Republic
by Plato
Mostly using Paul Shorey's translation
Reading Notes--Adam Kissel

After hearing an excellent lecture on this book by Herman Sinaiko, I do not think these notes are quite right. See corrections, to come.

Book I - 24 chapters of elenchus (Shorey arranges the books into chapters)

I. [327a] Socrates agrees to stick around to see the "new" (kainon) thing [consider persuasion vs. force].

II. [328b] Socrates asks Cephalus how old-age is.

III. [329a] Ceph. says that in old age, even though there are external ills, the passions subside (hai epithumiai pausOntai katateinousai kai chalasOsi). But character remains (ho tropos tOn anthrOpOn) [kosmios, eukoloi]

IV. [329e] Ceph. on epieikEs vs. mE epieikEs. It is good to pass on to the next generation something more than you received. [ties into giving what is due].
Socrates on the love of one's creations--people who make money love it, and they come to love money too much, to the exclusion of other things.

V. [330d] Cephalus: while wealth easily corrupts the bad man, wealth is worth most to the good man (epieikei). He has considered his own sins and virtues, now being old and near death. The bad must fear the afterlife [consider justice as future-oriented and related to fear]. The good use wealth to pay debts; the bad use it, or the desire for it, to deceive in order to gain wealth for themselves.
Socrates presents a situation ethic regarding justice (dikaiosunE) in specific cases. [Justice is more complicated than a simple rule, in this analysis.]

truth telling - it is OK to lie to a madman
paying debts - it is OK to not pay a madman

Cephalus leaves [because he embodies the alternative that justice presents civic duties and has to do with fear--or because he see what Socrates is about to do and embodies the alternative of the wise old man who doesn't need to go through the philosophizing of Socrates with the young?]
Meanwhile, Socrates puts off the horse-viewing in order to keep chatting.

VI-VII. [331e] What is justice?
Polemarchus for Simonides on justice: justice = to give each his due (to ta opheilomena hekastOI apodidonai)
Socrates: what does "due" mean? This is the harder question.
Polemarchus: the "due" is the good (agathon, vs. kakon). [This is exactly what Socrates means in Book VI explaining that the argument goes nowhere.] And this applies to all, both friends and enemies. But what is due an enemy [echthros]? Harms (blabas). But this seems to be the good for the actor, if for anyone, and not for the enemy. The locus for benefits and harms, for the just man, is war and with one's allies.

Socrates gets Pol. to agree that

1. Justice is also useful in peace

2. Peacetime arts make things

3. Justice makes partnerships work justly.

What kind of partnerships?

Socrates: not those merely of art/craft
Pol.: therefore, those dealing with money

What kind of transactions?

Socrates: not those in which expertise in particular objects is needed
Pol.: therefore, those dealing with money as the object
-- expanded to all transactions about safeguarding objects or money. [Justice preserves the potential use of good by keeping track of and giving each the proper goods and harms.]

VIII. [333e] Socrates:

1. The one able to do something for good, has the ability also to do it for evil
2. The just man does have ability to preserve goods for potential use, but the same ability can redistribute goods for potential misuse (here, by giving an amount different than what is due, creating waste or deficiency)
3. The just man has a neutral ability that permits either virtue or vice in distribution
[4. The just man has something more beyond the ability or skill, beyond deinos. It is more than something mathematical.]

Again:

1. Soc: True friends are those who really are friends
2. Pol: people love those they deem good (chrEstous), hate those they deem bad (ponErous)
3. Both: People err in deeming good and bad
4. Soc: Justice is giving each what is really due, not what seems to be due. It is just to hurt those who seem to be good, if they are really bad, if hurting the bad is justified. [This confuses Polemarchus.]
5. People who have bad friends should therefore hurt their "friends" who are bad, but not their true friends. [Here Polemarchus agrees to the distinction Socrates has been making.]

IX. [335b]

Can the dikaios harm anyone? (Now that the true nature of "enemy" is more clear.)

1. Harming animals gives them less virtue, as such.
2. Justice is man's virtue.
3. Harming a man gives him less justice [Though external "harms" are not so bad; cf. Cephalus above.]
4. The master of an art can, but does not, create things badly or make them worse in respect of that virtue the artist controls.
5. Even more so, the just man, desiring justice in others, can but does not make people less just.

a. The good does not harm;
b. Making-unjust is to harm;
c. The just is good;
d. Therefore, the just man does not make-unjust or harm.

6. So to harm one's enemies is not of justice.

Socrates: It is merely the idea of the rich and unrestrained that one justly harms one's enemies. So still trying to define "to each his due."

X. [336b] Thrasymachus is an unrestrained man, at least in conversation. But he enters with the same question: to define precisely "the due." In answer, Soc. shows, in a sense--when someone is in a bad way about something, it is right not to be harsh but to show pity (eleeisthai). Socrates says that Thras. is deinos [how?] -- from above, and not necessarily good or bad.

XI. [337a] Socrates rails against Thras. for prohibiting the kind of general answers about what justice is that befit the general term "justice." [The just "penalty" for ignorance is to be taught. Thras. would impose a fine (implying that Socrates is less worthy of safeguarding money as a potential good?)] Thras. instead says that he knows "justice," and Socrates enjoins an explanation.

