Philosophy 340
Theory of Meaning
University of Chicago, winter 2001
Course Instructor: Jason Bridges
Office hours: Wednesday, 10am-12pm, Harper Memorial E589
In this course we address a group of related philosophical questions about linguistic meaning. What is the relationship between meaning and reference? What is the relationship between meaning and truth? In what sense, if any, is linguistic meaning a mental phenomenon? Are the meanings of a person's words determined entirely by what is going on inside her brain, or do external factors play a role? What is the connection between the meanings of a person's words and her intentions in uttering them? What is the connection between the meanings of a person's words and the shared language to which those words belong? Is meaning essentially social? Is meaning indeterminate? Is there reason for thinking that there is no such thing as meaning at all? Throughout, our aim is to gain a better understanding of the place of the concept of linguistic meaning within larger conceptions of human psychology and action.
Prerequisite: at least one previous course in philosophy or permission from the course instructor.
There are three required texts for the course, available for purchase at the Seminary Coop Bookstore (in the basement of 5757 University Ave.):
Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press)
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Press)
Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press)
Copies of these books will be on reserve at Regenstein.
The remaining course readings are collected in a reading packet, available for purchase at the Humanities Copy Center (on the first floor of Classics).
First paper: 3 pages due February 1st worth 25% of course grade
Second paper: 5 pages due February 18th worth 35%
Final paper: 7 pages due March 12th worth 40%
There is no final exam.
All papers are due by 5pm on the assigned day in Professor Bridges’ teaching box in Classics 17.
Late papers will be docked a grade per day (e.g., B+ to B) unless you have received approval ahead of time.
(Dates are tentative.)
Date |
Topic |
Reading |
Th 1/3 |
Course overview |
|
Part I: Two approaches to meaning
Tu 1/8 |
Communication-intention theories of speaker’s meaning |
Grice, “Meaning” Optional: Grice, excerpt from “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” |
Th 1/10 |
Davidson-style formal theories of meaning |
Class handout
|
Tu 1/15 |
Formal theory at work: definite descriptions |
Class handout
|
Th 1/17 |
Do formal theories of meaning go deep enough? |
Strawson, “Meaning and Truth”
|
Tu 1/22 |
Davidson on interpretation |
Davidson, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning” and “Radical Interpretation” |
Th 1/24 |
Kripke against descriptivism, part one
|
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 24-32, bottom of 47 to top of 49, 57-78 |
Week 5:
Tu 1/29 |
Kripke against descriptivism, part two |
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 78-97 Optional: Evans, “Proper Names” |
Th 1/31 |
Burge’s argument for anti-individualism |
Burge, excerpt from “Individualism and the Mental” |
Week 6:
Tu 2/5 |
Narrow content |
Loar, “Social Content and Psychological Content” |
Part III: The ontological status of natural languages
Th: 2/7 |
Languages as conventional |
Schiffer, “Utterance-Meaning and Convention” |
Week 7:
Tu 2/12 |
The primacy of the idiolect |
Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” |
Th 2/14 |
Languages as social objects |
Wiggins, “Languages as Social Objects”
|
Part IV: Doubts about meaning
Week 8:
Tu 2/19 |
The indeterminacy of reference, part one
|
Quine, “Ontological Relativity”, in Ontological Relativity and other Essays Quine, from Pursuit of Truth |
Th 2/21 |
The indeterminacy of reference, part two
|
Stroud, “Quine on Exile and Acquiescence” |
Week 9:
Tu 2/26 |
Semantic irrealism, part one |
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pp. 7-51 |
Th 2/28 |
Semantic irrealism, part two |
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pp. 51-54 |
Week 10:
Tu 3/5 |
(Slack) |
|
Th 3/7 |
NO CLASS (reading period) |
|