

**Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric:
A New Method for Resolving Interdisciplinary Conflicts**

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Abstract

Deliberations about joint projects often go awry when representatives of diverse disciplines fail to understand or make good use of the arguments presented from each other's perspective. This problem may occur, for example, when research faculty make decisions about an undergraduate general-education curriculum, or when scientists assemble to determine the contents of a science museum. Achieving mutual understanding is often insufficient for resolving such interdisciplinary disputes. Rather, the deliberators can ask more and better questions and can better organize those questions, arriving at better or optimal decisions, by employing a comprehensiveness criterion throughout their deliberations. This method, "deliberative architectonic rhetoric," integrates stasis theory, its closest relative, with Richard McKeon's work and related work on rhetorical invention and other studies in the rhetoric of inquiry.

Introduction

Today's interdisciplinary consultants use a complex-systems approach to interdisciplinary deliberation, taking for granted that a complex problem can be divided into sub-systems that can be treated by disciplinary investigation.¹ Likewise, disambiguation, careful listening, and mutual understanding of contrary positions all stress the disciplinary identity of the deliberators. These are valuable but limited methods for productive deliberation. Such methods often leave deliberators with no questions and few answers beyond what each participant brings to a bargaining table. This may be the case whether the goal is to design a general-education curriculum, a science museum, a small physical object, a human rights document, or a defensible history of philosophy (see below). These methods are especially inadequate in interdisciplinary conflicts, conflicts in which the subject matter in dispute lies beyond the expertise of any one deliberator. To develop more questions and answers, grounding investigations in the thing-to-be-designed rather than each participant's disciplinary predilections, the deliberators might draw on the resources available in the field of deliberative rhetoric. In doing so, they would be counting on the ancient promise that rhetoric should enable them to discover *all* the relevant means of persuasion. By agreeing to seek comprehensiveness, they can investigate a maximum of possible questions and evaluate a maximum of possible decisions.

This kind of "rhetorical" perspective, Miller (1990) argues, stands in sharp contrast with the "decision science" that builds on Simon's (1957) articulation of bounded rationality. Proponents of decision science realize that decision makers tend to work "not with all logically possible alternatives but with a limited number" (Miller 1990: 167). The philosophical challenge to decision science

¹ See Newell (2005). The Association for Integrative Studies teaches this approach to its consultants.

comes from arguments like Toulmin's (1958) that failing to follow up on any "possibility" opens us to the charge of inconsistency. I propose a rhetorical standard of completeness, between decision science and philosophical strictness, that is simple and achievable. The process I propose can lead beyond mere compromise, and it can lead to improved criteria for evaluating proposed solutions. What is more, deliberators' attention may shift from individual motives and conflicts toward collective inquiry. I propose a deliberative rhetoric, drawn from recent work on the rhetoric of inquiry (see Simons 1990) and from the rhetorical and philosophical work of Richard McKeon, which develops stasis theory (see Kennedy 1994) far beyond its original formulations. This deliberative rhetoric, which I call architectonic (McKeon 1971), flows from the source of ambiguities and other primary conflicts to help specialists produce and organize a maximum of relevant questions to ask and a maximum of solutions to evaluate.

Some aspects of this project are not new; professional negotiators already understand, for example, the importance of expanding the range of possibilities available to disputing parties. Teachers of rhetoric have long pointed their students to *topoi* where previously unconsidered arguments might be found. But studies of deliberative rhetoric have offered unexpectedly few resources for proceeding comprehensively. Probably the best resource so far is stasis theory, generally building on Hermagoras, Cicero, and Quintilian. Proponents of stasis theory identify a small number of questions that can be asked in any dispute and which cover all aspects of the dispute. In practice, these questions help disputants clearly state their positions and identify points of disagreement. More importantly, these questions help disputants and neutral negotiators discover new sources of arguments (see Hultzén 1958).² I propose to bring stasis theory into the theory of deliberative rhetoric in a new way via the work of Richard McKeon (1900-1985), with the goal of helping participants in interdisciplinary disputes find arguments and formulate plans in areas outside their original expertise. McKeon's work in interrelating different philosophical systems can be expanded to provide a method for finding a maximum of possible practical options in a given case and for arguing that a given set of options is truly comprehensive.

Confusion about what McKeon's work was really about has been compounded by several factors. His writings are dense, almost all of his output in rhetoric appears in essays that he never integrated into a book, and the scope of his work is purposefully wide and multidisciplinary. In addition, he intentionally gives his terms different meanings in different essays, and while some key

² Hultzén updates stasis theory in his discussion of "stock issues" (see Hample 2002). Teachers of composition who are trained in rhetoric frequently rely on stasis theory to help students with invention. Konishi (2001) has been expanding stasis theory in terms of an "arguer's dialectical obligations."

points are ubiquitous, they often serve different purposes in different contexts. Other key components of his philosophy rarely appear in print. For example, he never published any matrix of “philosophic semantics” and “philosophic inquiry,” though his students are quite familiar with such matrices (especially through the classes he taught and one posthumous publication)³ and even though it is fair to claim that McKeon’s matrix-building lies at the core of his philosophy. What is more, some of his students have limited themselves to just one of his philosophical schemata, treating it in conversation and published work alike as though it were the *only* or *best* such matrix possible. Some of his critics have taken the overzealousness of those students as a fair reflection of his work.