XII. [338a]
Socrates shall pay what " he is able to pay--praise, not money--if Thras. gets it right. [Is that what is "due"--i.e., due the knower?]
Thras.: the just is the advantage of the stronger (to tou kreittonos xumpheron).
Socrates: So what is just for the stronger is just [advantageous?] for all? [vs. each his own due]
Thras.: the stronger cares only for itself, doing what is [or what seems?] most just for only the stronger; the just is what serves the stronger [because the stronger defines justice anew in each regime].

What does the ruler do?

XIII-XV. [339b]
1. Being just includes obeying rulers
2. Rulers err; they produce wrong laws; i.e., they pass laws against their own advantage
3. So the just includes all orders, even the wrong ones? Thras: yes.
4. Elenchus: so subject must both obey orders and act only for the ruler's advantage, which is sometimes absurd
5. Correction by Thras: the stronger is not always the ruler--he is "ruler" only insofar as he is right about his advantage
a. This opens the door for deposing the acting ruler or for disobeying him
b. It also redefines the stronger's right to rule: he must be correct about his advantage

6. So what does a ruler do? IF ruling is an art:

a. There is something about which the art relates, some advantage to the artist from the object;
b. The art is for the sake of the advantage
c. The art has its own advantage--to be most perfect (malista telean)
[d. Being more perfect, it can bring the best benefit to the artist.
How does the art become more perfect? Through its use? By making its objects as good as possible? Or through another art?]
e. But Thras. had said (in the case of rule) that, strictly, the art-as-such is perfect and is misnamed if not perfect, and geared to the benefit of the ruler
[f. So the art would perfectly, without gap, be dedicated to the artist, in Thras's view. But Socrates has said that the art would be dedicated to the object.]
g. In Socrates' view, then, ruling would be dedicated to the objects of rule = the subjects, rather than the advantage of the ruler = the artist
[h. Is it possible that by making the objects as good as possible, the artist gets the best advantage? Or is he in some way not fulfilling his highest calling merely by acting as the artist?]

7. Thras. calls Socrates to account. Doesn't the artist define the perfection of his art as that which best serves him? The shepherd defines the best sheep as those that can best serve him, which is not necessarily the same as what is best for the sheep! The ruler actually may be unjust toward the subjects, taking advantage of the "just" subjects who act in the interest of the ruler. The just subjects perform justice by tending to the advantage of the stronger. In fact the unjust ruler still serves himself and his friends best, which makes him also just towards them and himself; he is happiest; the just subjects neglect their own special advantage and are most unhappy (athliOtatous). The unjust ruler creates tyranny, using stealth and force.

Injustice seems to be operative most of all for the unhappy--those who have suffered injustice--than for those who do injustice. Full, tyrannical injustice is stronger, free, and more ruling (despotikisterov). The advantage of the stronger depends on (1) justice in the citizens toward the ruler; (2) injustice in the ruler toward the citizens.

XVII. [344d] The group vs. the tyrannical Thrasymachus. Socrates gets him to remain:
1. Thras. should be concerned for the welfare of the "many" in the room
2. Thras. has knowledge that may be worth knowing and therefore worth sharing (if #1 is true)
3. Thras. is probably wrong anyway--the tyrant actually gets less benefit than the just (i.e., the just is NOT the interest of the stronger)
4. Thras. should persuade the group that he is right after all, if he really believes what he has said
5. Thras. should persuade the group openly and without deception

It appears that Socrates is trying to train Thrasymachus in care for the group--in other words, training him in Socratic justice.

Socrates: IF ruling is an art, then just as the shepherd makes the sheep best (i.e., best for the sheep), the ruler makes the people best [but for whom?] The true ruler/shepherd has the leisure to take control because he already has everything he needs [but does such a human one exist?]

Socrates: Does the ruler want to rule [since he serves the ruled]?
Thras.: Yes [because he mainly serves himself].

XVIII. [345e] Socrates: But some rulers are not tyrants; they seek pay in exchange for services.

A. Each art provides a particular benefit to the artist [taking Thras's side]
B. This benefit remains even if side-benefits such as payment accrue (e.g., basket-making and basket-selling are different arts)
C. Is there any value in the art itself? (Thras.: No. [He is now thinking about pay--as though basket-making has no value apart from basket-selling.]
D. Socrates: If the value is not in the art then it must be in the object [why not in the artist? From the perspective of the rule-sellers, at least, this is true.]
E. So such a ruler says that needs pay to make up for serving the good of the subjects, or tries to avoid the penalty for refusing to serve them.

XIX. [347a] What is the penalty? [especially regarding the epieikestatoi, the finest, who sometimes rule to avoid the penalty]

1. The good (agathoi) rule not for money or honor (chrEmatOn, timEs) -- Socrates is simply asserting the opposite of what Thrasymachus was saying--Socrates has turned to what is the case what the just are the ones ruling.

2. The agathoi must be compelled to rule on the basis of avoiding penalty, since there is no actual benefit they get in ruling

3. The greatest penalty is to be ruled by the unjust

4. So the most just will seek to rule; it is a self-imposed compulsion. In the ideal state, people would contend NOT to rule rather than to rule. (See Books VI-VII.)

But still unanswered: what does the ruler do? How to give each his due?

Does the good ruler prefer to be benefited by the rule of another (which would imply that the other ruler is more able to rule, more just) or to rule others himself (which implies that he is the best ruler)?

Whose life is better: the UNJUST or the JUST man?

