

RESEARCH STATEMENT

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An open debate in the development of legal institutions is whether individuals obey the law because the law incentivizes or because the law has legitimacy. Much of my research in law and in development seeks to understand how people form normative commitments and how they respond to these normative commitments. My work in development traces the incentives that lead to what has now come to be viewed as human rights violations, such as religious, ideological, and gender violence, even though they derived their legitimacy from proto-legal sources and ultimately undermined that legitimacy. I examine how interpretations of religious and legal texts, particularly those associated with fundamentalism, interact with market forces. In two multi-part studies, I investigate the economic forces underlying the religious provision of social insurance, social sanctions, and social conservatism and, turning to one dimension of social conservatism, the economic incentives that give rise to gender violence. In doing so, I provide an explanation for why church-state separation arose in the US but not in many European countries and develop a methodology for empirically evaluating the effects of interpretations and the law using the random assignment of interpreters, such as judges and doctors.

Evaluating legal rules with observational data provides only a black box on human behavior, but experimentally manipulating legal rules in contextualized field settings is practically infeasible because doing so often violates normative commitments. Using a disaggregated labor market and drawing on field experience in developing countries, my research in law conducts a series of field experiments in mechanism design to test behavioral economic theories of how individuals are incentivized in groups, a central assumption underlying the law and economics approach to law, contracts, and optimal taxation theory. This apparatus also provides a contextualized setting for conducting experiments in empirical moral psychology and philosophy and interactive epistemology, in order to explore the transmission and persuasion process of normative ideas whose incommensurability lead to conflict. Concomitantly, using observational data on judges and courts where normative ideas incubate, I study incentives and market design for the formation of legal ideas, judicial innovation, and the production of justice.

Throughout my research, I have been motivated by an idea that can be broadly termed, hermometrics, which is hermeneutics and econometrics, the measurement of meaning, or economics of interpretation, as a source of normative commitments. Examples include modeling the economic incentives behind the shift from pro-welfare religious interpretations a century ago to the anti-welfare posture of today's religious right and why church-state separation arose when and where it did, measuring the effects of sexual harassment law—an interpretation of anti-discrimination law—on gender inequality by exploiting the random assignment of appellate judges interpreting the facts and the law differently but in a predictable manner, using a particular instance of interpretive injustice where British capital cases during World War I were randomly executed or commuted to estimate the deterrent and delegitimizing effects of the death penalty, and studying how individuals misinterpret the law by manipulating tax schedules and contracts in contextualized labor market settings. If economics is the science of how individuals optimize to budget constraints, hermometrics examines how societies respond to textual constraints, from religion to constitution to the tax code.

My research and teaching interests in law fall into the substantive areas of contracts, tax, and procedure.

Contracts

Markets and Morality: Do Free Markets Corrode Moral Values?

Investigates the long-standing issue of market inalienability / commensurability

Are There Stable Types? Hot and Cold Social Preferences

Another reason, besides incentive compatibility, why agents might not have incentives aligned with principals. The decision to work with the principal involves cold decision-making, while the actual work involves hot decision-making.

A Market for Justice: The Effect of Third-Party Litigation Funding on Legal Outcomes

Market inalienability of litigation

The Welfare Consequences of Physician Pharmaceutical Choice

Morality of contracts between physicians and pharmaceutical companies

Hard and Soft Betrayals

Agreements that are closer to actual contracts induce less betrayal aversion and more trustworthiness

Pricing Wage Cuts: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Justification for breaking contracts matter

The Economics of Crowdsourcing: A Theory of Disaggregated Labor Markets

What kinds of contracts prevent anonymous individuals from appropriation in disaggregated labor markets that would otherwise cause these markets to unravel?

Epistemic Crowdsourcing: Motivation vs. Incentives

A field experimental test of relational contracting

Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts

Consequences of inability to contract

Interim Report on a Preschool Intervention Program in Kenya

A case study of failed relational contracting

Tax

Scheduling

These results suggest that workers may be less responsive to marginal tax rates than previously thought, eliminating some of the loss in labor supply from high implicit margins.