Although McKeon made frequent use of both stasis theory and his earlier training in logic, it has gone unexamined how his method for producing comprehensive matrices relies on a fusion of principles of logic and rhetoric. I concur with Wayne Booth and some of McKeon’s other students⁴ that his work is greatly underappreciated or ignored in fields to which he has made significant contributions. Even in Simons’s classic collection of articles on the rhetoric of inquiry (1990), in which Simons himself calls McKeon’s work “the most thoroughly developed of the contemporary theories of rhetorical invention” (18), McKeon is mentioned and then simply left behind. This state of affairs may change, however, now that several books of his essays have appeared and a body of secondary literature is creeping forward.⁵ My dissertation will be the first that significantly treats McKeon’s work. In describing how his work can be expanded into a method for interdisciplinary conflict resolution, I will reconstruct and explain his work in rhetorical invention and show that it liberates rather than constricts deliberation and decision-making.

McKeon suggests that “logics of invention” similar to his project have been scarce in most generations, because rhetoricians fear that strict adherence to a method might *limit* the range of possibilities (see, for example, Miller 1990). Like theorists of creativity, theorists of invention sometimes conclude that creating a logical method for invention is impossible. Others propose that the mind spontaneously discovers arguments in eureka moments after unordered periods of “incubation.”⁶

I propose not a strict, philosophical logic of invention but an architectonic *art* of invention. That is, the fundamental questions relevant to a particular deliberative problem can be identified and

³ “Philosophic Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry” (1966a; matrix on p. 253); see also Plochmann 1990.

⁴ See, for example, Garver and Buchanan 2000 and Booth 2004.

⁵ Some promising attention is given McKeon in Gross 2004.

⁶ Cicero, *De Inventione* II.45-46; Graham Wallas, *The Art of Thought* (1926); in contrast, see “Creativity and the Commonplace” (McKeon 1973). Much recent literature on “invention” now appropriates the term to mean “composition,” referring to how students compose essays (for example, Crowley 1990).

organized by what Aristotle calls an architectonic art, an art that provides necessary starting points.⁷ In isolation an “architectonic dialectic” might involve painstaking philosophical work. But when that work is performed in the service of deliberation about a particular problem, its characteristics change somewhat; it becomes “deliberative architectonic rhetoric.” Unlike the ideal philosophical situation of unfettered leisure, practical deliberation is constrained by time and often by other factors such as operational parameters. Furthermore, it is a commonplace that practical decisions tend to require a great deal of argument from probabilities rather than from certainties. When a problem at hand is treated as rhetorical rather than philosophical, the deliberators can unabashedly accept a practical criterion of comprehensiveness that is possible to fulfill, rather than a strict philosophical standard that might be impossible to meet or a pseudo-comprehensive standard limited to, for example, economic considerations.⁸

The common questions and starting points that deliberators sketch out communally, plus the criterion of comprehensiveness itself, can constitute a *new* set of locally significant commonplaces or rhetorical *topoi*. Specialists will note that these *topoi* fall outside their original expertise. Together the deliberators can discover a new common source of arguments and new common principles for design.⁹

Even so, the specialists’ different ways of identifying, organizing, and employing those common *topoi* can lead to *mutually exclusive solutions*. The criterion of comprehensiveness may again be employed, leading the deliberators to search for an exhaustive set of such solutions. The twin criteria “exhaustive and mutually exclusive,” which have their roots in mathematical studies of probability, are familiar in many disciplines. For example, psychologists often claim to fulfill these criteria when they create typologies to classify disparate research data. In philosophy, McKeon employed these criteria to create an architectonic, pluralistic schema of basic philosophical options and of the basic topics philosophers treat. He figured this schema as a well-known (and sometimes infamous) four-by-four grid. That was to take “architectonic dialectic” to its primary level. Specialists deliberating about particular problems, however, need not resort to this primary level in order to employ the twin criteria.

⁷ Recalling the term *archē*. See *Metaphysics* 1013a, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a-b, and elsewhere. At this level of analysis I am not distinguishing “arts” from “methods.”

⁸ This is to reject claims to comprehensiveness only in cases where an agreed standard (such as a measure of the economic effects of a decision) is perceived to be failing to generate agreement. Below, I argue that any comprehensiveness standard accepted by a group of deliberators has a fair claim of being suitable in their situation.

⁹ Booth (1987) similarly identifies a store of interdisciplinary commonplaces, including evaluative criteria, available to academic specialists.

In fact, the starting points need only be relevant to the subject matter involved. Take, for example, a group of scientists consulting to determine the contents of a public science museum. The biologist might declare that “science” is best represented by the biosphere, since living things are the most complex and varied of phenomena. Therefore, he argues, more than half the museum should be devoted to this subject matter. The geophysicist might declare that most of the world is actually inorganic, so more than half should feature chemistry, plate tectonics, volcanoes, and so forth. The astrophysicist responds that if quantity of material is the first criterion, his colleague has forgotten that the world is only a tiny speck of matter in the universe; the museum therefore should cover mainly astronomy and astrophysics. The sociobiologist counters that a museum is for people and that the exhibits should focus on medicine, biological anthropology, human origins, and the ethics of science. The theoretical physicist (of a certain stripe) then argues that everything reduces to mathematically represented forces and basic particles, so every exhibit should make this point paramount.¹⁰ The various experts might each be right in one sense, but the museum could not hold all the exhibits promoted by each of them. It would be arbitrary for them to hold their noses and divide the spoils evenly, unappealing to give the most aggressive scientist the largest run of the museum, and terrible to litigate the matter in court.