Thras. is more like the unjust; Glaucon, the just, saying that the group should try to come to terms with Thras. rather than be in conflict with him, requiring a judge to intervene to decide "justice" for them (which is less preferable than knowing it for oneself).

XX. [348b]

Thras.: injustice -- "vice" -- pays benefits; justice -- "virtue" -- does not pay back benefits. This is because he who is just has good character (euEtheian) without good judgment (euboulian), but he who is unjust at least has good judgment. Thras. would add that the unjust man is also phronimos and agathos (prudent and good), on the basis of his ability [but this was refuted at chapter VIII].

Socrates is upset: adikia has been declared aretE and sophia! Perfect injustice does seem to require prudence and wisdom and other virtues! But Thras. is talking about dunamis which Socrates is tacitly talking about choice --Socrates demonstrates care for the relationship and the person; Thras. only for the argument.

Next:
(1) the just man seeks his due in relation to the just and the unjust; ditto for the due of others;
(2) the unjust are worse,
(3) because the just seeks to exceed the unjust in the virtue called JUSTICE! [still not defined]

[(4) Meanwhile, the unjust seeks to exceed all in advantage] Socrates: really, in all? Thras: yes [meaning: in "all advantages"].

XXI. [349c]

How does the just exceed the unjust? A series of unproven assertions.

1. People are good in their art, insofar as they are phronimos in it.
2. The phronimos wants to exceed the not-phronimos in the activities of the art
3. The knower wants/chooses to exceed the not-knower in the praxis
[Note the change of terms. Does the not-knower want to exceed in advantage like the unjust does? But for Thrasymachus, the unjust is the phronimos, so S's terms do not match T's. Thus, T says, perhaps.]
4. The knower is wise and good (sophos, agathos)
5. The knower seeks not to exceed other knowers, but seeks to exceed the not-knowers
6. The not-knower is bad [this is merely stated], and seeks to exceed all [again, not demonstrated. Thus, T says, it seems.]
7. People "are" that which they are "most like".
8. So the just are good and wise (in respect of justice and just actions, by Socrates' unstated definitions), while the unjust are bad and ignorant (in respect of justice).

[Likewise, by this reasoning, the just are bad and ignorant regarding personal gain, while the unjust are good and wise regarding personal gain, seeking to exceed the just]

XXII. [350d] [Socrates may seem to be winning the argument, but Thras. is not willing to go through it again in order to fight it. Thras. will not agree, without referring to specifics, that justice = virtue and wisdom while injustice = vice and ignorance.] But they agree: injustice is stronger and more able (dunatOterov)--so is knowledge really on the side of justice or injustice?

Persons and groups

XXIII. [351c] An object's function is what it is best for, or what it is necessary for.

1. A group achieves its advantage by justice within the group; the group having justice also has homonoia and philia. Injustice inhibits group action and group benefit.

2. A person, insofar as a person is a composite, needs justice within himself if the whole person is to benefit. Injustice in the self inhibits that.

3. Even an unjust group benefits best from justice within the group; likewise, an unjust person benefits his whole person if he has justice within himself, serving the advantage of the whole self. [See far ahead, Book VIII.]

XXIV. [353a] Is an object's virtue that which renders it most useful for another, or that which renders it best able to perform its function for itself?

The soul has a double function: life and thought. So its virtue is justice (ordering itself to best serve life and thought together), toward happiness.

Book VI

[484a]

introduction - Socrates: the goal (even in this digression) is to know how the just life exceeds/differs from the unjust (ti diapherei bios dikaios adikou). The philosophers can apprehend the eternal and unchanging--by this we distinguish them from the not-philosophers, who wander amidst multiplicity. This apprehension gives the philosophers knowledge of the essence of things. Thus they have the first qualification to be leaders in a state (where leaders are the guardians who guard the laws and pursuits of society, or at least appear competent to: dunatioi phainOntai phulaxai nomous te kai epitEdeumata poleOn). Philosophers have sight of the most true (alEthestatov) and always use it most deeply to establish laws about kalos, dikaios, and agathos, when necessary to establish them, or else to preserve them actively once such laws are established.

explanation
Soc: is not seeing the truth as bad, philosophically, as is blindness with regard to everyday life?
Glaucon: yes
[in other words: you can still get around, but you don't really know what's going on--you can trust others and your own instinct and some learning, but you will easily be tripped up by the unexpected.]
Soc: so, like the blind, the non-philosophers should not be guardians (because they do not know what they are guarding, and they could not create new laws when necessary).

other qualifications for guardians
(1) experience
(2) all virtue, to a degree superior to that of others

[485a]

How do these other qualifications arise?

A. education and maturity (487a)

B. from birth, a certain starting nature (phusis). Such a nature loves (eraO) the eternals it must know. Such a nature seeks all knowledge.

(2a) abides in truth, against falsity--because, loving knowledge, such a person loves that of two opposites which most overlaps with knowledge or is most like knowledge.

C. from childhood on, the prospective guardian must seek all truth, because if one seeks all truth, the soul is forced to desire truth as strongly as possible, weakening other desires--this process aims at the soul's pleasures rather than those of the body.

(2b) seeking truth therefore produces temperance, and no lust for wealth

[486a]

(3) [not necessarily a qualification, but another difference between the philosopher and the non-philosopher]
the philosopher is not illiberal.

