text{Fic} \) express belief base commitment, though the belief can be mixed with knowledge (Mem), or can be belief about alternative realities (dream and fiction verbs).

The concept of objective \( \text{reals} \) is totally irrelevant, as it turns out, for the indicative mood. As d-commitment states ignoring reality and knowledge, veridical doxastic verbs are solipsistic, and select indicative complements, and we can view this, syntactically as a form of L(exical) selection:

(51)  
\( \text{Generalization: Strict selection of indicative in Greek} \)
\( \text{Sollipsitic Veridical verbs L(exically) select indicative } oti \text{ complements} \)

(52)  
\( \text{Greek doxastic verbs} \)
Sollipsistic Veridical Doxastic V: [CAT: [V]; SEL: [INDICATIVE: oti]]

Lexicalizations: pistevo, nomizo, onirevome, and the rest of the verbs discussed here that strictly select indicative.

The Greek doxastics are therefore lexically specified as selecting complements marked indicative by oti. Mood selection is therefore in this case like case selection, e.g. accusative or dative, for the direct object of the verb in a language that assigns case. And just like with case, mood alternations are not possible. Mood marking, thus, in strict selection, has no semantic effect as correctly pointed out in Giannakidou (2016) and Ambar (2016), unlike in optional cases e.g., epistemic subjunctive in questions and relative clauses.

Generalizing, Sollipsistic Veridical Doxastic V will select INDICATIVE also in Romance languages:

(53) Veridical doxastic verbs
Sollipsistic Veridical Doxastic V: [CAT: [V]; SEL: [INDICATIVE]]
Lexicalizations: Penso, creer, penser, croire, and the rest of the verbs in Romance that strictly select IND.

Sollipsistic Veridical doxastic verbs are thus purely subjective, and this is reflected in the grammatical choice of indicative. Let us move on to Italian now which exhibits a more flexible mood pattern with doxastics, and therefore allows us to establish a non-solipsistic belief construal with a nonveridical presupposition. Non-veridical belief contrasts with solipsistic belief in conveying an awareness by the main clause subject i that the complement is believed but not known.

### 4.3 Suppositional belief and the subjunctive

In contrast to Greek, Italian allows belief and other doxastic verbs to select indicative as well as subjunctive:

(54) Credo/Penso che Maria sia/è incinta.
Believe/Think.PRES.1sg that Mary is.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.
‘I believe that Mary is pregnant.’

The Italian doxastics are therefore mood flexible. The indicative is also allowed with non-epistemic factives, but the subjunctive is the preferred form. Subjunctive might be taken to indicate some form of weakness, e.g., partitioning in the doxastic space (as is argued, e.g., by Homer 2008). The major argument against this idea is provided by verbs of certainty and conviction (Mari 2016a) which can
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select subjunctive. When one is certain or convinced one is d-committed to the truth of \( p \), i.e., there can be no \( \neg p \) worlds in Dox.

\[ \begin{align*}
(55) & \quad \text{Sono sicura che Maria sia/è incinta.} \\
& \quad \text{Am certain.PRES.1sg that Mary be.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘I am certain that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
(56) & \quad \text{Sono convinta che Maria sia/è incinta.} \\
& \quad \text{Am convinced.PRES.1sg that Mary be.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘I am convinced that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*} \]

Moreover, as pointed in Mari (2016a), also dream verbs, which prototypically select indicative in Greek, can license subjunctive in Italian.

\[ \begin{align*}
(57) & \quad \text{Immagina che Maria sia./è incinta.} \\
& \quad \text{Imagine.PRES.3sg that Mary be.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘S/he imagines that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*} \]

It is very important to note the intuition that subjunctive with fictional predicates conveys a ‘do not know’ component (see Mari 2016a, 2017b,c). The sentence means that the attitude holder does not know whether Mary is pregnant— s/he just imagines that she is, to the best of her imagination.

Crucially, the subjunctive is not an option for Italian ‘know’, sapere, which selects indicative. This is the case for all other languages that we are aware of. With factive ‘know’ the veridicality of the epistemic space is settled. With subjunctive ‘belief’ and ‘imagining’ there is no epistemic certainty, but this does not mean that there is uncertainty in the doxastic space or in the imagination space (Mari, 2016a). Informally, the distinction between knowledge and belief, in a language like Italian can be represented as in (59).

\[ \begin{align*}
(58) & \quad \text{Sa che Maria è incinta.} \\
& \quad \text{Knows that Mary is pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘S/he knows that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
(59) & \quad \text{a. Knowledge: } p \text{ is presupposed; M is veridical (e-commitment)} \\
& \quad \text{b. Belief: that } p \text{ is known is not presupposed; Dox is veridical (d-commitment)}
\end{align*} \]

The above facts indicate clearly that (a) the difference between epistemic versus doxastic modal space matters in Italian, and (b) the Italian doxastic verbs are not lexically specified to select IND, unlike Greek and other Romance doxastics.
4.3.1 Solipsistic and suppositional belief: Italian

As mentioned earlier, an obvious conjecture is that in Italian belief is ‘weak’, and that it reveals uncertainty (Homer 2008). However, as we said, this cannot be correct because even the predicate meaning be certain licenses the subjunctive. To make our way into the semantics of Italian doxastics, a better way to start is in the context of our analysis of modals since these also select the subjunctive: in the subjunctive version, can assume that belief verbs are construed with the nonveridical presupposition as ‘believe but not know’. This ‘do not know’ component is the nonveridical presupposition of modals; when added, it imbues the doxastic verb with anti-knowledge— just like with modal verbs. The nonveridical construal is always an option, we will argue, in the interpretation of doxastic statements in Italian, and plays the key role in triggering the subjunctive.

Mari (2016a) proposes that the Italian doxastic verbs are underspecified lexically: they can be interpreted either as Hintikka beliefs (in the Greek style and selecting the indicative); or they can be interpreted conjecturally, as she calls it. The ‘do not know’ presupposition adds, just like with modals, uncertainty to the lexical entry and the doxastic verb acquires mixed veridicality. We will call such construals of doxastic attitudes suppositional doxastics. The two meanings of doxastics are, of course, closely related. The ‘believe but don’t know’ meaning can be understood under Gricean assumptions to be the more basic meaning of a doxastic. If the speaker choses to report ‘I believes that p’ rather than ‘I knows that p’, then the speaker probably doesn’t have sufficient evidence to say the latter. But ‘I believes that p’ can always be strengthened to ‘I knows that p’:

\[(60)\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Roberto believes that Carla had an offer from Harvard; in fact, he knows she did.} \\
\text{b. } & \text{I know you think otherwise, but I believe he is lying. I truly do.}
\end{align*}\]

In these examples, belief is construed quite strongly as equivalent to knowledge, or contrasting another’s disbelief. Such uses of belief verbs are quite common, and rely of course on the context, as all strengthenings do. The Greek style Hintikka doxastic verbs can be understood as conventionalizations of strengthened belief, but Italian doxastics, apparently, can retain ‘believe but don’t know’. When construed this way, Italian doxastics obey the Nonveridicality axiom of modals and combine a veridical assertion with a nonveridical epistemic presupposition. It is then no surprise that they select the subjunctive, just as modals do.

4.3.2 Nonveridical epistemic space with suppositional belief

Our specific proposal for suppositional doxastics in Italian will implement the system we employed for MUST, and we will present an analysis building on Mari
(2016a) (which is responsible also for revealing the empirical richness of the phenomenon). Suppositional belief statements and bare sentences differ in some important respects which are reminiscent of the difference between bare sentences and MUST discussed in chapter 2. Note that this is not peculiar to Italian. English also allows spelling out a series of differences between belief statements and bare assertions, which highlight the ‘lack of knowledge’ component of belief. The most important test is parallel to the one that we used in chapter 2 to show that MUST lacks knowledge.

(61) Context: I look through the window and it is raining.
   a. It is raining.
   b. #I believe that it is raining.
   c. #It must be raining.

In the context where knowledge of $p$ is established, a mere belief statement is weak, just like a MUST statement is.

Belief statements and assertion have different effects on the common ground. The bare assertion is a proposal to update the common ground with $p$, while a belief statement cannot eliminate $\neg p$ worlds. Denials are a good test to capture the difference.

(62) Context. I believe that God exists. I utter:
   a. God exists.
   b. I believe that God exists.

Only the bare assertion can be challenged. Neither the belief statement nor the prejacent embedded under it can be. Consider this more closely:

(63) A: "I believe that God exists."
    B: "No you are wrong." A: "I only said that I believe it" !

(64) A: "God exists."
    B: "No you are wrong." A:="#I only said that I believe it" !

We have put forth the same argument for future expressions (Giannakidou and Mari, 2018a), which we claimed are universal epistemic modals akin to MUST. If we are correct, belief in some languages and under a suppositional interpretation, becomes the attitude counterpart of MUST.\(^5\) How can we reconcile these observations with the claim, which we have been defending based on the Greek data, that belief is strong and reveals d-commitment? Mari (2016a) proposes that we can distinguish between two beliefs: the classic Hintikka belief which is

\(^5\)See also Papafragou 2006 for a suggestion in this direction.
veridical and solipsistic, and the MUST-like belief which is suppositional. Mari characterized Hintikka belief ‘credence’. Just like MUST, we argue, suppositional belief features two modal bases, a veridical doxastic one (just as with Hintikka belief) and a nonveridical epistemic modal base. We generalize this treatment here.

Greek verbs are lexically specified, as we showed, as solipsistic doxastics, hence the mood rigidity. Italian verbs, on the other hand, are underspecified in the lexicon. The indicative is a signal that the verb is used solipsistically; and the subjunctive is signal to add the nonveridical anti-knowledge presupposition. The co-existence of a nonveridical $M(i)$ (as with modals), and a veridical $Dox(i)$ in a single lexical entry is sufficient to explain the licensing of the subjunctive in Italian and in other languages. $Dox$ is the single modal base relevant for classical doxastics in Greek, French and the languages that select indicative; but $Dox$ is only one of the two parameters for suppositional belief. The two types of belief are given below (in a preliminary format), following Mari (2016a) but with our new terminology here:

(65) Solipsistic belief (also called ‘expressive’ in Mari, 2016a)
\[
[i \text{ believe}_{sol} p]^{Dox,i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'(w' \in \cap Dox) \rightarrow p(w')
\]

(66) Suppositional belief: (called ‘conjectural’ in Mari, 2016a)
\[
[i \text{ believe}_{sup} p]^{M,Dox,i} \text{ is defined iff } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined, } \forall w'(w' \in Dox) \rightarrow p(w')
\]

Solipsistic belief is the subjectively veridical belief described in section 2. It only features a doxastic modal base, or variants thereof and expresses $d$-commitment. Suppositional belief, on the other hand, while also expressing $d$-commitment, it also takes $M$ as an argument and obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom: i.e., it has a presupposition, like MUST, that the epistemic space $M$ is nonveridical. It is this that renders a suppositional belief verb akin to ‘believe but not know’. In other words, Italian belief is not weaker doxastically than solipsistic belief.

One can view suppositional doxastics as mixed doxastics — mixed in the sense that they combine in their lexical entry belief and lack of knowledge. The two kinds of belief, crucially, can be expressed also by Greek and French modal adjectives which are attitudinal, and have the structure in (66), which explains that they are subjunctive licensors.\(^6\)

(67) Il est probable qu'il vienne.
It is probable that he come.SUBJ.3sg.
'It is probable that he comes.'

(68) Ine pithano na erthi. (Greek)
is probable that.SUBJ he come.3sg.

\(^6\)In French both subjunctive and indicative are possible with future orientation.
'It is probable that he comes.'

Here again, the matter is not settled in the epistemic modal base, but in those worlds that better comply with the stereotypicality conditions are worlds in which the prejacent is true. The subjunctive is thus predicted, as we elaborated in chapter 2.

It is important to acknowledge this distinction between two types of belief is a more general phenomenon, and does not concern just Italian. However, in Italian this distinction is made visible by the systematic flexibility of mood. In other languages, especially those lacking systematic mood distinctions in clausal complements, the distinction may surface in other ways. We are not saying that mood is a prerequisite for the two kinds of belief to exist; we are saying that the subjunctive versus indicative distinction is a safe diagnostic to track the difference.

To provide a fuller picture, consider fictional predicates which are indicative selectors in Greek but flexible in Italian. As we already noted, the interpretation with the indicative and the subjunctive mood are not identical: when the indicative is used, the fictional space of the attitude holder is described. When the subjunctive is used, the speaker reports a supposition and contrasts it with knowledge. Letting $Fic$ be the set of propositions corresponding to the imagination of the attitude holder, the two resulting interpretations for *immaginare* in Italian are the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(69) Private or solipsistic imagination (Mari, 2016a calls this ‘expressive fictional’)}
& \quad [i \text{ immaginare}_{sol} p]^{Fic,i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' (w' \in Fic \rightarrow p(w')) \\
\text{(70) Suppositional imagination: (Mari, 2016a calls this ‘conjectural fictional’)}
& \quad [i \text{ immaginare}_{inq} p]^{M,Fic,i} \text{ is defined iff } = 1 \text{ iff } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined, } \\
& \quad \forall w' (w' \in Fic) \rightarrow p(w')
\end{align*}
\]

As we have noted, predicates of certainty also license the subjunctive. Let us recall the examples:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(71) Sono sicura che Maria sia/é incinta. –} \\
& \quad \text{Am certain.PRES.1sg that Mary be.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘I am certain that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(72) Sono convinta che Maria sia/è incinta. –} \\
& \quad \text{Am convinced.PRES.1sg that Mary be.SUBJ/IND.3sg pregnant.} \\
& \quad \text{‘I am convinced that Mary is pregnant.’}
\end{align*}
\]

We treat certainty just as we treat belief (in the same way as in a Hintikkean
semantics belief and certainty amounts to the same).

(73) Solipsistic certainty:
\[
\begin{align*}
\llbracket i \text{ CERTAIN}_{sol}\, p \rrbracket^{M,Cer,i} = 1 \iff \\
\forall w' (w' \in Cer \rightarrow p(w'))
\end{align*}
\]

(74) Suppositional certainty:
\[
\begin{align*}
\llbracket i \text{ CERTAIN}_{sup}\, p \rrbracket^{M,Cer,i} \text{ is defined iff } = 1 \iff & M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined, } \\
& \forall w' (w' \in Cer) \rightarrow p(w')
\end{align*}
\]

By using Cer instead of Dox we intend to signal that probably the modal base is construed based on different evidence. While doxa includes personal opinions, guesses, consideration of normality conditions, certainty involves inferential evidence (see discussion in Mari 2016a, 2017a,b). As with belief, certainty does not imply knowledge; unlike belief, to form a thought that can be qualified as certain, the speaker uses more reliable knowledge such as facts, and inferences.

Consider, finally, the role of negation. When doxastic verbs get negated, they can allow subjunctive (see Giannakidou 1995, Quer 1998, 2001). This was the use of the subjunctive that initiated the characterization ‘polarity subjunctive’ in the literature:

(75) a. Dhen pistevo oti/na efiye i Ariadne.
not believe.1sg that.IND/SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘I don’t that Ariadne left.’

b. Pistevo oti/*na efiye i Ariadne.
believe.1sg that.IND/*SUBJ left.3sg the Ariadne.
‘I believe that Ariadne left.’

If I don’t believe that Ariadne left, then it is not the case that all world in Dox are worlds where Ariadne left. The subjunctive is therefore licensed.

(76) \[
\begin{align*}
\llbracket i \text{ dhen pistevo } 'not believe'\, p \rrbracket^{Dox,i} \text{ is } = 1 \iff \\
\forall w'' \in Dox(i)(p(w''))
\end{align*}
\]
The effect of negation on the attitude is thus simply understood as a consequence of the fact that Dox is no longer veridical, and the subjunctive is fully expected.

To sum up, in Italian, mood flexibility between indicative and subjunctive with doxastic verbs reveals that doxastic verbs can be construed as obeying the Non-veridicality axiom of modals, i.e., as taking an epistemic nonveridical modal base as an additional argument. This component is absent from classical belief verbs, which we labelled solipsistic. These track only the doxastic dimension, and have simple, uni-dimensional lexical entries lacking the nonveridical presupposition. With suppositional doxastics, what is known and what is believed co-exist in the lexical entry, and it appears that Italian doxastic verbs are systematically construed
4.3. SUPPOSITIONAL BELIEF AND THE SUBJUNCTIVE

In this way.

Generalizing, we propose the following lexical entry for Suppositional Doxastic V, which will select SUBJUNCTIVE also in Romance languages:

(77) Suppositional doxastic verbs
Suppositional Doxastic V : [CAT: [V]; SEL: [SUBJUNCTIVE] ]
Lexicalizations: Italian doxastics, Greek memory verbs, SEEM (to be discussed next)

Italian doxastics can be construed suppositionally or veridically, and they will select the respective moods. In other words, Italian doxastics appear to be massively underspecified.

4.3.3 Summary: typology of doxastic attitudes and mood

Let us summarize our analysis of epistemic and doxastic verbs in Greek and Italian.

(78) Typology of doxastic verbs
a. Indicative-selecting solipsistic doxastic verbs: they have a simple truth condition and assert doxastic commitment.
b. Subjunctive-selecting suppositional doxastic verbs: the doxastic commitment assertion is augmented with an epistemic nonveridical presupposition. Dox and M coexist in the lexical entry: full doxastic commitment in the truth condition, and nonveridicality in the presupposition.
c. Some doxastic verbs are lexically specified as solipsistic (Greek doxastics). Other verbs are underspecified, and can accept the nonveridical presupposition. Underspecified verbs allow both moods.

Given this typology, we can see that there is a continuum between the assertion of the unmodalized veridical sentence and doxastic statements. By having postulated veridicality and commitment as preconditions on assertion, we assume that, when asserting $p$, the co-operative truthful speaker is BOTH doxastically and epistemically committed to $p$. The speaker believes and knows (always relatively to the best of her knowledge) that $p$ is true.

With Italian-style subjunctive belief, the speaker believes that $p$ is true, but does not know that $p$ is true (to the best of her knowledge, she knows that she does not know whether $p$ is true). With Greek-style indicative belief (which, do not forget, is also an option in Italian), the speaker believes that $p$ is true and knowledge of whether $p$ is true or false is not relevant. The doxastic verb meaning is more flexible in Italian than it is in Greek. But as we will see next, Greek too
4.4 More flexible doxastics: memory, semblance, perception

4.4.1 Mood flexibility with memory verbs

Recall that memory verbs can take subjunctive:

(79) O Nicholas thimate na kleini ton the Nicholas remembered.3sg that.SUBJ close.NONPAST.3sg. the porta, alla den ine sigouros. door, but not is sure.
4.4. MORE FLEXIBLE DOXASTICS: MEMORY, SEMBLANCE, PERCEPTION

‘Nicholas remembers closing the door, but he is not entirely sure.’

The subjunctive is compatible with a context where Nicholas is not fully sure about his memory, and he has some doubt, i.e., he ‘does not know for sure’. This is the by now a familiar nonveridical supposition that denies knowledge. The solipsistic oti clause is incompatible with such reading:

(80) #O Nicholas thimate oti eklise ton porta, alla den the Nicholas remembered.3sg that.IND closed.3sg. the door, but not ine sigouros.
is sure.
‘#Nicholas remembers that he closed the door, but he is not entirely sure.’

Note the exact parallel with the English -ing clause. The that vs. ing difference is reflected in Greek with the oti vs. na distinction.

Recall that with verbs such as thiname ‘remember’, we are looking at Mem (subject), that it to say, the set of propositions that are remembered by the attitude holder:

(81) Memory state of an individual anchor i
A state Mem(i) is a set of worlds associated with an individual i representing worlds compatible with what i remembers.

(82) \[ [i \text{ remember-}oti/\text{that } p] w,Mem,i = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Mem}(i)(p(w'')). \]

Memory is construed solipsistically as a combination of knowledge and belief, as we said earlier, and takes indicative and that. What is remembered is indeed a combination of knowledge and belief. Memories are not photographic snapshots of the world, but rather inner representations of events, construed, compensated to, or even made up by the person who remembers; hence Mem can contain also pure beliefs.

Memory can also be construed as remembering a fact, in which case we have pu and an epistemic M:

(83) O Nicholas thimate pu eklise ton porta, (#alla den the Nicholas remembered.3sg that.IND closed.3sg. the door, but not ine sigouros).
is sure.
‘Nicholas remembers the fact that he closed the door, (#but he is not entirely sure).’

(84) \[ [i \text{ REMEMBER-}pu/\text{the fact that } p] w,Mem,i = 1 \text{ iff } p \in w; \text{ if defined, } \forall w'' \in \text{Mem}(i)(p(w'')). \]
Here we have the factive presupposition \( p \in w \), plus commitment in \( Mem \). The subjunctive variant, however, uses \( Mem \), and the presupposition that \( M_{epistemic} \) is nonveridical. In this case, what is remembered will be contrasted with what is known. What we remember does not always correspond to what is real.

(85) Suppositional memory:

\[
[i \ \text{REMEMBER}_{\text{sup}} \ p]^{M,Mem,i} \ \text{is defined iff} \ M(i) \ \text{is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined,}
\]

\[
[i \ \text{REMEMBER}_{\text{sup}} \ p]^{M,Mem,i} = 1 \ \text{iff} \ \forall w'(w' \in Mem \rightarrow p(w'))
\]

The interplay is crucially between d-commitment (veridicality) in Memory, but partition (nonveridicality) in the presupposition. The subjunctive is triggered, exactly parallel to Italian, in case the subject remembers but doesn’t know for sure.

### 4.4.2 Semblance verbs

The attitude \text{SEEM/APPEAR} behaves in a similar way to the memory verb and has considerable flexibility. We have not discussed these predicates thus far because in English they are raising construals, unlike the typical attitude verbs. Their attitude anchor is the speaker. Implicative verbs and ability modals (to be discussed in chapter 6) have similar syntactic properties, and are likewise anchored to the speaker’s doxastic state. It is useful to consider here semblance verbs both for their flexibility, as well as because they raise important questions about perception and veridicality.

The key facts are below. We have used translations in English to capture accurately the meaning of the Greek sentences which differ minimally only in the use of complementizers. As we see, all three complementizers — \( na, oti, pu \) — are allowed:

(86) Ta paidia fenonde na ine kourasmena (ala bori ke na the children seem.3pl that.SUBJ be.3sg tired (but might and subj min ine).

not be.3pl).

‘The children seem to be tired (but they might not be).’

(87) Ta paidia fenonde oti ine kourasmena (#ala bori ke na the children seem.3pl that.IND be.3sg tired (but might and subj min ine).

not be.3pl).

‘It is obvious that the children are tired (#but they might not be).’
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(88) Ta paidia fenonde pu ine kourasmena (#ala bori ke na the children seem.3pl that.IND be.3sg tired (but might and subj min ine).
not be.3pl).
‘The children are tired, and it is apparent.’

It is in the nature of the semblance predicates to be a flexible attitude sometimes as knowledge (using the appearance of P as evidence for P), and sometimes as suppositional belief, in which case it takes the subjunctive. The subjunctive complement of a semblance SEEM, APPEAR predicate allows the nonveridical inference: for any predicate P, and individual x, x seems P does not entail that x is P. In other words, appearances can be deceiving, and semblance verbs do not entail knowledge. We call this variant ‘suppositional SEEM’ below to keep in line with our vocabulary so far:

(89) Suppositional SEEM (fenete with subjunctive Greek):
\[ [i \text{SEEM}_{\text{sup}} P]^{M,\text{Dox,speaker}} \text{ is defined iff } M(\text{speaker}) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined, }\]
\[ [i \text{SEEM}_{\text{sup}} P]^{M,\text{Dox,speaker}} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' (w' \in \text{Dox}(\text{speaker}) \rightarrow p(w')) \]

Suppositional SEEM then, it is pretty much like suppositional belief and memory in Italian and Greek, only anchored to the speaker. The speaker expresses a belief that i has the property p (or, any proposition), but at the same time they know that they do not know that for sure.

The indicative complement correlates with solipsist commitment, in which case oti will be chose, or with factivity in which case we will have pu:

(90) Solipsistic SEEM ((fenete oti Greek)
\[ [i \text{SEEM}_{\text{solipsistic}} P]^{w,\text{Dox,speaker}} \text{ is } 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Dox}(\text{speaker})(p(w'')) \]

(91) Factive SEEM (fenete pu Greek)
\[ [i \text{SEEM}_{\text{factive}} P]^{w,\text{Dox,speaker}} \text{ is } 1 \text{ iff } p \in w' ; \text{ if defined } \forall w'' \in \text{Dox}(\text{speaker})(p(w'')) \]
(\text{fenete pu Gr.})

We see that the lexical entry is flexible and can associate with both Dox and M. This flexibility affects veridicality which is itself reflected in the distinct mood choice. We want to repeat therefore that flexibility in mood choice does not necessitate imposing ambiguity in the lexical entries of propositional attitude verbs. It rather shows that doxastic propositional attitudes exhibit the variability that we see typically with modal in being able to pick different modal bases, and in some cases, to take two. Here, Dox and M belong to the same realm of epistemic modality; we will see more interactions in the bouletic realm in chapter 5, including lexical entries being able to combine with epistemic/doxastic base or bouletic
ones (such as, for instance, the lexical entries of persuasion attitudes).

In Italian we observe indicative/subjunctive alternations, as one can expect. Just as in Greek, the attitude holder is always the speaker. When the speaker does not know, only the subjunctive is possible. In this case, there is epistemic uncertainty and the embedded clause expresses a likelihood judgment about \( p \), very similarly to credere.

(92) Sembra che sia arrivato.
    Seems that be.SUBJ.3sg arrived.
    ‘It seems that he has arrived.’

When the speaker knows that \( p \) is false, both the indicative and the subjunctive are possible.

(93) Sembra che ha/abbia vent’anni.
    Looks like that have.IND/SUBJ.3sg twenty-years.
    ‘It looks like he is twenty years old’

When the subjunctive is used, the subjunctive enhances an effect that we find akin to ‘widening’ of the common ground: in most similar worlds, which are not part of the common ground, he is twenty. The epistemic uncertainty of the SEEM relation seems to be generally producing this effect, therefore also in Greek. If you widen what can be known, it becomes more difficult to know for sure.

Note, finally, that in Italian suppositional belief can also appear in the infinitival:

(94) Sembra essere contento.
    Seems be happy.
    ‘He seems to be happy.’

Let us move on now to perception verbs.

4.4.3 Perception verbs

Perception patterns are very similar to semblance and memory: subjunctive and indicative are both possible:

(95) O Nicholas idhe ton Flavio na
    the Nicholas saw.3sg the Flavio that.SUBJ
    kleini tin porta, alla i porta dhen ine
    close.NONOPAST.IMPERF.3sg. the door, but the door not is
    kleisti.
    closed.
‘Nicholas saw Flavio closing the door, but the door is not closed.’

(96) O Nicholas iðhe oti o Flavio eklise ton porta, alla the Nicholas saw.3sg that.IND the Flavio closed.3sg. the door, but i porta den ine klisti. the door not is closed.

‘#Nicholas saw that Flavio closed the door, #but the door is not closed.’

Observe again the contrast in finiteness in English between an *-ing* or bare infinitival complement and a that complement. The subjunctive complement (equivalent to the *-ing* complement) conveys direct perception, seeing with Nicholas’ own eyes. In addition, the closing of the door need not necessarily include the result state of the door being closed. The indicative complement, on the other hand, includes the result state. The difference, we will argue, illustrates that in the indicative complement we have a veridical doxastic state that includes the result, but in the subjunctive complement we have the presupposition of not knowing that the door is closed in all worlds.

For $p$ being indicative ‘Flavio closes the door and the door is closed’, we have the following. Anchoring again happens to the speaker’s doxastic state:

(97) Seeing is believing (solipsistic SEE, indicative)

\[
[i \text{ SEE}_{\text{belief}} p]^{w,\text{Dox}(\text{speaker})} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Dox}(\text{speaker})(p(w'')).
\]

Greek *vlepo oti* denotes solipsistic SEE. Here, seeing is understood as a solipsistic belief that the door is closed. It cannot be contradicted without producing Moore paradoxical effects. The subjunctive, on the other hand, reveals the following structure ($\text{Per}$ is for ‘perception state’):

(98) Suppositional SEE ($vlepo na$):

\[
[i \text{ see}_{\text{sup}} P]^{M,\text{Per, speaker}} \text{ is defined iff } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base). If defined, } [i \text{ see}_{\text{sup}} P]^{M,\text{Per, speaker}} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'(w' \in \text{Per}(\text{spekaer}) \rightarrow p(w')).
\]

Here, the speaker perceives that Flavio closes the door, but doesn’t know that the door is closed. The modal base is now strictly perception ($\text{Per}$ stands for perception worlds) and the nonveridical epistemic presupposition is added. This explains both the direct perception effect and non-entailment to the result.

There is finally also a factive construal. This is parallel to the factive SEEM and REMEMBER: it contains the factive presupposition of objective veridicality, and then commitment in $\text{Per}$ (or $\text{Dox}$, we don’t think the difference is important here):
Nicholas saw that Flavio closed the door, but the door is not closed.

We therefore find a systematic pattern of flexibility in Greek that allows us to see not just the mood flexibility, but also an important distinction within the indicative between a solipsistic, subjective veridicality construal, and a presuppositional factive one. This difference is hard to detect in Italian or any other Romance language, since these languages lack overt lexicalizations of the factive indicative.

We think it is useful to consider that there are additional temporal constraints on the perception verb. Observe:

Recall our discussion in chapter 3. The subjunctive complement accepts only the PRES from. Let us explain this by showing why the other options are bad. The NONPAST is bad because it forces future reference. PAST is bad because seeing requires simultaneity. Hence, the true perception reading forces simultaneity: you cannot be seeing in the now of an event of the past. Seeing and happening of the event must therefore coincide. This is why a past complement of SEE (in the indicative) results in an 'understand' reading. We take the attitude UNDERSTAND to be a doxastic attitude too.

With indicative seeing there is no problem with past or even future, because the modal base is not Per. The reading is, in other words, not true perception. HEAR behaves similarly. HEAR plus indicative is indirect perception, so temporally independent, but HEAR plus subjunctive is just like the seeing variant.
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(103) Akousa oti o Giannis *xtipisi/xtipise tin porta.
hear.1sg ind the John *knock.NONPAST.3sg/*PAST.3sg the street.
‘I heard that John knocked on the door.’

In both cases the direct perception reading forces the necessity of PRES.

4.4.4 Summary: mood choice with doxastic verbs

To sum up: what is crucial for the licensing the subjunctive in all the cases of doxastic predicates that we studied in this chapter is the presence of a non-veridical epistemic modal base M in the presupposition of the lexical entry. This rendered suppositional doxastic verbs similar to modals: they both obey the Nonveridicality Axiom. We saw this to be the case with:

1. Modal verbs;
2. Belief, certainty, awareness, and opinion attitudes;
3. Imagination and fiction attitudes;
4. Memory attitudes;
5. Semblance attitudes;
6. Perception and attitudes;

It becomes clear, then, that the subjunctive mood depends on the nonveridical epistemic presupposition of a lexical entry. Some attitude verbs are strict—or, solipsistic, as we called them—and cannot combine with a nonveridical M. These express ‘pure’ subjectively veridicality and commitment, and prototypical cases are Greek doxastic attitudes of belief, certainty, imagination (thus, other than memory, perception and semblance verbs), and the many similar verbs in Romance that follow the Greek pattern.

The use of subjunctive, on the other hand, is an indication of lack of knowledge. The subjunctive is thus an anti-knowledge marker, like modal verbs. It is the mood indicating that the attitude holder does not know p:

(104) Subjunctive as epistemic uncertainty

For a proposition p and an individual anchor i (where i is the speaker or a propositional attitude subject):
SUBJUNCTIVE (p) entails that i does not know p to be true.
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The above is the broadest generalization for the subjunctive given what we have discussed so far—and it can account for all uses of subjunctive to be discussed in this book, including cases of autonomous subjunctive in main clauses where, as we saw, the subjunctive itself seems to contribute a possibility modal. Epistemic uncertainty is expressed formally as obeying the Nonveridicality principle, which for propositional attitudes will be as follows:

(105) **Nonveridicality Axiom for propositional attitudes**
For any propositional attitude verb ATT and epistemic space M, ATT is nonveridical if ATT M (\(p\)) can be defined if and only M is nonveridical, i.e., if M contains \(p\) and \(\neg p\) worlds.

(106) **Nonveridicality Axiom of modals**
MODAL (M) (\(p\)) can be defined if and only if the modal base M is nonveridical, i.e., M contains \(p\) and \(\neg p\) worlds.

Hence, modals and attitudes are similar in that they can take a nonveridical epistemic M as their argument, and they can both require that M be nonveridical.

At the same time, doxastic verbs at their truth conditional core—both when they select the subjunctive and when the select the indicative—are ‘strong’ in that they denote veridical states, expressing commitment of the attitude holder to the complement proposition. In combining these two components, the subjunctive doxastics become similar to modals, which express commitment to Ideal worlds. The difference between attitudes and modals is that with modals there is no additional modal base, but with attitudes we have various kinds of doxastic models (Dox, Fic, Cer, Mem), combining with the epistemic M.

We want to emphasize two things: first, the use of subjunctive remains doxastic and does not add a preferential component to the lexical entry. This is important to remember because often attempts are made to render the subjunctive dependent to non-doxastic or epistemic spaces. This is clearly a problematic assumption given the bulk of data we discussed here, and more discussion will follow in chapter 5.