While the dispute continues and valuable time for scientific research is being lost, could any expert be summoned to break the gridlock? I argue that if anyone could, a practitioner of deliberative architectonic rhetoric would be the one. This practitioner would not have the subject-matter expertise normally expected of a professional mediator, arbitrator, or neutral evaluator who engages in “alternative dispute resolution.”¹¹ Instead this person would begin by helping the scientists develop a common set of fundamental questions with an eye on treating the issues comprehensively. This would mean going beyond the question “What is science about?” and expanding comprehensively the criteria offered by the various scientists. The practitioner would raise normative questions such as “What are the ends of science? What are the ends of a science museum?” He would take up the sociobiologist’s response above by introducing questions related to audience, such as “Who is a science museum intended to serve?” He would add descriptive questions such as “How can different

¹⁰ The same kinds of arguments might be made in deliberations about what to include in a “science” curriculum and which research methods to teach via laboratory work within a program of general education. In fact, this example reflects the very problem faced in the 1940s as the University of Chicago developed its undergraduate science curriculum (Schwab 1948; Levine 2000a, 2003). Later, reflecting McKeon’s influence, Joseph Schwab “identified six ‘decision points’ that determined which of a small finite number of alternative patterns of enquiry natural scientists adopt” (Levine 2003 on Schwab 1960).

¹¹ This term signifies the new paths that organizations have been developing to avoid direct litigation of disputes.

organizations of the sciences lead to different arrangements of exhibits?” and technical or practical questions such as “How costly is it to staff, maintain, and rearrange a science museum?”

To develop a comprehensive set of such questions and organize them in usable structures, the practitioner and the scientists might work from Aristotle’s famous four causes, from his or Cicero’s set of four “questions”¹² or other sets of questions derived from stasis theory, by analogy to a set of comprehensive questions developed for another purpose,¹³ or by inventing a new criterion for comprehensiveness that can be accepted by the group. Many such questions will be new for, or relatively unexamined by, these specialists. In addition, as these questions arise, the deliberators might find that representatives of additional disciplines would contribute productively to the discussion. Using these questions to develop a comprehensive set of answers, and then following those answers through to different practical conclusions, the scientists might produce radically novel plans for the design of the science museum.

One broader context of my study involves the rise of rhetoric in McKeon’s generation. That generation has become important in intellectual history, sometimes for its various pragmatisms, sometimes for its rejections of Enlightenment ideals and logical positivism. Charles Wegener (2000) notes that although logical positivism was dominant as McKeon entered academe, philosophy and studies of culture shifted “from logic to rhetoric” in that *rhetoric* replaced *logic* as the architectonic discipline of disciplines. Wegener asks, “Why and how did McKeon make this shift?” (108-09).¹⁴

McKeon himself characterizes the early twentieth century as a period of revolution:

The revolutions in the first decades of the twentieth century which set directions in modern philosophy abandoned methods of criticism and the construction of systems, and turned to methods of rhetoric and the grounding of statements. They revolted by seeking meaningful questions in the concrete and the real; by cultivating experience and phenomena, existence and nature; by appealing to science and history, common sense and language. They refuted no metaphysical or epistemological proposition, but they exhibited the absurdity of metaphysical statements which purport to be about all things, and idealistic statements which confuse thinking with being.¹⁵

He argues that these revolutions in philosophy lacked an adequate art of rhetoric and that they therefore required, as in former ages, a “new rhetoric” that would facilitate rhetorical invention, in

¹² Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 2.1.89b23-24; see also McKeon 1979, p. 315.

¹³ See especially Biela 1991.

¹⁴ Garver and Buchanan 2000, 104; see also 105-06 and 108, and Plochmann 1990.

¹⁵ McKeon 1966c, 56. In using the term “revolution” to characterize the turn to semantics he follows Victoria Lady Welby (1903); using the term more generally he follows Dewey (1929); all three, recalling Kant’s claim to be leading philosophy through a “Copernican revolution,” imply that their age involves a major order of change.

order to state new questions addressed to the new problems of the twentieth century.¹⁶ Several of McKeon's contemporaries, especially Chaïm Perelman and Kenneth Burke, participated in the revolt in favor of rhetoric. *The New Rhetoric* would become the English title of Perelman's landmark study of argumentation.¹⁷ Kenneth Burke and, more recently, scholars of the rhetoric of inquiry have run far after making this "rhetorical turn" (Simons 1990).¹⁸ In another vein, McKeon's influence on his generation extended further to Neo-Aristotelian, Chicago School colleagues engaged in studies of rhetoric and literary creation.¹⁹ These studies provided the next generation of pluralist literary critics with positions left standing after the decline of the New Criticism. Although the current project will not dwell on all these influences, this investigation will shed some light on the new paths that characterized McKeon's generation.

