STORYTELLING AND THE LAW
Adam Kissel
work for Joe Williams

Kathryn Abrams, "Hearing the Call of Stories," 79 California Law Review 971 (1991). An admirable defense of elaborated storytelling, with exaggerated attacks on rationality.

Susan Bandes, "Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements," 63 The University of Chicago Law Review361 (1996). We need to be more careful regarding which narratives and emotions are permitted into law.

Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, "Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives," 45 Stanford Law Review 807 (1993). A solid response to, for example, Abrams.

Martha L. Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, "Passion for Justice," 10 Cardozo Law Review 37 (1988). Aims "to articulate and understand [the] interconnections" between reason and emotion (passion).

Joseph William Singer, "Persuasion," 87 Michigan Law Review 2442 (1989). Persuading by presuming parallel values.

Lawrence B. Solum, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma," 54 The University of Chicago Law Review 462 (1987). Limits the range of reasons that cases can be called "indeterminate" and limits the number of cases that genuinely are indeterminate.

Mark Tushnet, "The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse," 81 Georgetown Law Journal 251 (1992).

Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," 73 Harvard Law Review 1 (1959). Abstract principles are required above concreteness of the situation in judging, especially at the level of the Supreme Court.

Steven L. Winter, "The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning," 87 Michigan Law Review 2225 (1989). Law as a particular kind of narrative based on human experience.