Secondly, we found in Greek a systematic pattern of flexibility that allows us to see an important distinction within the indicative: we have a subjective veridicality construal reflected with o\(ti\), and a presuppositional factive lexical entry reflected with pu. We found this pattern to be true of knowledge, memory, semblance and perception verbs, it was therefore quite systematic. This difference is hard to detect in Italian or any other Romance language since these languages lack overt lexicalizations of the factive indicative (pu); but the two kinds of indicatives are significant in showing, as we will present next, that the indicative is not simply the mood of assertion—as much literature to data seems to assume (most notably Farkas’s work)—but also, and quite distinctively, a mood sensitive to presuppo-
sitional material, namely to an objective veridicality (factivity) presupposition.

Let us now move on to develop this last piece further by address the discourse functions of the mood particles.

### 4.5 Anchoring updates of mood morphemes

In this section, we discuss the discourse function of mood morphemes. Semantically, as we mentioned already, the subjunctive and indicative contribute no independent modality; they rather reflect the veridical or nonveridical property of the scope of the higher verb. By contrast, in main clauses, the subjunctive may contribute a possibility modal, as can be recalled from our earlier discussions:

(107) Ti na theli?
     What that.SUBJ want-3sg.
     ‘What might he want?’

(108) Na tou arese to fagito?
     That.SUBJ he-GEN liked-3sg the food.
     ‘Might it be the case that he liked the food?’

The subjunctive adds a possibility epistemic modal might. Importantly, these questions are reflective and open ended, as we said. Giannakidou 2016 calls this subjunctive epistemic, and has the following denotation:

(109) Epistemic subjunctive as a possibility modal

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Epistemic subjunctive as a possibility modal} \\
& \left[ ?(\text{Subjunctive } p)) \right]_{M,i,S}^{L,R} = \exists w' \in \mathcal{M}(i) : p(w'); \\
& \text{where ‘?’ is the question operator}
\end{align*}
\]

As we noted at the beginning of chapter 3, the subjunctive in main clauses does have the semantic contribution of a possibility modal. In complementation, however, the subjunctive is a subordinator, as can be seen clearly in Greek, and all the semantic action is in the (non)veridicality of the main attitude verb. We used the subjunctive as a diagnostic for whether the verb contains an epistemic uncertainty presupposition or not.

In subordination, mood morphemes can be subordinators themselves as in Greek, or not as in Italian; in both cases they have the function of anchoring the embedded proposition to the preceding discourse. Preceding discourse is, in this case, the main clause— hence anchoring will result in updating the attitude with the complement proposition, thus creating a sub-context within the larger context (and the common ground that main clause is anchored to). The complement does not have access to the common ground, it can therefore not update it. The discourse anchoring of mood is comparable to the Now Anchoring that we
mentioned earlier. Syntactically, if Now-anchoring happens at the Mood node, update anchoring happens at C.

Recall our mood generalizations:

(110)  
  a. The subjunctive is sensitive to the nonveridicality in the presuppositional component of an attitude verb.
  b. The indicative *oti* is sensitive to the veridicality of the truth condition.
  c. The indicative *pu* is sensitive to the veridicality of the presupposition. It is selected by verbs that have a veridical presupposition (either a factive one, or a presupposition of subjective veridicality, as we explore further with emotives in chapter 7).

The subjunctive versus indicative difference appears to be not just a difference in veridicality (indicative) vs. nonveridicality (subjunctive), but also a difference at the level at which the sensitivity applies: the truth conditions (indicative) vs. the presupposition (subjunctive). But there is also presuppositional indicative, manifested in Greek *pu*. The indicative can therefore not be de facto identified with assertion, as we emphasized already.

The indicative *oti* performs assertive anchoring. We will call this also Private Anchoring!:

(111) Indicative: Private Anchoring

Anchor *p* to epistemic M(subject), or Dox(subject).

The *oti* proposition is a signal to add *p* to the local M(subject) or Dox(subject). Embedded indicative in Italian functions in exactly the same way. Because it is an embedded clause, addition cannot happen to the common ground, as we said; only the propositional attitude sentence itself gets added to the common ground. The addition of *p* to M or Dox, narrows down the worlds in those spaces by intersection, as expected.

(112) $\text{Dox}(i) + p = \{w' \in \text{Dox}/M \text{ where } p \text{ is true}\}$

The update Private Anchoring anchors *p* to the main subject’s private space, thus performing a kind of context shift. This addition is informative: it adds more information to the preceding modal space and narrows down possibilities in it. The private spaces can be build information by adding propositions, just like unembedded assertions add to the context set W(c). *Oti* is unnecessary in main clauses, where addition happens to the common ground, and this explains without any additional assumptions, the absence of *oti* in main clauses. *Oti* performs only private assert; it is not a lexicalization of the Assert operator.

Greek has another type of indicative, we argue, which does performs what we
4.5. ANCHORING UPDATES OF MOOD MORPHEMES

call presuppositional anchoring: \textit{pu}. In this case, \textit{p} is required to already be in the common ground:

\begin{align*}
\text{(113) Presuppositional (pu) indicative:} & \text{ Presuppositional anchoring} \\
& \text{\textit{p} is already in the common ground.}
\end{align*}

Presuppositional anchoring doesn’t update M or Dox, the way private anchoring does. We can rather think of it as a filter: the proposition added by the \textit{pu} clause is already in the common ground (factivity), and does not add new information. This captures the distribution of \textit{pu} with all the doxastic verbs we mentioned here, as well as the occurrence of \textit{pu} with emotive factives (to be discussed further in chapter 7). Just as an illustration of the contrast with \textit{oti}, recall that \textit{pu} can’t be used in the a context where the speaker doesn’t know \textit{p}. Consider the answer to a question: How much did that book cost?

\begin{align*}
\text{(114) Ksero} & \text{ know.1sg *pu/oti } \text{\textit{kostise} 25 dollaria. ksero know.1sg that.IND-\textit{pu}cost-3sg 25 dollars.} \\
& \text{‘I know that it cost 25 dollars.’}
\end{align*}

In this context of seeking information, the person asking the question does not know how much the book costs. Hence that the book cost 25 dollars is not part of the common ground, and \textit{pu} cannot be used. The fact that Greek lexicalizes an assertive and a non-assertive distinction in the indicative suggests quite clearly that the indicative mood is not fully isomorphic to assertability, contrary to what e.g. Farkas (2003) claims.

For subjunctive, with Giorgi and Pianesi (1996) and Mari (2017a,b,c), we propose Non-veridical anchoring:

\begin{align*}
\text{(115) Subjunctive anchoring:} & \text{ Non-veridical anchoring} \\
& \text{Do not add \textit{p} to the common ground.}
\end{align*}

The subjunctive mood is a prohibition: do not add \textit{p} to the common ground. Given that, as we saw in chapter 3, main clause subjunctives are non-assertions, we can generalize that the subjunctive mood is an instruction \textit{not} to add \textit{p} to the common ground.

Finally, we have inquisitive anchoring with embedded questions (Greek an, 'whether'). Inquisitive anchoring is adding a question:

\begin{align*}
\text{(116) An/Whether: Inquisitive anchoring} & \text{ Add } ?\textit{p} \text{ to the common ground}
\end{align*}

Inquisitive anchoring adds specifically a question to the common ground C.

Here we can show in pictures what the output of the anchoring rules are, as a
mnemonic tool for the reader (see Mari 2015a, 2017a,b for more discussion about possible spaces and their interactions).


![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

We see here that what it is being anchored is the private state of the epistemic agent and that anchoring to the common ground is irrelevant.

(118) PU-Anchoring: $p$ is already in the common ground.

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

(119) NA/subjunctive-anchoring: non-assertive anchoring to M; is partitioned into $p$ and non-$p$ worlds.

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

Our anchoring approach acknowledges that mood morphemes have sentential update functions (Portner 2009, 2018), just like, e.g., the imperative. And the imperative too is a signal of nonveridicality, i.e., the proposition that follows is not
objectively true, or known to the speaker. In fact, as we will argue in chapter 5, the imperative has an anti-veridical presupposition (that \( p \) is objectively false, or is believed to be false by the speaker) at the time of utterance. Hence, one can generalize that non-indicative moods all require nonveridicality in the presupposition. Unlike the imperative, the subjunctive in complement clauses and adjuncts does not have illocutionary force because illocutionary force is a property of main contexts only.

The analysis we proposed here, finally, shares some similarities and differences with Farkas (2003). Farkas uses updates of private states, but unlike in our theory, for her the verb is responsible for the update of \( p \). For us, it is the mood morpheme itself that is responsible for anchoring \( p \) (see also Mari, 2017a,b and the recent study in Mari and Portner, 2019). Quer (2001), at the same time, proposes to consider mood in a dialogical perspective, where subjunctive means, in essence, disagreement and lack of endorsement (he calls it ‘model shift’). As we showed in the four preceding chapters, the subjunctive does not depend on disagreement, but on the nonveridical presupposition of epistemic uncertainty. This characterizes all uses of the subjunctive.

4.6 Conclusions

In this chapter, we proposed a theory of mood choice that relied on the simple premise that what underlies mood choice is veridicality and nonveridicality. The indicative mood is selected by veridical predicates, i.e. epistemic verbs such as those meaning KNOW which are objectively veridical, i.e. they entail truth of the complement in the actual world, and solipsistic doxastics, which are subjectively veridical and entail truth of the complement in a doxastic space (\( \text{Dox, Fic, Mem, Cer, Per} \) and the like.

\( \text{(120) Licensing condition for the indicative mood} \)

The indicative will be licensed in the complement of a propositional attitude that is veridical (objectively or subjectively).

The indicative is therefore the mood of truth but also of subjective veridicality and full commitment.

The subjunctive, on the other hand, is the mood of nonveridicality. It is an indicator of non-entailment in the modal space, and this is typically manifested as epistemic uncertainty. The subjunctive is selected by propositional attitudes that, like modals, obey the Nonveridicality Axiom:

\( \text{(121) Nonveridicality Axiom for propositional attitudes} \)

For any propositional attitude verb \( \text{ATT} \) and epistemic space \( \text{M} \), \( \text{ATT} \) is
nonveridical if ATT M (p) can be defined if and only if M is nonveridical, i.e., M contains p and ¬p worlds.

(122) **Nonveridicality Axiom of modals**
MODAL (M) (p) can be defined if and only if the modal base M is nonveridical, i.e., M contains p and ¬p worlds.

(123) **Licensing condition for the subjunctive mood**
The subjunctive will be licensed in the complement of an attitude that obeys the Nonveridicality axiom.

Modals and attitudes are similar in that they can take a nonveridical epistemic M as their argument, and they can both have the presupposition that M must be nonveridical. Attitudes, in addition, take doxastic spaces as arguments due to their lexical meaning. Doxastic verbs at their truth conditional core — both when they select the subjunctive and when they select the indicative — denote veridical states expressing commitment of the attitude holder to the complement proposition. The use of subjunctive with doxastic propositional attitudes is in itself an argument against the association of the subjunctive with bouletic orderings, as we are about to discuss next is chapter 5. The concept of preference was shown to be unnecessary for the explanation of mood choice.

Doxastic verbs can be flexible in how they are construed: they can be construed solipsistically, thus veridically, but also suppositionally in which case they license subjunctive in the complement. Suppositional doxastics obey the Nonveridicality Axiom. Italian construes it doxastics suppositionally, and this option is also explored in Portuguese (see Marques 2004) and in some dialects of Spanish (e.g., Yucatec Spanish as recently argued for in Bove 2019).

We continue this discussion in the next chapter, where we expand our theory by showing that the nonveridical presupposition — and not preference or gradability — is also the key to selecting the subjunctive with bouletic attitudes.
Chapter 5

Bouletic attitudes: volition, hope, promising, and persuasion

In this chapter, we focus on some ‘classically’ subjunctive and infinitival predicates such as verbs of volition and desire. We argue that the truth conditions of these predicates require the notion of bouletic commitment, as the counterpart of doxastic commitment in the realm of doxastics. Like pure belief— which can be construed solipsistically, as we illustrated, and selects the indicative— some volitional verbs are also construed as solipsistic desires, defined on variants of the bouletic state $Boul$, on a par with variants of $Dox$ that we defined in chapter 4. When construed solipsistically, volitional attitudes select indicative, as expected.

Bouletic attitudes can also be constructed suppositionally with the by now familiar noneveridical presupposition. In this case, the subjunctive is licensed, in agreement with what we have observed so far. WANT, on the other hand, always selects the subjunctive or infinitive, and is never compatible with indicative. We propose that there are two reasons for this. The first reason is that WANT features a nonveridical, partitioned $Boul$ that does not entail $p$; it is therefore the bouletic counterpart to MUST, and only in Ideal worlds in $Boul$ is $p$ entailed. Secondly, WANT predicates have an antiveridical presupposition that $p$ is not true, or that $i$ believes it to not be true at the time of utterance. We will label this anti-factivity. Anti-factivity underlies all non-indicative moods, therefore also the optative and imperative.

The landscape of desiderative predicates that emerges is reminiscent of the landscape we just observed with doxastics— hence supporting our intended parallelism between the two realms. While our analysis necessitates the concept of ordering, in line with what much of the current literature proposes (Heim 1992, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 2009, Portner 1997, Villalta 2008, Moulton 2014, Grano 2017, 2018 and references therein), bouletic preference does not play a role in our system. Within a unified analysis for doxastic and bouletics, nonveridicality as
a partitioning of the relevant modal base becomes the core common to subjunctive licensing doxastics and bouletics. Preference ordering becomes unnecessary to explain mood choice, and this has repercussions for the *that* vs. *to* choice in English.

Finally, we find systematic correlations between the embedded tense and potential shift in the type of model an attitude can associate with. We find this to be the case with verbs of persuasion and assertive verbs, for example. When combining with a tense other than the NONPAST, PERSUADE shifts to the doxastic type of modal base. The lower tense is crucial in triggering the shift in the modal base, and our account offers a simple explanation for what otherwise could be thought as lexical ambiguity. If models of evaluation are available for attitudes, and if doxastic/epistemic and bouletic are the two major types of models, shifts between the two are not unexpected, but are in fact consistent with the properties of the lower tense. In addition, they illustrate one more similarity between attitudes and modals, many of which are also flexible in the type of modal base they associate with.

### 5.1 Introduction

Let us start with our main findings thus far about the layers in the attitude meaning that impact the licensing of the indicative and subjunctive. First, propositional attitudes that select the indicative are veridical in the following sense: they are construed solipsistically as epistemic or doxastic commitments of the attitude subject $i$ to the truth of the complement proposition $p$. Solipsistic doxastics have very simple truth conditions, supporting the complement proposition in the entire $\text{Dox}$ (or its variants), and lack any presupposition whatsoever.

Second, doxastic verbs can also be construed suppositionally in which case they trigger a subjunctive complement. Suppositional doxastics take an epistemic $M$ as an additional parameter of evaluation, and presuppose, just like modal verbs, that $M$ is nonveridical, i.e., that $i$ doesn’t know $p$ to be true. The use of subjunctive mood reflects this epistemic uncertainty, while the indicative is a signal of veridical commitment:

1. **Licensing condition for the subjunctive mood**
   The subjunctive will be licensed in the complement of a propositional attitude that obeys the Nonveridicality axiom, i.e., the attitude presupposes that the attitude holder $i$ does not know that $p$ is true.

2. **Licensing condition for the indicative mood**
   The indicative will be licensed in the complement of a propositional attitude that is veridical objectively (knowledge) or subjectively (solipsistic
When we say ‘nonveridical’ attitude, we intend to refer to a propositional attitude that obeys the Nonveridicality axiom; and when we say a ‘veridical’ attitude, we intend to refer to a solipsistic attitude that makes no reference to or lack thereof. The indicative can thus also be understood to be the mood of subjective commitment par excellence. The subjunctive, on the other hand, is the mood of epistemic uncertainty.

Syntactically, as we said, mood selection is encoded in the subcategorization frame of the lexical entry of the verb. The flexible patterns suggest that lexical entries are underspecified and that subcategorization is not strict. By distinguishing the veridicality of the truth condition from nonveridicality in the presupposition (Nonveridicality Axiom), our system allows for mixed lexical entries that explain the flexible mood patterns without resorting to ambiguity, as most previous accounts had to do. A mixed lexical entry with a nonveridical presupposition will always trigger the subjunctive, and the whole process of mood choice becomes more flexible procedure as is indeed required by the empirical data.

Our goal in this chapter is to develop this theory further in the domain of bouletic, or volitional, verbs. These verbs involve in their truth condition a bouletic model, i.e., a set of worlds compatible with what i wants, hopes, intends, is required to do, promises to do, and the like. These verbs typically come with future orientation, hence at present there is uncertainty as to whether the complement p will come to be true. The literature also uses labels such as desiderative, directive, and we assume that these all refer to the same class of verbs. The tense of the complement of volitional verbs is the future oriented NONPAST (discussed in chapter 3), the infinitival NONPAST, or actual future when we have indicative. The bouletic model comes in various forms, depending on the lexical meaning of the attitude, as is the case with doxastics.

We confirm that the presence of the nonveridical presupposition is key to understanding the selection of subjunctive with volitional verbs. We propose bouletic commitment as homogeneity of Boul, i.e., universal quantification over p worlds in Boul. Verbs that only have this component are ‘solipsistic’ bouletics, and will select indicative. This, we will argue, is an option with with verbs meaning HOPE, PERSUADE and PROMISE. We will also propose a novel semantics for pure volition without bouletic preference, and because of that quite different from much contemporary work (Heim 1992, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 2009, Portner 1997, Villalta 2008, Moulton 2014, Grano 2017, 2018).

The discussion proceeds as follows. In section 2, we offer our analysis of WANT, including discussion of previous accounts based on ordering. We argue that such accounts fail to unify the use of subjunctive with both bouletics and suppositional doxastics (which do not involve ordering in any sensible way). In
ordering based accounts, these two uses of subjunctive remain coincidental, but our theory succeeds in unifying these two core cases of subjunctive. In section 3, we discuss HOPE and PROMISE. In section 4, we discuss the dual patterns with Greek and Italian equivalent of verbs meaning PERSUADE. In section 5, we discuss dual patterns with verbs of assertion such as SAY and DENY. We close in section 6 with some general discussion about the typologies observed, which will help in our further exploration of implicative verbs, ability modals, and attitudes of emotion in the remaining chapters.

5.2 WANT: bouletic commitment, anti-factivity

Along with modals, verbs of desire such as those meaning WANT are strict subjunctive and infinitive selectors. They are never flexible, and univocally reject the indicative. The pattern is remarkably stable across languages. Here are some basic examples from Greek and Italian:

(3) I Ariadne theli na/*oti kerdisi o Janis. the Ariadne want.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John. (Greek)

‘Ariadne wants (for) John to win.’

(4) I Ariadne epithimi na/*oti kerdisi o Janis. the Ariadne desire.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.

‘Ariadne desires (for) John to win.’

(5) I Ariadne efxete na/*oti kerdisi o Janis. the Ariadne wish.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND win.NONPAST.3sg the John.

‘Ariadne wishes (for) John to win.’

(6) Gianni vuole/desidera che Maria vada a scuola. (Italian)

Gianni wants/desires that Mary go.SUBJ.3sg to school.

‘Gianni wants/desires that Mary goes to school.’

Notice that the Greek verb efxome ‘wish’ is not counterfactual, but indeed a regular volitional. The subjunctive is typically followed by the familiar form glossed above as NONPAST which gives future orientation as discussed in chapter 3. Generic PRES with stative verbs is also possible, but not with eventive verbs. PAST is excluded:

(7) I Ariadne theli panda na/*oti einai kalontymeni. the Ariadne want.3sg always that.SUBJ/*IND be.3sg well-dressed.

‘Ariadne wants to always be well-dressed.’
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(8) *I Ariadne theli na grafei to gramma tora.  
   the Ariadne want.3sg that.SUBJ write.PRES.3sg the letter now.  
   *# Ariadne wants to be writing the letter now.’

(9) *I Ariadne theli na egrapse to gramma xthes.  
   the Ariadne want.3sg that.SUBJ write.PAST.3sg the letter yesterday.  
   *# Ariadne wants to wrote the letter yesterday.’

The pattern is almost parallel in Italian. PRES with statives are allowed although with what we call a ‘generic’ interpretation of the will. We will return to this specific case at the end of our discussion and set them aside for now. PAST, as we mentioned, is otherwise banned.

(10) Maria vuole sempre che Susanna vada vestita bene a scuola.  
   Mary wants always that Susan go.SUBJ.3sg dressed well at school.  
   (ok generic)  
   ‘Mary always wants that Susan dresses well at school.’

(11) Maria vuole che Susanna sia contenta. (generic or coerced)  
   Mary wants that Susan be.SUBJ.3sg happy.  
   ‘Mary wants that Susan be happy.’

(12) *Maria vuole che Susanna sia stata contenta.  
   Mary wants that Susan be.SUBJ.3sg been happy.  
   *#Mary wants that Susan had been happy.’

   Recall that epistemic modals can combine a na complement with past.

(13) I Ariadne prepi/bori na efiże xthes.  
   the Ariadne must/may that.SUBJ leave.PAST.3sg yesterday.  
   ‘Ariadne must/may have left yesterday.’

(14) Maria crede che Susan sia stata contenta.  
   Mary believes that Susan be.SUBJ.3sg been happy.  
   ‘Mary believes that Susan has been happy.’

   Hence, there is no incompatibility with the subjunctive and PAST generally, and we will see in the next section that with HOPE the subjunctive can accept PAST; but the PAST is excluded in a volitional complement. Unless bearing on a generic situation (cf. textitinfra), event-directed volition is future oriented: you want at a now something that will happen in the future of that now. You cannot want something you already have; in that case you are happy to have it, i.e., you have an emotive attitude towards it and not a volition al one, it appears.
(15) Gianni voleva che venisse anche Lucia.
    John wanted that come.SUBJ.IMPERF.3sg also Lucy.
    John wanted Lucia to come as well.

As a convention for ease of exposition, we will say that the Greek and Italian attitude verbs presented here denote the volition meaning WANT. The Italian pattern can be replicated for French.

(16) a. Je veux que Marie vienne.
    I want that Mary come.SUBJ.3sg.
    I want that Mary comes.

b. *Je veux que Marie soit venue.
    I want that Mary be.SUBJ.3sg come.
    I want that Mary has come.

c. Je veux que Marie soit heureuse.
    I want that Mary be.SUBJ.3sg happy.
    I want Mary to be happy.

We will continue using upper case to denote the abstract meaning that is realized by the specific Greek, French, and Italian words. WANT uniformly selects the subjunctive in the languages we know, but it contrasts with HOPE which, as we saw at the beginning and discuss further in the next section, can appear with either mood. The English verb want has been argued to have an ordering or preference component (pace Anand and Hacquard 2013, going back to Heim 1992, Giannakidou 1998, 1999, Portner 1997). Let us take a look at this idea and investigate the role of a preferential semantics in mood choice.

5.2.1 Against bouletic preference as subjunctive trigger with WANT

The general idea promoted in the literature is that volition attitudes, along with persuasion and intention attitudes, are (bouletic) ‘preference based attitudes’, according to the initial characterization in Bolinger (1975) (see for recent work, Anand and Hacquard, 2013; Grano 2018). Most of the literature working on to vs. that distinction in English (Portner 1997, Moulton 2006, Anand and Hacquard 2013, Grano 2018) assumes a clear difference between that-selecting attitudes as being epistemic (Grano calls them ‘rational’), and preference to-selecting attitudes that convey priority or dynamic modality (Portner 2009), also referred to as preference modality.¹ In English, in other words, the semantic contrast correlates

¹Here ‘preference’ stands for ‘bouletic’ preference, as, strictly speaking, any time an ordering source is used, there is a ‘preferential’ component in the meaning of the verb.
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not with mood but with finiteness: finite complements express doxastic modality, but non-finite complements express preference modality:

\[(17)\]
\[
a. \text{Mary wants/intends [for John to be happy].} \\
b. *\text{Mary believes/claims [for John to be happy].}
\]

\[(18)\]
\[
a. *\text{Mary wants/intends [that John is happy].} \\
b. \text{Mary believes/claims [that John is happy].}
\]

The *for*-infinitive is sometimes distinguished as a special designator of preference; however, it is really unclear whether *for* actually conveys more than simply being the vehicle for obviation in English. *For* does not combine with *believe, claim*, surely, but this does not suggest preference: it could simply be that *for* is excluded because the obviating alternative with doxastic and assertive verbs such as *believe, claim* is *that*.

The typical thesis in the literature is that *(for) to* infinitives contribute preference modality, whereas *that* complements convey doxastic modality. Note that this distinction cannot hold in Italian or French were WANT also selects *that* clauses. But let’s assume, for the sake of the argument that *that*-subjunctive clauses are the correspondent of English infinitival.

In the initial and foundational characterization of bouletic attitudes (Heim, 1992; see later Villalta, 2008), these attitudes convey ordering of doxastic worlds according to a bouletic ordering source. According to Heim (1992: 197) and in her dynamic framework, the lexical entry for WANT is as follows:

\[(19)\] Heim 1992, WANT:
\[
c + a \text{ wants } \phi = \\
\{\{w \in c : \text{for every } w' \in Dox_a(w)\}\} \\
Sim'_w Dox_a(w) + \phi <_{a,w} Sim'_w (Dox_a(w)) + \neg \phi
\]

According to this, WANT introduces the ordering source, ranking $\phi$ worlds higher than $\neg \phi$ worlds. And there is also an underlying doxastic layer in desire.

When we consider the Greek and Italian mood facts, the idea of bouletic preference becomes problematic. The subjunctive versus indicative choice is only parallel to the *to, that* contrast, not identical to it, yet the generalizations proposed for English are proposed as generalizations about verb classes across languages. When one tries to generalize the observations about *to vs. that* complements in English and the idea that subjunctive is triggered by preference ordering, one is faced with a number of challenges. First, modal verbs of all modalities (priority, deontic, but also doxastic) select subjunctive and infinitive, as we saw; it is therefore impossible to say that the infinitive and the subjunctive correlate with one type of modality, namely bouletic, deontic or teleological modality. This is simply not the case.
Secondly, as Giannakidou (2009, 2016) further points out, and we illustrated already in this book, temporal connectives such as those meaning BEFORE and WITHOUT select the subjunctive but do not convey any preference. Recall some of data that we discussed earlier:

(20) *Prin (na) vreksi, as pame spiti.*
    before SUBJ rain.3sg, that.OPT go.1pl home.
    ‘Before it rains, let’s go home.’

(21) *Andiamo a casa prima che piova.*
    Go.IMP.1pl to home before that rain.SUBJ.3sg.
    ‘Let’s go home before it rains.’

(22) *Ekane tin metafrasi xoris na xrisimpopiisi leksiko.*
    did.3sg the translation without that.SUBJ use.3sg dictionary.
    ‘He did the translation without using a dictionary.’

The use of subjunctive in the examples above is clearly at odds with the idea that the subjunctive requires or contributes preference. It would be simply wrong to say that there is a component of preference or bouletic modality in these cases.

Thirdly, the suppositional doxastics we studied in chapter four does not convey preference either. Suppositional doxastics and modals do use ordering sources, in the way we showed in chapters 2 and 4, but the ordering is stereotypical or meta-evaluative and not preferential. Adding a subjunctive, crucially, does not alter the type of modality from doxastic to bouletic. Hence, the preference-as-bouletic ordering idea fails to capture this major aspect of the subjunctive choice, namely that the subjunctive correlates with epistemic uncertainty. And if one takes a look at the English infinitivals from the perspective of subjunctive doxastics, one has to admit that even in English it is not accurate to say that the infinitive reflects non-doxastic modality. Quite the contrary: ECM infinitives have been argued by Moulton (2009) to contribute doxastic modality. Hence, the split to-that in terms of belief vs. preference is not clearcut in English either.

A final issue that we want to discuss is that most of the preference based works in English that argue for a categorical difference in modality between *that* and *to* attribute the semantic difference not to the attitude predicate but to some head in the complement, in some cases *for*. The idea that there is a modal in the complement clause appears in Bhatt (1999), Kratzer (2006, 2013), Moulton (2009), Anand and Hacquard (2013), Gosselin (2013) White (2014), Bogal-Allbritten (2016), Grano (2016), Gluckman (2018); for earlier references to this end, see Bresnan (1972), Stowell (1982), Pesetsky (1992). Apart from lacking empirical evidence, this idea (namely that there is modality in the complement clause and that it is due to some modal head) leaves unexplained the selection problem: why is it that some verbs select the particular complement with the specific modality,
while others require another modality, and some are compatible with both? The selection patterns become arbitrary in such approaches, and the dependence on the higher propositional attitude is at best only indirect.

Our approach, on the other hand, starts with the meaning of the higher verb as the key function. Understanding the (layers in the verb) meaning is then used as the basis for explaining the mood patterns. As we have argued, there is little to no evidence that the actual mood morphemes contain themselves any modality in embedding. Greek, in particular, which allows main, unembedded, subjunctives, allows us to see that while these do convey possibility modality, in the complement clause no such modality is conveyed. As we argued at the end of chapter four, mood morphemes convey only pragmatic content in complementation, specifically about how to anchor the upcoming proposition to the context.

In the case of the indicative it is possible to have a modal particle below mood, specifically the future particle; but in this case, clearly, the modality is contributed by the future particle, and not the mood morpheme. The key to understanding the choice of complement, in our case, is the meaning of the attitude verb. The temporal properties of the complement follow from the nature of the higher predicate.

With these in mind, let us proceed now with our new analysis of WANT.

5.2.2 A new semantics for WANT

WANT is the prototypical volitional attitude, and one is tempted to treat it as parallel to BELIEVE. Just like BELIEVE expresses doxastic commitment, WANT expresses bouletic commitment in the worlds consistent with one’s desires, one might argue. Yet wanting is weaker than belief, as it turns out; the predicate WANT is more akin to MUST.

A precondition for wanting \( p \), we will argue, is for \( p \) to not be true. Consider the following case:

(23) Context: I just received a letter from Bill:

#I want so much to receive a letter from Bill!

(24) The door is open.

a. #I want to open the door.

b. #Open the door!

These examples suggest that a precondition for wanting something is to not have what you want at the time of wanting. If \( p \) is already true, the appropriate attitude to have is emotive, i.e. one can be happy or sad about it (to be discussed in chapter 7). Crucially, when \( i \) wants \( p \), either \( p \) is false at the time of utterance, or the subject \( i \) believes \( p \) not to hold. For instance, \( i \) might erroneously believe \( p \) to not hold:
(25) Ariadne wants Flavio to buy her a nice gift for her birthday. He did just that, but it’s a secret, she doesn’t know!

In this sequence, at the time of utterance, Ariadne does not know that Flavio bought her a nice gift. The speaker knows that, but the speaker’s knowledge is irrelevant for Ariadne’s desires. We will call this property of WANT anti-factivity:

(26) Anti-factivity presupposition of WANT attitudes

\[ i \text{ WANTS } p \text{ at } t_u \text{ can only be defined if } p \text{ is not true at } t_u, \text{ or if } i \text{ believes that } p \text{ is not true at } t_u. \]

Anti-factivity is an antiveridicality presupposition, either objective anti-veridicality or subjective one. Crucially, anti-factivity characterizes not just WANT but other directive moods such as the optative and imperative. These too require, upon being issued, that the action has not been undertaken (Portner 1997, Kaufmann 2012). Issuing an imperative when the required effect already holds is redundant. At the time of utterance, then, it seems necessary to assume that a precondition for the use of volition predicate is not simply uncertainty about \( p \), but rather certainty that \( p \) is not true. \(^2\) In this sense, WANT, imperatives and optatives are like the future, which is also anti-factive at the time of utterance (Giannakidou and Mari 2018); the future orientation of WANT, imperatives and optatives is therefore quite understandable.

Anti-factivity manifests itself also with counterfactual desires and wishes:

(27) a. I wish John were here!
   b. Ariadne is 14 years old, does not have a driver’s license, but she wants to drive this car.

Clearly, there is no contradiction in the above sentences. Ariadne wants something impossible given that she is only 14 and doesn’t have a driver’s license. The fact that she knows that her desire cannot be true at \( t_u \), doesn’t prevent her from having it. Likewise, counterfactual verbs express a subject’s desire for something that is clearly not true at \( t_u \).

Anti-factivity is stronger than the nonveridicality presupposition, i.e., anti-factivity

\(^2\)Iatridou (2000: 243) has some examples that might seem like challenges to antifactivity: \textit{I have what I want, I live in Bolivia because I want to live in Bolivia}. Crucially, these exaples do not involve sentence complements: the WANT predicate is found in a \textit{because} clause and in a free relative. Notice that our anti-factivity presupposition is defined as a a precondition on uttering \( i \text{ WANTS } p \). At the same time, in \textit{I have what I want, what I want} defines an object, not a proposition, i.e. the set of things or the unique thing that I want. The \textit{because} clause, on the other hand, can be understood as a sort of co-ordination, or even a conditional, in which case the \textit{because} clause would be equivalent to an \textit{if} clause, hence temporally prior to to the main clause, consistent with anti-factivity. Many thanks to Tom Grano for bringing these examples to our attention.
entails nonveridicality. The presupposition of wanting is therefore stronger than mere not knowing or not believing required by the nonveridicality axiom, hence the rigidity of mood choice.

Let us now define \( Boul \) as follows:

(28) \( Bouletic \) state of an individual anchor \( i \)

A bouletic state \( Boul(i) \) is a set of worlds associated with an individual \( i \) representing worlds compatible with \( i \)'s desires.