Characteristics of Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric

The example above shows three senses in which deliberative rhetoric can be architectonic. I have already suggested its root in the ancient Greek term *archē*; architectonic arts construct solutions by beginning with first principles. Second, the adjective "architectonic" has been employed to describe arts that *subsume* other arts, or those which can be described generally enough to be applied *universally*. Many fields can lay claim to being architectonic in this sense. Name any field X, for example, and a historian could write us a "History of X," interpreting all the details of that field from the historian's perspective. But a philosopher also might fit the same details *mutatis mutandis* into a "Philosophy of X," and a rhetorician might do the same in a "Rhetoric of X." In each case the subsuming field assumes a certain intellectual control of the field X—and since X may stand for any field, history and philosophy and rhetoric might each stake an independent claim to be the Queen of the Sciences.

Gorgias's claim that he could argue persuasively about any subject was an architectonic claim; he averred that his arguments, when addressed to nonspecialists, could surpass the arguments used by specialists in any field. Similarly, a proponent of deliberative rhetoric can claim that deliberative problems in all fields fall under a single demesne. The same is true for deliberative

¹⁶ McKeon 1966c, 57, 64-65.

¹⁷ Perelman 1969, English edn. of *Traité de l'argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique* (1958). David Frank is working on why Perelman made a parallel shift to rhetoric (personal communication, 7/25/02). See also Maneli 1993.

¹⁸ Simons reports Richard Rorty's coinage of the term in 1984, but Rorty, a student of McKeon's, was building on McKeon's and Welby's idea of a rhetorical "revolution" (see above, note 12).

¹⁹ This group, of which McKeon is considered a founding member, includes especially R. S. Crane, W. R. Keast, Norman Maclean, Elder Olson, I. A. Richards, Bernard Weinberg, and later Wayne Booth. Brian Corman (1997)

architectonic rhetoric. Like other arts of language and thought, the art of asking fundamental questions in order to resolve interdisciplinary disputes is an art that transcends individual disciplines. Even when subspecialists confront “interdisciplinary” deliberative problems within their own field, such as in the above example regarding experts in various fields of “science,” deliberative rhetoric might be employed as an architectonic art in the second sense.

Third, the word connotes *architecture*: architectonic arts help us design solutions. To relate these three senses together briefly, one could say that to resolve interdisciplinary disputes, deliberative architectonic rhetoric can promote attention to under-treated *first principles* relevant to *all the disciplines* involved, in order to use those principles to *design* the complex sequences and structures required for each proposed resolution.²⁰

Furthermore, deliberative architectonic rhetoric may be construed as a *creative art* in two senses. It is creative not only because it can result in designs for completed structures but also because its *method* is creative. The search for comprehensiveness both in questions asked and in answers provided can lead to a greater number of paths from relevant first principles to possible solutions to a problem. Just as edifice construction can be planned by employing well-tested architectural methods, this second kind of creativity can be *planned* by employing and greatly extending methods borrowed from the traditional arts of rhetorical invention.

In studying deliberative architectonic rhetoric, I have identified several additional characteristics of the art. It is likely to be needed most and to work best when a complex whole—some practical, productive, or even theoretical project—must be constructed within specific, fairly inflexible parameters; when some other parameters are not constrained; and when no conclusive (with Aristotle, call it “scientific”) knowledge from any source can lead to a unique solution. Deliberative architectonic rhetoric is likely to have all of the following characteristics when used for conflict resolution and project design: experimental in tone, provisional in its conclusions, pluralistic in its assumptions and methods, free in its debate, and collective in its discussions. It also requires certain deliberative skills beyond most specialists’ areas of academic training or expertise, as well as some degree of philosophical skill in investigating fundamental questions, plus the personal psychological factors that permit or do not inhibit such investigations. An independent mediator is not necessarily required if the deliberators have the proper abilities. In specific situations, the process of employing this art may work best when a group of open and intelligent people, each having some expertise to

gives a long list of second- and third-generation successors in the Neo-Aristotelian line. McKeon 1982 helps uncover relevant points of contact in the feud between New Critics and Neo-Aristotelians.

bring to the design of the whole, all understand the difficulty of the problem and the characteristics of the inquiry and debate that must ensue.²¹ Without an arbiter from on high, each person may argue from his expertise for a different vision of the constructed solution but also must be willing to accept that another's expertise may produce a more persuasive vision. Beyond that, for best results each deliberator must be willing to accept a search for a comprehensive set of possible resolutions. This is to admit that no participant may yet have determined the best solution; a certain "preaffirmative pluralism" is required.