The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives (Liberals) Come Hand-in-Hand

Religion, Welfare Politics, and Church-State Separation

Examine sources of tax preferences

Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian

Financial Crisis

Private redistribution mechanisms in the absence of public redistribution

Does Economic Distress Stimulate Religious Fundamentalism

Islamic Resurgence and Social Violence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis

Potential negative externalities from private redistribution mechanisms

Can Countries Reverse Fertility Decline? Evidence from France's Marriage and Baby Bonuses, 1929-1981

Population was one of the prime reasons for some of the earliest tax laws

Trading Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Do IVF Subsidies Decrease Adoption Rates?

Tax laws that have had ethically ambiguous redistributive and demographic consequences

Income Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility

Models incorporating demographic forces into tax policy suggest that even temporary redistribution, such as increasing opportunities for the poor, could permanently reduce inequality

Tastes for Desert and Placation: A Reference Point-Dependent Model of Social Preferences

An economic model of deontological choices

The 21st Century Mechanical Turk: A True Automaton for Running Experimental Games on the Internet

Cooperation represents altruism not trust and rejection of unfair situations may stem from anger

Procedure

The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I

Response to state-imposed sanctions may depend on perceived legitimacy of the law

Does Forbidding Sexual Harassment Exacerbate Gender Inequality?

Using random assignment of appellate judges to estimate the causal effect of common law

The Consequences of Judicial Discretion

Using random assignment of appellate judges in a variety of areas to test legal theories

Electoral Cycles Without Electoral Incentives? Evidence From Appellate Judges

Behavioral biases in the evolution of common law

Priming Ideology: Is Judicial Bias Cognitive or Motivational?

Investigates mechanism for above paper

Judicial Innovation

Democratic appointees are more likely to reverse and reversals making new law are more highly cited

Are There Paradigm Shifts? A Statistical Approach to Postmodern Theories of Knowledge

Using citation patterns to detect incommensurability

Completed Research

“Does Forbidding Sexual Harassment Exacerbate Gender Inequality?” (with Jasmin Sethi), under review, *American Economic Review*

Making the work environment friendlier to women has been one of the more dramatic labor market changes in the past half-century. This paper evaluates the effect of sexual harassment law by exploiting the random assignment of appellate judges and the fact that Democratic appointees and female judges tend to decide favorably for sexual harassment plaintiffs. Forbidding sexual harassment reduced gender inequality by 1.3-8.6% in employment status, hours worked, wages, and management status, but these ameliorative effects on gender inequality are reduced for women previously in the labor force. These findings are consistent with an insider-outsider theory of involuntary unemployment.

“Markets and Morality: Do Free Markets Corrode Moral Values?” under review, *Journal of Political Economy*

Economists have traditionally focused on the boundary between markets and government but not so much on the boundary between markets and what should not be on the market (market inalienability). Moral philosophers worry that market alienability can corrode moral values. I study the impact of exposure to market interactions on normative commitments in the form of utilitarian vs. deontological values, other-regarding preferences, and charitable donations. I randomly assign workers to different market conditions - competitive vs. commodifying - and find that competition increases deontological commitments and increases charitable donations among productive workers, but competition increases utilitarian commitments for American workers.

“Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis,” forthcoming, *Journal of Political Economy*

This paper tests a model where group identity in the form of religious intensity functions as ex-post insurance. I exploit relative price shocks induced by the Indonesian financial crisis to demonstrate a causal relationship between economic distress and religious intensity (Koran study and Islamic school attendance) that is weaker for other forms of group identity. Consistent with ex-post insurance, credit availability reduces the effect of economic distress on religious intensity, religious intensity alleviates credit constraints, and religious institutions smooth consumption shocks across households and within households, particularly for those who were less religious before the crisis.

“Can Countries Reverse Fertility Decline? Evidence from France’s Marriage and Baby Bonuses, 1929-1981,” under review, *National Tax Journal*

During the early 20th century, France initiated an unusual tax policy to promote fertility and marriage, regressive in that fertility incentives were so large and greatest among the rich. Eugenic interest in family allowances was substantial during this time due to fear of depopulation and changing ratios of educated-to-uneducated. Family incomes were divided by family size to determine a final tax bracket. Exploiting newly collected archival data and three natural experiments, I find a large and significant elasticity of fertility and marriage with respect to tax incentives. These results suggest that France’s higher post-war fertility and flatter fertility income gradient relative to other European countries may be partly due to its remarkable tax policy.