In a Portnerian perspective, \( Boul \) is useful for priority modality, and indicates will of doing. According to Copley (2009) WANT also relates to plans and goals. Here we do not endorse any specific view, but acknowledge that \( want \) can also be directed towards a state, as in \( I \) want Cuomo to be the winner. In this case, I have my desire without necessarily having a plan or taking any action towards that end; our theory will easily accommodate these case by simply manipulating a temporal parameter (cf. infra).

Given anti-factivity and \( Boul \) the lexical entry for \( WANT \) could look like this:

(29) \( Boul(i) \): \( \lambda w' (w' \) is compatible with what the subject \( i \) is wants in \( w_0 \) at \( t_u \))

(30) Semantics of WANT. (first take, to be revised)

\[
[i \text{ WANT } p]^{1,\text{Dox,}Boul,t_u} \quad \text{is defined iff}
\]

a. \( \forall w' \in \text{Dox}(i) \) at \( t_u: p \) is not true at \( w' t_u \). If defined,

b. \( [i \text{ WANT } p]^{1,\text{Dox,}Boul,t_u} = 1 \) iff \( \forall w' \in \text{Boul}(i) p(w') \).

The antiveridical presupposition of WANT helps understand why the subjunctive is unequivocal across languages, and obligatory. At the same time, WANT is forced to the future orientation, as we said. Volition is always relative to reality or the belief about it, but the temporal parameter can be fixed at any time provided by higher tense.

Now, when it comes to universal quantification in \( Boul \), if WANT induces universal quantification over the entire bouletic space, as depicted above, an issue arises with how the account would handle the apparent non-monotonicity of desire (Heim 1990). (We appreciate Tom Grano raising this key point). Heim offers examples such as the following:

(31) I don’t want to teach, but (since I have to) I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.

There is also the possibility of conflicting desire reports such as:

(32) John wants it to rain so the picnic will be canceled, but he also wants it
not to rain so he can go hiking.

These led Heim 1990 and Giannakidou 1997 to propose that \textit{Boul} is partitioned. In our theory, this means that WANT becomes equivalent to MUST: \( p \) is true only in the Ideal set in \textit{Boul}, and there are still worlds in \textit{Boul} where \( p \) is not true. In bouletic ideal worlds, \( p \) is true. In this case, \textit{Ideal} is a function over the bouletic modal base. Here is, then, the semantics for WANT that we will adopt:

\begin{equation}
\llbracket \textit{WANT} \llbracket_{Dox,Boul,Ideal,S,t_u} \text{ is defined iff}
\begin{align*}
a. & \quad \forall w' \in Dox(i) \text{ at } t_u: \text{ \( p \) is not true at } w' \text{ } t_u \text{ (antifactivity), and} \\
b. & \quad \textit{Boul} \text{ is nonveridical: } \exists w' \in \textit{Boul} \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in \textit{Boul} p(w''); \text{ If defined,} \\
c. & \quad \llbracket \textit{WANT} \llbracket_{Dox,Boul,Ideal,S,t_u} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w''' \in \textit{Ideal} S p(w''').
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

Hence, WANT emerges as the bouletic counterpart of MUST, and it will select the subjunctive. In other words, WANT does not express bouletic commitment, unlike BELIEVE. At best, it expresses commitment in the Ideal worlds, just like MUST. HOPE, on the other hand, can indeed express bouletic commitment as we shall see.

Before turning to the semantics of HOPE, let us conclude with the generic WANT, illustrated in (34) and repeated here in (34). We see that there is no antifactivity proper.

\begin{equation}
\text{Je veux que Marie soit heureuse.} \\
\text{I want that Mary be.SUBJ.3sg happy.} \\
\text{I want Mary to be happy.}
\end{equation}

We claim that here WANT describes a generic desire (see also the distinction WANT as desire and WANT as a principle for action in Condoravdi and Lauer 2016). We implement this by manipulating the temporal parameter of WANT. While when anchored to a context the temporal parameter leads to sensitivity to antifactivity relatively to the time of the context, in the absence of the temporal parameter, antifactivity becomes irrelevant, and the desire is considered to hold no matter when and what.

\section{5.3 Hoping}

\textit{Elpizo} (hope) and \textit{spero} in Greek and Italian exhibit flexible mood and flexible tense:

\begin{equation}
a. \text{ Elpizo na kerdisi/kerdise o Janis.} \\
\text{hope.1sg that.SUBJ win.PERF.NONPAST/PAST.3sg the John.}
\end{equation}
5.3. **HOPING**

I hope for John to win/to have won.

b. Spero che Gianni abbia vinto/vinca.  
Hope.1sg.PRES that John have.3sg.SUBJ won/win.3sg.SUBJ.  
I hope that John has won.

(36) a. Elpizo oti kerdisi o Janis.  
hope.1SG that.IND won.3sg the John.  
‘I hope that John won.’

b. Elpizo oti tha kerdisi o Janis.  
hope.1sg that.IND FUT win.nonpast.3sg the John.  
‘I hope that John will win.’

c. Spero che il Milan vincerà/ha vinto.  
Hope.1sg.PRES that the Milan win.3sg.FUT.IND/has won.  
‘I hope that Milan AC will win/has won.’

Notice the correlation with tense: the past is now allowed with the subjunctive, something impossible, as we said, with WANT predicates. Recall:

(37) *I the Ariadne theli na egrapse to gramma xthes.  
the Ariadne want.3sg that.SUBJ write.PAST.3sg the letter yesterday.  
‘*Ariadne wants to wrote the letter yesterday.’

In other words, the HOPE attitude is not restricted temporally: one can hope things about the past, the present, or the future. In sharp contrast with WANT, in Italian the indicative version is exclusively restricted to future orientation.

(38) a. Spero che verrà.  
Hope.IND.1sg that come.IND.FUT.3sg.  
‘I hope that he will come.’

b. *Spero che venuto.  
Hope.IND.1sg that be.IND.3sg come.  
‘I hope that he has come.’

The indicative version, in Italian as in Greek, reveals that the speaker is expressing an attitude of expectation, rather than relying on reasonable evidence that can trigger a supposition about what will happen.

Equivalents of **hope** are also flexible in other languages, and the flexibility has created difficulty in handling this attitude. According to Anand and Hacquard (2013), English **hope** features a preferential and an epistemic layer. The epistemic layer comprises $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds— it is therefore nonveridical in our terminology— but, according to Anand and Hacquard, it is not non-homogeneity that triggers subjunctive but the preferential layer is responsible for it. The epistemic layer (even if partitioned) triggers the indicative. We saw why the prefer-
ential argument is not right, and Anand and Hacquard offer no new arguments. Overall, their account fails to appreciate the role of the partitioned modal space in licensing the subjunctive; Anand and Hacquard, rather, predict indicative in the cases of suppositional doxastics that we discussed in chapter 4. In our approach, nonveridicality triggers the subjunctive in HOPE, in a way parallel to doxastics and modals.

Intuitively, hoping feels stronger than mere wanting. Often, a flavor of planning or a path to realization is understood at the foundation of hope— one can therefore not have counterfactual hopes or contradictory hopes. Heim’s sentences that we discussed earlier with WANT are pretty strange with HOPE:

(39) a. I don’t hope to teach, but (since I have to) I hope to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.
    b. #I hope not to teach, but (since I have to) I hope to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.

It is rather odd to hope not to teach and then continue as above. Likewise, there are no conflicting hopes:

(40) #John hopes that it will rain so the picnic will be canceled, but he also hopes that it won’t rain so he can go hiking.

We can assume that HOPE is stronger than WANT in that it contains a path to action— as opposed to mere wanting which doesn’t, as we said. We will also maintain the idea that a nonveridical epistemic presupposition is a subjunctive trigger. The duality of patterning shows that HOPE can be construed solipsistically like pure bouletic commitment (thus stronger than WANT which commitment only in the Ideal bouletic alternatives) without the epistemic component:

(41) Solipsistic HOPE (indicative)

\[
\text{Nicholas HOPES that } p \text{ is true in } w \text{ with respect to } \text{Boul(Nicholas)} \iff \\
\forall w'[w' \in \text{Boul(Nicholas)} \to p(w')] 
\]

This conceptualization of HOPE identifies hoping with pure bouletic commitment with no epistemic or doxastic uncertainty. HOPE, in other words, is the bouletic counterpart to belief. The sense of a plan or action is a result of bouletic commitment, most plausibly an implicature: a rational agent can only be bouletically committed to a proposition only if they have reasons to do so, and having some plan or other is a good enough justification. The Greek and Italian words elpizo and spero can be used to denote solipsistic HOPE, and in this use, as expected, they select the indicative.

But the meaning HOPE can also be construed as having the extra nonveridical layer. Here Boul is a function over the modal base and stands for Boul(M(i))
returning those worlds in $M(i)$ that are compatible with $i$’s preferences.

\[(42)\] Suppositional hope (subjunctive)

\[[i \text{ HOPE } p]^{i,M,Boul} \text{ is defined iff } \exists w' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i)p(w'').\]

If defined, $[i \text{ HOPE } p]^{i,M,Boul} = 1$ iff $\forall w''' \in Boul p(w''')$.

The Greek and Italian words *elpizo* and *spero* can also be used to denote suppositional HOPE, in which case they select subjunctive. Hence, HOPE verbs are underspecified lexically as to which version of HOPE they convey. This dual strategy, as we see, is available at the bouletic realm as much as it was available at the doxastic realm, and the HOPE verb emerges as the obvious bouletic dual of the Italian BELIEVE verb.

It is also important to note another difference between HOPE and WANT predicates: the speaker believes $p$ to be actually possible in the case of HOPE (see discussion in Portner and Rubinstein, 2013), but not with WANT. (43-a) is felicitous only if marrying Brad Pitt is inferred to be a possibility. This inference does not come about with (43-b):

\[(43)\] a. Spera di sposare Brad Pitt.

Hope.PRES.3sg of marry Brad Pitt.

‘I hope to marry Brad Pitt.’

b. Vuole sposare Brad Pitt.

Want.PRES.3sg marry Brad Pitt.

‘I want to marry Brad Pitt.’

This also justifies using an epistemic modal base for HOPE but not for WANT, which allows unreasonable and unrealizable desires. Our account here succeeds in offering a relatively simple semantics for the flexibility of HOPE attitudes without resorting to preference or ambiguity.

## 5.4 Promising

The verbs meaning PROMISE also feature mood shifts, but their profile is yet different from HOPE and WANT. Like WANT, the PROMISE attitude is clearly future oriented; but promising is also known to be performative in the Austinian sense, i.e., it is said to involve commitment of $i$ to act on bringing about $p$. Neither WANT nor HOPE has this commitment to action.

Like HOPE, PROMISE is flexible in the mood it takes, as can be seen here with examples from Greek:

\[(44)\] a. Ι Αριάνδη ιποσχεθικη na fiji

the Ariadne promised.3sg that.SUBJ leave.NONPAST/PAST.3sg
noris.
early.
‘Ariadne promised to leave early.’
b. I Ariadne iposxethike oti tha the Ariadne promised.3sg that.IND Fut
fiji noris.
leave.NONPAST/PAST.3sg early.
‘Ariadne promised that she will leave early.’

But of the PROMISE attitude is necessarily performative, what does the use of the subjunctive show? The problem is observed already in Giannakidou 1997, where it is claimed that only the indicative version involves performative promise; the na version does not convey commitment, Giannakidou argues, of the speaker to carry out the action indicated by the oti clause. The dual pattern is puzzling from the performative perspective, clearly.

Past tense is excluded with the oti clause because of the nature of promise, which is like WANT:

(45) #I Ariadne iposxethike oti efije noris
the Ariadne promised.3sg that.IND left.NONPAST/PAST.3sg early.
‘Ariadne promised that she left early.’

English does allow promise with past, but in this case the reading is akin to emphasizing, or swearing, that the speaker or the promise subject is saying the truth. Italian is parallel to English in this respect. Greek promising lacks this flavor.

(46) Ti prometto che me lo ha detto (similar to ‘ti giuro’ – I swear)
To you promise that me that has said.
I promise you that he told me so.

Our lexical entry for performative PROMISE encodes future orientation as part of the lexical meaning of the attitude driven by the specific type of bouletic commitment which is intention, understood as a plan to bring about p.

(47) Performative PROMISE (Greek: iposxome)
[promise that p]^{i,Boul} is 1 iff:
\[ \forall w' \in Boul(i) \exists t't' > t_u p(w', t') \]; where Boul is plan to bring about (intention)

This reveals commitment of i to p. In the case of PROMISE, it is commitment to bring about p.

With the subjunctive version, PROMISE is gauged against uncertainty and has a suppositional layer: it is not certain that there will be a time in which p will turn
out to be true. This is non-performative PROMISE, and triggers subjunctive.

\[5.4.\text{ PROMISING}\]

Non-performative PROMISE (Greek: iposxome)

\[\text{[promises that } p]_{M_{\text{epistemic}},i,Boul} \text{ is defined iff } \exists w' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) p(w'').\]

If defined,

\[\text{[Nicholas promises that } p]_{M_{\text{epistemic}},i,Boul} \text{ is 1 iff } \forall w'w' \in Boul(M(i)) : \exists t't' > t_u p(w', t'); \text{ where } Boul \text{ is plan to bring about}\]

Here we have the uncertainty about the outcome \( p \) in \( w' \); hence although there is bouletic commitment in entailing \( p \) in \( Boul \), there is still nonveridicality in \( M \). The Greek verb iposxome can be used in both ways, which means again that it can be used presuppositionally— in which case it selects the subjunctive – or solipsistically, in which case it selects indicative. It is not clear to us that the difference is traceable in English since the description of English promise has always been that it is performative. In our theory, performativity is solipsistic promise, and non-performative promise is promise with uncertainty.

Suppositional promise can be understood as pure intention. The verb meaning INTENT has this semantics, we will argue. Notice that the Greek protitheme ‘intend’ selects strictly the subjunctive:

\[5.4.\text{ a. I Ariadne protithete na*/oti}\]

\[\text{the Ariadne intends.3sg that.SUBJ/that.IND}\]

\[fiji\]

\[\text{noris.}\]

\[\text{leave.NONPAST/PAST.3sg early.}\]

‘Ariadne intends to leave early.’

Intention is an attitude of plan to act, but unlike solipsistic promise, when \( i \) intends to bring about \( p \), \( i \) is aware that this may not happen:

\[5.4.\text{ b. INTENT (Greek: protitheme)}\]

\[\text{[INTEND that } p]_{M_{\text{epistemic}},i,Boul} \text{ is defined iff } \exists w' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) p(w'').\]

If defined, \[\text{[Nicholas INTEND that } p]_{M_{\text{epistemic}},i,Boul} \text{ is 1 iff } \forall w'w' \in Boul(M(i)) : \exists t't' > t_u p(w', t'); \text{ where } Boul \text{ is intend to bring about}\]

Verbs of intention across languages have this meaning, we will submit. Suppositional PROMISE is an intentional attitude rather than a performative one. We could designate the set for intention distinctively as \( Int \), and we will use it again soon with PERSUADE.

In WANT, HOPE, INTEND and PROMISE, the attitude remains the same but there is an observed difference in ‘strength’, as was with doxastics. The strength
change that mood brings about concerns whether the attitudes are construed as obeying or not obeying the nonveridicality axiom (solipsistically). Being strong refers to the latter case; weaker construals of the lexical meanings have the non-veridicality presupposition added. An additional aspect of strength, finally, had to do with what exactly *Boul* encompasses. In the case of wanting and hoping, it is pure desires, but in the case of promising is plan to act.

We move on now to examine cases where the choice of two moods is not simply about strength, but produces an apparent difference in the meaning of the attitude verb. Here, will observe interactions between *Boul* and *Dox*.

### 5.5 Attitudes of persuasion

Apparent meaning change is observed with attitudes of persuasion, assertives, and certain negative verbs. We will show that in these cases the difference in meaning indicates, in addition to the presence or not of a presuppositional nonveridical layer, also a shift in the type of model chosen (bouletic or doxastic). The lower tense is crucial in triggering the shift, as we shall see.

The attitude PERSUADE is manifested in English with the verbs *persuade*, *convince*, in Italian with *persuedere*, and in Greek with *pitho*, *ime pepeismenos*. Both moods are allowed:

(51) a. I Ariadne epise to Nikolas na fiji ton noris. 
   ‘Ariadne convinced Nicholas to leave early.’

b. I Ariadne epise to Nikolas oti i idea tou ine kali. 
   ‘Ariadne convinced Nicholas that his idea is good.’

(52) Gianni ha persuaso Maria che era ora di partire. 
    ‘John has persuaded Mary that it was time to leave.’

(53) Gianni ha persuaso Maria che fosse ora di partire. 
    ‘John has persuaded Mary that it was time to leave.’

Notice the change in meaning and the alteration in English between *convince*
to (equivalent to *pitho na*), and convince that (equivalent to *pitho oti*). The English difference is discussed in a recent paper by Grano (2018). Like in English, *pitho na* means convince someone to act, but *pitho oti* means to make someone believe that the complement proposition is true. This difference is brought about in Greek by the mood, in English by the *to* vs. *that* choice. Italian also allows the infinitive with the expected ‘convince to act’ reading:

(54) Gianni ha persuaso Maria a partire.
    Gianni has persuaded Mary to leave.
    ‘John has persuaded Mary to leave.’

As in the case of the attitudes discussed so far, there is no evidence that we are dealing with preference. We will start our discussion of the English verb *persuade* with some comments from Grano (2018), who defends the following generalization:

(55) a. When persuade combines with a nonfinite control complement, the meaning is roughly ‘cause to intend’;
    b. When persuade combines with a finite complement, the meaning is roughly ‘cause to believe’.

For Grano, the semantic difference in the two patterns of *persuade* correlates with finiteness and control, as we see. This is in the spirit of works positing a sharp distinction between doxastics and preference attitudes. In Greek, this generalization is not transferable, since with both subjunctive and indicative we have finite clauses. Moreover, in Greek it is not even about control. Notice below the pattern of obviation:

(56) a. I Ariadne epise ton Nikola na
    the Ariadne persuaded.3sg the Nicholas that.SUBJ
    fijoun ta paidhia noris.
    leave.NONPAST.3pl the children early.
    ‘Ariadne convinced Nicholas for the children to leave early.’

In Greek, instead, the contrast is between subjunctive with NONPAST and future orientation versus indicative with past or present. The same holds in Italian: the imperfective indicative indicates PRES, whereas with the subjunctive version (*fosse*, (53)) the question whether it was time to leave is open and forward shifting of the time of evaluation is conveyed. This specific subjunctive pattern is by now familiar for all bouletics.

Are the Greek, Italian, and English verbs of persuasion ambiguous? Not really. Our method of explanation should be obvious by now: the verbs can be construed with or without a nonveridical presupposition, and accordingly they select indica-
tive or subjunctive. In addition, we will argue, a modal base shift happens with this group of verbs from bouletic to doxastic. Just like modal verbs are flexible in the types of modal bases they combine with—and shift from epistemic to deontic or other modalities—so do some propositional attitude predicates.

Grano follows a different route, and distinguishes between what he calls ‘rational’ and preference attitudes. Belief is a rational attitude, and desire a preference attitude for him, with intention having features of both. Given our own analysis of volitionals without ordering, the distinction is not motivated. But in his framework, the divide implies the following for persuade:

(57) Summary of analysis (Grano 2018:49)
   a. persuade = cause to have a rational attitude
   b. $p$ finite = information that $p$ is true
   c. $p$ for / to = preference for $p$ to be true
   d. RATIONAL + PREFERENCE = INTENTION

(58) a. #I persuaded John to quit smoking, although he still doesn’t intend to.
    b. I persuaded John to quit smoking, although he still doesn’t want to.

Persuade, according to Grano, targets rational attitudes, which include belief and intention but not desire. Intention and desire constitute a semantically natural class (preference-based attitudes) to the exclusion of belief. In addition, he proposes that there is another class of attitudes that crosscuts this distinction, including belief and intention but not desire, and this is the class that includes persuasion verbs. Grano’s account remains informal, but he suggests that rational attitudes are those that have a Hintikkan semantics—the ones that we called solipsistic here. Non-rational attitudes, such as desire reports, have a semantics that is either non-Hintikkan (as in Heim 1992, Giannakidou 1997, 1999 and as we suggested here, i.e. equivalent to MUST), or Hintikkan but "context-sensitive in a way that may nullify some of the effects of a Hintikkean semantics (as in von Fintel 1999)" (Grano 2018: 14).

In our approach, the choice is fundamentally between a solipsistic versus a suppositional construal of PERSUADE on a par with the other cases we discussed thus far. And intention, as we said, is suppositional and contains epistemic uncertainty. In the case of PERSUADE, we will postulate that there is a shift also in the model chosen. Consider first the subjunctive variant which is persuade to act. The resulting lexical entry is as follows:

(59) PERSUADE to act (with NONPAST)
   \[ [\text{persuade NONPAST}(p)]_{\text{epistemic},Boul}^{\text{epistemic}} \text{ is defined iff} \]
   a. At $t_u$: $\exists w' \in \text{M}_\emph{epistemic}(i) \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in \text{M}_\emph{epistemic}(i) p(w'')$. If
defined,

\[ \left[ i \text{ PERSUADE NONPAST} \right] p \]^{\text{epistemic}, Bouli} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Boul} \exists t' \in [t, \infty)(w'', t'); \text{ where Boul is a function that triggers worlds of } M_{\text{epistemic}}(i) \text{ where } i \text{ intends to bring about } p.\]

Boul now is the set of worlds \( w' \) compatible with \( i \) having the intend to bring about \( p \). It is, in other words, an intentional space. The choice of subjunctive and the ensuing NONPAST follows from the nature of Boul since they are future oriented, and the intention to act excludes doxastic alternatives. The effect is similar to PROMISE and INTEND. An interesting difference between PERSUADE and PROMISE lies in who is in charge of, i.e., who intends to, bringing about \( p \). With PROMISE it is the subject, with PERSUADE it is the object.

Persuade plus PAST or present, on the other hand, produces the meaning 'cause to believe,' and there is no reference to action. This is a doxastic solipsistic construal; we shift to a doxastic model:

(60) Doxastic PERSUADE (indicative)
\[ [\text{Nicholas is convinced that } p] \text{ is true in } w \text{ with respect to } Dox(Nicholas) \]
\[ \text{iff: } \forall w'[w' \in Dox(Nicholas) \rightarrow p(w')] \]

In this construal, to be convinced means to believe. As expected, doxastic persuasion is fully compatible with PAST and PRESENT tenses, just like other doxastic verbs. Interestingly, the HOPE meaning in the solipsistic construal can sometimes also give the flavor of a doxastic reading. Consider:

(61) Elpizo oti kerdise o Janis.
\[ \text{hope.1SG that.IND won.3SG the John} \]
\[ \text{‘I hope that John won.’ Sounds like 'I believe that John won and this is desirable'.} \]

In other words, a bouletic verb, when combining with a tense other than the NONPAST— which is its natural choice because of the nature of desire to be future oriented— may shift to the doxastic type of modal base. Doxastic spaces are more naturally compatible with past and present, since only facts about the past or the present can be known or believed. The lower tense is crucial in triggering the shift in the modal base.

Our account thus offers a simple explanation for what otherwise could be thought as lexical ambiguity. If models of evaluation are available for attitudes, and if doxastic/epistemic and bouletic are the two major types of models, shifts between the two are not unexpected, but are in fact consistent with the properties of the lower tense. And these shifts are exactly the shifts we observe with modal
verbs when they associate with different types of modal bases. Grano’s postulated
difference, therefore, between rational and preference attitudes can be rethought
as shifting between doxastic and bouletic spaces, and this is again another simi-
larity between propositional attitudes and modals.

5.6 Verbs of assertion

Verbs of assertion display a similar change of model (or, modal base), and cor-
relation with tense reminiscent of persuasion verbs. We illustrate below with the
Greek verbs leo, and arnoume (examples from Giannakidou 2016, and Giannaki-
dou and Staraki 2013). The contrast is now a lexical contrast in English:

The John says that.IND left.3pl early.
‘John says that they left early.’
b. O Janis lei na figoun noris.
The John says that.SBJ leave.3pl early
‘John wants for them to leave early.’

(63) a. O Janis arnithike oti efijan noris.
The John denied that.IND left.3pl early.
‘John denied that they left early.’
b. O Janis arnithike na fiji noris.
The John says that.SBJ leave.3sg early.
‘John refused to leave early.’

The choice of na and the nonpast correlates with action or thought of the future.
The difference in mood lexicalizes in two distinct verbs in English (refuse, deny
and say, want). With both lei and arnithike, the subjunctive complement acquires
a volitional, intentional meaning; the oti complements, on the other hand, with
veridical past or present tense remain assertive.

For assertive verbs, the model of reported conversation is relevant (following
Giannakidou 1997, 1999):

(64) Reported conversation (rc) information state of an individual anchor i
A reported conversation information state state M_{rc} (i) is a set of worlds
associated with an individual i representing worlds compatible with what
i knows or believes to be true of the reported conversation.

The model of reported conversation is essentially, as we can see, a bouletic or
epistemic space (or, more likely, mixed); The oti complement adds the proposition
to the reported conversation, with a possible intent to also add it to the common
5.6. VERBS OF ASSERTION

ground. This is, however, only possible intent:

(65) O Janis lei oti efijan noris, alla dhen ton pistevo)

The John says that-IND left.3pl early, but not him believ.1sg.

‘John says that they left early, but I don’t believe him.’

(66) [Nicholas said that \( p \)]^{M rc} = 1 in \( w \) with respect to \( M rc(Nicholas) \) iff:

\[ \forall w'[w' \in M rc(Nicholas) \rightarrow p(w')] \]

Hence, the speaker can believe or disbelieve the reported fact, but the subject of SAY has to accept it as part of the conversation. This renders leo veridical, and allows the indicative.

Leo na, on the other hand, contains bouletic component (again, Boul is a function over \( M(i) \)).

(67) Bouletic assertive verb

\[ \left[ i \text{ SAY } p \right]^{M epistemic,Boul} \text{ is defined iff } \]

a. \( \exists w' \in M epistemic(i) \rightarrow p(w') \wedge \exists w'' \in M epistemic(i) p(w'') \).

b. \( \left[ i \text{ SAY } p \right]^{M epistemic,Boul} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w''' \in Boul: p(w''') \).

In other words, verbs that denote SAY can use a bouletic argument, and in this case they produce a bouletic meaning. The verb ASK is similar: Ariadne asked what time it is versus Ariadne asked me to read her a story. These systematic switches in verbal meaning need not be thought of as ambiguities, but rather as flexibility in what kind of modal space verbal meanings can take as arguments for their truth condition. We find, then, that there are interactions between Dox and Boul, and attitude verbs can combine with both. As we mentioned before, this argues against the strict separation of attitudes often assumed in the literature between epistemic (or rational) versus priority (or preference). A single attitude can take a priority or an epistemic base, and shift in meaning accordingly.

In Italian, there is meaning shift, but the resulting interpretations are similar to the alternations we observed with doxastics. With the indicative there is full commitment of the speaker (and possibly request of adding \( p \) to the common ground); with subjunctive, there is no full commitment, and the speaker is in a state of uncertainty of whether \( p \) is true (see Mari 2015a, 2016a). As we see, in Italian, there is no shift to bouletic worlds. Instead, it is worth noting that reportative say triggers subjunctive in Italian. The relevant lexicalization is not truthfulness in the reportative space, but epistemic uncertainty that the reported status of \( p \) enhances.

(68) La gente dice che è incinta.

People say that be.IND.3sg pregnant.

‘People say that she is pregnant.’
La gente dice che sia incinta.
‘People say that she is pregnant.’

Subjunctive SAY, Italian
\[ [i \text{ say } p]^{M_{epistemic}, M_{rc}} \text{ is defined iff } \]
\[ a. \exists w' \in M_{epistemic}(i) \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in M_{epistemic}(i)p(w''). \]
\[ b. [i \text{ say } p]^{M_{epistemic}, M_{rc}} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w''' \in M_{rc}(M_{epistemic}(i))p(w'''). \]

With Italian dire, thus, the model does not change; we find, once again, that lexical meanings of the verbs can differ for the same class crosslinguistically (SAY). Notice, crucially, that the tense in Italian remains the same, unlike in Greek, where the shift to the bouletic modal base correlates with the use of non-past — which itself necessitates subjunctive. In Italian, there is no shift in tense, therefore also no shift in the model. This lends support to our idea that tense and modal base shift correlate, just as they do with modal verbs.

Regarding, DENY, recall our earlier discussion in chapter 2:

Nicholas denied that Ariadne helped him.
‘Nicholas refused to help Ariadne.’

We see the by now familiar correlation: subjunctive with NONPAST, indicative with PAST (and present). The indicative version is a negative assertion (briefly mentioned in chapter 1). DENY is a variant of SAY, but this time the commitment of the subject i is to \( \neg p \), i.e. negative commitment. Negative commitment, as we said in chapter 2 is positive homogenous commitment to \( \neg p \), it therefore selects indicative:

\[ [\text{Nicholas DENY that } p] \text{ is true in the world of the utterance context } w \text{ iff: } \]
\[ \forall w'[w' \in M(Nicholas, w) \rightarrow \neg p(w')] \]

Note that there is also an implicature of doxastic commitment: if i denies that p and i is truthful, then i knows or believes \( \neg p \) to be true. The point here is that the subjective commitment of the solipsistic construal explains why we get indicative with even negative assertives.
5.7. THE (NON)VERIDICALITY THEORY OF MOOD SELECTION

The subjunctive version, on the other hand, comes with NONPAST and shifts the model to a bouletic one: all bouletic worlds are \( \neg \! p \) worlds. In Italian we do not have NONPAST, therefore no forward shifting with the subjunctive, hence no triggering of a bouletic \( M \) either. Rather, the indicative subjunctive shift reflects whether \( p \) is settled in the common ground, and, as we have made explicit earlier, mood morphemes can indicate whether \( p \) should be appended to the mental space of the attitude holder or to the common ground. In Italian, DENY is a typical example of the shift to the common ground.

(74) Maria nega che ha ucciso Marco.
Mary denies that she has killed Marco.
‘Mary denies that she has killed Marco.’

(75) Maria nega che abbia ucciso Marco.
Mary denies that she has killed Marco.
‘Mary denies that she has killed Marco.’

In the subjunctive case, it is common knowledge that Mary has killed Marco. In the indicative case, all participants but Mary are committed to \( p \). In this case, nonveridicality is part of the common ground, rather than the epistemic space (see Mari, 2017a,b).

(76) Subjunctive DENY, Italian

\[
[i\text{ deny } p]_{1,CG,Mr} \text{ is defined iff}
\]
\[
a. \exists w' \in CG \neg p(w') \land \exists w'' \in CG p(w''). \text{ If defined,}
\]
\[
b. [i\text{ say } p]_{1,CG,Mr} = 1 \text{ iff}
\]
\[
\forall w''' \in Mr(CG) \neg p(w''').
\]

Note that the same analysis can be extended to subjunctive SAY in Italian, where there is free variation between nonveridicality in the modal base and nonveridicality in the CG. There is an obvious connection between the two (Mari 2015,2017a,2019): if the speaker is uncertain about \( p \) and shares the CG set with the interlocutors, then the CG also does not settle \( p \) and nonveridicality can be a property of either the belief model or the CG.

5.7 The (Non)veridicality theory of mood selection

Now that we finished the analysis of the major bouletic attitudes, we want to take stock in this final section to put together the landscape of mood selection as it emerges from the study of doxastics, bouletics and modals. The result is a semantic typology of propositional attitudes based on their (non)veridicality and a small number of premises that allow predictions for other attitudes and larger sets.
of data.

Here are the basic premises that hold crosslinguistically in Greek and Italian, French:

(77) Two kinds of propositional attitude verbs (ATT)
i. Solipsistic ATT: no presupposition
ii. Presuppositional attitude verb ATT: mixed lexical entry with presupposition(s) and a truth condition.

(78) Veridical propositional attitudes
i. Epistemic attitudes are veridical. ii. Solipsistic attitudes are veridical: they entail that \( p \) is true in the anchor’s \( i \) modal space.
iii. The modal space is a variant of epistemic (\( M \)), doxastic (\( Dox(i) \)), or bouletic (\( Boul(i) \)).

Negation, of course, affects epistemic and solipsistic attitudes: the scope of negation is nonveridical. Belief is the prototypical doxastic solipsistic attitude, and hope the prototypical solipsistic bouletic. Nonveridical attitudes, on the other hand, obey the Nonveridicality Axiom:

(79) Nonveridical propositional attitudes and modals
ATT/MODAL is nonveridical iff ATT/MODAL obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom.

(80) Nonveridicality Axiom.
i. For any propositional attitude ATT or modal MODAL, ATT/MODAL obey the Nonveridicality Axiom iff \( i \) ATT/MODAL \( p \) presupposes epistemic uncertainty: that \( M(i) \) is nonveridical, i.e. partitioned into \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds.

The mood morphemes indicative and subjunctive are sensitive to the assertion (indicative), and the presupposition (subjunctive, indicative \( pu \) in Greek). Here are the licensing conditions for subjunctive and indicative:

(81) Licensing condition for the subjunctive mood.
The subjunctive is licensed in the complement of a nonveridical ATT, i.e. iff ATT obeys the Nonveridicality axiom.

(82) Licensing condition for the indicative mood.
The indicative is licensed in the complement of a veridical ATT, i.e. iff ATT is solipsistic or epistemic (therefore factive).

