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Ph.D. Candidate in Accounting
I am a fifth year student in the Ph.D. program in Accounting at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. My primary research interest is in disclosure incentives and consequences in various capital market settings.
Prior to joining the Ph.D. program, I worked at Morgan Stanley as an equity research associate covering the property and casualty insurance industry and as an auditor in the Banking and Capital Markets group at PricewaterhouseCoopers.
I will be joining the faculty at NYU Stern as an Assistant Professor of Accounting in July 2013.
My curriculum vitae is available
Works in Progress:
"Determinants of Municipal Disclosure and the Consequences of Dissemination" (Dissertation)
Abstract: The municipal bond market is a unique laboratory in which to study the economic and political determinants of disclosure. This setting offers several advantages over those usually studied in the disclosure literature. First, the size, diversity, and regulatory structure of the market provide cross-sectional and time-series variation in disclosure incentives. Consistent with market demand for information influencing disclosure decisions, I document public disclosure increases in response to a positive shock to nonpayment risk that is exogenous to underlying credit quality. Second, although certain public disclosures, including financial statements, are contractually mandated in this market, enforcement is weak and regulatory oversight is limited to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts. Consistent with the notion that issuers withhold information to avoid incurring regulatory or reputational costs, I find disclosure decreases when a local economic shock increases risk. Third, in the wake of a number of high-profile defaults, regulators have attempted to improve transparency and disclosure in this market. My analysis shows that public disclosure increases in response to a regulator-imposed decrease in the cost of disseminating information, highlighting the importance of the disclosure delivery mechanism. I also present evidence that this shock to the cost of becoming informed helped improve retail trade liquidity. Overall, my findings support the role of market and political forces on disclosure.
With Jeffrey J. Burks, Joseph Gerakos, and Joao Granja:
"Entry Threats and Voluntary Disclosure"
Abstract: We exploit the relaxation of interstate bank branching restrictions in the 1990s to examine how the threat of new entrants affects incumbents' voluntary disclosure choices. The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act relaxed interstate banking and branching restrictions, thereby increasing competitive entry threats. The Act was implemented over several years and to varying degrees by different states, allowing us to identify the effect of changes in potential entry on the voluntary disclosure decisions of both public and private banks. Controlling for changes in actual entry and changes in state-level economies, we find that increases in the threat of new entrants are associated with increases in the level of voluntary disclosure as measured by press releases. Our results are consistent with theoretical predictions that higher levels of entry threats lead to higher levels of disclosure.
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