Interdisciplinary Disputes with Multidisciplinary Solutions

The motivation to achieve comprehensiveness can lead deliberators in one further way. When deliberators realize that they have proposed mutually exclusive solutions, they might be motivated to satisfy the claims or needs of a *maximum* proportion of disputants or interested parties. The drive to be maximally efficient when deliberating can be supplemented by the drive to design a product whose *energeiai* or operating activities are themselves maximally efficient. This drive might arise from the motivation to produce the "best" solution or product. In some cases, this desire might lead deliberators to design a single product that can be used or interpreted in divergent ways to meet the divergent goals of different users. In these cases, the practitioners of deliberative architectonic rhetoric may successfully investigate solutions that permit each faction in a dispute to be provisionally "right" by its own criteria. This is to permit each faction to use the product of the deliberation in its own way without compromise. What began as an "interdisciplinary" dispute might be resolved by producing a "multidisciplinary" product, bringing disciplinary identity back into play.²²

To construct such a radically ambiguous product, the deliberators probably must understand which fundamental questions as well as which answers are held in common and which are not. This understanding should enable them to determine precisely which ambiguities are required for the

²⁰ For some elements of this argument, see "The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age: Architectonic Productive Arts" (McKeon 1971).

²¹ See Strober (in progress). A few businessmen have independently pointed out to me that groups beset by conflicts over power in an organization will find the art much more difficult to utilize. Nevertheless, some corporate planning teams without executive power can use the pluralism in this method to their advantage. If a team permits all members to improve their recommendations to the fullest, the team can present several defensible options to those with executive power.

²² The method involved does not belong to *relativism* for two reasons. First, each participant may continue to believe the others' positions are wrong. After a decision is made, "in [later] moments of leisure from creative inquiry and expression," deliberators become "free to undertake the task of refuting and converting each other" (McKeon 1970a, 61; compare Maritain 1944). Second, such a pragmatic method leads to an experimental, provisional solution that must be tested against the reality understood by each party. Although a resolution that does not "work" may be

“common” solution. While traditional stasis theory focuses on the sticking points, architectonic rhetoric emphasizes the common ground. Using this method, radical disagreements occasionally can be reformulated as “productive ambiguities” that lead to ambiguous products. Such plurally usable products need not be caught in the quagmires of disagreements about first principles or final conclusions.

In further work, I would like to determine the characteristics of the class of problems for which identifying “productive ambiguities” may be most valuable. I see this class of problems as a subset of a large class of everyday problems, identified by Richard Buchanan, to which the agreed solution is an ambiguous physical object. For example, some people need a low desk chair, some need a high one; families may want to buy only one chair, so designers propose a chair with variable height.

Buchanan’s theory of design involves the essentials for understanding and resolving less concrete problems as well, including some for which deliberative architectonic rhetoric is likely to be quite useful. For example, working from intentionally ambiguous *definitions* enabled a worldwide “Committee of Experts” with different philosophical and political leanings to contribute intellectually to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Producing a measure of agreement on the subject of human rights was a problem that McKeon led UNESCO to solve:

Does the fact that human rights depend on ideas and on a philosophy mean that men must come to agreement on a common philosophy before they can make a Declaration of Rights, or does the philosophy of human rights take a more flexible form congruent with the freedom to philosophize which is a basic human right? After long and detailed discussion the Committee agreed that the recognition of common grounds of human rights, the enumeration of particular rights, and agreement on the actions required to achieve and protect them, *do not require a doctrinal consensus or agreement concerning the philosophic definition of basic terms.*²³

McKeon led the committee to use these productive ambiguities to facilitate discussion and create their common proposal:

The Committee therefore agreed on working definitions of “right,” “liberty,” and “democracy,” susceptible of divergent particularizations. They were *definitions which contained a deliberate, pragmatic, and productive ambiguity*. . . . The Committee recognized that the ambiguity of the terms in which human rights and policies for their achievement are stated is the source both of agreement and differences at each stage of

rejected or adapted, sometimes its unexpected failure leads to a change in a fundamental belief and a new convergence of opinions.

²³ See also Maritain 1947, 1949, 1951.

discussion and action.²⁴

The participants did not seek common agreement about the *principles* that might support one particular definition or another.²⁵ Instead they achieved a common understanding that each set of divergent first principles might independently support a common, pluralistic solution. “Criteria,” McKeon adds as a pragmatist, “would be sought in the actions proposed to resolve a concrete problem, rather than in the principles, or methods, or interpretations used in statements of the problem.”²⁶

Dissertation Plan: General Discussion

To summarize: deliberative architectonic rhetoric is an interdisciplinary, creative art that provides key resources for conflict resolution, especially for resolving interdisciplinary conflicts. These resources are available to some degree in the literature on rhetorical invention and stasis theory in particular, and most notably in the work of McKeon and some of his students. McKeon’s work has been left behind by most other philosophers and rhetoricians, even while scholars of the rhetoric of inquiry find occasion to cite him favorably without building on his work (for example, Simons 1990). Those who study deliberative rhetoric almost never identify the resources of deliberative architectonic rhetoric along the lines I have described, and McKeon’s contributions rarely wink above the horizon of those who work on the theory of conflict resolution, although they are starting to take root in Julie Klein’s work on interdisciplinarity.²⁷ I contend that these contributions do not appear in the literature on conflict resolution because that literature so often focuses on producing mutual understanding and compromise at the expense of working comprehensively. They do not appear in the work of interdisciplinary consultants because of their tendency to use a complex-systems approach.