The mood morphemes marker the scope of the modal or ATT as veridical or nonveridical. Their discourse contribution, as illustrated in chapter 4) is to provide anchoring instructions.
Factivity characterizes epistemic verbs of knowledge but also emotive factive verbs, as we will discuss in chapter 7. Factivity, we shall see, is objective or subjective veridicality. WANT verbs are anti-factive in that they have an anti-veridicality presupposition that $p$ is not true, or that $i$ believes $p$ to not be true.

(83) Antifactivity presupposition of ATT

ATT in $i$ ATT $p$ at $t_u$ is antifactive iff $p$ is not true at $t_u$, or if $i$ believes that $p$ is not true at $t_u$.

Given this system, the picture we are building looks as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notion</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Attitude Type</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doxastic</td>
<td>Solipsistic</td>
<td>Believe</td>
<td>pistevo, nomizo 'believe', 'think'</td>
<td>credere, pensare, 'believe', 'think'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dream</td>
<td>onirevome 'dream'</td>
<td>sognare 'dream'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imagine</td>
<td>fandazome 'imagine'</td>
<td>immaginare 'imagine'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppositional</td>
<td>Believe</td>
<td>Credere, 'believe'</td>
<td>pensare 'think', essere sicuro 'be certain', essere convinto 'be convinced'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>ricordarsi 'remember'</td>
<td>'remember'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Convinced</td>
<td>semblare 'seem'</td>
<td>'seem'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>thimame 'remember'</td>
<td>'remember'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>vlepo, akouo 'see, hear'</td>
<td>ricordarsi 'remember'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Epistemic modal verbs</td>
<td>epistemic modal verbs</td>
<td>epistemic modal verbs (è necessario, possibile, probabilé; it is necessary, possible, probable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouletics</td>
<td>Solipsistics</td>
<td>Want</td>
<td>elpizo 'hope'</td>
<td>Sperare 'hope'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deontic Modals</td>
<td>ipoxome 'promise'</td>
<td>promettere 'promise'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>pitho 'persuade'</td>
<td>Persuadere 'persuade'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppositional</td>
<td>Say</td>
<td>leo, arnoume 'say, deny'</td>
<td>Dire 'say'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>Negare 'deny'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1: Notions, values and attitude types: solipsistic and suppositional variants

(84) **DOXASTIC**
- Solipsistic doxastics: oti-belief in Greek, indicative belief Italian.
- Suppositional doxastics: subjunctive belief Italian.

(85) **BOULETIC (HOPE type) / PERSUADE**
- Solipsistic bouletic: oti-hope in Greek, indicative hope Italian.
- Suppositional bouletic: subjunctive-hope Italian.
BOULETIC (WANT type)
Suppositional only. Subjunctive WANT across languages, in virtue of the antiveridical presupposition.

SAY
a. Solipsistic say. *oti*-say in Greek; indicative-say Italian: total commitment to p, the attitude holder aligns with the common ground.
b. Suppositional say. Subjunctive-say Italian: partial commitment, the attitude holder does not align with the common ground.

As Figure 1 shows, Greek lexicalizes attitudes as solipsistic (when not antifactive). Italian has a preference for the suppositional lexicalization. French is in between: it lexicalizes non-factive epistemics as solipsistic, but has a preference for suppositional bouletic. A we will argue once we will have introduced more attitudes types, we can conceive the lexical realizations in each language, as different instantiations of lexical concept for attitudes (which we refer to as ‘notions’).

While we can foresee blocking rules for Greek and Italian (in Greek the suppositional version is blocked, whereas Italian blocks the solipsistic version), as we have extensively argued in our discussion in chapter 3, any theory of mood will have to allow for flexibility intra and cross-linguistically. Recall, indeed, that there is flexibility even in Greek in the class of bouletic.

No theory of blocking will be able to account for such complexity of pattern in mood shift, that can be the result of diachronic variation and contact across verb classes. What we hope we have shown, is that attitudes have different lexicalizations, which can be conceived as manifestations of an abstract meaning or notion (see Mari 2003). In this line of thought, attitude classes can be conceived as attitude concepts, and the two variants can be seen as the linguistic realization of the values that these conceptual category (in our specific case, solipsistic and suppositional). Which variant is realized in which language, can be predicted to some extent in terms of preferences, but no theory can fully predict the multi-factorial variation observed.
Chapter 6

Ability modals, temporality, and implicatives

In this chapter we want to accomplish three tasks: the first one is to explain why the subjunctive/infinitive is chosen with ability modals and implicative verbs, instead of a finite tensed clause when a language makes it available. The selection of the subjunctive is expected with ability modals since, as modals, they obey the nonveridicality axiom. We propose a new analysis of ability modality (building on earlier work by Giannakidou 2001, Mari 2010,2013,2015a,2017c, Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, and Thomason 2005) by treating the modal ABLE as the dispositional counterpart of epistemic MUST, entailing action to only in the Ideal worlds.

Implicatives, on the other hand, appear to pose a challenge for the subjunctive since it looks like—at least in Karttunen’s initial approach—that they entail that \( p \) is true. We offer an analysis of MANAGE as an aspectual operator presupposing that a volitional agent \( i \) tried to being about \( p \), without, in fact, entailing actualization of \( p \). This presupposition alone suffices to license the subjunctive, which, as we argued, is triggered by a nonveridical presupposition. Our challenging of Karttunen’s idea that MANAGE \( p \) entails \( p \) echoes recent voices in the literature (Baglini and Francez 2015, Nadathur 2016), but our own account relies on the affinity between managing and trying, and the nonveridicality of trying.

Under certain circumstances, ability modals do allow entailment to \( p \), i.e., the entailment that the ability was actualized and led to \( p \) (‘actuality’ entailment). The actuality entailment renders the prejacent true at a past time, and depends crucially, we newly argue, on ABLE being embedded under past. We offer a thorough analysis of this phenomenon based on Mari 2016b, consistent with the fact that the choice of subjunctive mood is not affected. We show the actuality entailment depends on PAST, not perfective aspect as previously thought. In our analysis, implicative operators and ability modals in the veridical reading are not
equivalent, contrary to Bhatt (1999). Extending the theory that we have been unravelling, we argue that when the actuality entailment arises, the modal remains nonveridical in the presupposition.

6.1 Core patterns of ability modals and implicatives

Ability in English is expressed through modal verbs and expressions such as can, be able to, be capable of, and similar expressions:

(1) a. Ariadne can solve this problem.
    b. Ariadne is able solve this problem.
    c. Ariadne is capable of solving this problem.

In Greek, Italian, and French, lexicalizations of ability relate to the possibility modal bori, pouvoir, potere; see Staraki (2013) for an extensive presentation for Greek; Mari (2015a) for Italian and French. The ability modal appears to be homophonous to the possibility modal; but unlike the latter, the ability modal has personal syntax:

(2) Ta pediα bori na/*oti pane sto spiti mona
    The children can.3pl that.SUBJ/*IND go.IMPF.3pl to-the home alone
    them.
    Ability: ‘The children are able to go home on their own.’
    Deontic: ‘The children are allowed to go home by themselves.’

Here we see the verb ‘boro’ in the 3rd person plural, agreeing with the plural children. As we showed earlier, the epistemic is invariant in the 3rd person singular, almost particle like. A deontic reading is also possible with the personal bori, but the epistemic reading is excluded, since epistemic possibility arises only with the impersonal form bori, that we studied earlier:

(3) Ta pediα bori na/*oti ine sto spiti mona
    The children can.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND go.IMPF.3pl to-the home alone
    them.
    Epistemic only: ‘The children may be home alone (as far as I know).’

(4) Ta pediα bori na/*oti ine sto spiti mona
    The children can.3pl that.SUBJ/IND go.IMPF.3pl to-the home alone
    them.
Permission only: ‘The children are allowed to be home alone.’

Notice here that the stative predicate ‘be home alone’ cannot combine with the ability borun; the only possible reading with the stative is that of permission.

In Italian and French, we have similar effects (see Kronning 1996). Ability and epistemic modals have the same morpho-syntactic profile, but ability is incompatible with stative meaning:

\[(5)\]
- a. Gianni può aprire la porta con il naso.
  Gianni can open the door with the nose.
  ‘Gianni can open the door with his nose.’
- b. Gianni può essere malato. (epistemic only)
  Gianni can be ill.
  ‘Gianni might be ill.’

\[(6)\]
- a. Jean peut ouvrir la porte avec son nez.
  Jean can open the door with his nose.
  ‘Jean can open the door with his nose.’
- b. Jean peut être malade. (epistemic only)
  Jean can be ill
  ‘Jean might be ill.’

We immediately note that abilitative modals require a non-stative predicate, as ability is ability to act. The abilitative - epistemic distinction correlates with embedding of eventive and statives respectively, as can be recalled from our discussion in chapter 3. The Italian ability modal selects an infinitive and not a subjunctive. This is because obviation is not tolerated, and it is obviation that allows the subjunctive generally in Romance. In Greek, the infinitive is not an option because all sentential complements must be finite, as we know. We will continue to take the infinitive and the subjunctive to be equivalent, and specifically in the case of ability modals—and similar control verbs—we will argue that it contains zero tense, although it is a morphological non-past. We also assume, following Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, and Staraki 2013, that the Greek ability verb is a separate lexical item from the possibility modal borì which is invariant, thus particle like. Finally, we acknowledge that abilitative but not epistemic modals can be pronominalized.

As modal verbs, borì, pouvoir, potere ability modals are expected to obey the Nonveridicality Axiom which requires that the modal base be nonveridical. They are also objectively nonveridical: ABLE (the children go home) does not entail that the children went, will, or are going home. Ability itself is a disposition, i.e., a state, which can be precondition for action. However, the mere disposition, as can be seen in the sentences above, does not entail that action is taken.
The ability of Ariadne to solve this problem does not entail that she does, or did solve the problem. Pure ability is thus nonveridical (Giannakidou 2001, Mari 2010b, 2015, 2016b, Mari, Beyssade and Del Prete 2012), and does not trigger actual truth of the prejacent clause.

### 6.1.1 Basic questions about ability

Portner (2009: 135) characterizes the modality expressed by ability expressions *dynamic* and considers it a subcase of volitional modality, thereby distinguishing ability from epistemic or deontic (which are characterized by Portner as *priority* modals). Unlike epistemic modals, where the key anchor is the speaker, with ability verbs the subject is important, i.e., she has the ability to do something. From this perspective, the ability modal looks more like an attitude verb--where we saw the key individual anchor is the subject. The term ‘root’ modal is used sometimes to reflect this similarity. The subject of the ability modal is typically agentive (see also Hackl 1998, Staraki 2013), in contrast with the subjects of epistemic or deontic modalities, and ‘controls’ the the action or state expressed by the complement clause (something not observed typically with propositional attitudes).

The proper treatment of ability has not been an easy task. One dimension of complication has to do with the quantificational force of the ability modal. Kenny (1975, 1976) agued that ability modality cannot simply be analyzed as a possibility operator within modal logic; likewise Giannakidou (2001) and Thomason (2005) propose analyses of CAN as a universal quantifier (hence like MUST). Thomason rejects the existential analysis as weak: "To put it roughly, Cross’s theory of the *can* of ability is based on equivalence between *I can* and *If I tried I might*. This doesn’t seem right; *If I tried I would* is a more intuitive conditional explication. This raises a fairly complex and delicate issue, one that is crucial for the logical analysis of ability." (Thomason 2005: 7). The data discussed in Giannakidou 2001, and Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, support this stronger analysis of ability which we will adopt in this chapter.

Another fact about ability is that is can be understood in terms of enabling factors as well as temporal constraints. As Thomason, again, puts it: "In general, ability can depend on favorable circumstances, on the presence of appropriate knowledge, and on non-epistemic properties of the agent. I can truly say I can’t write a check either because my bank balance is negative, or because I don’t know where my checkbook is, or because my hand is injured. I believe that the same sense of *can* is involved in each case." (Thomason 2005: 3). Additionally, ability can be understood as a general disposition of the subject (holding generically), or as being anchored to a specific situation and time. An example like *I can lift a 50 pound rock* would be most plausibly understood as generic; it attributes a
property to an agent that holds under a wide variety of times and circumstances, perhaps to all that are Ideal, as we will argue here (see also Thomason 2005: 3). J.-H. Lee 2006 further shows that, in Korean, generic and time-bound CAN are realized by lexically distinct verbs, showing that the difference between generic ability and time-bound ability can be lexicalized in a language. So, abilities may be generic or time-bound dispositions for action; but neither generic, nor time bound abilities imply acting on the ability, ability is therefore nonveridical and the choice of subjunctive in Greek is expected.

Ability expressions, however, can also be used to refer to real actions. Aristotle expresses this difference in the following way (On Interpretation 23a 7-13): "'Possible' itself is ambiguous. It is used, on the one hand, of facts and things that are actualized; it is possible for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks, and in general we call a thing possible, since it is now realized. On the other hand, possible is used of a thing that might be realized; it is possible for someone to walk, since in certain conditions he would." Crucially, Aristotle aims to distinguish two readings of possible, and possible expresses an 'actualized possibility' (puissance en acte, as Mari and Martin 2009 put it). "In fact, if possible expresses an actualized possibility, on this reading, ABLE p entails p, since actualizing an ability involves performing an action" (Mari and Martin 2009: 9).

This actualized ability, as one may think of it, has been studied recently in a number of works under the label 'actuality entailment' coined by Bhatt (1999) who discussed Hindi and Greek examples. Bhatt attributes the entailment to the perfective aspect on the modal verb. We give below two examples from Greek (from Giannakidou and Staraki 2012). Recall that Greek, unlike English, has a perfective-imperfective distinction in the past (as well as in the nonpast; recall chapter 3 for details):

(7) John was able to escape.

(8) O Janis borese na apodrasi (#ala dhen The John can.perf.past.3sg that.SUBJ escape.perf.nonpast.3sg (but not apedrase). escaped).

‘John was able to, and he did escape (#but he did not).’

(9) O Janis boruse na apodrasi (ala dhen The John can.impf.past.3sg that.SUBJ escape.perf.nonpast.3sg (but not apedrase). escaped).

‘John could/was able to escape (but he did not).’

The sentence with perfective aspect borese entails that John escaped, an entailment lacking with imperfective aspect, as we see. The imperfective sentence is
a statement of pure ability, and is nonveridical, since it does not imply \( p \). The perfective ability statement is also in the past, and it is factual: it implies that John engaged actually in a series of actions the result of which was the fact that he escaped.

French and Italian are similar to Greek, and have also been thoroughly discussed in the literature (see, e.g. for French, Hacquard 2006, 2009, 2014; Mari and Martin 2007, 2009, Homer 2010; for Italian, Hacquard, 2006; Mari, 2010b, 2015a, 2016b).^1

(10) Jean a pu prendre le train, #mais il ne l’a pas pris.

‘John managed to move the table, #but he did not do it.’

(11) Gianni ha potuto prendere il treno, #ma non lo ha preso.

‘Gianni managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

^1Several authors do not subscribe to an aspectual analysis, though, and some of them argue that causality also plays a role (see e.g., Giannakidou and Staraki 2012).

The *imparfait* cancels the actuality entailment in French (*a contrario*, see Giannakidou and Staraki 2012; Davis et al. 2009).

(12) John pouvait prendre le train, mais il ne l’a pas pris.

‘John could have taken the train, but he did not take it.’

(13) Gianni poteva prendere il treno, #ma non lo ha preso.

‘Gianni managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

Bhatt and others (Hacquard 2006, 2009, Pinon 2003) argue that the actuality entailment with ability is an aspectual phenomenon. Bhatt suggests actualized ability has the logical structure PERF(ABLE \( p \)), whereas pure ability is GEN(ABLE \( p \)), and most of the literature assumes some variant of this thesis. Mari and Martin 2007, 2009, and Giannakidou and Staraki 2012 challenge this type of analysis and offer alternative accounts. In this chapter, we will discuss thoroughly the relevant facts in Greek, French and Italian, and offer an analysis of the actuality entailment that is consistent with the ability modal obeying the Nonveridicality Axiom (following some ideas in Mari 2016b). The effect will be derived from the ability being in the scope of PAST, the role of which has been under-appreciated in previous accounts.
6.1.2 Implicatives

Bhatt points out a similarity between the action reading of ability and implicative verbs such as MANAGE:

(14) I Ariadne katafere/borese na*/oti
    The Ariadne managed.could.PERF.3sg that.SUBJ*/IND
    ftiaksi to aftokinito.
    fix.NONPAST.3sg the car.
    ‘Ariadne managed to/was able to fix the car.’

(15) a. Mario è riuscito a riparare la macchina.
    Mario is managed to repair the car.
    b. Mario ha potuto riparare la macchina.
    Mario has could to repair the car.
    ‘Mario managed to repair the car.’

Notice that PRES (which is the present progressive in English) is either odd, or doesn’t produce the actuality entailment:

(16) #John is managing /is being able to fix the car.

(17) John is forcing Ariadne to sign the papers.
    Does not entail that Ariadne signed or is signing the papers.

(18) John is getting Ariadne to sign the papers.
    Does not entail that Ariadne signed or is signing the papers.

The implicative structure is not inherently veridical, i.e. it does not entail $p$. Whether or not the veridical inference will be possible depends largely on tense. It is crucial to make this observation right at the beginning because the role of tense tends to be overlooked in almost all the accounts we know. None of the existing accounts explains why the intended veridicality entailment doesn’t arise with PRES. On the contrary, under Bhatt’s account, and because PRES is not generic, the veridicality inference should be allowed, contrary to fact.

Crucially, the future also doesn’t license the veridical inference:

(19) I Ariadne tha kataferi/boresi na ftiaksi to
    The Ariadne will manage.3sg/can.3sg that.SUBJ fix.perf.3sg the
    aftokinito.
    car.
    ‘Ariadne will manage/will be able to fix the car.’

Despite the presence of perfective aspect, embedding under FUT doesn’t give actuality. This casts doubt on the idea that implicatives inherently entail $p$, and it
also shows that actualization, contrary to what is claimed in most of the literature, cannot be simply due to perfective aspect. It seems rather to be an effect of PAST. We will offer an analysis based on this idea. The crucial element will be that with ability, unlike with other modals, semantic PAST applies. This is impossible with epistemic modality, e.g., *MUSTED, and epistemic could is not necessarily about the past: Flavio could be home now.

The semantics of MANAGE has been an issue of considerable debate. Karttunen (1971) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) present the earliest discussions. Karttunen posits that MANAGE $p$ entails $p$ – which would render MANAGE veridical. The use of a nonveridical tense, however – i.e., the morphological non-past — is inconsistent with a veridical analysis. The literature typically focusses on English, and the problem of tense and mood choice is not adequately appreciated, but it sheds new light on implicatives as we will show.

Crucially, unlike the ability modal, MANAGE does presupposes trying; and it implicates that it took (some or considerable) effort to bring about $p$:

\[
\begin{align*}
(20) & \quad \text{John didn’t manage to fix the car } \text{entails that John made an effort to fix the car.} \\
(21) & \quad \text{John managed to fix the car } \text{entails that John made an effort to fix the car.}
\end{align*}
\]

TRY itself is nonveridical (Giannakidou 2013) and selects the subjunctive. In addition, the TRY component often (but not always) gives rise to a difficulty reading. Difficulty, on the other hand, seems to not be a necessary component of actualized ability:

\[
\begin{align*}
(22) & \quad \text{O Janis borese na } \text{ pji deka bires – kai itan efkolo!} \\
& \quad \text{the John could that.SUBJ drink ten beers – and was easy.} \\
& \quad \text{‘John was able to drink ten beers last night – and it was easy!’} \\
(23) & \quad \text{O Janis katafere na } \text{ pji deka bires – #kai itan efkolo!} \\
& \quad \text{the John managed that.SUBJ drink ten beers – and was easy.} \\
& \quad \text{‘John managed to drink ten beers last night – and it was easy!’}
\end{align*}
\]

In the ability sentence, John is a heavy drinker, and 10 beers were easy to drink; but notice the contrast with MANAGE, which is odd with the statement of ease. Difficulty is thus not an intrinsic component of ability, at least not in the way it appears to be with MANAGE.\(^2\) Bhatt (1999) argues that the ability modal in

\[
\begin{align*}
(24) & \quad \text{O Janis borese } \text{ na sikothe.} \\
& \quad \text{The John can.PERF.PAST.3sg that.SUBJ stand-up.PERF.NONPAST.3sg.} \\
& \quad \text{‘John was able to stand up?it was a difficult thing!’}
\end{align*}
\]
6.2. ABILITY MODALITY

the perfective is an implicative verb, whereas the pure ability has the structure GEN(able). But given the contrast with manage above, simply reducing the ability modal to an implicative will not be sufficient. We will argue that implicatives and ability modals differ importantly in that only the actualized ability entails \( p \). We will treat MANAGE as a non-actualization (therefore nonveridical) aspectual operator, explaining the use of subjunctive— a longstanding puzzle that none of the existing analyses addresses.

Our discussion proceeds as follows. In section 2, we offer an analysis of the ability modals in Greek, Italian, and French as MUST in the realm of ability. In section 3, we consider and reject previous accounts of the actualized reading of ability. In section 4, we offer our own analysis. In section 5 we discuss implicatives. We will argue that the choice of the subjunctive is justified because the implicative presupposes TRY, and try is nonveridical. We will also follow recent analyses of the assertion of MANAGE that argue that MANAGE only entails the means to bring about the prejacent are (Nadathur 2016). This analysis derives nonveridicality for MANAGE \( p \) and the subjunctive is justified by nonveridicality both by the assertion and the presupposition.

6.2 Ability modality

6.2.1 Some background notions

Giannakidou (2001) offers an analysis of the ability modal— which we will designate as ABLE— as a universal quantifier. We will start by presenting that analysis; then we will adjust it to the framework developed in chapter 2 so that a full parallel to epistemic MUST will be established.\(^3\)

As we mentioned at the beginning, it has been common to admit that the semantics of mere possibility is too weak for ability verbs. Giannakidou (2001), Thomason (2005), and Portner (2009) are recent discussions (see also references therein); Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1992): 238 also admit that the analysis of can as a possibility modal is "certainly not right".\(^4\) The problem with mere possibility is that it conceptualizes ability as occasional, i.e. it makes ABLE \( i p \) true in case there is some (and possibly random) outcome associated with a manifestation

Standing up is normally easy, but with borese we need a context in which it takes effort to stand up, i.e. John was sick or John is a non-walking infant. In any case, there appears to be a contrast between ability modals and MANAGE when it comes to difficulty, something that the literature typically overlooks.

\(^3\)See also Maier 2016 for the role of ordering sources with dispositional modality.

\(^4\)See Hackl 1998 for an existential analysis.
of i’s ability (see Thomason 2005, Kenny 1975, 1976, and Mari and Martin 2009, Mari 2012, 2015a, 2017c on this point). The basis of our discussion, then, is that in all ideal worlds consistent with i’s abilities, i carries out p — and the mere possibility circumstantial modal analysis cannot capture this. The individual anchor i, crucially, is the sentence subject, i.e. the subject argument of ABLE. In Greek, Italian and French, the relevance of the agent is suggested clearly by the fact that the ability modal is a personal verb, as we mentioned, contrary to the epistemic modal which has impersonal syntax. The same holds, as we showed in (1) for the deontic modal.

Giannakidou (2001), to our knowledge, is the first explicit analysis of the ability modal as a universal modal. The reasoning is justified as follows. In an example like John can swim, for each world we consider, John will have the ability to swim in that world. Though this definition seems to work in worlds where John knows indeed how to swim (and he knows that he knows that) due to training or natural talent, in worlds where John didn’t learn how to swim, or hasn’t discovered his natural talent yet, p is clearly not true, Giannakidou argues. Therefore, we need to restrict the set of worlds in the modal base to those worlds in which people have abilities to do things (because of proper training, natural talents, or whatever other reason), and where people are aware of these abilities. Giannakidou calls these worlds the ability modal base; following the standard Kratzerian framework, the ability base is a function from w to worlds w′, at least as normal as w, compatible with what an agent i is capable of doing at w.

\[
K_{\text{ability}}(i)(w) = \{ w': \forall p[i \text{ is capable of } p(w) \to p(w')] \} \quad (\text{Giannakidou 2001: 702}).
\]

This is a good start; but a problem is raised by this definition, namely that whenever the agent has an ability in a world, s/he actualizes that ability in that world. We will develop here an account that does not encode this notion of obligatory actualization. Within this modal base, we need to partition between worlds where i undertakes action to bring about p, and worlds in which i has not taken such action.

The truth condition for boro given by Giannakidou is as follows:

\[
\text{(26) For all worlds } w' \text{ in } K_{\text{ability}}, \text{ there is a world } w'' \text{ in } K_{\text{ability}} \text{ such that } w'' <_w w', \text{ and for every other world } w''' <_w w'' \text{ in } K_{\text{ability}}, \text{ p is true in } w'''. \quad (\text{ABILITY CAN; Giannakidou 2001: (132)})
\]

Given the fact that abilitative modals can give rise to actuality entailments, the role of the ingredients involved in turning ability into action is crucial. The notion of ability needs some rethinking in order to better understand the role of tense as well as the nature of the relation between ability and action. We proceed to show
6.2. ABILITY MODALITY

now to offer an analysis within our current system.

6.2.2 ABLE and MUST: The structure of the ability modal base

The analysis we offer here is exactly parallel to epistemic MUST. We start by reminding the key features of MUST. Recall the epistemic modal base:

(27) \( M(i)(t_u)(w_0) = \lambda w' (w' \text{ is compatible with what is known by the speaker } i \text{ in } w_0 \text{ at } t_u) \)

Recall that our notation \( M(i) \) corresponds to the Kratzerian notation using set intersection \( \cap f_{\text{epistemic}}(w_0, i, t_u) \), where this returns the set of worlds compatible with what it is known in \( w_0 \) by \( i \). Modality, in our framework, is always subjective, allowing also for cases where the epistemic agent \( i \) is a collective individual or group of people (and this may be used to capture what others would call objective modality). The epistemic modality is, as we said, dependent to knowledge at \( t_u \), as is often acknowledged in the literature (see Portner 2009, Hacquard 2006, 2010, Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b 2018a,b).

Now, when it comes to ABLE, we will use \( K \) to designate the modal base, and \( i \) will be the subject of ABLE. Ability is parametric to time, as people have different abilities at different times. Ability as a general predisposition is thought to be atemporal (recall that Bhatt’s uses GEN), and certain abilities may indeed be atemporal, e.g., such as the ability to talk, to walk, to breath, etc. However, abilities are also skills and they become parametric to time and training, age, and so forth. The ability to drive, to speak French, to cook well are such abilities – and one can actually argue that all abilities are of this type.\(^5\)

(28) \( K(i)(t_u)(c) = \lambda w' (w' \text{ is compatible with what the subject } i \text{ is capable of doing in } w_0 \text{ at } t_u) \)

\( K \) encompasses what \( i \) can do at \( t_u \) in \( c \). Knowledge is always anchored to \( t_u \), but this is not so for ability. Time sensitive variants of ABLE, as in Korean, or embedding ABLE under PAST (the specific configuration producing actuality entailment) have the temporal argument of \( K \) affected: it is, by default, \( t_u \) if ABLE is in the present tense, but the temporal parameter can be in the past or future depending on whether ABLE is embedded under PAST or FUT. Unlike epistemic modality which doesn’t scope under tense, ability modality is a lower operator and does – hence its characterization often as ‘root’ modality. The actuality en-

\(^5\)See also discussion in Menendez-Benito 2012 on the possible ingredients of an abilitative modal base.
tailment is a case where ABLE has narrow scope below PAST, and, anticipating our analysis of the phenomenon, the K parameter in this case is set to a time prior to \( t_u \).\(^6\)

The modal base of epistemic MUST, as we noted, is nonveridical about the proposition \( p \) denoted by its prejacent, and contains both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds. To derive the truth conditions of MUST we assumed with the literature (see e.g. Portner, 2009) that MUST uses a set of propositions \( S \) which describe shared stereotypical/normalcy conditions. Given the epistemic modal base \( M(i)(t_u)(w_0) \), in chapter 2, we have defined \( \text{Ideal}_S \) as a function over \( M(i)(t_u)(w_0) \). The output \( \text{Ideal}_S \) is a subset of \( M(i)(t_u)(w_0) \):

\[
\text{Ideal}_S(M(i)(t_u)(w_0)) = \{ w' \in M(i)(t_u)(w_0) : \forall q \in S : w' \in q \}
\]

So defined, \( \text{Ideal}_S \) delivers the worlds in the epistemic modal base, a subset of \( M(i) \), in which all the propositions in \( S \) are true. \( S \) is a set of propositions that corresponds to common ground norms. Since only those worlds are considered in which all the propositions in \( S \) are true, the function \( \text{Ideal}_S \) determines a cut-off point. (The set \( \text{Ideal}_S \) is also parametric to time. Unless otherwise stated, we consider that \( \text{Ideal}_S \) is determined at the actual world and at the utterance time).

The basic truth condition of MUST requires that \( p \) is true in the Ideal set of \( M(i) \). Tense comes from below MUST, and can be either a semantic present (PRES) or past. (FUT is a case of MUST scoping above a NON-PAST, a case that we will not consider here). Given a set \( \text{Ideal}_S \) and the utterance time \( t_u \),

\[
\text{prepi/devere/must (PAST (p))}^{M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : \exists t' \prec t_u \land p(w', t')
\]

\[
\text{prepi/devere/must (PRES (p))}^{M,i,S} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_S : p(w', t_u)
\]

(To keep things simple here, we ignore the role of the metaevaluation, although we do seem to get the PPI effect \textit{John is not able to sing} only has the expected MUST above negation reading). Echoing Giannakidou and Mari (2016a,b), we said that we can think of \( \text{Ideal}_S \) as the ‘inner’ domain of MUST, and \( M(i) \) as the ‘outer’ domain. The outer domain is a nonveridical epistemic space that does not as a whole support \( p \); but the \( \text{Ideal}_S \) space is veridical: all worlds are \( p \) worlds. In

\(^6\)The same, we will argue, holds for deontic modals: the deontic MUST can scope below PAST. In this case, an actuality inference is also triggered, although it is only an implicature; more discussion in section 4.
other words, MUST is nonveridical with respect to M, but veridical with respect to IdealS. This accounts for why we say that MUST expresses partial commitment: it expresses commitment to p in the IdealS subset of M(i). This makes it stronger than MIGHT, and grants MUST mixed veridicality status. Because of the nonveridical M(i), MUST satisfies the licensing condition for the subjunctive we posited, and this explains why the complement of MUST appears in the subjunctive.

ABLE works in a parallel way but now we have K(i)(tu)(w0)(c). We define IdealR as a function over K(i)(tu)(w0). The output IdealR is a subset of K(i)(tu)(w0):

\[
\text{IdealR}(K(i)(tu)(w0)) = \{w' \in K(i)(tu)(w0) : \forall q \in R(w' \in q) \}
\]

Now IdealR delivers the worlds in the K, a subset of K(i) where all abilities are carried out. The function IdealS determines a cut-off point, as with epistemic MUST.

What are the Ideal worlds with ability? In our account, circumstances establish a divide between worlds in which the ability is actualized and those in which it is not. To actualize abilities at least two preconditions must be met. First, the circumstantial preconditions must be satisfied, and again, normality plays a role: the world has to function in the normal way with the usual causal laws. Secondly, the agent must want to carry about p. Volition has been recognized as a precondition of ability several times in the literature (see discussion in Mari and Martin 2007; Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, which develop an account based on volitional causation). The volitional agent i might not be the entity denoted by the subject, but there is a notion of plan and possibly of goal underlying abilitative modality (Thomason 2005; Hacquard 2006; Mari 2015 among others). In this respect, parametrizing the ABLE modal to the volitional agent i is going to be crucial if we want to understand the entailment of actuality. Notice, crucially, that nonvolitional agents are impossible:

\[
\#\text{The wind was able to break the window.}
\]

Now let us consider the lower tense.

### 6.2.3 Zero tense, obligatory control

With epistemic MUST, as can be recalled, the lower tense can be quite free: a present, past, or nonpast (in which case the MUST is predictive). However, the complement of ABLE lacks this flexibility, and only accepts morphological nonpast forms, perfective or imperfective:
(34) a. I Ariadne bori na odigisi (tora). Ariadne is capable of driving right now.
   b. I Ariadne bori na odigi. Ariadne can drive (generally).

Recall that in French and Italian we only have infinitives, the tense of which is also nonpast. In Greek, as can be seen, two nonpast forms are possible: the perfective (which we have seen so far to be a semantic NONPAST and forward-shifts), and the imperfective nonpast, which is a semantic PRES or the generic tense, and does not forward-shift. The imperfective version above is a statement that Ariadne has generally the ability to drive, but the perfective statement is that Ariadne has at present the ability to undertake driving. In other words, the perfective vs. imperfective contrast with the nonpast marks a divide between general ability versus the time-space bound ability (a difference that can be lexicalized in some languages, e.g. in Korean, Lee 2008). Perfective aspect still does not entail that Ariadne is driving now, but it anchors the ability to now. \( K \) is relativized to \( t_u \) in both cases.

Importantly, there is no forward-shifting despite the use of nonpast with perfective; this is because the ability holds at the time of utterance, though acting on the ability may happen afterwards.

The ability, crucially, cannot be followed by a lower past. As we can see here, if we try to embed a past tense under ABLE, only the epistemic reading arises, and the difference between perfective and imperfective goes away (for reasons that are not relevant right now):

(35) I Ariadne bori na odigise (xthes). Epistemic reading only: ‘Ariadne could have driven yesterday.’
    ‘#Ariadne is capable of having driven yesterday.’

