I develop a computational model for cross-context comparison mediated markets according to their social structure, and present suggestive evidence from the domain of higher education.
A second-wave of bureaucratization occurred in the early 20th century US railroads following public accounting reform. Because these clerks were providing financial information to external constituents and not costing information to managers, this influx of bureaucrats did not correspond to increases in efficiency, as it did in Chandler's examination of mid-19th century firms when the rise of the M-form organization spawned the emergence of a professional managerial class.
We systematically review scholarship on the influence of ranking / scoring on 1) the position and 2) the strategic behavior of universities, schools and departments. Much literature has estimated the influence of rank on position, and the effect is small (e.g., 1 rank position <= 1% more applicants/students) and comparable to that in many other institutional domains. This estimation exercise, however, understates the much larger effect of metrification on the institutional structure, strategy, behavior and quality of research outputs associated with science, scholarship and higher education--an effect demonstrated in other areas.
I digitized large time-series, panel and cross-sectional datasets on the financials and labor force of the late 19th/early 20th century US railroads with the help of some friends.