The core of McKeon’s contribution to this art is a species of rhetorical invention that expands stasis theory beyond its customary schema. I further expand this species of invention into a rhetorical method for maximizing the possibility of reaching a comprehensive set of possible resolutions to an interdisciplinary design problem. To locate such formulations of deliberative rhetoric and rhetorical

²⁴ “Philosophy and History in the Development of Human Rights” (1970a), 41, 49; my italics. McKeon notes that this is no new method: “the statesmen who borrowed the term [“natural law”] when they drew up Declarations of Rights or interpreted them did not define natural law more rigorously than had the philosophers” (41). In “Scientific and Philosophic Revolutions” (1967), McKeon defined a productive ambiguity as “an open possibility of more than one tenable resolution, which is the source of suggestive inconsistencies, that is, a hypothetical entertainment of assumptions prior to examining their relation to other principles already assumed” (63).

²⁵ Michael Green calls this strategy Maritain’s “don’t ask why” strategy.

²⁶ McKeon 1970a, 61. Again, McKeon would stop short of Richard Rorty’s relativism, since testing of solutions in practice is only one criterion.

invention within the long rhetorical tradition and to some degree within the traditions of American pragmatism, I will examine contemporary formulations of stasis theory with reference to the relevant work of Aristotle, Cicero, Vico, and Dewey.²⁸ In extending the analysis beyond McKeon, I will refer not only to those among McKeon's most successful contemporaries (Chaïm Perelman²⁹ and Kenneth Burke) and those of his students who have had a passion for pluralism (Wayne Booth, Richard Buchanan, Donald Levine, and Walter Watson), but also those who independently have worked to expand the uses of stasis theory (for more recent attempts, see Konishi 2001 and Gross 2004). The point of this history is to examine deliberative architectonic rhetoric, as I formulate it here, in the work of those who have contributed to that study in whatever terms they have chosen.

This history is necessary because once McKeon's work is recovered and explained, analyzed, and supplemented by the work of his relevant predecessors, contemporaries, and students, I argue that much about deliberative architectonic rhetoric remains to be formulated and specified. First of all, the art itself must be fully articulated. Then, for resolving which problems would deliberative architectonic rhetoric be a superior method? What are the general characteristics of these problems? It is not enough to state blithely that "interdisciplinary" problems in all fields *could* be treated with this art.

Whenever a method with broad application is proposed, it is important to identify its limits. Those who focus on McKeon's work, for instance, too often elaborate very broad applications for it. Mark Backman (1987) sees architectonic rhetoric as the foundation of revolutions in education, business, and politics.³⁰ McKeon's work in the language arts leads Gerard Hauser and Donald Cushman (1973) to see that work as the basis for a theory of communication that will effect radical changes in "truth, knowledge and education, community, and rhetoric" (228). Douglas Mitchell (1988) claims that McKeon "refurbishes culture by creating a new organization of arts and sciences"

²⁷ Personal communication, March 2005. Klein is the foremost theorist of interdisciplinarity.

²⁸ McKeon was well aware of the influence of these predecessors, and he wrote short histories of rhetorical terms ("commonplaces," "topics," and so on) and made use of the traditional meanings of such terms. Like Cicero and Vico, McKeon encourages his contemporaries to expand rhetoric and philosophy by uniting them—uniting "wisdom and eloquence," and "theory and practice." He also draws on both symbolic logic and philosophical pragmatism (drawing especially on Dewey) for his philosophy of creativity. McKeon names his "Philosophy and Method" (1998, 183-208) as a good introduction to his thought in the area of method. Douglas Mitchell (1988) has pointed correctly to Aristotle and Cicero as prime classical sources of McKeon's rhetorical-philosophical methods; for example, Cicero's semantics of opposed philosophical schools [used] a schematism of opposed meanings and methods . . . based on a rhetoric of interpretation and probability in context of conflicting philosophies" (396-97, reordering the sentence). See also McKeon's "Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero" (1950) and McKeon's explicit admissions of his debts to Cicero as noted by Mitchell.

²⁹ Marc Fumaroli notes that Perelman's influence has been more substantial on his side of the Atlantic (personal communication, 4/18/03). See also Maneli 1993.

³⁰ Backman 1987, Introduction.

(396). Thomas Conley (1990) sees McKeon as a prime representative of a “new Ciceronianism” designed to “involve education in rhetoric as a means . . . of transforming society.”³¹ And Walter Watson writes ebulliently: “I view the semantic schema as one of the great achievements in the world history of philosophy.”³²

To expose such hopes that a new rhetoric will serve as a kind of panacea is not to criticize these writers very much. It would be to agree with them, if one were to agree with McKeon’s implicit claim that he was helping lead philosophy through its latest revolution, or at the least through a broadening in which philosophy and rhetoric, theory and practice were once again being reunited.³³ Indeed, insofar as the arts of demonstration, deliberation, judgment, invention, organization, and so on describe the basic processes underlying human thought and action, such articulations of rhetoric may be called architectonic and can claim wide-ranging contributions.

Yet when a description of “universal arts” expands “rhetoric” and “philosophy” so far—naming everyone a philosopher of sorts and declaring that all communication expresses philosophy (as Quintilian similarly argued)³⁴—one ought to determine whether the distinctions among such generalized terms are enough to satisfy the distinctions made by other philosophers regarding who counts as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy (and who counts as a rhetor and what counts as rhetoric). It is time to be more precise about the characteristics of architectonic rhetoric itself, especially in its deliberative species, so that its application to particular classes of problems can be better understood. I expect recent work to understand the boundaries of the rhetoric of inquiry (such as the essays in Simons 1990) to be extremely helpful in this regard.