(36) I Ariadne bori na odigouse (xthes). Epistemic reading only: ‘Ariadne could have driven yesterday.’
    ‘#Ariadne is capable of having driven yesterday.’

This also holds in Italian, as we showed in section 1. We repeat the examples:

(37) a. Gianni può aprire la porta con il naso.
    Gianni can open the door with the nose.
    ‘Gianni can open the door with his nose.’
   b. Gianni può essere malato.
    Gianni can be ill.
6.2. ABILITY MODALITY

Gianni might be ill.

Notice the oddity of the English examples too. And in Greek, even with higher past, only the morphological non-past forms in the complement of ABLE are available:

(38) I Ariadne borouse na odigisi/*odigise.

the Ariadne could.3sg that.SBJ drive.PERF.PAST.3sg/drive.IMPERF.PAST.3sg

(39) *Ta paidia borousan na odigisan/odigousan (xthes).

the children could.3spl subj drive.PERF.PAST.3pl/drive.IMPERF.PAST.3pl

We must conclude, therefore, that the ability modal is incompatible with lower past, which means that the embedded clause cannot refer to a time prior to the ability time (unlike with epistemic modals). The reason for this follows from the relation between ability and action: ability is a precondition for action, action therefore cannot precede ability temporally. The ability to do the action coincides with, and is sustained through the action in the worlds where the action is carried out (for Italian and French, see Mari, 2010b,2012,2015,2016b). This also follows from the nature of ability as a necessary means (Giannakidou and Staraki 2012) to carry out the action, it can therefore not precede or follow the action.

The only tense that can be used is the nonpast, as we said; but at the same time, nonpast cannot forward shifting the ability. In other words, it does not behave like the semantic NONPAST that we are by now familiar with. What is it then, semantically?

We will assume that ABLE embeds semantically a zero tense. Zero tense characterizes a number of Greek verbs that seem to have raising-like behavior (Grano 2015, based on earlier discussion by Spyropoulos 2008). The ability modal is certainly one of these, and it does exhibit distinctive syntactic behavior in that it does not obviate, i.e. it appears to be obligatory control, a property that characterizes also English ABLE:

(40) *I Ariadne bori na tragoudisi i Maria.

the Ariadne able that.SBJ sing the Mary.

"*Ariadne can for Mary to sing."

Notice the contrast with thelo ‘want’:

(41) I Ariadne theli na tragoudisi i Maria.

the Ariadne want.3sg that.SBJ sing the Mary

‘Ariadne wants for Mary to sing.’

Grano proposed zero tense for similar verbs such as tolmo ‘dare’, and aspec-
tual ones like those meaning START and FINISH:

(42)  
    a. *I Ariadne tolmise na antimilisi i Maria.
         the Ariadne dared.3sg SUBJ talk-balk.3sg the Mary.
         ‘*Ariadne dared for Mary to talk back.’
    b. *I Ariadne arxise na antimilisi i Maria.
         the Ariadne started.3sg that.SUBJ talk-balk.3sg the Mary.
         ‘*Ariadne started for Mary to talk back.’

When you dare do something, the daring and the doing coincide: you cannot
first dare and then do. The same with START. With this class of verbs, then, the
embedded nonpast must logically coincide with the actions, since it is a means
for the action. The property of obligatory control thus correlates with this form
of co-incidence tense, which we understand zero tense to be. A zero tense is truly
anaphoric, i.e., it identifies with the value of the tense of ABLE, DARE or START.

We are ready now to give the truth condition. Given a set Ideal$_R$, the utterance

\[
\left[ \left[ \text{ABLE (zero-T)} \right] \right]_{K,i,R}^{K,i,R} \text{ is defined only if } K(i) \text{ is nonveridical and is partitioned into Ideal}_R \text{ and } \neg\text{Ideal}_R \text{ worlds. If defined, }
\]

\[
\left[ \left[ \text{ABLE (zero-T)} \right] \right]_{K,i,R}^{K,i,R} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_R: \exists t \in Tp(w', t)
\]

(43)

As we see, the generic version, in accordance with our observations and the lit-
terature on genericity has no temporal information whatsoever. A zero tense is a
kind of anaphor, taking the value of the higher tense, but unlike NONPAST, zero
tense doesn’t move the time forward.

We therefore have a difference between temporal and atemporal (generic)
ABLE. Aspect brings about the two versions, but semantically it plays no role
other than distinguishing a generic from an episodic version of ability. With the
above analysis as the base, we move on now to deal with the cases where the act-
ing on $p$ is entailed. The property of obligatory control, as we noted, is used a
diagnostics for zero tense.

### 6.3 The actuality entailment: previous accounts

In this section, we consider previous explanations of the actuality entailment that
rely mostly on aspect. Giannakidou and Staraki 2012 offer an account in terms of
causality— and aspects of that account become relevant in our own analysis later.
Bhatt (1999) is the first to discuss actuality entailments and he immediately notes that they arise when the modal is in the perfective. We have given examples in Greek, French and Italian—here is an original one from Hindi from Bhatt:

(45) a. Yusuf havaii-jahaaz uraa sak-taa hai/thaa (lekin vo Yusuf air-ship fly can.IMPF be.PRES/be.PAST (but he havaii-jahaaz nahii uraa-taa hai/thaaa). air-ship neg fly-IMPF be.PRES/be.PAST).
   ‘Yusuf was able to fly airplanes (but he didn’t/didn’t fly airplanes).’

   ‘Yusuf could fly the airplane (#but he didn’t fly the airplane).’

Bhatt’s observation has been that the perfective aspect triggers actualization, and is replicated across a variety of languages that show the perfective vs. imperfective contrast (recall for French, Hacquard 2006; Mari and Martin 2007, Homer 2010; for Italian, Hacquard 2006; Mari 2015a; for Greek, Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, a.o). In addition, remember that the perfective under future does not license actuality, as we showed earlier:

(46) I Ariadne tha kataferi/boresi na
    The Ariadne will manage.PERF.3sg/can.PERF.3sg that.SUBJ ftiaksi to aftokinito.
    fix.PERF.3sg the car.
    ‘Ariadne will manage/will be able to fix the car.’

Despite the presence of PERF, embedding under FUT doesn’t give actuality, as we noted—and this fact alone challenges the assumption that actuality is due to perfectivity alone.

But let us accept, for the sake of the present discussion, the role of perfectivity in Bhatt’s account and subsequent accounts in the same spirit. In the actualization reading, ability modals are argued to be identical to implicatives:

(47) a. Jean a pu prendre le train, #mais il ne l’a
    John has can.PAST/PART take the train, #but he not that-has
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pas pris.
ot taken.
‘John was able to/managed to move the table, #but he did not do it.’
b. Gianni ha potuto prendere il treno, #ma non lo ha preso.
Gianni has can take the train, #but not that has taken.
‘Gianni was able to/managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

The imparfait cancels the actuality entailment in French (a contrario, see Gian-
nakidou and Staraki 2012; Davis et al. 2009).

(48) a. John pouvait prendre le train, mais il ne l’a pas pris.
John can.IMPF to take the train, but he not that-has not taken.
‘John could have taken the train, but he did not take it.’
b. Gianni poteva prendere il treno, #ma non lo ha preso.
John can.IMPF to take the train, #but not that has taken.
‘John was able to/managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

Bhatt (ibid.) proposes that the modal is ambiguous and that in addition to a non-
implicative can1, there is an implicative can2 that behaves just like the implicative
manage to. Bhatt also argues that the imperfective conveys generic information,
which prevents the actuality entailment from arising.

Mari and Martin (2007) observe that imperfectivity cannot cancel the impli-
cation with implicative verbs, and can be seen in the examples below which are
replicated for Greek too; Mari and Martin argue that there is no such thing as an
implicative modal.

(49) a. John arrivait à prendre le train, #mais il ne l’a pas pris.
John arrive.IMPF to take the train, #but he not that-has
taken.
‘John managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’
b. Gianni riusciva a prendere il treno, #ma non lo ha preso.
John arrive.IMPF to take the train, #but not that has taken.
‘John managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’
c. O Janis kataferne na perni to treno, #ala dhen to
the John managed.IMPF.3sg SUBJ take the train, #but he not
erperne.
has taken.
‘John managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

(50) O Janis boruse na perni to treno, ala dhen to eperne.
the John managed.IMPF.3sg to take the train, but not it has
6.3. THE ACTUALITY ENTAILMENT: PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS

For now, we will describe the previous accounts in order to illustrate the current extend of available analyses. Since Bhatt (ibid.), theoreticians have built on the assumption that the modal is non-implicative, nonveridical, and the actualization is the effect of aspect or causality. The debate has been very active since Bhatt (ibid.) and, most prominently, Hacquard (2006, 2009, 2010). Given the mismatch between implicative verbs – which remain implicative with the imperfective – and modals – which are only implicative in the perfective – two different accounts seem to be needed, and this is what we do in section 5.

6.3.1 Identification of events across worlds

Hacquard (2006, 2009) observed that the actuality entailment does not arise when the modal has an epistemic interpretation.

(51) Jean a pu prendre le train, comme il a
    John has can.PAST.PART to take the train, as he has
    pu ne pas le prendre.
    can.PAST.PART not it take.
    'John might have taken the train, and he might not have taken it.'

To the best of our knowledge, Hacquard (2006,2009) remains the only work that aims at providing an explanation for the implicative-epistemic ambiguity of the modal in the perfective in French. She proposes that modal bases are parametric to events, and the interpretations of modals depend on them being anchored to different event types. Hacquard proposes a structural account for the ambiguity, such that the epistemic modal scopes above tense and aspect (consistent with what is known in the literature), and the goal-oriented modal is interpreted below temporal and aspectual operators—a position that we also endorse and which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Because we are not trying to explain the ambiguity of the modal but only actuality entailments, we focus on the theory that Hacquard offers to derive this entailment.

Hacquard seeks to maintain a non-implicative reading of the modal. Let us consider (47-a), repeated here in (52):

(52) Jean a pu prendre le train, #mais il ne l’a pas pris.
    John has can.PAST.PART to take the train, #but he not that-has taken.
‘John managed to take the train, #but he did not take it.’

Modals triggering the actuality entailment are modifiers of event descriptions. The modalized event description denotes a set of events such that there is at least one world compatible with the circumstances in the actual world such that John takes the train in this world.

The ability modal, as we see, is simply an existential, which is a major difference with our approach (and the motivating literature we referenced in our earlier discussion). However, we will not focus on that here. Under the scope of aspect, the modal receives a ‘root’ (the term is used by Hacquard) interpretation from being anchored to a wordily event that is introduced by aspect. The world that is introduced by aspect is the actual world. The time of predication of the temporal property is then restricted as past, and the following interpretation is obtained: ‘There is an event in the actual world that is located in a past interval, and there is a world that is compatible with the circumstances in the actual world in which the event is an event of John taking the train.’ To obtain the actuality entailment, the event located in the actual world at a past time must bear the same description as the ‘possible’ event. To this end, Hacquard proposes the following principle.

Preservation of Event Descriptions Across Worlds: for all worlds w1, w2, if e occurs in w1 and w2 and e is a P-event in w1, then ceteris paribus, e is a P-event in w2

It has gone unnoticed in the literature that Hacquard’s account functions properly only in the case in which the modal base contains only P-event worlds. This is certainly an unsuitable solution because an existential modal claim is compatible with all worlds being P-event worlds, but also with some of the worlds being ¬P-event worlds. The latter possibility, however, is blocked under Hacquard’s view. We explain why.

Given the compatibility of existential modals with there being ¬P-event worlds in the modal space, it would have to be possible to extend the truth conditions in the following way.

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Given the compatibility of existential modals with there being ¬P-event worlds in the modal space, it would have to be possible to extend the truth conditions in the following way.
As we said, the modalized event description denotes a set of events such that there is at least one world compatible with the circumstances in the actual world, such that John takes the train in this world. There might be other worlds in the modal base in which John does not take the train. According to the principle (54), given (55), the actual world can turn to be one in which the event is a $\neg P$-event. For this reason, it is not possible, under Hacquard’s account, to extend the truth conditions as in (55).

Hacquard can still advance the counter-argument that the problematic portion above is not part of the truth conditional content, but rather, an implicature that can be cancelled, just as it happens with the *some-all* pair: ‘Some of the students got an A, in fact, all of them did’. Nonetheless, if the part in bold in (55) is an implicature, it is an implicature that must be cancelled under Hacquard’s view to obtain the entailment. If there are accessible $\neg P$-event worlds, the entailment cannot go through. Again, given the preservation of event descriptions across worlds, if some of the accessible worlds are $\neg P$-event worlds, the actual world can be identified with either a $P$-event world or a $\neg P$-event world.

Interpreting the above with a sympathetic eye, we can still concede that the principle of event identification goes through before the calculation of the implicature: the actual world is identified as being a $P$-event world in virtue of (54) and then the implicature (that there are $\neg P$-event worlds in the modal base) is calculated. This would be the only way to save the account, but there are several questionable assumptions that be must endorsed for it to work. Moreover, even admitting that there is such a principle of preservation of events, we would have to define a precise algorithm allowing the computation of this (pragmatic?) principle and of the implicature of existential modal quantification that the modal base contains $\neg P$-event worlds. It is unclear to us whether such a difficult enterprise would provide insights worth the effort.

### 6.3.2 Action dependent abilities

Mari and Martin (2007) build on the clash between the stativity of the modal and the perfective aspect. They propose that the perfective introduces a ‘boundedness condition,’ and they newly distinguish two cases: the ‘bare case,’ where no adverbs are used (52) and the cases in which temporal adverbs are used, as in (56).

(56) #Le robot a pu repasser les chemises à un stade bien
The robot has can.PAST.PART iron the skirts at one stage well
préci de son développement, mais cette fonction n’a jamais été
precise of his development, but this function not-has never been
utilisée.
used.
They propose that the boundedness condition of the perfective aspect can be satisfied in two different ways. When the adverbs are used, they provide the temporal boundaries within which the possibility holds. In this case, there is no actuality entailment. When there are no adverbs, however, the boundaries of the action itself satisfy the boundedness condition of the perfective. In this case, the action ontologically precedes the attribution of the ability, and thus the actuality entailment arises. Let us explain while walking through the definition of action-dependent abilities (ADA) that Mari and Martin (ibid.) introduced to explain the entailment.

(57) **Action Dependent Abilities (ADA)**

(i) ADAs require an action to exist: an ADA *ontologically depends* on the corresponding action.

(ii) A unique and non repeatable performance suffices to *imply* the corresponding ADA.

(iii) ADAs have the same temporal boundaries as the action on which they depend, and are thus bounded.

Clause (i) has the purpose of explaining the actuality entailment: the action has to *ontologically exist* in order to attribute the action-dependent ability to the agent. However, the actuality arises even when the existence of the action is not established, as in questions, in which the speaker is not asking whether John had the possibility of taking the train but whether he actually took it. As ‘No’ is a possible answer to this question, we see that the action need not ‘exist’ to obtain the entailment.

(58) Il devait partir. Est-ce qu’il a pu prendre le train?
‘He had to leave. Did he manage to take the train?’

Claim (ii) states that performing an action *implies* that the performer of the action had the ability to perform it. So far so good. However, why do we choose to utter an abilitative statement in some cases but not in others? Consider the following scenario. I see a dog running. Then, I utter (59):

(59) Ce chien a pu courir.
‘This dog managed to run.’
Since the ability to run is implied by the running itself, I can feel entitled to utter an abilitative statement. In the absence of any further information, the hearer would mostly likely respond:

(60) Wait a minute: there were some impediments?

In other words, the performance of an action does not always seem to justify the attribution of an ability to act, *post facto*. In a context in which the speaker knows $p$ but chooses to utter the weaker $\diamond p$, the Gricean maxim is violated. The question then arises of what renders such a weaker statement felicitous. The constraints on the context of use of implicative modals must therefore be spelled out.

Mari and Martin (*ibid.*) importantly propose (iii), namely that ADA has the same temporal boundaries as the action. They explain this temporal coincidence by the fact that the ability ontologically depends on the action. However, as we have seen the action need not to exist, in order to derive the entailment. Other proposals explaining this coincidence have been advanced. We focus on the cases where the entailment arises, and return later to the cases in which temporal adverbs are used ((56)).

### 6.3.3 Actualistic present perfect

Homer (2010) shows that the perfective on a stative leads to actuality entailment beyond modal verbs. (61) entails that the house has been sold.

(61) **La maison a coûté 200000 euros.**
   
   The house has cost.PAST.PART 200000 euros.
   
   ‘The house has costed 200000 euros’.

Homer’s explanation resorts to an actualistic operator ACT. The schematic LF proposed by Homer for modal sentences giving rise to the AE is in (63).

(62) **Jean a pu prendre le train.**
   
   John has can.PAST.PART take the train.
   
   ‘John managed to take the train’.

(63) **[PRES [PERF [PFV [Q ACT [pouvoir [Jean prendre le train]]]]]]**

The analysis for (62) is in (64).

(64) **$[\text{Jean a pu prendre le train}]^{c_s(c_w)} = 1$** iff there is a past interval $t$ s.t., there is an eventuality $e$ of $s(Q)$ in $t$ in $c_w$ s.t. no proper part of $e$ is an eventuality of $s(Q)$ and $e$ is simultaneous with a state in $c_w$ of John taking the train being possible.
Homer codes in the semantics of ACT the simultaneity between the state of John taking the train being possible and of the event \( e \), which is an event, presumably, in this case, of John taking the train.

Piñón (2011) observes that (64) does not entail the existence of an eventuality \( e \) in which John takes the train though. Homer explains (Homer, *ibid.*, p.11) that a pragmatically determined event is entailed. As a consequence, one can legitimately wonder, with Piñón (*ibid.*), how an actuality entailment is ensured, given that in any realistic context there are a number of available values for \( Q \).

In spite of the several insights that these accounts have provided, the role of PAST is systematically underappreciated, and there seems to be an over-emphasis in event semantics. As can be recalled, under future, perfective aspect and events cannot license the actualization reading of ability. The causality based theory of Giannakidou and Staraki 2012 also relies on event semantics, though it emphasizes the role of ability as a causal factor in bringing about the veridicality entailment. The causality account and its underlying assumptions seem to be better suited for implicatives, and we will have to say more on this in section 5. In our discussion next, we offer own own analysis which capitalizes precisely on the PAST.

### 6.4 New account: Actualizing ABLE is scoping below PAST

#### 6.4.1 ABLE under PAST

The analysis that we adopt here follows Mari (2016b), for whom, the key to understand the actuality entailment lies in the following: (a) the relative scope of PAST, i.e., it is a necessary condition that PAST scopes higher that ABLE; (b) the presence of zero tense; and (c) the modal structure of the inner domain (the quantificational domain) of the ability modal, where \( \text{Ideal}_R \) are parametrized to a volitional agent \( i \) (see Mari, 2016). Recall the truth condition:

Given a set \( \text{Ideal}_R \), the utterance time \( t_u \), and \( i \) the main clause subject:

\[
[\text{ABLE (zero-Tp)}]_{K,i,R,t}^{K,i,R,t} \text{ is defined only if } K(i) \text{ is nonveridical and is partitioned into } \text{Ideal}_R \text{ and } \neg \text{Ideal}_R \text{ worlds. If defined, } [\text{ABLE (zero-Tp)}]_{K,i,R,t}^{K,i,R,t} = 1 \iff \forall w' \in \text{Ideal}_R: \text{ there exists a time } t \text{ such that } p(w', t)
\]

Recall that the zero tense does not function prospectively but it identifies with \( t \), the time of evaluation for ABLE. The ability to do the action coincides with the action in the worlds where the action is carried out. This follows from the
6.4. NEW ACCOUNT: ACTUALIZING ABLE IS SCOPING BELOW PAST

nature of ability, as we noted, which is a prerequisite to carry out the action and is sustained as the action is carried about, not prior to it.

Crucially, the LF syntax of actualized ability has PAST above ABLE. This means that the \( t \) variable will be set to a time prior to now. There is no need for a special operator PERF, as the morphological form perfective nonpast is now a zero tense. As we said, a zero tense is a kind of anaphor, taking the value of the higher tense, in this case past, but unlike NONPAST, zero tense doesn’t move the time forward. Unlike in previous approaches, in our theory PERF plays no role and is therefore unnecessary. Notice that English also shows the actuality effect despite the fact that it doesn’t employ aspect. The following analysis, which we adopt and extend here is from Mari 2016b.

\[(66)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{ABLE} &= \lambda p^s \rightarrow (i \rightarrow t) \lambda w^s \lambda t^i \lambda w' \left[ w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t) \wedge p(w')(t)) \right] \\
\text{PAST} &= \lambda p^s \rightarrow (i \rightarrow t) \lambda w^s \lambda t^i \exists t' \left[ t' \prec t \wedge p(w'(t')) \right] \\
\text{VP} &= \lambda w^s \lambda t^i p(w)(t)
\end{align*}\]

\[(67)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{ABLE (VP)} &= \lambda w \lambda t \lambda w' \left[ w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t)) \wedge [\lambda w \lambda t. p(w)(t)(w')(t)](w')(t) \right] \\
&= \lambda w \lambda t \lambda w' \left[ w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t)) \wedge p(w')(t) \right] \\
\text{PAST(MOD(VP))} &= \lambda w \lambda t \lambda w' \lambda t' \left[ t' \prec t \wedge [\lambda w \lambda t. \exists w' \left[ w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t)) \wedge p(w')(t') \right]](w')(t') \right] \\
&= \lambda w \lambda t \lambda w' \lambda t' \left[ t' \prec t \wedge \forall w' \left[ w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t')) \wedge p(w')(t') \right] \right]
\end{align*}\]

c. \( t \) is fixed as \( t_u \) and \( w \) is the world of evaluation

Truth conditions: \( \exists t'[t' \prec t_u \wedge \forall w'[w' \in \text{Ideal}_R(w(t')) \wedge p(w')(t')] \]

Paraphrase: there is a past time at which there is a world accessible from the world of evaluation, at which \( p \) is true (e.g. John takes the train).
Recall that we have theorized the inner domain of abilitative modal as anchored to a volitional agent $i$. According to Mari 2016b, the agent $i$ has a goal. We now add with Elgesem (1997), reinterpreting Belnap (1992), that the volitional agent projects a choice into the modal base, see Figure 6.1: in this space, for each point in time the options are closed past and present-wise, whereas they are open future-wise. In Belnap, choices are conceptualized as sets of points in a branching-like structure where, at each point, the future is open (is a set of choice points) and the present and past are closed (choices have been made). The branching-time model precognized in Mari (2016b) representing a space where the agent achieves a goal becomes the choice space of $i$.

How does the entailment arise? Given the modal-temporal setting underlying the choice space of the agents, the answer that Mari 2016b provides is straightforward: in the veridical past, the choice space is closed. Moreover, given zero tense, there is no forward-shifting of the prejacent with respect to the time at which the modal base is projected. In other terms, given the point of evaluation at which the modal base (the choice space) is projected – which is past, and at which $p$ becomes true –, and given that it is the same time at which the choice space is projected, the actuality entailment arises because, at that time, the choice space is closed.

Had a prospective aspect intervened between the modal and the VP, the entailment would have not arisen, as with the French or Italian ‘imparfait’.

6.4.2 No entailments when the modal is not agentive and abilitative

Note that Mari (2016b) and our account with her rely on the specific type of modal base that abilitative modal triggers— given the anchoring to the volitional agent $i$, ...
6.4. NEW ACCOUNT: ACTUALIZING ABLE IS SCOping BELOW PAST

![Figure 6.1: Choice space à la Belnap.](image)

The scoping of ABLE below PAST, and the presence of zero tense: the modal base is a choice space which has the specificity of being closed past and present-wise. It follows that if a modal cannot embed under PAST, it won’t be able to get the actualization entailment.

That this prediction is on the right track is evidenced by the fact that epistemic modals cannot occur in the past. Below, the invariant (hence epistemic) form *boruse 'can.3sg" with past is simply ungrammatical:

(69) Ta pedia *boruse/bori na odhijisoun.
    the children could.3sg/can.3sg that.SUBJ drive.3pl.
    ‘The children can drive.’

Recall that the invariant ‘bori’ is the epistemic CAN. We see that it cannot occur in the past. Past can scope below it, of course:

(70) Ta pedia bori na odhigousan.
    the children can.3sg that.SUBJ drove.3pl.
    ‘The children could have driven.’

This scoping is expected with epistemic modals since, as we said, they can combine will three tenses below. But in Greek, the epistemic modal *bori itself simply does not combine with past. Given that it also doesn’t inflect, one can actually think of the epistemic *bori itself as a particle since it is invariant just like particles.

Importantly, the ability personal *boro can have a use as a permissive modal. We can call it deontic use. Deontic *boro indeed combines with past, and actualization is possible. Recall our initial example:

(71) Ta pedia borun na pane sto spiti mona tus.
    The children can.3pl that.SUBJ go.impf.3pl to-the home alone them.
    Ability: ‘The children are able to go home on their own.’
    Deontic: ‘The children are allowed to go home by themselves.’
As we can see, deontic and ability *boro* behave similarly. However, with the permissive reading, actualization is not necessary. Unlike with ability, it can be cancelled:

(73) Ta pedi borusan na pane sto spiti mona tus, The children could.3pl that.SUBJ go.IMPF.3pl to-the home alone them, ala dhen pigan. but not went.3pl. Deontic: ‘The children could (were allowed to) go home by themselves, but they didn’t.’

The difference, we argue, brings about the significance of the abilitative modal base. Or, it could simply be due to the fact that permission is weaker. If we consider deontic MUST, actualization is stronger, but still cancellable:

(74) Ta pedi eprepe na pane sto spiti The children MUST.PAST.3pl that.SUBJ go.IMPF.3pl to-the home mona tus, ala dhen pigan. alone them, but not went.3pl. Deontic: ‘The children had to go home by themselves, but they didn’t.’

Hence, the fact that the ability modal base depends on an volitional agent who has a choice (choice space) is key to explaining the effect of the PAST with ability in a branching-time framework, and why it is either impossible or, at best, weak, with other modals.

Consider now this example, whereby the set of alternatives is not projected from *i* who triggers the choice space, but it is projected by the information provided by the adverb (between 3 and 5 pm; see Mari and Martin, 2007 for the first observation of this phenomenon). Here the space does not have the same structure as the choice space, and this is crucial to the derivation of the entailment.

(75) Jean a pu entrer entre 3 heures et 5 heures, mais John has can.PAST.PART to enter between 3 hours and 5 hours, but il n’est pas entré (adapted from Mari and Martin, 2007) he did not enter. ‘John had the opportunity to enter between 3 and 5, but he did not enter.’
This is also observed for deontic modals, when they are combined with an overt temporal adverb.

(76) Il a dû lire ce livre pendant tout le mois de septembre et il ne l’a même pas touché.  
He has must,PAST,PART read this book during whole the month of September and he did not even touch it.

‘He had to read this book during the whole month of September and he did not even touch it.’

Actuality entailments are specific to abilitative modals, with intentionality (and thus choices).

Likewise, the entailment does not arise with past oriented deontic modality. Here again, there is no agentivity, no choices, and nothing, in the structure of the possibilities makes it possible for the entailment to arise (see also Castroviejo and Oltra-Massuet, 2016).

(77) Pour entrer tu dois avoir acheté les billets.  
To get-in you must,2sg have bought the tickets.  
‘You must have bought the tickets to get in.’

(78) Tu dois être un garçon pour pouvoir utiliser ces toilettes.  
You must,2sg be a male to can use this restroom.  
‘You must be a male to use this restroom.’

Given this derivation of the entailment, our proposal faces the question of the triviality of the modal, or by Gricean reasoning, of why the speaker is choosing to use the modal, in comparison with the bare assertion. Our proposal is that the modal bears its nonveridicality presupposition, as in any other of its uses, excluding the alethic.

6.4.3 The nonveridicality of the modal with the entailment

How is the nonveridical presupposition of ABLE consistent with actualization?

Recall our distinction between the inner and the outer domain of the modal. In Mari’s (2016b) our theory Ideal, is parametrized to i and it is represented as a choice space, with its own specific structure. However, the outer domain, does not have this structure. The abilitative modal base is partitioned between worlds in which p is carried out and those in which it is not. To put it otherwise, an abilitative modal base is such that certain preconditions must be met in order for the action to be carried out (which include the agent volition and the normalcy of the circumstances, at the very least) and by partitioning the modal base we encode the idea that the action can fail. Note that, when this presupposition that the action
can fail is not satisfied, the modal is not felicitous (see Mari, 2016b for extended discussion).

Consider the following scenario from Mari 2016b. As is well-known, Usain Bolt is the fastest runner in the world, who can run 100 meters in 9.58 seconds. The examples are from Mari 2016b.

(79) Usain Bolt a pu battre le record du monde des 100 mètres grâce à son entraînement.

‘Usain bolt was able to break the 100-meter world record thanks to his training.’

Breaking the world record is never granted, and the possibility that even Usain Bolt does not break it is open at a time prior to the race. The sentence is felicitous. Sentence (81), instead, is infelicitous in Context 1 and felicitous in Context 2 described in (80).

(80) a. **Context 1** : Usain Bolt is in his best shape and at the climax of his career.
   b. **Context 2** : Usain Bolt is recovering from a long cold and is far from his highest standards.

(81) (#)Usain Bolt a pu courir 100 mètres en 15 secondes aujourd’hui.

‘Usain Bolt was able to run 100 meters in 15 seconds today.’

Consider context (80-a), in which sentence (81) is infelicitous. Since Usain Bolt can run 100 meters in 9.58 seconds, it is taken for granted that, in his best shape, he can run 100 meters in fifteen seconds, and the possibility that he does not run 100 meters in fifteen seconds was not open. Sentence (81) is instead felicitous in context 2 (80-b), where Usain Bolt is recovering from a very bad cold. In this context, running 100 meters in fifteen seconds is not granted; the possibility of ¬p was open before p becomes true.

The unmodalized sentence (82), on the other hand, is felicitous in both contexts (80-a) and (80-b). It is veridical, and does not require that ¬p be an open possibility (see Mari 2016b for further discussion).

(82) Usain Bolt a couru 100 metres en 15 secondes.
Given the partitioning of the nonveridical modal base between worlds in which the action succeeds and worlds in which it does not, we can derive the inferences of difficulty which, as we mentioned, is a cancelable one. In other words, it is the nonveridicality of the modal base that lies at the foundation of the difficulty premise of ABLE (Mari, 2016b).

To sum up, we have argued that the ability modal has a nonveridical modal base and will therefore select the subjunctive if the language allows it. The actualization entailment is derived by simply acknowledging (a) that ABLE scopes under PAST, and (b) the ramifications of choice. There was no need to appeal to perfective aspect. The phenomenon, therefore, is not aspeactual but rather modal/temporal and articulates at issue and non-at issue content by locating non-veridicality in the presupposition. For further developments in this direction, see Laca 2018, 2019.

Let us move on now to examine the class of implicative verbs.

### 6.5 Implicative verbs and the choice of infinitive and subjunctive

Karttunen (1971) identifies implicative verbs, illustrated by *manage*, as verbs giving rise to an implication as follows (examples from Francez and Baglini 2016):

(83) Solomon managed to build the temple implies that Solomon built the temple.

(84) Solomon didn’t manage to build the temple implies that Solomon didn’t build the temple.

It is often assumed that the verb *manage* contributes no truth-conditional content beyond that of the prejacent. Karttunen (1971:350) writes: "All that takes place when John manages to do something is that he does it. While intending to do is one thing and doing another, managing to do is inseparable in space and time from doing: it is the same event." In other words, this original analysis renders MANAGE $p$ equivalent to $p$, therefore, from our perspective, veridical.

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8For further developments in this direction, see Laca 2018, 2019.
6.5.1 The puzzle from the perspective of Greek and Italian

If the meaning MANAGE is veridical as per Karttunen’s analysis, why do implicative verbs select the subjunctive and the infinitive?

(85) I Ariadne katafere/borese na/*oti
The Ariadne managed.3sg/could.PERF.3sg that.SUBJ/*IND
ftiaksi to aftokinito.
fix.PERF.NONPAST.3sg the car
‘Ariadne managed to/was able to fix the car.’

(86) Mario è riuscito a riparare la macchina.
Mario is managed to repair the car.
‘Mario managed to repair the car.’

The occurrence of the subjunctive, infinitive, and zero tense is quite unexpected if semantically MANAGE $p$ is identical to $p$, as hypothesized by Kartunnen. From the perspective of Greek and Italian (and almost all of Romance, actually) this choice is at odds with the idea that MANAGE operators do not contribute anything to the assertion other than $p$ itself. Most of the literature focusses on English where this problem is literally invisible. But for us, this discrepancy becomes the springboard to argue that MANAGE $p$, actually, is not veridical, and does not entail $p$.

Karttunen and Karttunen and Peters further observe that manage has presuppositional content. The sentences above presuppose (or ‘conventionally implicate’) that Ariadne and Mario tried to fix the car, and that it took some sustained effort to do it. This has been referred to sometimes in the literature as the ‘effort’ presupposition. Now, it has also been noted that the effort component can be rather weak sometimes. For instance, Coleman 1975 gives examples such as the following:

(87) a. Harry managed to insult Ursula without even trying.
b. My neighbors managed to schedule their one wild party of the year on the night before my German exam.

Here we see that the effort can even be explicitly denied without contradiction. Coleman therefore concludes that the MANAGE presupposition varies between one of effort, difficulty, and/or sheer coincidence, depending on the context of utterance. We will argue, however, that even in the case of mere co-incidence, the use of a MANAGE word seems to presuppose that some effort was produced, as can be seen by negating the above sentences:

(88) a. Harry didn’t manage to insult Ursula (#without even trying).
b. #My neighbors didn’t manage to schedule their one wild party of the year
year on the night before my German exam.

