Reading Notes--Adam Kissel
(using Library of Liberal Arts ed. (1958), tr. D. W. Robertson, Jr.)

            B. McGinn lecture in HCT 1, 11/27/01

The first part (Bks. 1-3) describes those "things" which are to be understood, e.g., the Trinity; these are opposed to signs, which might be valuable in themselves but which point outside themselves to some other thing. It is better to know that a sign is not something to be worshiped, even not knowing what it signifies, than to worship the sign as though it is a "thing." "We must beware not to take figurative or transferred expressions as though they were literal," and v.v. (87).
       Discovery (like invention, but in reverse) is the figuring out of what is meant in the Scriptures. Here is the method: "whatever appears in the divine Word that does not literally pertain to virtuous behavior or to the truth of faith you must take to be figurative. . . . But since humanity is inclined to estimate sins, not on the basis of the importance of the passion involved in them, but rather on the basis of their own customs," this method is very hard to apply effectively (88). One solution is to permit a diversity of interpretations, so long as only those interpretations shall be deemed correct which point to charity and love. In fact, "For what could God have more generously and abundantly provided in the divine writings than that the same words might be understood in various ways which other no less divine witness approve? [i.e. readings are good if they match with other parts of Scripture]" (102).
       The last part (Bk. 4) describes the teaching of those things which have been learned, i.e., it describes rhetoric. Communication ought to be lively and varied according to subject matter and the level of attention of the audience, using an appropriate style.

Petrarch writes: "Among poets . . . a majesty and dignity of style are maintained, not so that those who are worthy may be prevented from understanding, but so that, a sweet labor having been presented to them, they may be benefited at once in memory and delight; for those things which we seek with difficulty are dearer to us and more carefully heeded. And for those who are unworthy it is provided that, lest they exhaust themselves in vain on the surfaces of these things, if they are wise, they are discouraged from approaching them." (Invective, ed. Ricci, 69-70) (qtd. in Robertson's introduction, xvi)

"Unidiomatic expressions do not impede the understanding, but they offend those who take more delight in things when the signs for them are governed by a certain correctness. For what is called a solecism is nothing else than an arrangement of words which does not conform to the law followed by those who have spoken before us with some authority. . . . Whether ignoscere is spoken with a long or short third syllable makes little difference to a man asking God to forgive his sins, in whatever way he can pronounce the word. What then is integrity of expression except the preservation of the customs of others, confirmed by the authority of ancient speakers?
       "The more men are offended by these things, the weaker they are. And they are weaker in that they wish to seem learned, not in the knowledge of things, by which we are truly instructed, but in the knowledge of signs, in which it is very difficult not to be proud. For even the knowledge of things frequently raises the neck unless it is disciplined by the yoke of the Lord." (46-47)

Beware sophisms and the love of controversy. Be careful about arguing from parts to wholes incorrectly; beware arguing about antecedents and consequents incorrectly.
       "The truth of valid inference was not instituted by men; rather it was observed by men and set down that they might learn or teach it." (68) In other words we discover the truth; we do not make it. Likewise we discover what moves men and cannot invent it.

Book II, chap. xxxix, section 59: the knowledge of "the science of disputation . . . is interwoven throughout the text of Scripture" (74). (Later Augustine shows rhetoric in action in Scripture, esp. in Paul's writings, 123 ff.) Scripture uses tropes and all kinds of things like them; it is both wise and eloquent. Paul teaches rhetorical principles to Titus and Timothy.

God is immutable, things discovered tend to be immutable, but men's minds are mutable. We should seek to learn about God, the source of the immutable truths. He who notices merely that minds are mutable, and neglects "to praise and love [the] one God from whom he knows that everything is derived--this man may seem to be learned. But he is in no way wise." (73) The law of justice is immutable, contrary to those who think it is only relative. It is absolute, e.g., in the formulation, "do unto others . . . ," under which are subsumed many of the various values of different societies. This maxim itself "cannot be varied on account of any diversity of peoples. When this idea is applied to the love of God, all vices perish; when it is applied to the love of one's neighbor, all crimes disappear" (92).
       Symbols and imagery are not always used consistently from one passage to another in Scripture, so beware of translating a meaning into an image where that meaning doesn't belong.