Furthermore, the architectonic method I propose requires not just the ability to deliberate in a certain “interdisciplinary” way but also the personal skills and habits that facilitate this creative art. Diverse fields have identified similar characteristics in other terms (for example, planning theory, deliberative democracy, constitution-building, and conflict in psychology), and these characteristics should be incorporated into a general compendium. Initiating that project, I intend to show how the resources formulated in this study and the work in multiple related fields may supplement each other. For example, research into conflict from the field of psychology (notably in Nancy Stein’s work) has

³¹ Conley 1990, 304. In ch. 10, “Philosophers Turn to Rhetoric,” Conley names McKeon, Perelman, Toulmin, and Jürgen Habermas as the characteristic four rhetorician-philosophers of contemporary times.

³² Watson 1994, 88.

³³ Perhaps echoing Vico’s attention to broad cycles of ages of human history, McKeon claimed that our “semantic” and “pragmatic” age is the latest such age, following a long series of revolutions in which fashions in philosophy moved in cycles from a focus on metaphysics to a focus on epistemology to a focus on semantics (one of his frequent refrains—see, e.g., several essays in McKeon 1998).

³⁴ *Institutio Oratoria*, Prooemium, 16. Compare even Foucault’s reading of the uses of analogy in the 16th

focused not just on improving the content of argument but also improving the quantity of arguments that disputants can make in favor of or against their own and others' positions.³⁵

Finally, all this general material calls for specific, practical examples. I propose to examine how McKeon and his colleagues employed deliberative architectonic rhetoric in the case of UNESCO, given in more detail below. I also intend to observe interdisciplinary consultants during their active onsite consultancies.

Dissertation Plan: Chapter by Chapter

The first two chapters will introduce the matters presented in this proposal. The next three chapters will describe and critique a theory of deliberative architectonic rhetoric. (Parts of these chapters are now drafted.) I begin by articulating the broader intellectual and historical contexts noted above.

One of McKeon's primary moves is to analyze the architectonic arts into three kinds of architectonic rhetoric and one kind of architectonic dialectic.³⁶ Similarly, making sense of the broad and uneven literature on interdisciplinarity can be greatly facilitated by looking at interdisciplinarity as *interdisciplinary communication*. In my schema of interdisciplinary communication, I analyze interdisciplinarity in the same four categories. These projects are in line with Aristotle's three categories of rhetoric, and his inclusion of dialectic as their counterpart, in the *Rhetoric*. For instance, the work of Michèle Lamont and others on peer review is clearly a species of *evaluative interdisciplinarity*, while the work of interdisciplinary committees to promote "dialogue" among disciplines or to generate "excitement" for interdisciplinary projects counts as *dialectical interdisciplinarity*. My project, along with much of the literature on interdisciplinary team research, belongs to *deliberative interdisciplinarity*. I also will examine classic formulations of creativity and rhetorical invention, focusing most on stasis theory.

Chapter 3 examines McKeon's contributions to the theory of rhetorical invention. For him, the grounding of invention in logic as well as rhetoric is fundamental.³⁷ In using rhetorical invention to establish a comprehensive set of philosophical commonplaces, he grounded philosophy in rhetoric at a time when logical positivism as well as self-grounding philosophies, sciences, and mathematics

³⁵ See, for example, Stein 1995. This is a very active research area for Stein and her colleagues.

³⁶ See McKeon 1971, 22.

³⁷ Douglas Mitchell (1988) identifies an important element of McKeon's work as that which is "aimed, rhetorically, at a philosophy of creativity" (396). He notes that McKeon characterized language not as arbitrary but as inventive, having rejected the "tendency to think of reality as a kind of statue on which one drapes language like a Roman toga" (395, quoting McKeon in a conference discussion).

were increasingly suspect. McKeon draws on both symbolic logic and philosophical pragmatism, and especially the work of Dewey, to provide a philosophy of creativity that might satisfy both traditional and more contemporary philosophical criteria.

Chapter 4 presents my formulation of deliberative architectonic rhetoric. I begin by reviewing some criteria for assessing such projects as philosophies of *communication*. I develop these criteria partly out of McKeon's own descriptions of what philosophers do, and I use his distinctions among what he calls four "new" arts of communication: new versions of *grammar*, *logic*, *rhetoric*, and *dialectic*.³⁸ At the same time, I will show that McKeon does not abandon more traditional philosophic criteria: *clarity*, *distinctness*, *adequacy*, *universality*, *objectivity*.³⁹ I argue that McKeon employs his philosophy of creativity and communication to create a defensible rhetorical-logical method for productive deliberation.

This chapter also will show how proficiency in four new "arts of communication and construction" can be assessed. In brief, the four arts may be formulated to identify four different philosophical tasks.⁴⁰ The new rhetoric describes how a philosopher constructs the matrix of key terms through which she understands and classifies the varieties of philosophies; the new grammar describes how she classifies them; the new logic describes the assessments by which different philosophies and her own philosophy critique one another; and the new dialectic describes the process of refining each philosophy in light of the critiques. Success can be assessed by examining the degree to which the practice of each of these arts evinces actual, productive communication across philosophical boundaries. In areas of interdisciplinary conflict, the same four arts can improve communication across disciplinary boundaries and can be assessed by the same criteria.