Effort seems to be undeniably present with MANAGE. In the \( a \) example, for instance, the coincidence reading is lost, and the effort presupposition is sustained. Likewise in the \( b \) example which is odd exactly because the effort inference survives but it is implausible. We think it reasonable, therefore, to posit a TRY presupposition for MANAGE. Let us formulate this initially as a generalization:

\[
(89) \quad \text{TRY presupposition of MANAGE} \\
\text{MANAGE } \text{at} \quad i \quad \text{at} \quad p \quad \text{presupposes that } i \quad \text{at} \quad \text{tried } p.
\]

The TRY component is key, we will argue, to understand why the subjunctive mood is chosen, and why the verb meaning MANAGE \( p \) is not equivalent the assertion of \( p \). Notice that the verbs meaning TRY also select subjunctive and infinitive:

\[
(90) \quad \text{I Ariadne prospathise/dhokimase na/*ot} \text{that.SUBJ/IND fix.nonpast.3sg the aftokinito.} \\
\text{car.} \\
\text{‘Ariadne tried/attempted to fix the car.’}
\]

The choice of subjunctive and zero tense (following our analysis of morphological perfective nonpast with ability modals) with verbs meaning TRY and MANAGE sheds new light on the puzzle of implicatives, and allows us to address the meaning of MANAGE knowing that the equivalence between PAST \( (p) \) and MANAGE \( p \) is simply not straightforward, pace Kartunnen. Recall again that whether we get implication to \( p \) \( (p \) to be true) depends on whether we have a higher PAST or not. PRES and FUT block the inference, as we mentioned at the beginning:

\[
(91) \quad \# \text{John is managing/is being able to fix the car.}
\]

\[
(92) \quad \text{I Ariadne tha kataferi na ftiaksi to} \\
\text{The Ariadne will manage.PERF.3sg that.SUBJ fix.PERF.3sg the aftokinito.} \\
\text{car.} \\
\text{‘Ariadne will manage to fix the car.’}
\]

None of the existing accounts explain the effect of tense, specifically why the intended implication to \( p \) doesn’t arise with PRES or FUT. At the same time, even with the past, the inference to \( p \) seems to be variable when it comes to other members of the implicative class (e.g., DARE, ALLOW below):
(93) I Ariadne tolmise na antimilisi.
   Ariadne dared.3sg subjtalk.back.NONPAST.3sg
   ‘Ariadne dared to talk back.’

(94) I the daskala epetrepse tin Ariadne na fiji noritera, ala telika
   the teacher allowed.3sg the Ariadne subj leave.3sg earlier, but finally
de xriastike.
   not needed.3sg.
   ‘The teacher allowed Ariadne to leave early but in the end it was not
   necessary.’

As we see, not all implicatives give rise to a veridical inference: the allow sentence
does not imply \( p \). Implicatives as a class, therefore, cannot simply be identical to
bare \( p \) in implying \( p \). The fact that they do not embed past further argues against
the equivalence:

(95) *I Ariadne katafere na eftiakse to aitokinito.
    The Ariadne managed.3sg that.SUBJ fix.PAST.3sg the car.
    ‘Ariadne managed to fix the car.’

The exclusion of past is at odds with the idea that the MANAGE sentence is
simply equivalent to the unembedded past sentence. Crucially, implicatives do
not convey a propositional attitude, they are not propositional attitude verbs. So,
wherever inferencing is done, it is done indeed by the speaker who choses to use
MANAGE instead of the unembedded sentence, and in so doing she chooses to
do something substantially more than merely asserting \( p \).

It appears that there are two main issues about MANAGE. The one issue is
whether the MANAGE sentence asserts \( p \) or not. If it does, it is veridical and the
choice of subjunctive seems puzzling. The second issue is the presupposition of
TRY. TRY is nonveridical, as we shall see, and if MANAGE has a presupposition of
TRY, as we are arguing, then it is of mixed veridicality, even if it entails \( p \).
Nonveridicality in the presupposition is the prerequisite for the choice of subjunc-
tive in our theory, and will override veridicality (objective or subjective), since the
subjunctive is sensitive to what the sentence presupposes, not what it asserts.

6.5.2 Veridicality of aspectual operators: actualization of an event

We will backtrack now to Giannakidou’s (2013) discussion of the problem of the
absence of NPIs in progressives because that paper offers a first handle of TRY
within the analysis of aspectual operators and actualization. Giannakidou argues
that the progressive operator PROG is veridical in entailing some actualization of
6.5. IMPLICATIVE VERBS AND THE CHOICE OF INFINITIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE

*p*, and it therefore does not allow NPIs:

(96) *O Janis egrafe olo to proi kanena grama.
    The J. wrote.IMPF.3sg all the morning any letter.
    *John was writing any letter all morning.

(97) O Janis prospathise na grapsi kanena grama pu na
    The J. tried.3sg that.SUBJ write.3sg any letter that was
    itan leptomeres.
    'John tried this morning to write some letter or other that was.SUBJ de-
    tailed.'

NPI and the subjunctive are not licensed here because PROG *p* is a veridical
clause, lacking a proper NPI and subjunctive licenser. Veridical PROG con-
trasts with nonveridical TRY which doesn’t entail realization of *p*, therefore al-
 lows NPIs, as we can see, as well as subjunctive relative clauses (which are kinds
of NPIs). If MANAGE presupposes TRY *p*, then the analysis of TRY carries over
to the presupposition of MANAGE.

How is PROG veridical? Giannakidou (2013) relies on Sharvit’s 2003 anal-
ysis. As we can see, that analysis poses an actuality component (clause a) and a
modal component (that itself relies on earlier work by Landman 1992 and others):

(98) For any event e, property of events P, and world w, e belongs to PROG(w)(P)
    iff:
    a. e is an event in w; and
    b. for any realistic continuation branch C for e relative to w, there is an
    event e’ and a world w’ such that < e’, w’ > is in C and e’ belongs to
    P(w’). (Sharvit 2003: 414)

According to this analysis, in order to evaluate a sentence such as Mary was cross-
ing the street (when a bus hit her), we build a continuation branch based on the
evaluation world and the ongoing event given by the VP. We stay in the evaluation
world until Mary gets hit by bus, at which point we shift to a maximally simi-
lar world in which a bus does not hit her and which is a reasonable option, and
continue to trace the progression of the event. Under normal circumstances, the
continuation branch will contain an event in which Mary successfully crosses the
street, and so the sentence is judged true. In a sentence like Mary was landing
on the moon (when the phone rang), on the other hand, we have a non-realistic
evaluation branch and therefore the sentence is judged to be false, or true only in
a fictional/dream context.

The important thing is clause a, that an event is physically realized in the
world. This physical realization, Giannakidou argues, suffices to give us veridi-
ability: a rational speaker choses to use PROG [cross the street] when she knows that there is an actual, though arguably not completed but ongoing event of crossing the street. All worlds compatible with the speaker’s beliefs, knowledge and perceptions, are worlds where the street is physically being crossed, though the event may not be completed. Likewise, in degree based approaches of the progressive (Piñón 2008), progressive events are realized, in the actual world, to a degree higher than zero. Partial unfolding of the event makes the progressive actual therefore veridical.

It appears, then, that when we consider events, the veridicality of the sentence correlates with actualization, and actualization is physical realization in the actual world of some portion of the event. The progressive is characterized by Giannakidou as an actualization function ACTUAL:

(99) ACTUAL is veridical (Giannakidou 2013b: (53))

(i) When an eventuality P is actualized, P is at least partially physically realized in the actual world.
(ii) Actualization happens with actualization functions (ACTUAL).
(iii) Application of ACTUAL to P entails veridicality: the speaker knows that P is at least partly realized.

ACTUAL refers abstractly to functions like the progressive (PROG), the perfective, and the PAST tense. In choosing any of these functions, the speaker knows or believes that there is (at least some) physical realization of the event P. This knowledge renders PROG veridical, and explains why the progressive patterns with the perfective past in being a bad context for NPIs, subjunctives, and other polarity items. Lacking a result, Giannakidou concludes, doesn’t have any implications: an actualized event can be a complete one (perfective) or an incomplete, ongoing one (progressive).

6.5.3 No actualization with TRY

As we noted, Giannakidou observes that Greek prospatho TRY contrasts with PROG in that it allows NPIs and subjunctive in relative clauses. The contrast suggests that TRY, unlike the progressive, must be nonveridical—a fact supported by the choice of subjunctive, and challenging analyses unifying TRY with progressive (Sharvit 2003). The contrast places TRY in the context of ‘intentional activity’ that can involve both mental and physical action (Kamp 1999-2007, Grano 2011).

The existence of the incremental theme has been central to the discussion of TRY. Sharvit (2003), cited in Grano 2011, argues that try is different from want, in that it entails existence of the theme:
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(100)  a. John wanted to cut a tomato, but there were no tomatoes to cut.
       b. John tried to cut a tomato, #but there were no tomatoes to cut.

(101)  a. Mary wanted to push a cart, but there were no carts to push.
       b. Mary tried to push a cart, #but there were no carts to push. (Sharvit 2003: 405)

She then goes on to say: "Intuitively, it seems that try differs from its cousins want, expect, believe, etc. in that it doesn’t simply express an attitude of some individual toward some proposition, but it also expresses some activity . . . This required ‘action’ is extensional, in the sense that it has to go on in the actual world for the sentence to be judged true." (Sharvit 2003: 407). Action, however, as Giannakidou points out, renders TRY an actualization operator, akin to the progressive. But then, the non-licensing of NPIs and subjunctive with TRY becomes a problem.

Is TRY really an actualization operator? Grano 2011 suggests that try does not necessarily involve physical action and does not always imply the physical existence of the incremental theme. He offers the following cases; notice crucially the contrast with PROG:

(102)  John tried to find a book, but there was no book.

(103)  a. John was eating an apple. Entails: Part of the apple was consumed.
       b. John tried to eat an apple. He looked everywhere but there was no apple, so no apple was consumed.

(104)  Context: John is severely injured and cannot move his arm:
       a. #John was raising his arm.
       b. John tried to raise his arm. (But he didn’t.)

These examples are problematic for the assumption that TRY involves action like the progressive, and lead Giannakidou and Grano to the conclusion that although we tend to think of TRY as involving physical action, in fact it need not. According to Kamp (Kamp 1999-2007: 1), TRY (as well as FAIL, SUCCED) is a device for intentional activity, and is one of the cases that indicate "conceptual continuity which often exists between things we intend to find or do or make, and the events in the real world that result when we try to realize those plans and intentions." In i TRY P, where P is a predicate of events, an agent i has the intention or a plan to set a path for action that will count as P, but what Kamp seems to be saying is that there is a conceptual continuum between the plan/intention and the action, a continuum that includes pure intention as well as action. Grano 2011, likewise, proposes that TRY, unlike the progressive, contains a preparatory phase of the event that need not involve physical action P, but just mental action (e.g.
planning, etc.). TRY is, therefore, nonveridical:

(105) Nonveridicality of TRY
TRY(i, p) does not entail ACTUAL(p); where p is an eventuality description.

This renders TRY operators veridical. The verb try itself and its cognates in Greek and Italian are TRY operators.

We could now argue that TRY p is presupposition of implicatives. However, a possible worry arises: the agentivity of TRY is too strong of a notion when it comes to implicatives proper (see Mari, 2010b, 2015a).

(106) He managed to be dumped by his girlfriend without even trying to be dumped.

We propose to introduce a weaker notion of trying, which we define as follows:

(107) Unintentional TRY: \textit{un}-TRY
\textit{un}-TRY (i, p) is true iff i brings about some action(s) A that can result in p being true.

In prototypical cases, the implicative manage seems to require an intentional TRY. However, since the more underspecified definition in (107) covers a larger number of cases, we will from now use \textit{un}-TRY.

This definition of \textit{un}-TRY allows a series of actions, unrelated to the content p that can lead to p be true, but TRY itself doesn’t directly address p; i.e., if you are trying to eat an apple, you maybe at the store right now doing grocery shopping, but you haven’t taken action that can be characterized as ‘eating an apple’. This is in line, as we now discuss, with recent proposals on implicatives.

6.5.4 MANAGE, \textit{un}-TRY, and the subjunctive

Putting it all together now, we will propose that MANAGE has the following presupposition:

(108) \textit{MANAGE} presupposes \textit{un}-trying
MANAGE (i, p) is defined only if i \textit{un}-TRY p is true.

This presupposition alone is sufficient to explain the use of the subjunctive: \textit{un}-TRY (i, p) does not entail that p, or part of p is actualized. As we have been arguing, the subjunctive is sensitive to the presence of a nonveridical presupposition. The presupposition that the subject agent i tried p does not entail that in all trying worlds i succeeded in bringing about p. In fact, i might actually not be
engaged in the activity described by \( p \) at all, as we just mentioned. Here is another example below:

(109) John managed to fix the car. He called the mechanic and the mechanic did it.

In this case, the managing of fixing the car does not involve John engaging in the fixing of the car at all. John simply initiated a series of events by calling the mechanic, and this event, followed by other events (such that the mechanic coming to see the car, taking it to his workshop, etc.) led eventually to the fixing of the car. John’s trying and managing to fix the car did not involve the proposition or eventualty \( John \ fixed \ the \ car \). There is no trying world where John actually fixed, or was engaged in physical activity that can be successfully described as ‘fix the car’.

But calling the mechanic was indeed a crucial enabling factor, a necessary means or a catalyst (Baglini 2010, Giannakidou and Staraki 2012, Baglini and Francez 2015) for the event of fixing the car to come to be. It was the act that initiated a number of events that are related causally to bring about the result state of the car being fixed. We can encode this as follows:

(110) MANAGE \((i, p)\) asserts that there is a causal path, i.e., a sequence of eventualties \( S \) such that \( S \) is a necessary means for \( p \).

If this is the assertion of MANAGE, then all it entails is that there is a causal path, initiated and sustained through the necessary means \( S \), and that the last stage of the path is \( p \). From this perspective, MANAGE \( p \) is nonveridical in its assertion, as well as its presupposition, and this explains why it invariably selects the subjunctive. At no time does the speaker know that John fixed the car himself:

(111) Epistemic uncertainty of MANAGE 
\( i \) MANAGE \( p \) does not entail that the speaker knows that \( i \) undertook action \( p \).

Hence the use of the subjunctive is not a surprise, but rather follows the patterns we have observed with the modal verbs and attitudes. And it appears to be both nonveridical in the presupposition (having a TRY component and epistemic uncertainty, ) and an objectively nonveridical assertion. \(^9\) Crucially, ability can trigger and sustain a causal path as argued in Giannakidou and Staraki (2012), and it is for this reason that ABLE and MANAGE seem similar— although, as we have

\(^9\) It is possible to also postulate a decompositional analysis of MANAGE as \( un-TRY \ p \) and \( p \). That would be compatible with the facts discussed here, and it would render MANAGE of mixed veridicality, again predicting the subjunctive. In that analysis, \( p \) is entailed but the nonveridicality of the presupposition would be sufficient to predict subjunctive.
shown, they are not identical: ABLE does not have a presupposition of trying.

Our analysis, which owes some inspiration from Giannakidou and Staraki’s (2012) analysis of CAN and Baglini’s (2010) analysis of get, is very close in spirit to a recent proposal by Nadathur (2016). Below is Nadathur’s proposal (Nadathur 2016: (24)):

(112) A statement of the form I(X), with implicative I and complement X:
   a. presupposes the existence of a causal factor (ancestor or set thereof) A for X, where A is causally necessary for X in the context of utterance;
   b. asserts that A was met in the world of evaluation. Consequently, \( \neg I(X) \) asserts that A was not met;
   c. If I is a two-way implicative, I(X) also presupposes that A is the only open prerequisite for X in the utterance context (all A-independent causal ancestors are presumed to be resolved in the X-conducive way).

(We appreciate Sven Lauer bringing Nadathur’s work to our attention). The presupposition of A’s existence, crucially, does not presuppose that A holds, Nadathur asserts. This lexical entry misses the presupposition of TRY, but if we just focus on the assertion, we read that all the so-called implicative verb asserts is the existence of means A which are causally necessary to bring about X. Our view of the assertion and Nadathur’s are therefore quite close. And in both versions, we do not get entailment to \( p \).

6.6 Conclusions

In this chapter we have shown that ability modals, even when giving rise to the actuality entailment, are no exception to our generalization about modality: like epistemic modals, ability modals are also subjecto to the Nonveridicality Axiom, and this explains two puzzles. The nonveridicality presupposition accounts for why past abilitative modals giving rise to the actuality entailment are more informative than bare assertion on the one hand, and why implicative verbs can select subjunctive on the other. We proposed an account of implicatives that radically differs from Kartunnen in deriving nonveridicality for MANAGE via presupposing of un-TRY. Mood and tense choice were key elements in advancing our new arguments for the nonveridical semantics.

As a side-effect of our analysis, the phenomenon of obligatory control with implicatives and ability modals was correlated to the lexical semantics of ability and implicativity: ability and causal path for an action have to hold concurrently
with the action, the morphological nonpast therefore cannot forward-shift but contributes zero tense. Zero tense requires a local relation to the ABLE time. This fact, we think, creates a useful frame within which to understand, and not simply stipulate, obligatory control.
Chapter 7

Propositional attitudes of emotion: gradability and nonveridicality

In this chapter, we complete our theory by considering the mood patterns observed in the complements of propositional attitudes of emotion. A precise treatment of emotion is lacking in the formal semantics literature, and the notion is often reduced to concepts such as preference (as with bouletic), gradability, or expressivity. In dealing with emotion attitudes, we will articulate a precise semantics for emotion as a gradable nonveridical space, on a par with modals and other partitioned attitudes that we have discussed.

Descriptively, emotion attitudes include (at least) three types of attitudes. First, there are attitudes known as emotive such as, e.g., the English be happy, regret, be surprised, be angry, which often appear with gradable psychological adjectives; these designate various kinds of emotion towards a fact or something that the subject perceives as a fact. Emotive predicates can be positive or negative. Secondly, there are attitudes that we will label ‘epistemic’ emotives, such as be aware, remember. Such attitudes combine an emotive component with an epistemic component in their meaning. Finally, we have attitudes of fear, known also as verba timendi such as, e.g., the English fear, be afraid. Fear, in contrast to the emotive predication, never relates to a fact, as we shall see. As we just alluded to, emotive predicates are often treated as factive. Verbs of fear, on the other hand, have not been claimed to be factive. All classes express psychological states of emotion and show variable, i.e. flexible, mood patterns.

7.1 Introduction: the puzzles of emotion attitudes

Let us start with emotive predicates which are the most frequently discussed. Across European languages, these predicates select both the indicative and the
subjunctive. French and Italian, for example select subjunctive, but Greek chooses the indicative complementizer ἰστι.

1 a. Jean regrette que Marie ait lu ce livre.  
   John regrets that Mary have.SUBJ.3sg read this book.

   b. Gianni rimpiange che Maria abbia letto questo libro.  
   John regrets that Mary have.SUBJ.3sg read this book.

   c. John regrets that Mary has read this book.

2 O Pavlos lipate pu/*na/*oti efije i Roxani.  
   Paul regrets that.*IND-pu/SUBJ/*IND-oti left.3sg the Roxani.  
   ‘Paul is sad that Roxanne left.’

Crucially, the assertive indicative— ὰτι — is not possible, as we see. In chapter 4 we proposed that ἰστι is the presuppositional indicative because it appears with the emotive class of verbs that have been claimed to have a factive presupposition. As we noted there, ἰστι appears also with the epistemic factive know, and with memory or perception verbs adding the presupposition that the ἰστι clause is a fact. We will revisit these cases later in the chapter. The key observation at this initial stage is that the emotive class is marked with the presuppositional indicative in Greek, which itself suggests that they must have a veridical presupposition (albeit not necessarily a factive one). From the point of view that ἰστι is sensitive to the presupposition, ἰστι is indeed like the subjunctive— which is sensitive to the presupposition of an attitude. But unlike the subjunctive which needs a nonveridical presupposition, the presuppositional indicative needs a veridical presupposition.¹

Because emotive verbs are thought to be factive (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1968, Karttunen 1971) the use of subjunctive is unexpected (Giannakidou 1998, 2006, 2016). Their non-emotive cousins meaning know strictly select the indicative:

3 a. Jean sait que Marie a lu ce livre.  
   John knows that Mary has read this book.

   b. Gianni sa che Maria ha letto questo libro.  
   John knows that Mary has read this book.

   c. John knows that Mary has read this book.

If emotive attitudes are factive, why do they take the subjunctive in Romance

¹Giannakidou (2016) claims that ἰστι has expressive content in the sense of Potts (2007), i.e. containing expressive indices. But ἰστι can be used also with memory predicates, epistemic know and perception verbs, and in these cases there is no emotion. Hence, it seems more reasonable to conclude that it is the presuppositional aspect of these predicates that ἰστι responds to, not the emotion. Yet, given that ἰστι is a complementizer and that expressive meaning is typically expressed high in the structure, it is also reasonable to assume, with Giannakidou 2016, that if there is expressive content, this complementizer is in a perfect place to encode it.
languages? If both know and emotives have a factive presupposition that their complement is objectively true, how can we explain the contrast vis-à-vis the subjunctive?

Giannakidou (2016) observes three types of languages:

(4) Flexibility in mood choice with emotive verbs
   a. Languages that require subjunctive (Spanish, Italian, French);
   b. Languages allowing subjunctive and indicative (Portuguese, Catalan, Turkish);
   c. Languages where emotives select indicative (Greek, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian).

Giannakidou’s previous version of the theory (Giannakidou 1994, 1998, 2009, 2016) predicts indicative after emotives and derives the languages in c; see also Marques 2004, Baunaz 2015. Emotives have also been argued to denote preference (Villalta 2008). Unfortunately, none of the approaches offers a satisfactory way to address the variation observed because the treatment is monolithic, i.e. the selecting predicate is either veridical or nonveridical, or preferential or non-preferential. In the approach we have developed in this book, the variation in the patterns of mood indicates layers in the attitude meaning, specifically between what a selecting verb asserts and what it presupposes. This allowed us to combine in a single lexical entry a veridical with a nonveridical component, i.e., what we called mixed (non)veridicality. Mixed veridicality, we showed, turns out to be massive, and it is the underlying cause of subjunctive choice in most cases.

In our study of various attitudes so far, we found that the subjunctive is sensitive to the presuppositional content of the predicate, and will be triggered by a nonveridical presupposition in the lexical entry of the predicate. Recall:

(5) Licensing condition for the subjunctive mood
    The subjunctive will be licensed in the complement of an attitude ATT iff ATT obeys the Nonveridicality axiom.

(6) Licensing condition for the indicative mood
    The indicative will be licensed in the complement of ATT iff ATT is veridical (objectively or subjectively).

When we say ‘nonveridical’ attitude, we refer to a propositional attitude or a modal that obeys the Nonveridicality axiom, i.e., the attitude presupposes that the attitude holder i is in a nonveridical state with regards to p. This nonveridical state is most typically a state of epistemic uncertainty: i does not know that p is true. But the nonveridicality condition on the presupposition applies generally, as we will show, as a condition that the relevant space be partitioned. From our study
of emotive predicates, it will become clear that the nonveridicality requirement generalizes to this class of predicates too. Emotives too obey the nonveridicality axiom. On the other hand, when we say a ‘veridical’ attitude, we intend to refer to a solipsistic attitude that lacks the nonveridical presuppositional layer. Epistemic attitudes are both presuppositional and veridical.

Recall also that, pragmatically, the subjunctive mood is a prohibition: do not add \( p \) to a subjective (M), or the common body of knowledge (the common ground). Not adding \( p \) to M is consistent only with a nonveridical state. The discourse function, therefore, of the subjunctive and its sensitivity to a nonveridical presupposition are interlinked. As said earlier, this generalizes to other non-indicatives such as the optative and the imperative moods which have also been argued to have a nonveridical—or as we argued in chapter 5, anti-factive—presupposition.

The licensing condition in (1) explained why suppositional doxastics in Italian, bouletic verbs in general, modals and implicatives select the subjunctive: they all have a nonveridical presupposition. Verbs of awareness, and perception can also be construed with this presupposition, as we saw earlier and we will revisit here; they will therefore also be compatible with the subjunctive. The meaning of these attitudes is multi-layered, and mood flexibility is a diagnostic for that.\(^2\)

Emotives, we will argue here, have mixed veridicality. They convey a presupposition of a nonveridical emotive space which has a positive and a negative extent. But unlike modals, suppositional doxastics and volitions, the emotive class also has a veridical presupposition of factivity or, as we will show, subjective veridicality. The indicative is possible because of this veridical presupposition.

Crucially, a similar mood variability is observed with awareness predicates—indicative in Greek, but subjunctive in Italian:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(7) } & \text{O Nicholas exei epignosi oti/*na i Ariadne tou leei the Nicholas has awareness that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him says psemata. lies.}
\text{\hspace{1cm} 'Nicholas is aware that Ariadne is lying to him.'}
\text{(8) } & \text{È molto/poco cosciente che tu sia stanco. Is very/little aware that you be.SUBJ.3sg tired.}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^2\)Giannakidou (2016), in a similar vein, acknowledges the subjunctive after emotives as a sub-species of what she calls evaluative subjunctive. The emotive subjunctive, it is claimed, is a case where the subjunctive functions modally, though not as a modal in the assertion but at the level of presupposition. The emotive subjunctive introduces the presupposition that the individual anchor considered \(-p\) possible at a time prior to the assertion (see also for Italian Giorgi and Pianesi, 1996). Thus in this case too, the subjunctive is an indicator of a nonveridical epistemic state prior to the assertion. We will revisit this idea in section 2 below.
‘He is very/little aware that you are tired.’

Maria è più cosciente di Gianni dell’accaduto.
Mary is more aware of John of happened. ‘Maria is more aware of Gianni of what has happened.’

We will discuss this alternation as part of the analysis we will develop for emotive predicates.

Finally, we will contrast emotives with verbs of fear, that seem to lack the veridical factivity presupposition. Predicates of fear do allow both subjunctive and indicative, but this correlates with prospective or past/present orientation in the lower clause:

(10) O Pavlos fovate *pu/*oti/na vgi
the Paul fears that.*IND-pu/*IND-oti/SUBJ go.NONPAST.3sg
ekso.
outside.
‘Paul is afraid to go outside.’

(11) O Pavlos fovate *oti/na i aitisi tou
the Paul fears.3sg that.*IND-oti/SUBJ the request his
aporifthike was-denied.3sg.
‘Paul is afraid that his request was denied.’

The subjunctive version is a fear to perform an action. The action is not realized yet (hence NONPAST above), and the fear does not imply that the action is not desirable. For instance, Paul might fear to go outside because it is raining and he doesn’t want to get wet, while at the same time he wants to go outside because he has a date he has been looking forward to for the entire week. The indicative statement, on the other hand, reads like a statement of belief, qualified with a negative emotive adverb: Paul believes that, unfortunately for him, his request was denied. In both cases, there is no factive presupposition.

Notice the parallel in Italian:

(12) Paul ha paura di andare fuori.
Paul has fears to go outside.
‘Paul is afraid to go outside.’

(13) Paul ha paura di aver svegliato il bambino.
Paul has fear of have woken the baby.
‘Paul is afraid of having woken up the baby.’

In both cases, Italian licenses the infinitive, which we take to be equivalent to
the subjunctive, and the past vs. non-past distinction is made. We will argue
that verbs of fear, like emotives, convey an emotional stance which is partitioned.
This explains why they select the subjunctive and infinitives. Verbs of fear lack
the veridical presupposition of emotives, therefore never select \( pu \). The indicative
indicates that the verb of fear is used as a verb of belief. Fear attitudes, thus, have
dual life as predicates of fear to act, and as believing something unfortunate.

Verbs of fear have yet a third dimension in their meaning, revealed in an addi-
tional selection pattern, with a special complementizer manifested in English with
\( lest \), and in Greek with the complementizer \( mipos \):

(14) O Pavlos fovate mipos di \( \text{tin} \) Maria.
    ‘Paul fears lest he see Mary.’

Here, seeing Mary is truly undesirable for Paul. \( Mipos \) emerges from a histori-
cal path that fused the subjunctive negation \( mi \) (Veloudis 1984, Giannakidou 1997,
1998, Chatzopoulou 2012, 2018)—which might appear here as ‘expletive’—with
the indicative complementizer \( pos \). Synchronically, it also has uses as an epis-
temic possibility adverb, exclusively allowed in questions:

(15) Mipos irthe i Maria?
    ‘Did Mary come, perhaps?’

(16) #Mipos irthe i Maria.
    ‘*Perhaps Mary came.’

As a possibility modal, \( mipos \) and questions convey the same kind of nonveridical-
ity: nonveridical equilibrium, not bias, as we noted in chapter 2. Crucially, \( mipos \),
is used also as an interrogative complementizer, roughly equivalent to ‘whether’:

(17) Me rotise an/mipos efaga.
    ‘She asked me if/whether I ate.’

The \( mipos \) version of the indirect question has a presupposition, absent in the
\( an/\text{if} \) version, that the possibility of eating was under discussion. The reading of
\( mipos \), likewise, with verbs of fear, we will argue, has a presupposition that the
possibility raised by the complement was under discussion. The fear space has

\(^{3}\) Expletive negation with verbs of fear has been analyzed by Yoon (2011) as a subjunctive
marker, and this is consistent with our approach here. Yoon adds that there is an additional pre-
supposition (or conventional implicature) of expressive meaning in the sense of Potts 2007; we
consider this possibility in section 5.
the additional presupposition of being nonveridical, as all emotive spaces. The sentence in this case asserts that in all fear worlds the possibility of \( p \) is resolved positively.

French and Italian express this same meaning with the subjunctive and French interestingly uses the expletive negation \( ne \).

(18) a. Carlo teme che arrivi un temporale. (Italian)
   ‘Charles fears that a storm is arriving.’

   b. Charles crains qu’une tempête ne soit en train d’arriver. (French)
   ‘Charles fears that a storm is arriving.’

(19) a. Carlo teme che sia arrivato un temporale. (Italian)
   ‘Charles fears that a storm has arrived.’

   b. Charles crains qu’une tempête ne soit arrivé. (French)
   ‘Charles fears that a storm has arrived.’

To summarize, there are three types of fear:

(20) Varieties of fear
   a. Fear to do something (subjunctive).
   b. Fear as a doxastic attitude towards something unfortunate that happened (indicative); and
   c. Fear that an unfortunate possibility will be realized/has been realized. (special complementizer / subjunctive (+expletive négation))

We proceed with the discussion as follows. We consider first the factivity presupposition of emotives in section 2, and conclude that emotives have a subjectively veridical presupposition and not a factive one. The emotive attitude can be directed also to a perceived or believed fact. In section 3, we offer our analysis of emotion space as a partitioned nonveridical space. We rely on the gradable, scalar nature of emotive verbs, and define a morphism between the emotive scale and possible worlds, such that we get a divide into worlds where the emotions hold (positive extent), and those where it doesn’t (negative extent). The existence of a scale thus creates a nonveridical presupposition, in effect unifying the scalar with the truth based aspects of mood choice. In section 4 we extend our analysis to awareness predicates. In section 5 we discuss the consequences for the complementizer system of Greek, and revisit verbs of memory and perception that are
also compatible with *pu*. We discuss fear predicates in section 6.

### 7.2 The veridical presupposition of emotive attitudes

In this section, we discuss the factive presupposition of emotive predicates. We also consider the possibility of a negative presupposition.

Emotive predicates are known to have a ‘factive’ presupposition:

(21) Pavlos *lipate pu efije i Roxani.*
    Paul regrets that.IND left the Roxani.
    ‘Paul is sad that Roxanne left.’

(22) Pavlos *dhen lipate pu efije i Roxani.*
    Paul not regrets that.IND left the Roxani.
    ‘Paul is not sad that Roxanne left.’

(23) Roxane left.

The positive and negative sentence both entail that Roxane left. This has been the standard observation since Kiparski and Kiparksi (1970), who argued that the factive complement is a fact, i.e., a presupposed true statement. This is also the reason why these verbs are characterized as presuppositional: the emotive verb presupposes some fact, and asserts the subject’s emotion towards that fact. The status of the emotive complement as a factive is also consistent with certain syntactic properties that it has, e.g. syntactically the complement is a weak island (Roussou 1994, Varlokosta 1994, Giannakidou 1998, Baunaz 2015, among others), it blocks quantifier movement, anaphor and NPI licensing, and the like.

Huddleston and Pullum 2002 call into question the factivity of the complement. They call emotives *not entailing*, and give examples like below:

(24) Falsely believing that he had inflicted a fatal wound, Oedipus regretted killing the stranger on the road to Thebes (Klein 1975, quoted in Gazdar 1979, p. 122).

It is not true objectively that Oedipus inflicted a fatal wound. Egré 2008 offers similar examples:

(25) John wrongly believes that Mary got married, and he regrets that she is no longer unmarried. (Egré 2008: (30)).

These examples show that one can have an emotive attitude towards something that one *believes* to be a fact, but may not actually be a fact. In the normal case, we are happy or sad about something that we know happened; but one may only
believe that something happened (a believed fact) and feel happy or sad about it. Hence, the alleged factivity presupposition need not be satisfied as objective veridicality; mere subjective veridicality, i.e., the emotive subject’s belief of \( p \) is enough.