“Trading Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Do IVF Subsidies Decrease Adoption Rates?” (with Glenn Cohen), invited to publish, *Texas Law Review*; invited to submit, *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*; accepted by *Capital University Law Review* as part of the *Wells Adoption Law Conference*

Do individuals have a moral duty to improve the life prospects of already existing children waiting for adoption rather than having genetically related children of their own? What role should the state play in mediating the claim of the infertile that they suffer an illness and merit state support to correct it, against the claim of adopted children? Should the state tip the balance by subsidizing the use of reproductive technology or should it remain neutral?

Motivating these normative and legal questions is an omnipresent assumption in the literature that state subsidization of reproductive technologies will reduce adoption; that is, there is a trade-off between helping individuals conceive and helping adopted children in America. We challenge that assumption. Using the differential timing of introduction of state-level insurance mandates in some states relating to In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), and differences in the form these mandates take, we find, contrary to the assumption in the literature, no strong evidence that state support of IVF crowds out adoption.

“Income Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility” (*Journal of Economic Growth*, 7(3), 227-258, 2002; with Michael Kremer)

“Income Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility” (*American Economic Review*, 89(2), 155-160, 1999; with Michael Kremer)

Developing countries with highly unequal income distributions, such as Brazil or South Africa, face an uphill battle in reducing inequality. Educated workers in these countries have a much lower birthrate than uneducated workers. Assuming children of educated workers are more likely to become educated, this fertility differential increases the proportion of unskilled workers, reducing their wages, and thus their opportunity cost of having children, creating a vicious cycle. A model incorporating this effect generates multiple steady-state levels of inequality, suggesting that in some circumstances, temporarily increasing access to educational opportunities could permanently reduce inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that the fertility differential between the educated and uneducated is greater in less equal countries, consistent with the model.

“The Political Economy of Beliefs: Why Fiscal and Social Conservatives (Liberals) Come Hand-in-Hand” (with Jo Lind), currently under revision

“Religion, Welfare Politics, and Church-State Separation” (*Journal of Ecumenical Studies*; Vol 42, No. 1, with Jo T. Lind, 2007; invited to reprint, *The City and Culture*)

Religious intensity as social insurance may explain why fiscal and social conservatives and fiscal and social liberals tend to come hand-in-hand. We find evidence that religious groups with greater within-group charitable giving are more opposed to the welfare state and more socially conservative. The alliance reverses (social conservatives become fiscal liberals) for members of a state church. Increases in church-state separation, measured by US judicial decisions and the 2000 Swedish separation of church and state, precede increases in the alliance between fiscal and social conservatism. The theory provides a novel explanation for religious history: as elites gain access to alternative social insurance, they judicate increasing church-state separation to create a constituency for lower taxes. This holds if religious voters exceed non-religious voters; otherwise, elites prefer less church-state separation in order to curb the secular left, generating multiple steady states where some countries sustain high church-state separation, high religiosity, and low welfare state, and vice versa. We use this framework to explain the changing nature of religious movements, from Social Gospel to the religious right, and why church-state separation arose in the US but not in many European countries.

“Does Economic Distress Stimulate Religious Fundamentalism,” currently under revision.

“Islamic Resurgence and Social Violence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis”

(*Institutions and Norms in Economic Development*, 2007, MIT Press, ed. Mark Gradstein and Kai Konrad)

Why in the presence of economic inequality, does social conflict occur along ethnic-religious lines instead of class lines? Economic theory suggests that groups with resources for the poor direct them to conduct conflict in a battle over resources. Consistent with these models, I find that economic distress alone does not stimulate social violence but stimulates it in the presence of religious institutions. I exploit relative price shocks induced by the 1997 Indonesian financial crisis and variation in religious institutions across Indonesia before the crisis to identify the effect of economic distress on the relationship between religious institutions and social violence. In the cross-section, high religious intensity areas before the crisis have more social violence after the crisis. Stronger measures of religious intensity are more strongly associated with social violence. In the panel, social violence increases fastest where participation in Koran study also increases the fastest. In the two-stage least squares, instrumenting for

economic distress using relative price shocks shows a causal relationship between economic distress and the relationship between religious intensity and social violence.

“Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts,” currently under revision

This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that arises from asymmetric virginity premiums and examines whether this can lead to social inefficiencies. Contrary to the efficient households hypothesis, women cannot prevent being appropriated by men once they enter marriage if they command lower marriage market opportunities upon divorce. Because men cannot or do not commit to compensating women for their lower ex post marriage market opportunities, marriage is an incomplete contract. Men may seek to lower women’s ex ante “market wages” in order to induce entry into joint production. Inefficient or abusive marriages are less likely to separate. Equalizing virginity premiums may reduce domestic and non-domestic violence. Female circumcision and prices women pay doctors to appear virgin before marriage in many countries suggest asymmetric virginity premiums continue to exist. Evidence from China and the US suggest asymmetric virginity premiums persist over economic development. Asymmetric virginity premiums are strongly positively correlated with female but not male virginity premiums. I use variation in religious upbringing to help estimate the effect of virginity premiums on gender violence in the US. The OLS relationship between virginity premiums and female reports of forced sex may be biased downwards if shame is associated with abuse and this shame is greater for women with higher virginity premiums. But the OLS relationship for males might not be biased downwards. Asymmetric virginity premiums are positively correlated with men forcing sex on women and paying women for sex. The model complements a growing empirical literature on inefficient households and human rights abuses, visible manifestations of female appropriability across time and space.

“Pricing Wage Cuts: Evidence from a Field Experiment” (with John Horton), currently under revision.

We conduct a field experiment to understand why firms rarely cut nominal wages, a central tenet of macroeconomics, and poorly understood due to the difficulty of observing plausibly exogenous wage reductions in actual labor market settings. We hired workers for a data entry task, paid them a high wage and then offered some of the workers the opportunity to keep working, albeit for a lower wage. Offers were framed differently across groups. Workers were more likely to reject lower offers, but “reasonable” justifications eliminated this effect. Yet not all justifications were effective---suggesting the cut would improve our profits increased quits. We also measured whether the treatments affected quality, trust and cooperation. The “profits” treatment reduced cooperation and possibly reduced quality; the other treatments had generally weak effects. Our auxiliary results are more consistent with theories of negative reciprocity, where firms are reluctant to reduce wages for fear of worker retaliation, than with theories of gift exchange or adverse selection. In a follow-up experiment, we measure the value of different framings for wage cuts.

“Are There Paradigm Shifts? A Statistical Approach to Postmodern Theories of Knowledge,” currently under revision

Thomas Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) proposes a theory of knowledge—science undergoes periodic paradigm shifts—that has been interpreted to mean that there is no ‘truth’ in science. To test this theory, I construct “citation trees,” where each node is a paper connected to all the papers it cites and the papers that cite it. Just as in evolutionary biology where a species tree has branches that get sparse or discontinued during periods of mass extinctions, I look for similar events in a citation tree. Using ISI data, I construct geology, linguistics, and literary criticism trees dating from 2001 back to 1945, 1956, and 1975 respectively. I also use the NBER Patent Citation database from 1975-1999. Markov clustering algorithms marking death of “bushes” indicate linguistics and geology are qualitatively different from literary criticism, where statistical “extinctions” occur often, contrary to the constructionist claim that all forms of discourse accumulate similarly. Paradigm shifts incommensurate enough to cause mass extinctions do not appear to have occurred in linguistics, geology, or patent citations but literary criticism may have had a paradigm shift in 1990.

Working Papers

“The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I” (with John Horton), invited to submit, *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*

Whether the death penalty deters is a classic legal and economic question that has been unable to be answered convincingly with any available data. During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed approximately 12% of these soldiers; the remainder received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially random – a “pitiless lottery.” Using a dataset on all capital cases during WWI, we statistically investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an essentially random process. Using this result, we exploit variation in commutations and executions within military units to identify the deterrent effect of the death penalty, with deterrence measured by changes in the timing of subsequent absences within that unit. Absences are measured via “wanted” lists prepared by British military police units searching for deserters. We find limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing non-deserters and Irish soldiers, regardless of crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. This provides causal evidence of minorities reacting negatively to state-imposed sanctions and novel evidence of individuals responding to the legitimacy of the law.