The philosopher always seeks integrity and wholeness of the human and divine [this apparently follows from the desire for all knowledge of the unchanging = some kind of wholeness. Illiberality takes limitations and change into account, which is not appropriate for the highest pursuits of the philosopher.] The philosopher thinks about the whole: grandeur (megaloprepeia), all time, all existence, and will be held back by mere thoughts of actual human life (anthrOpinon bion), especially by thoughts of death. So a liberal spirit qualifies one for true philosophy [but not necessarily for being a willing and happy guardian in the city!]

Such a philosopher is orderly (kosmios), because temperate; not petty, not afraid of death--so the true philosopher has no reason to be unjust. [The problem is that if the philosopher becomes a guardian, he will want to focus on eternals rather than human living and dying--his focus will be on human wholeness, if that is no contradiction in terms.] He is both just abd gentle (hEmeros), not unsocial or savage (duskoinOntos kai agria).

(2c) Soc: so is the next qualification that he must be a good learner, because it is hard to love philosophy if it's difficult and painful to perform? Gl: Yes. [But the philosopher loves knowledge and wisdom, not necessarily philosophy itself.] Soc: Also, since he must retain what is learned, he will love philosophy if it conduces to knowledge. A sufficient (hikanOs) philosopher will therefore also have good memory.

     (2d)
          (1) Truth is like measure and proportion
          (2) Therefore the mind that is well-measured and of good grace (emmetrov kai eucharin), by nature, leads it to the true being of each thing.
          (3) Lack of harmony and seemliness (amonsou te kai aschEmonos) produces a lack of proportion (ametrian)
          (4) Therefore the one lacking such harmony and measure will not so easily be led on to truth like the philosopher is.

[487a]

conclusion
So the philosopher has the right qualifications to have a sufficient and complete apprehension of reality [which, in the preface, Soc. had said such a one uses to establish or maintain just laws]. The more full set of qualifications: good memory, good learner, magnificent [megaloprepEs], of good grace, friendly to and similar to truth, justice, courage, temperance; completed by education and maturity.

[487b]

Adeimantus' response: the challenge to this argument is that, somehow, the die-hard philosophers turn out to seem useless to society. [But this is in the society's uneducated and disordered view.] So perhaps Soc's argument above does have a flaw somewhere, and it could be Glaucon's inexperience in dialectic that has led him to miss the flaw. [So they will have to make sure they understand dialectic before assessing this idea.] Furthermore, Soc could be just playing and intentionally leading Glaucon astray for some other purpose.
Socrates responds: Rather than continue in this manner, I'll use a parable [eikonos]. The goal here is to express how hard it goes for the most decent man [epieikestatOn] in relation to the state. [And to be true to the original goal, to show how the life of this just man differs from that of the unjust.]

Ship Parable
The pilot is not perfect but the best on the ship, yet the sailors take over for the sake of power and for feasting. The science of navigation and the true art of piloting are different than the haphazard "art" of simply seizing the helm. The sailors simply don't understand the actions or the art of the pilot. Ditto the city-dwellers in relation to the true philosophers. The epieikestatoi of the philosophers are useless to the many because the many cannot properly use these most decent men. [Can the philosopher or someone else teach them how to do so, or must one train up children from youth in the art of proper use of philosophers?] It is not in the nature of the philosopher to offer his services to the many, but the many must realize their need and then turn to the philosopher for his enlightened rule. [How will they recognize their need? Why must the philosophers wait to be asked?] The many cannot understand the philosopher; worse, the philosopher is disparaged as useless.

[489e]

Now, if the many actually get worse, do we blame the philosopher?

the philosopher is deeply dedicated to the truth, esp. of universals. Each part of the soul is best suited to know a particular point of reality, which leads to flourishing. Truth-getting requires a healthy and just character (hugies te kai dikaion Ethos), which temperance facilitates. It is the many who are kakoi and not the philosopher. So how do they get worse? Knowing how they get worse will help answer whether to hold the philosophers or philosophy responsible. [490e]
[491a] The pseudo-philosophers try to rule like philosophers, but since their souls are inferior they do cut a poor figure, so the true philosophers get blamed (per Adeimantus' challenge). The complete (teleOs) philosopher is rare.

Half-ironic interlude

It is "most surprising of all" that, in imperfect society, the aforementioned virtues tend to corrupt the soul and divert it from philosophy. So do what are normally called goods (things that are good for use in the city)--beauty, wealth, strength, and business contacts.

The sophists can lead astray the promising young men, whose enthusiasm gets directed as the sophists point. This is worst for these young men, because their energy leads them astray farther and quicker. Ditto the great energy of a whole town led astray by the sophist; the town's approbation of the sophist leads the naturally good young men astray by poor nurture. The sophist leads astray by means not only of false arguments but also by the so-called goods and virtues--by both words and deeds. The true philosopher is powerless in the face of such a powerful sophist. Only a god could counteract the bad nurture! In fact it's a marvel that societies survive as well as they do, thinking their opinions are wisdom--trying to run a state based on the opinions and desires of the many rather than on true wisdom--running the state by conventions based on opinions and the "necessary" rather than true knowledge of good and bad. There is no solid connection between the desires of the many and the truly good and noble. [Can anyone educate the many to turn them from particulars (necessities) to universals?]