(26) Subjective veridicality presupposition of emotives
\[
[i \text{-}V \text{-emotive that } p]_{W, \text{Dox}(i)} \text{ is defined iff } \forall w'[w' \in \text{Dox}(i) \ p(w')].
\]

The presupposition of \textit{know}, on the other hand, is objective veridicality, namely \( w_0 \in p \):

(27) \[
[i \text{-}k \text{nows that } p]_{w_0, \text{M}(i)} \text{ is defined iff } w_0 \in p.
\]

If defined \( [i \text{-}k \text{nows that } p]_{w, \text{M}(i)} = 1 \) iff: \( \forall w'[w' \in \text{M}(i) \ p(w')] \)

The factivity of \textit{know} and its equivalents is unquestionable; \textit{know} is veridical in both the presupposition and the assertion, subjectively and objectively. Emotive verbs, on the other hand, in the counterexamples above, do not rely on objective veridicality—but on doxastic commitment of \( i \) to the truth of the complement.

Baker (1970) suggested further that emotives express a negativity, a ‘contrari-ness’ between a perceived fact and some mental or emotional state. According to Baker, we say that we are \textit{surprised} when a certain fact does not conform to our expectations; \textit{relieved} when it does not conform to our fears; \textit{disappointed} when a (perceived) fact is not in line with our hopes. Likewise, Baker claims that we say that a certain fact is odd or strange if it seems counter to our view of what is logical. Emotives, as a class, appear to convey this perceived contrariness—and it allows them to license NPIs:

(28) a. *Ariadne believes/dreams that she talked to anybody.
   b. *Ariadne knows that she talked to anybody.
   c. Ariadne regrets that she talked to anybody.
   d. Ariadne is amazed that we got any tickets at all!

Very much in agreement with Baker (and later Linebarger 1980), Giannakidou (1997, 2006, 2016) argues that the appearance of NPIs with emotive verbs is due to the fact that the emotive verbs triggers an implicit negative inference. Giannakidou (2006) suggested that the component of emotives responsible for implicit negation is a counterfactual conditional. The implicit negation is a non-cancellable counterfactual conditional with a negative protasis:

(29) a. John regrets that I bought a car. Entails John would prefer it if I had not bought a car.
   b. John regrets that I bought a car; #in fact he wouldn’t want me to buy a car.
Negating *John would want me to buy a car* creates oddity, suggesting that this inference is ‘not merely a conversational implicature, as argued in Linebarger, but rather something stronger, perhaps a presupposition or a conventional implicature in the sense of Potts (2005). In fact, since emotive factives convey an expressive attitude toward the propositional content of their complement, it makes sense to argue that they all encode conventionally this negative attitude.” (Giannakidou 2006, p. 595). Giannakidou (2016) later suggests that the negative component is a presupposition: *i* has a belief or expectation that not *p* was true prior to the assertion. It is because of this presupposition that we get the perceived contrariness, and the NPI sanctioning, it is claimed. We give below Giannakidou’s version of the presupposition:

(30) **Negative (nonveridical) presupposition of emotive factives (Giannakidou 2016)**

*i* is surprised that *p* is defined if only if: *i* believed that ¬*p*, at a time *t’* ≺ *t*<sub>u</sub> (where *t*<sub>u</sub> is the utterance time).

A similar idea is also found in Giorgi and Pianesi (1996), where a counterfactual presupposition is advocated on a par with Giannakidou (2006). On the other hand, Giannakidou andMari (2016a,b) present challenging examples that show the negative inference to be softer than a presupposition. Observe the following example, where the continuation ‘and she always knew that’ is felicitous:

(31) Arianna è contenta/felice/triste/irritata/...* che* Nicholas ha abbia partecipato alla maratona, e ha sempre saputo che lo *participated to the marathon, and has always known that that have.COND.3sg done.*

‘Arianna is happy/glad/sad/irritated that Nicholas participate in the marathon, and she always knew that he would do it.’

Example (31) clearly does not convey that the speaker had an expectation or belief that ¬*p* prior to *t*<sub>u</sub>. Notice the contrast with *surprise* where the negative inference cannot be cancelled:

(32) Ariadne is surprised that Nicholas participated in the marathon, #and she always knew that he would do it.’

If we take it that the negative component is presuppositional, we then have to explain why it can get systematically cancelled with non-*surprise* types of emotives (positive *be glad, happy*, and even negative *irritated, sad*). The strength of the
negative inference seems to be limited to attitudes of surprise which are inherently akin to a change in expectation; but on the basis of that, it will be unjustifiable to conclude that negativity is a presupposition of all emotives. In many cases it has to be understood as an implicature.

Let us proceed now to the meaning of the emotive component. The nature of emotion will make obvious a nonveridical presupposition.

7.3 Gradability, emotiveness, and nonveridicality

Emotion predicates express emotions. Emotions are ‘attitudes’ in a broad sense; but in a more narrow and accurate sense, they are psychological states towards facts, perceived facts, or potential facts (as is the case with fear). Emotive states are gradable: one can be very sad, a little bit sad, terribly sad—or, on the other hand, not sad at all, or only a little bit sad. It is therefore no accident that emotional attitudes often employ adjectives that are gradable and scalar. The gradable nature of emotion, we argue (following our earlier work Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b), is responsible for their nonveridical content.

7.3.1 The presupposition of nonveridicality of the emotive space

No attention has been paid in the literature to the fact that emotives are gradable predicates, with the exception of Villalta (2008) who, however, does not capitalize on what gradability tells us about veridicality. For us, gradability and nonveridicality will be the starting point. Gradability is diagnosed by number of tests in many works (see indicatively Kennedy 2007, and Giannakidou and Mari 2016a,b). Gradable predicates are, first, compatible with degree modifiers e.g. very; so are emotives:

(33) John is very tall.
    a. Gianni è molto alto.
    b. O Janis ine poli psilos.

(34) John is very irritated/happy that Mary came.
    a. Gianni è molto irritato/contento che venga anche Maria.
    b. O Janis ine poli thimomenos pu irthe i Maria.

Second, gradable predicates and emotives can be used in comparative sentences:

(35) John is taller than Mary.
Emotion predicates, therefore, can be understood on a par with gradeable predicates which denote scales. The scales of emotion, in contrast to scales such as tallness, length, or time, do not rely on objective measure (e.g. based on meter or inches, minutes or seconds), but are purely subjective: what is frightening or irritating or surprising differs from person to person, and there is no objective way of measuring or building fine grained differences of emotion. In this respect, the scales of emotive predicates are akin to the scales of predicates of personal taste (see Munoz 2019 for a recent discussion that embeds emotion predicates to the discussion of personal taste). Emotion scales are construed by individual anchors based on their own emotions and perceptions.

In all analyses of gradability, gradable predicates introduce degree scales and map individuals onto points on the scales. Fine grade distinctions, as we just said, are impossible with emotion which lacks a precise measurement. What is distinctive, however, is a designated degree available in all scales, and which functions as a threshold between the positive extent of the scale and the negative extent. For instance, if I say John is tall, I am saying that John exceeds the degree \(d\) that is the threshold/standard of what counts as tall in the context. If John’s height maps onto a degree \(d’\) below \(d\), then John cannot be said to be tall, he is not-tall. Let \(\mathcal{D}\) be a set of ordered degrees, and \(\mathcal{I}\) a set of individuals. We assume, quite standardly, that a scalar predicate has the analysis in (37):

\[
\lambda P. \lambda x. \lambda d. P(x) \geq d
\]

Variables \(x\) and \(d\) take their value in the sets \(\mathcal{I}\) and \(\mathcal{D}\). Given the threshold \(d\), two equivalence classes are determined: one above \(d\) in which \(i\) has the property, and one in which \(i\) does not have it (below \(d\)). Since we are now considering emotion scales, the space above \(d\) is the space in which \(i\) has the emotion, and the space below \(d\) is the portion of the scale where \(i\) does not have the emotion. This is key to understanding the mapping to veridicality we proposed.

We are now going to map scales into modal spaces. We propose that there is a morphism \(\mathcal{H}\) from degrees \(\mathcal{D}\) and individuals \(\mathcal{I}\) to worlds.

\[
\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{D})(\mathcal{I}) = W
\]
The modal base that we obtain via this mapping is non-homogeneous.\textsuperscript{4,5} The worlds in the modal base are partitioned into those in which \(i\) has the emotion and those in which she does not. This partition is driven by the threshold \(d\). Note (Figure 1), that the worlds in which \(i\) has the sentiment, \(p\) is true. In other worlds, \(W\) is a set of worlds ordered by \(\leq_s\). The set of worlds is partitioned into two equivalence classes of worlds. One is the set of worlds in which the attitude holder has the emotion and \(p\) is true. The other one is the set of worlds in which the attitude holder does not has the emotion and \(p\) is false.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure71}
\caption{Emotion as a non-veridical space}
\end{figure}

This partitioning allows us to define \textit{Positive-Extent-worlds} (PE) for \(p\):

\begin{equation}
\text{PE}_P = \{ w' \in \mathcal{E}_P : w' \text{ where the propositions in } \mathcal{P} \text{ are true } \}
\end{equation}

Here, the set \(\mathcal{P}\) is the singleton set \(\{p\}\). So \(\text{PE}_P\) contains all the worlds in which \(p\) is true. In \(\text{PE}_P\) \(i\) has sentiment \(S\). But not all worlds in \(\mathcal{E}\) are PE worlds for \(p\), \(\mathcal{E}\) only partially supports \(p\). \(\text{PE}_P\) is a subset of \(\mathcal{E}\) (the emotive space). The complement of \(\text{PE}_P\) contains \(\neg p\) worlds. The semantics we propose here may remind the reader of the Best ordering used for modals (Portner 2009), but our ordering source merely contains \(p\).

\textsuperscript{4}Klecha (2014) proposes an account of gradable modal adjectives like \textit{important} that incorporates degrees into the denotation of the adjectives, combining a degree-based semantics and ordering sources à la Kratzer. Here we propose an analysis of scalar emotive predicates in modal terms.

\textsuperscript{5}On emotivity and non-veridicality, see also Beltrama 2015.
Hence, the gradability of the emotive predicate triggers an emotion space $\mathcal{E}$, and partitions it into $p$ and $\neg p$ worlds. The emotion space is thus a nonveridical space. Now that we have the semantics for the emotive component, let us put it together with the presupposition of subjective veridicality in the doxastic space.

(40) Presuppositions of emotive verbs
\[ [\text{V-emotive } p]^{w,\text{Dox}(i),\mathcal{E}} \text{ is defined iff} \]
\[ \begin{align*}
& \text{a. Dox}(i) \text{ contains only } p \text{ worlds (subjective veridicality)} \\
& \text{b. The emotion space } \mathcal{E} \text{ is nonveridical and contains } p \text{ and } \neg p \text{ worlds} (\text{emotive nonveridicality})
\end{align*} \]

The emotion and the doxastic space are independent of one another, as emotion is not a kind of belief. The emotive verb obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom and presupposes that the emotion space be partitioned, just like with other subjunctive licensors, i.e., modals, suppositional doxastics and bouletics. The partitioned space is not epistemic, as was the case with those— it can therefore not be said that the emotion expresses epistemic uncertainty. Given the partition, subjunctive is absolutely expected, and consistent with the predictions we made so far.

As an illustration, consider an emotive sentence, say I am happy that Bridget came today. There are $p$ worlds in my emotion space, but also $\neg p$ worlds, worlds where I do not have the emotion. The sentence asserts that $p$ worlds are in which I am happy, and $\neg p$ worlds are those in which I am sad. The emotive space describes my emotional state in terms of the propositions that make the emotion true. The attitude, just like any other attitude, introduces in the assertion a quantification over those worlds in which the emotion that they denote is true.

### 7.3.2 The assertion of emotives

On the assumption that attitudes and MUST modals introduce universal quantification, emotives are no exception: they introduce universal quantification over the positive extent of the emotion modal base, asserting that in all worlds compatible with the sentiment, $p$ is true.

The mechanics is thus similar to the mechanics we proposed for doxastics, bouletics, and modals. An ordering source carves out the positive extent of the modal base, that part of the modal base in which the prejacent is true.

(41) $\text{PE}_\mathcal{E} = \{ w \mid \forall q \in \text{PE}q(w) \}$

The positive extent is thus defined as the set of worlds in which all the relevant propositions (compatible with the emotion at hand) are true. In these worlds $p$ is true. The truth condition is then universal quantification over these worlds. Thus the final analysis for emotive is as follows:
7.4 Attitudes of awareness

Awareness is arguably a layer of epistemic nature, supplementary to the knowledge layer (see also Jäger and Franke 2011). Languages differ as to how they construct this epistemic space, which is independent of knowledge itself within a single agent, i.e., the idea being that one can know something without being aware that she does (see also discussion in Stanley (2008) about knowledge and certainty).

The knowledge space is binary in the sense that one can only know or not know a particular fact \( p \). One cannot know a fact A more than one can know a fact B; if \( i \) knows A and \( i \) knows B then both A and B are known to \( i \). The awareness space, on the other hand, can indeed be conceived of as gradable, on a par with the emotive space, to the point that one is aware of some of the facts s/he knows and not of others. The awareness space, in this respect, can be partitioned in two: those worlds in which the propositions of which I am aware are true and those worlds in which the propositions of which I am not aware are not true.

Note that \( p \) is objectively true in all worlds. In the Figure here below, we only picture the awareness space \( \mathcal{A} \), which is partitioned between \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds, in a way parallel to the emotive space. \( p \) worlds are worlds in which the attitude holder in a state of awareness of \( p \), and \( \neg p \) worlds are worlds in which the attitude holder is not aware of \( p \).

Italian illustrates that the epistemic be aware space can also be understood as gradable, producing nonveridicality on a par with emotives, as in the schema above. This explains why the awareness predicate selects the subjunctive in Ital-
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Figure 7.2: The non-veridical space of awareness

Italian:

(43) È molto/poco cosciente che tu sia stanco.
Is very/little aware that you be.SUBJ.3sg tired.
‘He is very/little aware that you are tired.’

(44) Maria è più cosciente di Gianni dell’accaduto.
Mary is more aware of John of happened.
‘Maria is more aware of Gianni of what has happened.’

Italian treats the awareness space as gradable. The space for essere consiente now is \( \mathcal{A} \), just like in Greek, but this space is conceptualized as gradable, thus partitioned into positive extent (PE) and negative extent, just like with emotives.

(45) Awareness in Italian.
\([i \text{ sono cosciente } p]_{w,M(i),\varepsilon}\) is defined iff
a. \(M(i)\) contains only \(p\) worlds (subjective veridicality)
b. \(\mathcal{A}\) is nonveridical and contains \(p\) and \(\neg p\) worlds (awareness non-veridicality).
c. If defined: \(\forall w' \in \text{PE-Awareness}p(w')\)

(46) Sono consciente che Anna è/sia a casa.
am aware that Anna be.SUBJ.3sg at home.
‘I am aware that Ann is home.’

For Italian, the assertion of ‘be aware’ will be like that of the emotive, dividing
the awareness space between \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds, thereby producing nonveridicality as reflected in the choice of the subjunctive. We see that the space of ‘awareness’ is conceptualized a partitioned one, including worlds of awareness and worlds of non-awareness. Awareness worlds (the Positive Extent \( \text{PE}_A \)) are \( p \) worlds. We see that awareness is lexicalized along the pattern of emotivity.

In Greek, by contrast, awareness verbs select indicative, thus aligning with knowledge verbs. We assume that \( A \) in Greek is simply a veridical, non-partitioned epistemic or solipsistic space. And since it has a veridical presupposition, the awareness verb is actually construed like \text{KNOW}:

\[
\text{(47) Awareness in Greek} \\
\quad [i \text{ exi-epignosi that } p]^w_{i, A} \text{ is defined iff } w_0 \in p. \\
\quad \text{If defined } [i \text{ exi-epignosi that } p]^w_{i, A} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in A(i)(p(w''))
\]

\[
\text{(48) O Nicholas exei epignosi oti/*na i } \text{Ariadne tou } \text{leei}\] \\
\quad \text{the Nicholas has } \text{awareness that.IND/*SUBJ the Ariadne him says}\] \\
\quad \text{lies}\] \\
\quad \text{Nicholas is aware that Ariadne is lying to him.}
\]

Greek lexicalizes ‘be aware’ as a knowledge verb and Italian lexicalizes it as an emotive. In Greek, notice that the construction \text{exo epignosi} literally means ‘have knowledge’. Hence awareness predicates are a genuine case of semantic variation in the two languages.

Let us now ask the more general question: why do we have this systematic difference between Greek and Italian in epistemic and doxastic verbs? We will answer that this difference illustrates a prototypicality effect. In Italian belief verbs can be subjunctive selectors and are not prototypically solipsistic, like the indicative selecting belief verb that we find in Greek. Now, if epistemic and belief verbs set the standard for subjunctive and indicative, as it is reasonable to assume, then languages seem to choose among possible lexicalizations of epistemic and doxastic attitudes those that better align with the general pattern set by the prototypical case of belief.

Finally, we want to reiterate that since the consciousness predicate can be a subjunctive selector, gradability per se cannot be the key in determining mood, \textit{pace} Villalta (2008). This is a point that we made earlier in view of the facts that doxastics remain doxastic when they shift to subjunctive in Italian. Gradability, rather, offers the necessary structure for nonveridicality by providing a threshold for \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds that mirrors the positive and negative extent of the scale. The connection between evaluating (via a gradable space) and nonveridicality has broader applications, as seen also in recent work by Beltrama (2015).

With this result, let us now address the implications of the semantics we have
proposed for mood morphemes. We will then move to predicates of fear.

7.5 Presuppositional indicative complementizer \( pu \)

At this point, it will be very useful, we think, to go back to the pragmatic contribution of mood morphemes that we established in chapter 4, and ask the question of how the mood sensitivities are consistent, or even dictate their pragmatic behavior. We will revisit the flexible patterns with knowledge, memory, and perception verbs, addressing not just indicative vs. subjunctive distinction, but also the dimension of assertive vs. presuppositional indicative that emerges in the \( pu \) vs. \( oti \) distinction in Greek.

7.5.1 The discourse function of mood morphemes and their sensitivity to (non)veridicality connected

Thus far, we have been arguing for the following generalizations:

(49) a. The subjunctive is sensitive to nonveridicality in the presuppositional component of an attitude verb. Nonveridicality is partitioning of an epistemic space (epistemic uncertainty), or partitioning of a modal space more broadly, as we saw this to be the case with bouletic and emotive spaces.
   b. The indicative is sensitive to veridicality in both presupposition and assertion.
   c. Indicative \( oti \) is sensitive to the veridicality of assertion. It is selected by veridical epistemic and solipsistic verbs.
   d. The indicative \( pu \) is sensitive to the veridicality of the presupposition. It is selected by verbs that have a veridical presupposition (either a factive one, or a presupposition of subjective veridicality).

The subjunctive versus indicative difference appears to be not just a difference in veridicality (indicative) vs. nonveridicality (subjunctive), but also a difference at the level at which the sensitivity applies: the presupposition (subjunctive), and the assertion as well as presupposition (indicative). The presuppositional indicative manifested in Greek \( pu \) is, from this perspective, quite significant. \( Pu \) performs presuppositional anchoring, we argued in chapter 4. Given that the emotive complement, as we showed, has a presupposition of belief of \( p \), we will refine presuppositional anchoring here as:

(50) Presuppositional indicative \( pu \): Presuppositional anchoring

Presuppositional indicative (Greek \( pu \)) can be used iff \( p \) or \( i \)'s belief of \( p \)
is already in the common ground.

This allows for the cases where the presupposition is not factive, but subjective veridicality. The existence of an indicative marker like \textit{pu} is important because it illustrates that the indicative can also be sensitive to presupposition, specifically a veridical presupposition. Hence, the indicative vs. subjunctive opposition does not simply map onto assertion vs. presupposition—although indeed the subjunctive remains sensitive to presuppositional content only. Our prediction is that \textit{pu} will be possible with other lexical entries as long as they contain a veridical presupposition. This is indeed what we find with attitudes meaning \textit{KNOW}, \textit{REMEMBER}, and verbs of perception, which we will discuss next.

But before we proceed, consider that most languages that have subjunctive vs. indicative contrast are unable to make the distinction drawn in Greek between \textit{oti} and \textit{pu}, or assertive vs. presuppositional indicative. Italian, French and the other European languages lack presuppositional indicative. Lacking this category, the only choice in these languages for emotives, consistent with the mood requirements emerged in this book, is the use of subjunctive. With emotive verbs, the assertive indicative can simply not be an option, because assertive indicative requires veridicality in the assertion:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Assertive indicative anchoring: Private Anchoring}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Assertive Indicative (Greek \textit{oti}, and indicative in Romance) anchors \textit{p} to \textit{M(subject)}, \textit{Dox(subject)}, or some variant thereof.
\item Anchoring means that the complement clause is added to \textit{M} or \textit{Dox}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

This explains why languages that lack the distinction between assertive and presuppositional indicative won’t be able to use the indicative when a predicate has veridicality in the presupposition, like the emotives. Another important thing to consider is also the stereotypicality effects we pointed out earlier with the awareness predicate. The nonveridicality presupposition, by itself, is enough to license the subjunctive in the stereotypical doxastic predicate, and by extension to all predicates that have it.

The subjunctive, as we said, performs non-assertive anchoring.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Subjunctive anchoring: Non-assertive anchoring}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Do not add \textit{p} to \textit{M}, \textit{Dox}, or the common ground.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

The discourse behavior of the mood morphemes follows their semantic sensitivity to veridicality and nonveridicality. Greek and Romance subjunctive can be used only if the relevant states (\textit{M}, variants of \textit{Dox}, and the emotive space) are presupposed by they key \textit{i} to be \textit{nonveridical} spaces. If is in a state of uncertainty, then \textit{i} cannot utter \textit{p} with the intent to add it to the common ground or her epis-
temic of doxastic space; hence the presuppositional sensitivity of the subjunctive follows from the semantics, and is not merely stipulated (as, e.g, in Farkas 2003).

7.5.2 Knowledge, memory and perception

Recall some data that we have presented earlier in the book. The verb ksero ‘know’ may also combine with pu, na:

(53) O Janis kseri na kolibai.
    The John knows.3sg that.SUBJ swim.IMPERF.3sg.
    ‘John knows how to swim.’

(54) O Pavlos kseriF pu efije i Roxani.
    the Paul knows.3sg that.IND left.3sg the Roxani.
    ‘Paul knows it that Roxanne left.’

   KNOW na does not presuppose or add na to the common ground. It is merely a statement of how-to ability: John knows how to swim. The pu variant seems to be equivalent to the oti variant. The choice of pu has a mere rhetorical effect, and makes the complement topical. Typically, as indicated, the word KNOW kseriF is in focus, which highlights that Pavlos knows (and is not ignorant of, thus the focus is contrastive) the already given proposition that Roxanne left. The oti variant of this statement is a mere statement of knowledge with no contrast or any particular discourse weight on either KNOW or the complement.

(55) O Pavlos kseri oti efije i Roxani.
    the Paul knows.3sg that.IND left-3sg the Roxani.
    ‘Paul knows that Roxanne left.’

   Consider now the memory verb thiname ‘remember’. The default, as we said, is the indicative oti, but na can also be used:

(56) O Nicholas thimate na kleini ton porta,
    the Nicholas remember.3sg that.SUBJ close.NONPAST.3sg. the door,
    alla den ine sigouro.
    but not is sure.
    ‘Nicholas remembered closing the door, but he is not entirely sure.’

   The na-version is compatible with a context where Nicholas is not fully sure about his memory or vision, and allows some doubt. He is, thus, in a nonveridical state. The oti clauses are incompatible with such context:

(57) #O Nicholas thimate oti eklise ton porta, alla den
    the Nicholas remembered.3sg that.IND closed.3sg the door, but not
Note the exact parallel with the English -ing clause. The that vs. ing difference is reflected in Greek with the oti vs. na distinction. We have discussed these cases before in chapter 4.

In Italian, ricordarsi (‘remember’) is also able to license both indicative and subjunctive:

(58) Si ricorda che era andato al mare.
    REFL remembers that be.IMPF.3sg gone at the sea.
    ‘He remember that he was gone at the seaside.’

(59) Si ricorda che fosse andato al mare.
    REFL remembers that be.IMPF.SUBJ.3sg gone at the sea.
    ‘He remember that he was gone at the seaside.’

With the indicative, that he went to the seaside is part of the common ground, or it is at least in the memory space of the speaker. This is equivalent to the pu-memory in Greek. With the subjunctive version, two interpretations are possible: (i) the attitude holder has a fuzzy memory, or (ii) the memory is not shared in the common ground. In both cases, there is nonveridicality either at the level of the memory space of the individual anchor, or in the collective space (we come back later to the non-assertive update in the common ground). We consider here only the case of fuzzy memory, which is equivalent to the na-memory of Greek.

Memory verbs, finally, can also take a pu complement. In this case, just as we saw with ksero ‘know’, they can’t be used in the following context where the speaker doesn’t know p:

(60) Question: How much did that book cost?  
    Answer: Thimame *pu/oti kostise 25 dollaria.  
    remember.1sg that.*IND-pu/IND-oti cost-3sg 25 dollars.  
    ‘I remember that it cost 25 dollars.’

(61) Question: How much did that book cost?  
    Answer: Ksero *pu/oti kostise 25 dollaria.  
    know.1sg that.*IND-pu/IND-oti cost-3sg 25 dollars.  
    ‘I know that it cost 25 dollars.’

In this context, the person asking the question does not know how much the book costs, in other words, the price of the book is not known in the common ground. In this case, pu cannot be used, in accordance with what we predict. The oti variant
is a perfect answer.

Now, consider a case when \( pu \) and \( na \) are both felicitous:

\[
\text{(62) Thimame } pu/oti \text{ to vilvio kostise 25 dollaria.} \\
\text{remember.1sg that the book cost.3sg 25 dollars.} \\
\text{‘I remember that the book cost 25 dollars.’}
\]

In this case, the \( pu \)-memory corresponds to common knowledge.

We can capture these alterations as follows. Recall that with verbs such as \textit{thimame} ‘remember’, we are looking at \( Mem \) (subject), that it to say, the set of propositions that are remembered by the attitude holder:

\[
\text{(63) Memory state of an individual anchor } i \\
\text{A state } Mem(i) \text{ is a set of worlds associated with an individual } i \text{ representing worlds compatible with what } i \text{ remembers.}
\]

\[
\text{(64) } [[i \text{ remember-oti/that } p]]^{w, Mem,i} = 1 \text{iff } \forall w'' \in Mem(i)(p(w'')).
\]

Memory is construed solipsistically as a combination of knowledge and belief, as we said earlier, and takes indicative and \( that \). What is remembered is indeed a combination of knowledge and belief. Memories are not photographic snapshots of the world, but rather inner representations of events, construed, compensated to, or even made up by the person who remembers; hence \( Mem \) can contain also pure beliefs.

Memory can also be construed as remembering a fact, in which case we have \( pu \) and an epistemic \( M \):

\[
\text{(65) O Nicholas thimate } pu \text{ eklise ton porta, (#alla den the Nicholas remembered.3sg that.IND closed.3sg. the door, but not ine sigouros).} \\
\text{is sure.} \\
\text{‘Nicholas remembers the fact that he closed the door, (#but he is not entirely sure).}
\]

\[
\text{(66) } [[i \text{ REMEMBER-pu/the fact that } p]]^{w, Mem,i} = 1 \text{iff } p \in w; \text{ if defined, } \forall w'' \in Mem(i)(p(w'')).
\]

Here we have the factive presupposition \( p \in w \), plus commitment in \( Mem \). The subjunctive variant, however, uses \( Mem \), and the presupposition that \( M_{epistemic} \) is nonveridical. In this case, what is remembered will be contrasted with what is known. What we remember does not always correspond to what is real.

\[
\text{(67) Suppositional memory:} \\
\text{[[i REMEMBER}_{sup} p]]^{M, Mem,i} \text{ is defined iff } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (parti-}
\]
tioned epistemic modal base). If defined,
\[ [i \text{ REMEMBER}^\text{sup} p]^{M,\text{Mem},i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'(w' \in \text{Mem} \rightarrow p(w')) \]

The interplay is crucially between veridicality in memory, but partition (non-veridicality) in the presupposition. The subjunctive is triggered, exactly parallel to Italian doxastics, also discussed in chapter 4.

Consider now, finally, verbs of perception like *see*:

(68) O Nicholas idhe ton Flavio na kleini
the Nicholas saw.3sg the Flavio that.SUBJ close.IMPF.NONPAST.3sg
ton porta, alla i porta dhen ine kleisti.
the door, but the door not is closed.
‘Nicholas saw Flavio closing the door, but the door is not closed.’

(69) O Nicholas idhe oti o Flavio eklise ton porta, #alla i
the Nicholas saw3sg that.IND the Flavio closed.3sg. the door, but the
porta den ine klisti.
door not is closed.
’#Nicholas saw that Flavio closed the door, but the door is nor closed.’

Observe again the contrast between an *-ing* complement and a *that* complement in English. Two things are noteworthy here. First, the complement conveys direct perception, seeing with Nicholas’ own eyes. Second, in the *na* version the closing of the door need not necessarily include the result state of the door being closed. The *oti* complement includes that state. The difference, we will argue, illustrates that in the *oti* complement we have a veridical doxastic state that includes the result, but in the *na* complement we have the presupposition of not knowing that the door is closed in all worlds.

For \( p \) being ‘Flavio closes the door and the door is closed’:

(70) \[ [i \text{ vlepo/SEE}^\text{belief} p]^{w,\text{Dox},i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Dox}(i)(p(w'')) \]
(71) Suppositional SEE (vlepo NA):
\[ [i \text{ SEE}^\text{sup} p]^{M,\text{Dox},i} \text{ is defined iff } M(i) \text{ is nonveridical (partitioned epistemic modal base).} \]
If defined, \[ [i \text{ SEE}^\text{sup} p]^{M,\text{Dox},i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'(w' \in \text{Dox} \rightarrow p(w')) \]

The \( pu \) variant, again, is like *thimame* and KNOW: the complement is now a fact marked with \( pu \):

(72) O Nicholas idhe\(_F\) pu o Flavio eklise ton porta.
the Nicholas saw.3sg that.IND the Flavio closed.3sg. the door.
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‘Flavio closed the door. Nicholas saw it.’

To sum up: the mood alternations we see here are systematic and completely predicted by our main ideas, repeated here:

(73) a. The subjunctive is sensitive to nonveridicality in the presuppositional component of an attitude verb.
    b. The indicative *oti is sensitive to the veridicality of assertion. It is selected by factive and veridical solipsistic verbs.
    c. The indicative pu is sensitive to the veridicality of the presupposition. It is selected by verbs that have a veridical presupposition.

Let us move on now to see how this theory explains the behavior of fear attitudes.

7.6 Attitudes of fear

The mood patterns with fear predicates are a choice between indicative and subjunctive, correlating expectedly with prospective nonpast (subjunctive) and past or present tense (indicative), in agreement with the general pattern observed. We also observe a special complementizer in Greek (mipos) and English (lest).

7.6.1 Three empirical patterns

Here are the generalizations specific to fear attitudes:

(74) Varieties of fear attitude
    a. Fear to do something (subjunctive).
    b. Fear as a doxastic attitude towards something unfortunate that happened (indicative)
    c. Fear that an unfortunate possibility will be/has been realized. (complementizer with possibility modal complementizer, both past and non-past tenses; subjunctive (+expletive negation in French))

Let us consider these in turn.

(a) Fear to do something: Subjunctive or infinitive with nonpast

(75) O Pavlos fovate *pu/*oti/na vgi ekso. 
    the Paul fears that.SUBJ go.NONPAST.3sg outside
    ‘Paul is afraid to go outside.’

(76) Paul a peur de sortir.
    Paul is afraid of going out.
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‘Paul is afraid to go out.’

(77) Paolo ha paura di uscire.
Paolo has fear of go out.
‘Paul is afraid to go out.’

Pu, as we see is impossible with predicates of fear, which leads us to postulate that there is no factivity or subjective veridicality presupposition. The subjunctive/indicative version is a fear to perform an action. The fear does not imply that the action is not desirable. For instance, Paul might fear to go outside because it is raining and he doesn’t want to get wet, while at the same time he really wants to go outside because he has a date he has been looking forward to for the entire week. Likewise, I may fear to do something I want very much such as give a talk in front of a big audience.

(b) Fear as a doxastic attitude towards something unfortunate that happened, is happening or will happen: assertive indicative

(78) a. O Pavlos fovate oti/*pu/na i aitisi tou the Paul fears that.*IND-oti/*IND-pu/SUBJ the request his aporifthike
was-denied.3sg.
‘Paul is afraid that his request was denied.’

b. O Pavlos fovate oti/*pu/na i aitisi tou the Paul fears that.*IND-oti/*IND-pu/SUBJ the request his tha aporifthi
FUT be-denied.NONPAST.3sg.
‘Paul is afraid that his request will be denied.’

c. O Pavlos fovate oti/*pu/na vrex.
the Paul fears that.*IND-oti/*IND-pu/SUBJ rain.PRES.3sg
‘Paul is afraid it is raining (unfortunately).’

The indicative statement reads like a statement of belief, qualified with a negative emotive adverb: Paul believes that, unfortunately for him, his request was denied. The use of oti is expected, and likewise note how the English words fear, be afraid acquire the same doxastic flavor. The unfortunate flavor emerges in a Gricean manner as the result of violating manner by using the verb of fear instead of an unmarked doxastic.