“Electoral Cycles Without Electoral Incentives? Evidence From Appellate Judges” (with Carlos Berdejo)

We uncover evidence that appellate judges are more likely to dissent in the three quarters leading up to a Presidential election, particularly in cases decided by ideologically divided panels. In addition, we find that appellate judges are less likely to voluntarily leave the bench in the three quarters preceding a Presidential election. This effect, which appears to be entirely driven by Democrat-appointed judges, is more pronounced when the party of the President at the time the judge leaves is different from the party of the President that appointed the judge. The electoral effects that we observe in both the propensity to dissent and retire are a relatively recent phenomenon, concentrated in the post-1980 period. These results shed light into the causes and consequences of judicial polarization along political party lines and raise potential questions regarding the nature of the balance of power among the branches of government and the independence of the federal judiciary.

“Schmeduling” (with John Horton, Jeffrey Liebman, and Richard Zeckhauser)

- Offers a kinked wage schedule and shows that labor is curtailed when workers see the marginal payment schedule as opposed to the average payment schedule.
- When workers are not primed with average or marginal payment rates, they do significantly more work.
- These results suggest that workers may be less responsive to marginal rates than previously thought, eliminating some of the loss in labor supply from high marginal taxes.

“A Market for Justice: The Effect of Third-Party Litigation Funding on Legal Outcomes” (with David Abrams)

The sale of litigation claims to third parties has historically been banned in almost every legal system. While this ban reduces the likelihood of frivolous, negative expectation suits, allowing such litigation may be welfare enhancing overall and may stimulate socially beneficial interpretations. A number of recent theoretical papers have proposed that the creation of a market for litigation would increase welfare, through the increased access to the courts for individuals who are risk averse or credit constrained. Until recently this question remained a theoretical one, as there was no venue to empirically test the impact of litigation sales. But recent court decisions in Australia have led to the formation of litigation funding corporations, which buy claims (or fractions) from third parties. We attempt the first empirical investigation into the impact of litigation funding. We analyze data obtained from the leading litigation funding firm in Australia, as well as from the Australian state and federal courts. Using this data we test several economic theories of litigation. If litigation trading alleviates credit constraints, litigation trading should stimulate the filing of more costly suits. If litigation trading allows the smoothing of risk, litigation trading

should stimulate the filing of lower probability suits. We make use of the changes in the law in Australia as natural experiments, which alter the cost of litigation. Specifically, we examine the impact of litigation funding on settlement rates and amounts, time to settlement, volume of litigation, conditional fees, establishment of precedent, and development of law. The findings are important to understanding the welfare implications of liberalizing litigation funding laws and allowing law firms to go public, currently under consideration in a number of countries.

In preliminary findings, litigation funding does appear to increase the number of suits filed and decrease the frequency of appearances before the court.

“Interim Report on a Preschool Intervention Program in Kenya” (with Paul Glewwe, Michael Kremer, Sylvie Moulin)

This paper evaluates an educational program that professionalized an informal educational system. Teacher training, classroom materials, and incentives for teacher attendance was provided to fifty preschools randomly selected from one hundred preschools in rural Kenya. Teachers were eligible for bonuses of up to 85% of pre-program salary depending on their attendance. Headmasters acted as monitors and distributed funds. In practice, headmasters typically paid the entire bonus to teachers regardless of attendance, which tended to crowd out parental contributions to teacher salary. Teacher training significantly reduced the number of minutes spent on the blackboard. The point estimates suggest that the program improved teacher attitude, energy, effort, control, and organization. The program increased progression to grade one by the end of three years; however, it also significantly decreased written test scores after two years.