Christian Use Of Pagan Philosophy (Hebrews take and use Egyptian gold)--orig. Origen's idea, I recently heard

"It is not the use of the things but the desire of the user which is culpable. . . . we are to be commended or reprimanded, not because of the nature of the things which we use, but because of the motive in using them and the way in which they are desired" (90-91). Applied to rhetoric: the goals of love and charity show the rhetor to be good, ultimately, independent of the success of the rhetoric.

Eloquence must come after knowledge and wisdom, and it arises through emulation and practice. Also natural ability supplies eloquence, and the truth carries its own power and eloquence. The use of Scripture brings eloquence to a speech. The rules of eloquence are useful, too, but less so than the other sources.
       Speeches should be judged foremost by their wisdom rather than by their eloquence. But any speech which aims at persuasion must be judged by its effect: the object has not been attained if one merely finds good reasons. (The speech cannot be separated from the audience.) Speeches (1) teach, (2) delight, (3) move minds, hearts, and men to actions. The emphasis shifts among these three depending on the overall purpose and the audience and the place in the speech.
       Speeches are delivered according to subject matter in a grand style, a moderate one, or a calm one. The most important matters are usually to be treated in the grand style. Again the emphasis shifts as needed. The subdued/calm manner is used primarily in teaching; the moderate manner is used primarily in epideictic rhetoric, for praise or blame.
       Some audiences may be delighted and may increase in knowledge, but need the grand style to move them to action based on their new knowledge. "The grand style differs from the moderate style not so much in that it is adorned with verbal ornaments but in that it is forceful with emotions of the spirit. Although it uses almost all of the ornaments, it does not seek them if it does not need them. It is carried along by its own impetus, and if the beauties of eloquence occur they are caught up by the force of the things discussed and not deliberately assumed for decoration. It is enough for the matter being discussed that the appropriateness of the words be determined by the ardor of the heart rather than by careful choice" (150).
       A speech should consider the possible objections from the auditors, and refute them in the course of the speech, "lest one appear where there is no one to refute it, or lest it occur to someone who is present but is silent about it so that he goes away with less benefit" (147).

Examples of grand style: Why women should not wear cosmetics
      (on the theme "cosmetics are like rhetoric" see Plato's Gorgias)
      (on the theme "rhetoric is like cosmetics" see Discourse p. 124)

Cyprian writes: "If an artist had depicted the face and form of a man and indicated the quality of his body with colors rivaling those of the original, and when the likeness was complete and finished another set his hand to it, as if being more skillful he would reshape the picture already made, this would be seen as a grave injury to the first artist and a reason for just indignation. Do you think that you can with impunity commit such a rash and wrongful act offensive to God the artist? Even though you may not be shameless concerning men nor defiled in mind by alluring rouges, you make yourself worse than an adulteress by corrupting and defiling those things which are God's. What you think ornaments you, what you think makes you more beautiful, is an attack on the divine work, a corruption of the truth. The voice of the Apostle warns: 'Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new paste, as you are unleavened. For Christ our pasch is sacrificed. Therefore let us feast, not with the old leaven, nor with the leaven of malice and wickedness; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.' [1 Cor. 5:7-8] Are sincerity and truth preserved when those things which are sincere are polluted and truth is changed into falsehood by adulterating colors and the tricks of cosmetics? Your Lord says, 'Thou canst not make one hair white or black'; [Mt 5:36] and you, in order to refute the word of your Lord, wish to be stronger. With brazen audacity and sacrilegious contempt you dye your hair; as an evil omen of the future, your hair already presages flames." [De hab. Virg. 15 f.] [Robertson 157]

Ambrose writes: "From these things proceed incentives to vices in that they paint their faces with artificial colors when they are afraid to displease men, and the adulterated face implies an adulteration of chastity. What a piece of foolishness is this, to change the image of nature and to seek a picture, and in dreading the adverse judgment of their husbands on their faces to reveal their own! For she passes a judgment on herself who desires to change that which is natural to her; thus when she seeks to please others she reveals her own prior displeasure. What more veracious judge do we need, woman, than yourself, when you are afraid to be seen? If you are beautiful, why do you hide? If you are ugly, why do you lie in implying that you are beautiful, since you will have neither the reward of your own conscience nor that of another's deception? If he loves another, you wish to please another; and you are angry if he loves another and was taught by you to be adulterous. You are the bad teacher of your own injury. For even she who has suffered from it flees from the art of the pander, and although she is a wicked woman, she sins not against another but against herself. Crimes against adultery are almost more endurable, for there shame is corrupted while here nature is adulterated." [de virg. 1.6.28] [Robertson 157-58]