Jonathan D. Caverley
I am happy to report that I have moved to
Northwestern University's Political Science Department. Please
visit my new web page. As of September 2008, this web page
will not be updated.
Email:
caverley-AT-uchicago.edu
WORKING PAPERS
“Why the U.S.
Will Fight More Small Wars…Poorly,” argues that democracies will
select and fight small wars using a firepower-intensive military
strategy because such a doctrine reduces the costs of conflict for the
average voter more than it reduces the benefits from an ineffective
strategy. The paper supports the theory with a case study of
Vietnam War counterinsurgency.
“Who Pays for
Defense? Inequality, Redistribution and the
Foundations of Democratic Militarism,” presents a formal model of
the median voter’s arming decision, and empirically
shows that
democracies with high economic inequality among voters build
capitalized militaries.
“Send the
Mild
Hindoo: Imperial Subjects as Source of British Military Labor,”
argues
that as European great power conflict grew increasingly heated, and the
average voter increasingly poorer in the nineteenth century, Britain
pursued a capital-intensive form of empire-building, parlaying taxes on
the relatively wealthy to gain the necessary military labor
required for great power politics.
“War is Costly, but for Whom? The Political Economy of War-prone
Democracies,” formally models the role internal cost distribution plays
in mobilization, appeasement and war initiation; demonstrating
empirically that democracies with heavily capitalized militaries are
likely to initiate militarized disputes.
PUBLICATIONS
“United States Hegemony and
the New Economics of Defense.” Security Studies 16, no. 4
(October–December 2007): 597–613. The paper proposes a theory
of technological
hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive military R&D
investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American
preponderance. Through this technology policy, the U.S. promotes
a form of defense industrial globalization that extends its
international political influence.