[493e]

1) the many only can conceive of particulars
2) they therefore cannot conceive of essences
3) therefore they can't pursue philosophy because they don't know that what they're pursuing is wisdom when it comes to essences
4) they therefore will censure the philosophers, who seem to be avoiding the particulars

Then:

A. The boy with a natural philosophic bent is called so because he has the natural virtues of memory, courage, etc.
B. He will be identified by the many as a standout
C. The many will encourage him to develop his gifts, not for his own sake but for theirs
D. This attention will give him ambition and pride
E. The honors they give him will seem satisfying and he won't know how far he is from knowledge of eternals
F. His natural talents will be diverted on account of the multitude's poor habits
G. Because they have censured the philosophers, and because they fear to lose his services, they prevent the philosophers from turning him toward philosophy and away from their particulars.

All this assumes that the philosopher has no intention of condescending to rule over particulars. [495a] Meanwhile, the sophists, who enjoy applying philosophical pretensions to the city's particulars (which the citizens prefer), make philosophy into a kind of vulgar craft that focuses the soul in the wrong direction. [Does the philosopher-guardian who deals with particulars end up suffering the same, or is he immune from this because his soul is securely focused toward eternals? Does the philosopher-guardian sacrifice for the good of the people?] The sophistic craftiness begets sophisms rather than genuine knowledge.

[496b] So perhaps exile from a young age will preserve those most apt to become philosophers; or,
-- the town could be so petty that the youth separates himself on his own power, not being swayed by pride and hopes of grandeur; or,
-- the young man might see that his current profession is leading to naught; or,
-- bodily illness could keep the citizens from calling him up to serve them; or,
-- there could be an inner motivation that is uncontrollable (as in the case of Socrates)
[496c] The philosopher is the champion of justice (tEn tOn dikaiOn boEtheian), standing alone in the degenerate city. He could not help the people even if he tried--they are like beasts with whom he cannot even begin to reason--so the philosopher should stay out and mind his own business--it is enough to seek a life of private virtue. He needs a state that will at least let him mind his own business, which--if he will achieve greatness--will put him in position to save or preserve the community (ta koina sOsei).

Response by Adeimantus

[497a] Adeimantus: So is any of our states suitable for philosophy?
Soc: None. The problem is that no state is suitable for the growth of the philosophic nature.
Adeim: But how about the ideal state described earlier?
Soc: More or less. The state must not only start out with a proficient lawgiver, but also must maintain itself through the same political reasoning of that lawgiver. Such a state takes up philosophy not merely for the training up of the young for greatness, but for the mature when, at the height of the soul's ability, they may be happiest. The old have only to philosophize to live happily (along with having a few incidentals to permit the body to survive). The body lives to support philosophy! An old philosopher has a favorable fate.

[498c] Adeim: But the many won't be convinced about all this.
Soc: That's because they have experienced so-called "philosophy" when they were too young, and they experienced it as performed by sophists who were manipulating opinion. But if they were to see true philosophic virtue they probably would respond in kind. The riotous, false "philosophers" study the changing human things, but the philosophic lawgiver is "equilibrated and assimilated" (parisOmenon kai hOmoiOmenon) in virtue--both in word and deed, as much as possible. The philosophic lawgiver rules the city of like virtue, the city with its eye on the eternal. Such a person encourages the many to have free (eleutheros) and beautiful (kalos) discussions for the sake of knowing.

How will the philosopher(s) take charge of the state? There are some real possibilities:
(1) There could be a chance passion in the philosophers to take charge--they may have to constrain the citizens to allow the takeover;
(2) There could be a divinely inspired passion for true philosophy on the part of the rulers or their sons--they may have to constrain the philosophers to rule

[end of half-ironic interlude]

[500b]

A more reasonable view: how will the citizens be won over to philosophy?

I. The philospher

A. Keeps his eyes on the truth, and forms himself according to the true characteristics of the virtues, as far as possible (out of a natural inclination to imitate what is admired by him)

1. Always existing and unchanging
2. Neither does nor suffers injustice
3. Exists in harmony according to logos

B. In contrast, he avoids the things of men while attending to his personal formation--especially avoiding strife, envy, and hate

C. By associating with the divine order, he becomes more orderly and divine

II. The ruler

A. Democracy

1. The citizens will start out calumniating the philosopher, saying he is poor at instilling temperance, justice, and all civic virtue.
2. But his duty is to mold the state in accordance with eternal truths (as he has molded himself). If the citizens understand, they will become less harsh. How?

a. The philosophers must wipe away the false opinions about philosophy and philosophers
b. Then the philosophers must establish a constitution, and as they proceed,

(1) They look, on the one hand, at the eternal nature of the just, beautiful, temperate, etc.;
(2) They look, on the other hand, at what they are trying to make among men: an image of the divine within men, loved by the divine.

c. The citizens must admit that

(1) The philosophers, whatever else they do, are lovers of the truth (alEtheias erastas);
(2) Their nature is of the best (aristos);
(3) If anybody is completely good and philosophic, it's such a nature once it has been cultivated accordingly
(4) [implied: the philosopher is not only best but also trying hardest to produce the best polity]

d. How to get them to admit these things? Let's assume that they are shamed into assenting to let the philosophers give it a try, if they are not also persuaded to do so.

B. Autocracy

Such a process can be accomplished best by a philosophic ruler who already enjoys the obedience of the people. To answer the challenge of long ago [Book V], the possibility of such a philosophic nature properly cultivated is a real possibility, so the possibility of the above transformation of the citizens, constitution, and state is also a real possibility.