There is a parallel in Italian, but the indicative version is only allowed with the first person subject, and has the flavor of politeness (see Tahar, 2018 and references therein). In French, the indicative cannot be used, and the subjunctive is mandatory across all these interpretations. In French, expletive negation is also
mandatory with fear predicates in this use:

(79)  
   a. Paolo ha paura che la sua richiesta sia stata negata.
       Paul has fear that the his request be.SUBJ.3sg been denied.
       ‘Paul is afraid that his request was denied.’
   b. Paolo ha pura che la sua richiesta sia negata.
       Paul has fear that the his request be.SUBJ.3sg denied.
       ‘Paul is afraid that his request will be denied.’
   c. Ho paura che piove.
       Am afraid that rain.IND.3sg.
       ‘I am afraid that it is raining.’

(80)  
   J’ai peur qu’il #pleut/ne pleuve.
       I have fear that-it rain.IND.3sg/expletive-negation-rain.IND.3sg.
       ‘I am afraid that it is raining.’

The use of so-called expletive negation with fear predicates is quite common, and is found even in typologically unrelated to French languages such as Korean and Japanese (Yoon 2012). Yoon in fact argues, based exactly on the parallel between the subjunctive mood and expletive negation, that expletive negation is the realization of subjunctive mood in languages that lack mood morphology (Korean, Japanese). In line with Yoon’s work, the expletive negation can be understood as contributing the negative component—a desireability scale in Yoon’s approach.

We will argue that verbs of fear, like emotives, convey an emotional stance which is partitioned between a positive and a negative extent. This explains why they select the subjunctive and infinitives. But verbs of fear lack the veridical presupposition of emotives, therefore they never select the pu. The indicative is triggered because the verb of fear is used as a verb of belief. In Italian, the indicative is possible only when there is hedging. Fear attitudes, thus, have a life as true predicates of fear to act, and as believing something unfortunate.

Verbs of fear have yet a third dimension in their meaning, revealed in an additional selection pattern, with a special complementizer manifested in English with lest, and in Greek with mipos.

(c) Fear of a possibility: mipos, lest

(81)  
   O Pavlos fovate mipos di tin Maria.
       the Paul fears lest see.NONPAST.3sg the Maria.
       ‘Paul is afraid lest he see Mary.’

English employs the special complementizer lest which is construed with a subjunctive. The lest complement is admittedly of higher register, therefore not as common and somewhat archaic sounding and marked. Greek mipos, on the other
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hand, is a quite common word with other related uses, and the pattern of *mipos* with the fear predicate is also quite common and unmarked.

*Mipos* emerges from a historical path that fused the subjunctive negation *mi* with the indicative complementizer *pos*. Synchronically, it also has uses as a possibility epistemic adverb, but only in questions (Giannakidou 2009):

(82)  *Mipos* irthe i Maria?
     maybe came.3st the Maria?
     ‘Did Mary come, perhaps?’

(83)  #*Mipos* irthe i Maria.
     maybe came.3sg the Maria.
     ‘*Perhaps Mary came.*’

The above shows a link between *mipos* and interrogatives. Recall that, as a possibility modal, *mipos* and questions convey the same kind of nonveridicality: non-veridical equilibrium, not bias, as we noted in chapter 2. Crucially, *mipos* is used also as an interrogative complementizer, roughly equivalent to ‘whether’:

(84)  Me rotise an/mipos efaga.
     me asked.3sg if/whether ate.1sg.
     ‘She asked me if/whether I ate.’

The *mipos* version of the indirect question has a presupposition, absent in the *an/if* version, that the possibility of eating was under discussion. The reading of *mipos*, likewise, with verbs of fear has a presupposition that the possibility raised by the complement was under discussion. The fear space has the additional presupposition of being nonveridical, as all emotive spaces. The sentence in this case asserts that in all fear worlds the possibility of *p* is resolved positively. We will extend this analysis to *lest*.

7.6.2 The semantics and pragmatics of fear

Consider first the case of subjunctive fear to do something:

(85)  O Pavlos fovate *pu/*oti/na vgi the Paul fears that/*IND-pu/*IND-oti/SUBJ go.NONPAST.3sg ekso.
     outside.
     ‘Paul is afraid to go outside.’

(86)  Paul a peur de sortir.
     Paul is afraid of going out.
     ‘Paul is afraid to go out.’
This, one could say, is the most prototypical case of fear. The attitude bearer Paul fears to do some future action, in this case to go out. Notice the infinitive and nonpast in English, along with the subjunctive in Greek and Italian. Notice also the absence of expletive negation in French. Recall that we argued that the fear does not imply lack of desirability because Paul might actually want to go out but it’s raining and he fear to go out for this other reason, namely not to get wet. Since fear is an emotion, it is reasonable to assume that the scale of fear is a variant of the scale of emotion we discussed earlier. It is subjective, relatively coarse, and lacks a precise objective measure. Key is the threshold $d$ that partitions the scale for any individual $i$:

$$
\text{Scale of fear} \quad \text{World ordering}
$$

![Figure 7.3: The non-veridical space of emotivity](attachment:image)

This partitioning allows us to define Positive-Extent-worlds (PE) for $p$:

$$
(88) \quad \text{PE}_p = \{ w' \in \mathcal{E}_p : w' \text{ where the propositions in } \mathcal{P} \text{ are true } \}
$$

Here, the set $\mathcal{P}$ is the singleton set $\{p\}$. So $\text{PE}_p$ contains all the worlds in which $p$ is true. These are the feared worlds. But not all worlds in $\mathcal{E}$ are PE worlds for $p$, $\mathcal{E}$ only partially supports $p$. $\text{PE}_p$ is a subset of $\mathcal{E}$ (the emotive space). The complement of $\text{PE}_p$ contains $\neg p$ worlds. These are the worlds where $i$ does not fear to do $p$. The structure is exactly parallel to the one we posited for the general emotive case. Recall that the semantics we propose may remind the reader of
the Best ordering used for modals (Portner 2009), but our ordering source merely contains \( p \).

Fear, unlike the emotive class, lacks the factive presupposition. Here is the lexical entry:

(89) Fear predicate (FEAR to)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[i FEAR} p\text{]}^w\mathcal{E} & \text{ is defined iff } \mathcal{E} \text{ is nonveridical and contains } p \text{ and } \neg p \\
\text{worlds (emotive nonveridicality).} \\
\text{If defined: } \text{[i FEAR} p\text{]}^w\mathcal{E} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{PE-fear}_\mathcal{E} p(w')
\end{align*}
\]

Words such as *fovame, be afraid, aver paura* and the like denote FEAR and select the subjunctive, as expected, since the presupposition is nonveridical. \( P\mathcal{E} \) is not licensed because there is no veridicality presupposition.

The indicative version *FEAR that*, on the other hand, is a case where fear is grammaticalized as a kind of solipsistic belief just like in the case of awareness, memory or perception with indicative.

(90) a. Paolo ha paura che la sua richiesta sia stata negata.
   ‘Paul is afraid that his request was denied.’

b. Paolo ha pura che la sua richiesta sia negata.
   ‘Paul has fear that his request be.SUBJ.3sg denied.’

c. Ho paura che piove.
   ‘I am afraid that it is raining.’

(91) J’ai peur qu’il #pleut/ne pleuve.
   ‘I am afraid that-it rain.IND.3sg/expletive-negation-rain.SUBJ.3sg.
   ‘I am afraid that it is raining.’

(92) Doxastic fear, I

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[i FEAR}_{\text{belief}} p\text{]}^{w,\mathcal{D}ox,i} & = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in \text{Dox}(i)(p(w'')) (\text{fear that}) \\
\text{Implicature triggered by expletive negation: } p \text{ is undesirable by } i.
\end{align*}
\]

It is, in other words, the choice of model (emotive or \( \mathcal{D}ox \)) that produces the apparent difference in meaning, just like with modal verbs, bouletics and the other attitudes we observed in the course of this investigation. Solipsistic doxastic fear states that \( i \) has the belief that \( p \) is, will be, or was true (we have abstracted away from time here) and that \( p \) is undesirable by \( i \). Recall that expletive negation can be used (though not in Greek). We will argue that it is a reflex of the undesirability, essentially following Suwon 2012. We add the undesirability clause as an implicature above, arising from the use of expletive negation or, as we said ear-
lier, by systematically violating Gricean manner in choosing a marked form over an unmarked doxastic. It is also conceivable that undesirability is a presupposition of doxastic fear, though clearly it is not a factive presupposition:

\[ \text{Doxastic fear, II} \]
\[ [i \text{FEAR}_\text{belief} p]^{w,Dox,i} \text{ can be defined iff } p \text{ is undesirable by } i; \]
\[ \text{if defined, } [i \text{FEAR}_\text{belief} p]^{w,Dox,i} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w'' \in Dox(i)(p(w'')) \]

Whichever version once chooses, the bottom line is that FEAR TO and FEAR THAT differ in the choice of model and the premise of desirability. FEAR TO can be fear to do an otherwise highly desirably thing—you might want to fly but you can still have fear to do it, you might want very much to talk to someone, but fear to do it. In other words, the emotion of fear is independent of desirability or lack thereof. Fear THAT is not, in essence, fear at all.

Fear LEST/MIPOS, finally, can be thought of as a variant of FEAR TO. It is important to note that many language lack this specific variant (e.g., Italian) and employ the subjunctive FEAR TO for this version. Just like doxastic fear, fear LEST considers both \( p \) and \( \neg p \), and expresses that \( p \) is undesirable. In addition, we will argue, there is a contextual requirement that whether \( p \) or not \( \neg p \) is under discussion:

\[ \text{Presupposition 1: whether Maria is coming or not is under discussion. This is consistent with the fact that } mipos \text{ is interrogative complementizer.} \]
\[ \text{Presupposition 2: the fear space is nonveridical, as is the case with FEAR TO.} \]
\[ \text{Assertion: in all fear worlds the question is resolved positively, i.e., } p \text{ is the case.} \]
\[ \text{Implicature or presupposition: } p \text{ is undesirable.} \]

The use of \( mipos \) has remained mysterious in the Greek literature for quite a while, and the analysis we offer here is new. Recall that in French and Italian the subjunctive is used (which is explained by (ii)) and French adds the use of \( ne \).

\[ \text{Fear predicate (FEAR to)} \]
\[ [i \text{FEAR } p]^{w,E} \text{ is defined iff:} \]
\[ (i) \text{ whether } p \text{ is/was/will be true or not is under discussion (} p \text{ or } \neg p; \text{ and} \]
\[ (ii) E \text{ is nonveridical and contains } p \text{ and } \neg p \text{ worlds (emotive nonveridicality).} \]
\[ \text{If defined: } [i \text{FEAR } p]^{w,E} = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in \text{PE-fear}_E p(w') \]

\( Mipos \) and \( lest \), in this analysis, need a question presupposition to be licensed. In this sense they are like the subjunctive. We can think of them as special sub-
7.7. CONCLUSIONS

According to Mari and Tahar (2019) expletive neégation reverses the ordering source by creating a negative ordering of undesirability. In this case, the scale is determined the propositions in the extension of the fear predicate in a given context and the extension of fear is conceived as the complement of the positive extension. Since this move is not necessary, expletive negation is disposable. The reasons for its use have historical roots that Mari and Tahar (2019) explain by rooting expletive negation in prohibitive negation used to create negative preferences with imperatives and bouletics more generally.

7.7 Conclusions

In this chapter, we considered the mood patterns observed with propositional attitudes of emotion. In our discussion, we relied on the gradable, scalar nature of emotion attitudes, and we articulated a precise semantics for emotion which capitalized on their scalar nature. We proposed a morphism between emotion scales and worlds which renders the emotive space nonveridical, thus sanctioning the subjunctive. Emotive predicates also have a presupposition of subjective veridicality or factivity, which is responsible for licensing the Greek presuppositional complementizer $pu$. Languages that lack this complementizer typically resort to the subjunctive (though the indicative may still be an option; Quer 2001). Emotion predicates will come with lexical entries that are akin to the mixed veridicality patterns of modals, bouletic attitudes, and suppositional doxastics that we are, by now, familiar with. Verbs of awareness can also be construed as containing emotive scales—and in this case they select subjunctive, as expected. This is the case of Italian. Again as expected, Greek grammaticalizes awareness as a knowledge predicate.

Overall, we found again that the apparent changes of meaning reflect not ambiguity, but flexibility with respect to the kind of modal bases emotion predicates can take as arguments. They can take an emotive modal base, an epistemic, or a doxastic one, as was the case with doxastic fear. The meaning shifts observed reminded us of the meaning shifts that we know well from the study of modal verbs, and of the newly identified ones we presented in our chapter on bouletic attitudes. Acknowledging this possibility of flexible modal base association, therefore, accomplishes two highly desirable goals: it highlights the similarities between attitudes and modals, and offers a simple and systematic account of meaning shifts with propositional attitudes that avoids ambiguity.
Chapter 8

Epilogue: Truth and Veridicality in Grammar and Thought

8.1 What we found

We set out at the beginning to investigate the question— central for language, central for thought— of how truth and veridicality are conceptualized in the grammar of human language. We established a number of phenomena that are particularly revealing for such an exploration: modality, propositional attitudes, temporal dependencies and mood selection. In this final chapter, we will highlight what the central findings of our investigation have been, and what the implications are for other related phenomena.

One important thing that we found was that knowledge is the only realm of truth— the realm traditionally called factive or realis, and which we identified with objective veridicality. Knowledge verbs are the only verbs that engage with the world directly, and whose complement sentences can refer to actual facts. In any other embedding, the world and reality are accessed only privately and indirectly, via subjective representations that individuals construct— which we called ‘models’, ‘information states’, and ‘modal bases’— based on their beliefs, memories, imagination, desires, expectation, and of course also knowledge. When a choice is made to use of modal expression or a propositional attitude verb, the speaker (as is the case with modals) or the propositional attitude bearer (as is the case with attitude verbs) are expressing stances towards truth by admitting essentially that they lack knowledge. These stances form veridicality commitments that can be stronger or weaker, depending on the modal or the chosen attitude.

The semantics of modal verbs and propositional attitudes is a privileged locus within which to observe how individuals rely on their own conceptualization of reality, through language, in the attempt to structure possibilities according to
their knowledge, beliefs, priorities, and expectations. Propositional attitude and modal meanings, in our theory, emerge as stances towards propositions that can be veridical or nonveridical. Our approach to modals and attitudes has been that, contrary to what previous literature believed, they are in fact quite similar—differing essentially only in what kind of anchor they have: the speaker for modals, the attitude subject for propositional attitudes. The logic of, and constraints in, reasoning are essentially the same with attitudes and modals, as we showed. Both modals and attitudes can be flexible with respect to modal bases they associate with—and this allowed us explain much of of the meaning and mood shifts observed within and across languages without resorting to ambiguity. Importantly, the shifts in the modal base co-relate with temporal shifts in the embedded clause, and explain the orientation of some attitudes to the future or past, as well as potential change in meaning that may look initially like ambiguity.

### 8.2 Veridical and Nonveridical Stance

We have distinguished two stances individual anchors take towards propositional content: the veridical and the nonveridical stance. Veridicality relates to knowledge and solipsistic commitment, as we showed. Modalization, on the other hand, is the prototypical nonveridical stance, i.e., acknowledging lack of knowledge, belief, or certainty. Recall: the speaker has a choice to use an unmodalized sentence in the simple past or present tense, or to use a modal verb:

(1)  
a. It is raining.  
b. It must be raining.  
c. It may be raining.

The modal sentences do not entail that it is raining, or that the speaker knows or believes that it is raining. By uttering the sentence ‘It is raining’, on the other hand, the speaker puts forth her knowledge or belief that it is raining. Putting forth her knowledge means that the speaker intends \( p \) to be added to the common ground and become public knowledge. Upon adding \( p \) to the common ground, a listener might object to it if they know otherwise, e.g., if they just came back from outside and notice that it is no longer raining. But insofar as the speaker is concerned, and given what she thinks at the time of utterance, it is true that it is raining.

When the speaker has knowledge, we say that the speaker is in a veridical state regarding the proposition \( \text{It is raining} \). And being in a veridical state means that the speaker is fully committed to the proposition \( \text{It is raining} \). A veridical state is a precondition for assertion, we argued:
8.2. VERIDICAL AND NONVERIDICAL STANCE

Veridical information state as a prerequisite for assertion

A sentence S is assertable if and only if the speaker is in a veridical state about p denoted by S.

That veridicality is a precondition on assertion follows from Gricean Quality, of course. In languages that have mood distinctions, indicative is the mood by default associated with a veridical state. The veridical stance relies on a homogeneous epistemic or doxastic state that does not allow both p and ¬p, and creates commitments of the individual anchors. Commitments are kinds of certainties that the anchors have about the truth of propositions. We say ‘kinds’ of certainties because, as we saw, veridical commitments can be doxastic (belief based), or they can be based on memory— which we argued can be construed as a kind of belief—, or on perception, desire, and expectations. Expectation can be understood as comprising elements of both desire and belief, as we saw in chapter 5, and some verbs (e.g. verbs of persuasion, assertive verbs) vacillate between the two options and may be anchored to either state. Veridical commitment can even be purely fictional, as is the case with dreams and fictional attitudes, in which case the subjective veridical stance replaces reality completely.

The nonveridical stance, on the other hand, is the case when the individual anchor reasons with uncertainty. Reasoning with uncertainty is one of the features of the human mind that mostly puzzles theoreticians across disciplines in a large variety of domains. In the nonveridical stance, the mental state allows both options p and ¬p, and this produces all sorts of weakening in the meaning of a propositional attitude verb or a modal. This nonveridical weakening typically takes the form of a presupposition. Hence, in the subjective realm, while the veridical stance typically dominates the assertion, the nonveridical stance manifests itself as a presupposition. In the objective realm, that is with knowledge, veridicality characterizes both.

We have argued for a unified theory of attitudes and modals, touching upon a deeper mechanism in human linguistic and cognitive behavior, one that acknowledges uncertainty while expressing partial commitment. It is refreshing, we think, to recognize this— and, to our eyes, surprising how seriously this possibility has been overlooked in previous literature. Scholars talk about ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ modals or attitudes, presuming monolithic characterizations of the meanings. But we have shown that uncertainty and commitment can co-exist in a lexical entry (what we called ‘mixed’ veridicality). We have shown this to be a quite general case, and for this reason we avoided using the terms ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, since they are, from this perspective, too vague. The only meaningful application of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ is to distinguish between what we called solipsistic and suppositional attitudes.
8.3 Mood choice

Our overall conclusion about the grammatical phenomenon of indicative versus subjunctive choice in embedded clauses—complements, adjuncts, relative clauses—is that indicative is the mood of objective truth and of the veridical stance; and the subjunctive is the mood chosen when the individual anchor has a nonveridical stance towards the proposition \( p \). Having a nonveridical stance toward \( p \) means that the subjunctive is chosen when the anchor cannot be committed to the proposition. When the anchor cannot be committed to the proposition, there is uncertainty: the modal base is partitioned into \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds, and does not entail \( p \).

As a quick summary, we distinguished between two types of attitudes:

(3) **Veridical** propositional attitudes
   - i. Epistemic attitudes are veridical (objectively and subjectively)
   - ii. Solipsistic attitudes are veridical only subjectively: they entail that \( p \) is true in the anchor’s \( i \) modal space.

(4) **Nonveridical** propositional attitudes
   - A propositional attitude is nonveridical if it obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom.

The Axiom states the following, and derives nonveridicality for all modals:

(5) **Nonveridicality axiom**
   - For any propositional attitude or modal \( \alpha \), \( \alpha \) obeys the Nonveridicality Axiom iff \( i \alpha p \) presupposes that the M(\( i \)) relevant to \( \alpha \) is nonveridical, i.e. partitioned into \( p \), \( \neg p \) worlds.

(6) **Nonveridicality** of modals
   - All (non-aleithic) modals obey the Nonveridicality Axiom.

The principles that guide mood choice in our theory are the following:

(7) Licensing condition for the **subjunctive** mood
   - The subjunctive is licensed in the complement of an attitude or modal \( \alpha \) that obeys the Nonveridicality axiom.

(8) Licensing condition for the **indicative** mood
   - The indicative is licensed in the complement of a veridical \( \alpha \), i.e., a solipsistic or epistemic attitude.

We have also seen cases where the subjunctive itself is a modal category, akin to a possibility epistemic modal (in questions, relative clauses).

Doxastic attitudes such as those of belief have often been considered the pro-
totypically solipsistic attitudes, and bouletic attitudes such as those of desire have been treated as the prototypically nonveridical attitudes. We have nonetheless shown that the matter is more nuanced than this. Doxastic lexical entries can be weakened with the infusion of the nonveridicality presupposition of epistemic uncertainty, as was to shown to be systematically the case with Italian, but also memory and perception attitudes in both Greek and Italian. Bouletics, conversely, can become solipsistic as in the case of HOPE and PROMISE.

These fine grained distinctions have lead us to argue that we can spell out general tendencies about mood selection, whereby Greek is a language that predominantly goes solipsistic, whereas Italian is a language that predominantly goes suppositional; and this generates more indicative and subjunctive respectively.

8.4 What mood flexibility tells us

We observed that mood flexibility with propositional attitudes is much more rampant than previously thought, and we took that flexibility to indicate flexibility in the attitude meaning, specifically that it is possible to be construed as obeying or not obeying the Nonveridicality axiom. Mood shift does not necessitate ambiguity in the verb meaning— but indicates that some attitude verbs can be underspecified with regards to whether they are construed with nonveridicality or not, as well as with respect to the types of modal spaces they take as arguments.

We observed potential shifts between bouletic and doxastic states with a single lexical entry. We found this to be the case in chapter 5 with verbs meaning HOPE, as well as verbs of persuasion and assertion. The lexical shift in English between deny and refuse happens in Greek with different modal bases. When combining with a tense other than the NONPAST, the verb meanings were shown to shift to the doxastic state. Our account thus offered a simple explanation for what otherwise could be thought as lexical ambiguity, and because the shift also correlates with the embedded tense, it renders tense a key factor. The shifts from doxastic to deontic modals are very similar and depend on tense in a very tight way. Indeed, we have a chain of semantic dependency that starts with the propositional attitude or modal verb and affects complementizer choice, mood choice, and embedded tense. These multi-dependencies are, in addition, one more reason to acknowledge that propositional attitudes and modal verbs are closer in their composition and logic than previously believed.

And here are some questions that arise. Why is it that some attitude types have flexibility and others do not? Why are the Greek doxastics construed only solipsistically, but in the same language attitudes of memory, perception, and persuasion are construed flexibly like in Italian? Why is it that bouletics such as WANT are rigid in mood in both Greek and Italian, but HOPE and PROMISE words can be
flexible? Why do some attitudes pose temporal restrictions on the arguments, and others do not? While it is impossible to give conclusive answers to all of these questions, we offered some concrete ideas that can help pave the way towards a more comprehensive understanding of the cognitive and conceptual aspects of the meanings of attitudes and modals.

Regarding volitional predicates, crucially, nothing in our analysis necessitates the concept of preference for the subjunctive selecting predicates, in stark contrast with what much of the current literature proposes (Heim 1992, Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 2009, Portner 1997, Villalta 2008, Moulton 2014, Grano 2016, 2018 and references therein). The concept of preference for the subjunctive became problematic in the realm of doxastics and epistemic modals, as we showed, since these remain doxastic with the subjunctive; and it is unnecessary for volitional attitudes too. The ingredients of veridicality (bouletic commitment) and the layers of meaning (specifically the presence or not of a nonveridical presupposition indicating lack of knowledge, as well as antifcativity) are sufficient to derive the mood patterns in Greek, Italian and French—and have the welcome result of avoiding the empirically problematic overgeneralizations that preference accounts would have to make.

Our analysis has repercussions for the that vs. to choice in English, as we discussed further in chapter 5, thus challenging the idea that preference plays any role in that choice either. We also suggested that in English too the regulating factor behind the that vs. to choice is not finiteness but temporal restrictions, as they are derived from the attitude meaning. In contrast to many accounts again, in the theory we proposed the action in mood choice lies in the meaning of the attitude predicate, and not in the syntax of the complement clause. It is the verb meaning that enables syntactic choice, not the other way round. If complementizer choice could affect the meaning of the verb there would in effect be no selectional restrictions; the higher verb would be able to combine with any complementizer or infinitive and the meaning would change accordingly. But this is clearly not the case. Flexibility is rampant, but also systematically constrained, based on the clear parameters we identified in our work. Relying on the semantics of the predicate, we illustrated, is an empirically more reliable way of explaining the issue of complement choice. It is lexical meaning that determines the distribution of complementizers and morphological moods.

8.5 Anchoring, (non)veridicality, and informativity

Recall that in Greek mood morphemes appear as subordinators. We argued that their function is to give instruction about how to anchor the embedded proposition to the main clause. Anchoring will result in updating the attitude $\alpha$ with the com-
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plement proposition. Semantic subjectivity is mirrored in the way the information updates will work.

Concerning the relation between propositional attitude meaning, embedding, and the common ground, we wanted to offer some final thoughts. While with solipsistic attitudes the private space replaces the common ground, with the suppositional attitudes obeying the Nonveridicality Axiom the role of knowledge becomes primordial. In this respect the truth of the prejacent and the complement becomes central given that epistemic knowledge calls into question its objective truthfulness. The speaker does not know whether \( p \) is objectively true, but by activating this presupposition the question of whether \( p \) is objectively true becomes at issue.

An unembedded, unmodalized indicative— which contains past or present tense, but not future because future, we argued, is a modal (Giannakidou and Mari 2018)— adds \( p \) to the common ground. In complementation, one type of indicative (Greek \( oti \)) performs **assertive update**. We called this **private anchoring**:

\[
\text{(9) Indicative update: Private Anchoring} \\
\text{Anchor } p \text{ to epistemic } \text{M(subject), or } \text{Dox(subject).}
\]

The \( oti \) proposition is a signal to add \( p \) to the local \( \text{M(subject) or Dox(subject)} \). Because it is an embedded clause, addition cannot happen to the common ground, as we said; only the propositional attitude sentence itself \( (i \alpha p) \) gets added to the common ground. The addition of \( p \) to \( \text{M or Dox} \), narrows down the worlds in those spaces by intersection, as expected.

\[
\text{(10) } \text{Dox(i) } + \text{ } p \text{ } = \{ w' \text{ in } \text{Dox/M where } p \text{ is true} \}
\]

The update Private Anchoring anchors \( p \) to the main subject’s private space, thus performing a kind of context shift from the common ground, and adds \( p \) to the private space. The private spaces can expand by adding propositions, just like unembedded assertions add to the context set \( W(c) \). Embedded indicative in Italian functions in exactly the same way. \( oti \) is unnecessary in main clauses, where addition happens in the common ground, and this explains, without any additional assumptions, the absence of \( oti \) in main clauses.

But the indicative can also perform presuppositional anchoring. This is revealed with \( pu \) in Greek. In this case, \( p \) is required to already be in the common ground:

\[
\text{(11) Pu-update: Presuppositional anchoring} \\
\text{ } p \text{ is already in the common ground.}
\]

This captures the distribution of \( pu \) with KNOW and emotive factives. The fact that Greek lexicalizes an assertive and a non-assertive distinction in the indicative
suggests quite clearly that the indicative mood is not fully isomorphic to assertion, contrary to what was previously thought (Farkas 2003).

For subjunctive, we proposed Non-veridical anchoring:

(12) Subjunctive anchoring
Do not add \( p \) to \( M \) or the common ground.

The subjunctive mood is a prohibition: do not add \( p \). Given that, as we saw in chapter 3, main clause subjunctives are either non-assertions or possibility statements, we can generalize that in all cases the subjunctive mood is an instruction not to add \( p \) to the common ground. If that is so, then the sensitivity to nonveridicality follows since it is only when the higher predicate or modal presupposes partition of \( M \) that \( p \) cannot be added to the \( M \) or the common ground.

A comparable update is the inquisitive anchoring with embedded questions (Greek \( an \), ‘whether’). Inquisitive anchoring is a special case of nonveridical anchoring, we said:

(13) Inquisitive anchoring
Update \( C \) with \( ?p \)

Inquisitive anchoring adds specifically a question to the common ground \( C \). The subjunctive does not add a question, but a question is indeed a nonveridical space. At this point, we want to offer some final thoughts on the effect of indicative versus non-indicative which, as became clear, goes beyond mere mood choice in complement clauses.

The nonveridical state emerges as the underlying state for all non-indicative moods, including those which appear to affect the illocutionary force such as imperatives, optatives, and, of course, questions. Giannakidou 2013 characterizes nonveridical assertions inquisitive, thus similar to questions in that they have "non-trivial inquisitive content; and they are informationally weaker than past or present positive and negative assertions." (Giannakidou 2013: 45). Hence, she concludes, from the point of view of nonveridicality, assertions do not behave as a uniform class, therefore a categorical distinction between assertion (trivial inquisitive content) and non-assertion (trivial informative content) is not desirable. More desirable, and indeed reliable, is the difference in veridicality.

Ciardelli et al. 2014 offer the following fact:

\[1\] Biased questions, at the same time, convey substantial information; hence, though inquisitive, their informative content is non-trivial. This suggests that the divide between inquisitiveness and informativity does not map straightforwardly onto assertion vs. question. Giannakidou and Mari 2019 take this up further to argue that the question itself is a modal structure, but we will not pursue this further here.
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(14) Fact (Inquisitiveness in terms of possibilities)
   a. \( \phi \) is inquisitive iff there are at least two possibilities for \( \phi \).
   b. \( \phi \) is an assertion iff there is exactly one possibility for \( \phi \).

By Fact (14), and given that the two possibilities for \( \phi \) and \( \neg \phi \), inquisitiveness becomes synonymous to nonveridicality:

(15) Veridical and nonveridical modal spaces, homogeneity (Giannakidou and Mari, 2018b)
   a. A modal space \( M \) is veridical with respect to a proposition \( p \) iff it is positively homogenous: \( \forall w'(w' \in M \rightarrow p(w')) \)
   b. A modal space \( M \) is nonveridical with respect to a proposition \( p \) iff it is non-homogenous: \( \exists w', w'' \in M \)(\( w' \neq w'' \wedge (p(w') \wedge \neg p(w'')) \))
   c. A modal space \( M \) is antiveridical with respect to a proposition \( p \) iff it is negatively homogenous: \( \forall w'(w' \in M \rightarrow \neg p(w')) \)

Inquisitive and nonveridical sentences convey nonveridical epistemic states, i.e. states with polar partitioning into \( p \) and \( \neg p \) worlds. So, inquisitive and nonveridical sentences boil down to the same thing. This is, we think, an important link to establish. A question, we argued, is like a possibility modal and conveys nonveridical equilibrium; a biased question is like a MUST modal and conveys bias. Veridicality and non-veridicality thus transcend the illocutionary force divide (assertion vs. question). Likewise, imperatives can be thought of as denoting nonveridical spaces, and they certainly have a nonveridicality presupposition. But, contrary to how most researchers think about it, non-assertion is not the cause of nonveridicality; it is its effect. A non-homogenous state is what all non-assertions have in common.

In information non-biased questions, there is nonveridical equilibrium, true uncertainty as to where the actual world is, i.e., in the positive or the negative space. The equilibrium is disrupted when the question is manipulated by material that creates bias. Universal modals are also manipulators of the nonveridical equilibrium, as we showed, and create bias towards \( \phi \). What is common in all nonveridical/inquisitive states is that the epistemic agent has a choice about where to place the actual world: in the positive or in the negative space. (Disjunctions, Giannakidou 2013 notes, come with partitioned spaces too. The partition can be the expected polar one (it rained or it didn’t rain), but it doesn’t have to be; it can also be a choice between two positive choices, \( p \) and \( q \).) In any case, the notion of bias is useful for both questions and modality, as we showed— and this is a novel insight that emerged from our work.

The final lesson from our work concerns the division of labor between informativity and (non)veridicality. Roughly, the proposed distinction in Ciardelli et
(16) Inquisitiveness and Informativity
   a. A question $?\phi$ has trivial informative content.
   b. An assertion $\text{Assert}\phi$ has trivial inquisitive content.

Our discussion has shown that nonveridical assertions are inquisitive, they thus have non-trivial inquisitive content; and they are informationally weaker than veridical (past or present) and negative assertions. Hence informativity correlates directly with (non)veridicality and not with illocutionary force. Other moods can also be understood in this way, e.g. the conditional mood, which we didn’t discuss here because Greek and Italian do not have it. The misnomers used in the literature, likewise, such as the so-called indicative vs. subjunctive conditionals, can now be understood in the light of the theory we developed here. The notion of veridicality and commitment has been applied to the conditional protasis in recent work by Liu (2018).

In the end, what seems to matter is whether a sentence presents the epistemic agent, i.e., the individual anchor, with one or more possibilities about the world, i.e. whether it reflects a homogenous or non-homogenous stance. Superficially, this appears to correspond to the contrast between assertion vs. non-assertion. However, nonveridical assertions (which are ‘inquisitive’) show us that the contrast is just that: superficial. The more fundamental distinction is between a partitioned or homogenous modal space, and this matters not only for propositional attitudes, modality, and mood choice— which is already quite a lot. It matters also for negative polarity and free choice items, evaluative adverbs (Liu 2012), as well as intensifying adverbs such as totally (Beltrama 2018), to mention just some of the linguistic phenomena that demonstrably show this sensitivity.

It seems, therefore, unavoidable to conclude that nonveridical partitioning vs. homogeneity (veridicality, antiveridicality, commitment) is telling us something very essential about the logic of human language. We just have to be willing to listen.
Chapter 9

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