“Are There Stable Types? Hot and Cold Social Preferences” (with John Horton)

- Experimental economics traditionally employ strategic form data rather than collect them in real time, primarily because of limitations in data quantity and expense.
- We find that real time behavior is different from calculated behavior.
- This suggests another reason, besides incentive compatibility, why agents might not have incentives aligned with principals. The decision to work with the principal involves cold decision-making, while the actual work involves hot decision-making.
- An explanation for Baby M case

“The Economics of Crowdsourcing: A Theory of Disaggregated Labor Markets” (with John Horton)

- What prevents anonymous individuals from appropriation in disaggregated labor markets? What kinds of contractual mechanisms prevent hold-up that would otherwise cause disaggregated labor markets to unravel?
- We present some stylized facts and a simple model illustrating the role of fixed price vs. cost plus contracts in disaggregated labor markets.

“Tastes for Desert and Placation: A Reference Point-Dependent Model of Social Preferences” (with John Horton)

Several paradoxes of empirical moral philosophy are inexplicable by current economic models of social preference focusing on outcomes and intentions. Consider the classic moral thought experiment where you have the choice whether to pull a lever and divert an out-of-control train careening towards a group of people, but at the cost of killing a strictly smaller number of people standing on the other track: many people find it acceptable to pull the lever--but in a related scenario, few people find it acceptable to push a portly companion into the train's path even if it has strictly better utilitarian outcomes. We argue that the difference between the train diversion and the shove is about expectations. We propose a reference-point dependent model of social behavior where individuals maximize a three-term utility function: a consumption utility term and two “social” terms. One social term captures a preference for desert (others getting what we think they deserve) and the other term a preference for the satisfaction of other's expectations, or to placate them (i.e. them getting what we think they think they deserve). We test the model in a contextualized field setting by asking subjects to grade data entry and propose a split of a bonus. We manipulate desert reference points by framing mistake frequency. Individuals transfer more when they do not

know the number of mistakes or are told how many subjects make at least one mistake than when individuals are told how many make two or three mistakes respectively, suggesting that individuals transfer more when subjects are viewed as more deserving. We manipulate placation reference points revealing information on how much the offeree might expect. When individuals are not told any information about the offeree's knowledge or when they are told the offeree knows about the potential bonus, there is no difference in the bonus split. When individuals are told the offeree is not told about the bonus, then offers drop precipitously.

Work in Progress (Grants and Preliminary Results)

“The Consequences of Judicial Discretion”

- Using random assignment of appellate judges to estimate the causal effect of common law in a variety of areas

“Priming Ideology: Is Judicial Bias Cognitive or Motivational?” (with Carlos Berdejo)

- Investigates mechanism for above paper
- Prime party affiliation and gender identity in subjects to ascertain the causal effect of social identity on judicial decision-making

“Judicial Innovation,” (with Carlos Berdejo, Andrei Shleifer, and Georgios Theophanous)

- Democratic appointees are more likely to reverse
- Reversals making new law are more highly cited

“The Welfare Consequences of Physician Pharmaceutical Choice” (with David Abrams, David Chan, Steve Olley)

- Morality of contracts between physicians and pharmaceutical companies
- Payments for physicians and physician prescription tendencies
- Random assignment of physicians in dataset of over 80 million prescription decisions to examine the welfare consequence of these payments

“Hard and Soft Betrayals” (with John Horton and Richard Zeckhauser)

- Present experimental subjects a contextualized, two-player decision-making scenario to investigate their aversion to being betrayed and their aversion to betraying others.
- Some treatments make the betrayal more or less severe by providing details about the prior communications of the actors in the scenario (not the experimental subjects themselves), and by changing the conditions under which betrayal might take place.
- Scenarios involving money (agreements that are *closer to actual contracts*) induce less betrayal aversion by player 1 and more trustworthiness by player 2.

“The 21st Century Mechanical Turk: A True Automaton for Running Experimental Games on the Internet” (with Anna Dreber, John J. Horton, and David Rand)

- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma is correlated with trustworthiness and not trust. This suggests that cooperation in PD represents altruism as opposed to trust and that they treat PD as PD not a stag hunt.
- There is no correlation between contribution in Public Goods game and the rejection threshold in the Ultimatum Game. This suggests that punishment in UG is not an altruistic but perhaps stems more from something like anger.

“Epistemic Crowdsourcing: Motivation vs. Incentives” (with John Horton and Aaron Shaw)

- A field experimental test of relational contracting