[502d]

How will following generations preserve the state? What will they do in the state?

Education of the next rulers:

1. They must be lovers of the state; this should be proved by tests of their ability to persist in the greatest studies against the desire to pursue those things that would show they are merely lovers of themselves (the test is whether they maintain their studies in the face of diversionary pleasures and pains).

2. They must be philosophers.

3. They are therefore few, because such philosophers are few, as stated above--they must be active in study as well as all virtue, yet orderly and stable (vs. the over-courageous), incorporating a good and fine combination of both temperaments (active and yet orderly).

4. Though we do not yet know the good, we see that the constitution shall need guardians who do know the good, so that the state can be completely ordered (506b).

What are these "greatest studies"? (mathEmata megista)

1. Adeim. and Socrates discuss the fact that there is an easy education that satisfies the lazy, but an education of reality and precision is what is needed for the guardians, who shall guard both the state itself and its laws.

2. The guardians need to study beyond knowing "justice" and "virtue" and the outlines of the highest things, to an exact knowledge of the highest things.

3. They especially need the idea of good (hE tou agathou idea) by which all just, all useful and beneficial things become so. They can't securely trust in good things without the idea of good, which is not yet fully understood in this conversation.
     Socrates: Is there any use in proceeding without having and knowing the good in itself?
     Adeim: No. [But this is the situation of all people all the time! (see below)]
     Socrates: [505d-e] Knowing the semblance of the good is not satisfactory.

So what is the good?

I. Background

A. The many say that it is pleasure, but there are bad pleasures.
B. The more sophisticated say it is phronEsis, but they describe it only as phronEsis of the good, which does not define the good after all.
C. Souls do, however, have an intuition (apomanteuomenE) of what it is.
D. Socrates: It is not enough to have (necessarily blind) opinions or to know the opinions of others. Nor is it enough to have true opinions without knowing why they are true. (But here it is enough for Glaucon!) E. Socrates says he does not yet know the good. So instead let's talk about what seems to spring from and resemble the good--which is admittedly a second-best pursuit [though Adeim. said above that it was therefore not worth pursuing; evidently Socrates does have patience for pursuits other than the highest one]--even though it is still a pursuit of permanent things, which are proper to the philosophic pursuit.

II. Turn back from to agathon to ta agatha and ta kala. (Notes on Organization of Knowledge)

A. ta agatha partake of to agathon, the idea of good or the good in itself (auto agathon).
B. We perceive ta agatha with senses, and most of all with sight, which requires light as a medium.
C. Vision and the sun are connected as effect and cause.
D. Analogy -- the good is to the sun as good things are to vision
E. Analogy -- Knowing-reality is to using-the-sun's-light as opining-in-the-world-of-change is to mingling-with-darkness
F. The idea of good is the cause of knowledge of good things, that they are good--e.g., knowledge, truth.
G. Knowledge and truth are secondary to the habit of the good: hexis tou agathou.

Adeim: Is the good, then, [since it is not knowledge, which is secondary] pleasure itself (see I.A above)?
Socrates: Hush. Let's take the comparison further.

H. The sun makes possible the very existence of many things that also are seen.
I. Likewise, the good makes possible various goods that are the objects of knowledge.
J. The good is not being (ousia), but transcends it in dignity (presbeia) and surpassing power (dunamei huperechontos).
K. Analogy: the sun is to visibles as [the good?] is to intelligibles.

[509d]

The Divided Line

A line divided into four parts, arranged proportionally according to clearness, truth, and reality. The proportion is the same across the four parts, e.g. 1:2:2:4. Why is the division like this? Let us leave that for later [see 534a].

A. The Visible (realm of doxa)

1. Shadows, reflections (eikasia)
2. Actual visibles (realm of pistis)

B. The Intelligible (realm of noEsis, nous)

1. realm of dianoia - where the soul makes deductions from assumptions, based on universal agreements [which themselves take on the character of doxa and render the whole argument ungrounded and unstable]

2. realm of nous - where the soul makes inductions from assumptions to principles, using the dialectical power [epistEmE, 533d]. Assumptions are merely hypotheses from which to rise to first principles and then no longer need the assumptions. Only after reaching first principles does one deduce conclusions [a kind of dianoia], never entering the realm of sense [the visible].

Book VII

Image of the Cave

After the prisoner is freed to see objects in the light of the fire, with some of the sun's dim light entering in, and after then being freed from the cave to see objects by the light of the sun, then things in the heavens (which cast their own light) and heaven itself, and finally to see the sun itself, he infers that the sun is a main cause of the visibles. He is happier to contemplate his deeper wisdom and better life. Meanwhile, the remaining prisoners would ridicule him (upon his return) for his inability to succeed in their lesser system of honors.

Entering the realm of the sun's light is like ascending to the intelligibles--but God knows whether the analogy is true. The region of the known has within it the idea of good, which is the last and hardest of the things to know; but knowing it would lead to the conclusion that it is the cause of all that is right and beneficial. It is the generator of light, the lord of truth and nous--and this situation must be admitted by anyone acting wisely either in private or in public.

Once catching glimpse of the intelligibles, it is hard for him to be persuaded to return to the affairs of men [which change and which are in the realm of images and pistis rather than of dianoia and noEsis). The distinction here is between the divine contemplations (theiOn theOriOn) and the regular human things (anthrOpeia). Moving into new realms of light or darkness will be confusing at first. There must be a conversion from darkness to light by turning the whole person from the world of becoming to the world of being. The goal is "to be able to endure the contemplation of essence" and "the brightest region of being" (518c), namely, the good.

Art of Conversion to the Good

The action of the soul in this regard may happen naturally if the soul is pointed toward the first principles. There could be an art of directing the soul most efficiently in this manner. Already there are ways to educate the soul in pistis and dianoia--habit and practice accomplish most of this--but noEsis, phronEsis, is more divine and would require a different art--it is about turning the soul rather than creating a virtue (518e). A person needs to be converted toward the true, especially he who has keenness of mind but is currently looking only toward the lower ends.

A. People unsuited to rule

1. Those uneducated and inexperienced in truth, because they have no single purpose (skopon) in life to which they direct all their public and personal activities;

2. Those who imagine that only the divine contemplations are worth performing, for they will perform no other actions throughout their life except mere philosophizing.

B. As for those educated to get the vision of the good:

1. They should be reminded that they have been specially educated;
2. Especially they should be reminded that their good fortune in this regard is due to the good policies of the city.
3. Since these educated young people are just,
4. They will agree to share their abilities in the city, for the sake of the whole.
5. Since there shall be many such people educated in this manner [those few compared to the whole], their public service may be brief and quickly handed on to the next person--they will take turns.
6. Furthermore, several guardians can rule together as friends, not needing or wanting to jockey for office.
7. In fact, the ability to enjoy philosophy over rule is what makes some people able to rule well--instead of wealth, they have true happiness, a good and wizened life (zOEs agathEs te kai emphronos).

C. As for those who get the vision of the good on their own -- they have no reason to repay the city and no such responsibility to serve it [but perhaps they come to see that they should choose it anyhow]

D. Socrates: Does any other lifestyle than the philosopher's scorn political office? [Perhaps fishing for categories such as artist, priest.] Glaucon: No.

1. Only the true philosopher does not love rule.
2. A well-ruled city requires one who scorns office.
3. Only the true philosopher can guard the city; i.e.,
     a. being the most wise (phronimOtatoi);
     b. able to run the best city;
     c. has a life better than the political life, which
     d. provides its own honors.

[521c]

So, since the well-run state needs these people, how do we produce them?

1. We are not looking at this point for the greatest study = study of the essence of the good.
2. Rather, we are looking for the study that effects the conversion to true philosophy--to draw the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of being. The goal is to awaken thought [523a]. So the secondary studies are actually just a prelude to actual dialectics.
3. [This conversion should happen as early as possible in life, but not too early--not before the child is ready.]
4. It is likely that the conversion will happen during the training in soldership--so the conversion should not detract from the athletic skill-building, which is something else altogether [and distracts the soul from actually engaging in dialectics].
5. Music encourages harmony, order, measure, grace, but it does not provide the turn toward transcendence that is sought.
6. All the arts likewise lack this pressure toward transcendence--they are base (banausoi) and not sciences.
7. All art, all dianoia, all science, must distinguish and use numbers and also must calculate by way of preparing the future leader.

Why is numeration/calculation so important? It drives the mind toward ousia.

a. Distinguishing one thing from another provokes some thought, but necessarily toward ousia.
b. More important, simultaneous contradictory perceptions provoke thought. We look for something else going on that will resolve (epikrinountos) the difficulty. E.g., great-yet-small, soft-yet-hard, become seen as continuous properties rather than each as a separate entity. We are led from the visible (horaton) to the intelligible (noEton).
c. Both dianoic and noEsis may be provoked.
d. The contradiction compels the soul to aporein kai zEtein, to be at a loss and to inquire. The soul arouses in itself ennoia.
e. We always see things as ones made up of a plurality of parts. This contradiction leads us to study the being of unity, and then on to study true being itself.
f. In fact, all number and calculation tends to move from the visible items what is intelligible about number.
g. But the danger is that numeration could facilitate conversion to philosophy, on the one hand, but on the other hand, it could facilitate huckstering.
h. The training therefore must be carefully monitored.
i. Discussion about number should move as quickly as possible away from any reference to actual objects [i.e., minimize 'word problems' as well as math drills at this level].
j. Some mathematical concepts will prove untranslatable to real objects, anyway.
k. Math ultimately compels the soul to use noEsis about truth itself.

Other reasons why math is important:

- It is a skill useful to the general and soldier.
- It helps identify the naturally able in philosophy, distinguishing both the quick and the tenacious.
- It helps improve, for everyone, thinking skills more generally.

[526c]

8. After math, the following studies. It is difficult to believe (pisteusai), or to go along with others (xundokei), that such studies rejuvenate and purify this important part of the soul. [Perhaps this purification occurs because the students run out of time for other pursuits?]

a. Geometry.

(1) Useful in war, and in fact for all later studies.
(2) Facilitates direction toward the idea of good, toward ousia rather than genesis.
(a) There are great contradictions between objects and the terms used to describe them
(b) The object of this study is gnosis, knowledge of that which always is.

b. Solid Geometry -- solids are not useful except when in motion (astronomy), so the study is not usually held in honor; thus there is no patient expert to teach it. Nevertheless it is the next study.

c. Astronomy

(1) Useful for domestic and military skills.
(2) Compels the soul to look upward

(a) This is not an obvious way to describe what happens. It is not the same as studying the actual heavenly bodies; these are merely paradigms [as is the whole of the sample state Socrates is imagining]. Objects are always deficient when it comes to studying being, because objects also change.
(b) The description is metaphorical [cf. 516a]. We apprehend the truths of astronomy by logos and dianoia, not by opsis.
(c) Problems or contradictions in observed phenomena, nevertheless, help compel the soul beyond, while abstract "problems" that ignore the actual objects will do even more.

d. Other studies of motion

(1) Harmony. Like astronomy, it does not deal with real sounds, but with general problems about concordant numbers.
(2) There is a study which is the study of finding out what all these studies hold in common

[532a-b]

A second description of dialectics

It occurs through reason (logos), without any aisthEsis, working towards the essence of each thing, toward knowing (noEsis) what is the good in itself. It is about leading the best part of the soul to the best essence.

[532d]

Glaucon's response

"I accept this as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject." [Shorey, p. 199: "This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of Plato's metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 130, n. 192, What Plato Said, p. 268 and p. 586 on Parmen. 135c. So Tennyson says it is hard to believe in God and hard not to believe."]

Glaucon continues: So what is dialectic? [as though Socrates hasn't been pointing to it the whole time]
Socrates responds: That question is very hard to answer. It requires someone with experience in dialectics [which the others would have, along with Socrates, if they had been doing their part] to then go ahead and work out what it is.

[533c]

A third description of dialectics

It is giving an account of one's assumptions--finding true starting points (archE) so as to move to true conclusions and to epistEmE. It does away with hypothesis toward the archE itself.

[534b] Reprise.
- The dialectician gives an account of each thing, against all comers including himself, out of the power of science and not of opinion;
- Children should be trained to be dialecticians first (and statesmen second, as needed)
- Dialectics should be set by law as the highest study
- Qualities of the ideal student--he or she must be proficient in both body and soul.
- The difficulty of getting philosophy a good name because of the sophists.

Wrapping up.

I. Just as a person is deficient if not interested in the virtues of both body and soul, a person also must both:

A. utterly despise the voluntary lie (hekousion pseudos)

1. Hate it (misEI)
2. Be troubled by it in himself (chalepOs pherEI autE)
3. Be greatly angered by the lies of others (huperaganaktEI)

B. utterly despise the involuntary lie

1. Be distressed when he is convicted of being unstudied
2. Be sensitive to his ignorance when he notes it in himself

Also,

C. For the sake of not embarrassing philosophy, the students must be well prepared in the virtues of body and mind before they become rulers [this now looks more like a concession than a part of building the whole person, which has not therefore been eliminated]

D. The person becoming a ruler must be a younger man trained aright, rather than an older one set more or less aright

II. The preparatory studies leading to the conversion to philosophy are for the young, who may freely choose them and therefore retain what is learned. The studies should be presented as play.

A. To maintain the freedom of the kids
B. To help the elders determine their natural capacities.

III. There is a conflict between vigorous exercise of the body (which produces fatigue and sleep) and that of the soul, so during the gymnastic training, kids will not be expected to get very far. Only afterward, when the student revisits his earlier studies, will he form a synopsis of the branches of study and start to understand their relationship to the nature of things. The synoptikos is a dialektikos, and if not synoptikos, then not dialektikos.

IV. The danger of dialectic, and a solution.

A. Analogy: The adopted child trusts and honors his putative parents, putting more stock in them than his flatterers. Then, finding he is adopted, he will lose trust in them and heed the flatterers more. Likewise, the young man who find it difficult to ground conventional morality [not having the idea of the good] will easily be tempted to give it up, and, not yet discovering the true ground, will imagine that there is no such thing and then will choose whatever lifestyle flatters him. The man has too quickly translated aporia in thought back into the world of sense and law [aporein without zEtein]. He will use disputation merely as play--but here is the time to be serious--dialectic is about more than mere contradiction. Such circumstances make it easy to discredit philosophy as something useful or productive of good citizens.

B. Solution: make sure that the young men already have been trained up in virtue. They must already have orderly and stable natures (tas phuseis kosmious einai kai stasimous).

V. Phases of education (somewhat kidding)

1. Preparatory exercises of the mind
2. Bodily exercise (2-3 years)
3. Study of dialectics--synoptics (about 5 years)
4. Military and civic experience (15 years)
5. By age 50, the time for youthful study is past! It is time to look upon the good itself.

[540a]

What then?

6. Using all their skills, drawing on their knowledge of the good in itself, the philosopher-guardians use the good (and the conclusions they draw from it) as a paradigm for ordering (a) the polis; (b) the citizens (idiOtas); (c) themselves
7. As said above, they take turns ruling, but mostly they are studying philosophy (preferring it)
8. They prepare the future generations of guardians
9. They take on a kind of divine status

Reprise: girls can become guardians too.

Here we have a difficult but possible model for the preservation of a philosophic state.

[540d] The values of the guardians: they scorn the honors of rule; instead prizing the right (orthos) and its honors. They regard justice (dikaios) as the greatest and most necessary thing [by why not GOOD? - this is a second-best pursuit], and it is by stamping the city with the form of true justice that they rule.

[Glaucon's dumb questions continue to inspire Socrates to humor. E.g., here at the end, Glaucon asks, So how will they administer the city? Socrates answers, At first they shall separate children from parents and make a fresh start of it all!

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