This chapter and Chapter 5 go beyond McKeon's work in deliberative architectonic rhetoric in several additional ways. First, McKeon's intellectual and methodological heirs have adapted his work beyond the contexts described in Chapters 2 and 3. I will identify the degree to which McKeon's theory of creativity, in particular his grounding of invention in logic, takes form in some other creative advances by his students. These mainly include Richard Buchanan's design theory,⁴¹ Wayne Booth's search for a productive "common ground," and Donald Levine's work on the forms

³⁸ "Philosophy of Communications and the Arts" (McKeon 1970b). Mitchell inexplicably gives this essay just a cursory paragraph in his review essay, despite calling it the *summum summarium* of Backman's collection (Mitchell 1988, 411). Hauser and Cushman (1973) do treat this essay at some length. In this essay McKeon spells out some relationships between "philosophic semantics" and "philosophic inquiry" that he scarcely treated in his famed 1966 presentation of those processes.

³⁹ For McKeon's definitions, see 105-06.

⁴⁰ Compare McKeon 1970b.

and functions of social knowledge and of sociologies.⁴² Each uses a McKeonesque method to create typologies or structure essays or develop his professional work, doing so in his own way.

This borrowing has not always been for the best. I argue that one of McKeon's prime interpreters, Walter Watson, has vitiated the part of McKeon's work most indicative of his theory of creativity. Watson (1985, 1993) has proposed a valuable semantic matrix mainly for the interpretation of texts, but his hermeneutic matrix appears rigid and offers no method for producing alternative schemata. Furthermore, it can hardly serve the purposes of deliberative architectonic rhetoric (for which it was not intended). Juxtaposing Watson's matrix and McKeon's project helps bring out the limitations and possibilities of each in terms of my own project.⁴³

Next, as I stated above, it is blithe to state that conflicts in decision-making in *all* fields *could* be treated by deliberative architectonic rhetoric, or that *all* deliberative problems that exceed the expertise of a single specialist *could* be treated by that art. Chapter 5 identifies the characteristics of problems for which deliberative architectonic rhetoric might be a superior method. This work may involve setting forth a typology of interdisciplinary problems, or setting such a typology within a more general typology of deliberative problems. This chapter will build on related work on the features and boundaries of the rhetoric of inquiry.

Third, also in Chapter 5, I intend to develop a general compendium of the skills and habits that best facilitate the practice of deliberative architectonic rhetoric. McKeon's work in ethics constitutes a major portion of his work in philosophy and rhetoric, but this material is poorly integrated with his work on education. He does not relate the skills and powers he identifies in his essays on education to the arts he identifies as central to success in deliberative rhetoric. Integrating this work is important for understanding the unity of McKeon's thought. But to develop a compendium of skills I can turn more fruitfully to others. In particular, researchers and practitioners in interdisciplinarity, psychology, and other fields have made their own lists and examinations of the skills, habits, and activities most

⁴¹ A good bibliography of Buchanan's relevant works through Spring 2000 is included in "A Neo-Aristotelian Bibliography: 29th Supplement," *Hypotheses: Neo-Aristotelian Analysis* 33-34 (2000), pp. 11-12.

⁴² See references below. Booth, Buchanan, and Levine are members of my dissertation committee; they might verify my claims even if they did not originally see such connections or influences in quite these terms. Levine, for instance, lauds Charles Camic's description of Levine's shift from "pluralism" to "dialogue" (personal communications with Levine, 2003). On Levine's "dialogical turn," see Camic and Joas 2003.

⁴³ Buchanan, in the only collection of secondary writings on McKeon (Garver and Buchanan 2000), alerts adherents of McKeon to beware of focusing on McKeon's "semantics" at the expense of "philosophic inquiry." Buchanan is apparently warning scholars such as Watson and David Dilworth, who employs McKeon's semantic categories mechanically to classify major world philosophies (1989). Other scholars, such as Herbert Simons and David Depew, do focus on invention and a "rhetoric of inquiry" (Simons ed. 1990).

suitable to nonviolent conflict resolution.⁴⁴ To the degree that I can integrate the most relevant work in interdisciplinary fields such as planning theory, deliberative democracy, constitution-building, and conflict theory in psychology, I can show how several fields complement each other in this area.

Part II will examine deliberative architectonic rhetoric in practice in two kinds of case studies. Chapter 6 depends in part on published accounts of the work of committees and on archival records in Chicago, and additional records are available online and in Paris.

Chapter 6 will examine the unprecedented attempt of UNESCO to use philosophers worldwide to ground some presumable elements of world peace and contribute to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through UNESCO McKeon, Perelman, and others formed several international “Committees of Experts” to create common documents regarding terms such as “human rights” and “democracy.” As the above excerpt suggests, these “experts” admitted the philosophical plurality they observed, came to understand that plurality through the use of architectonic dialectic, and did so for the sake of deliberation—in other words, to facilitate their use of deliberative architectonic rhetoric. The key work and method of the “Committees of Experts” has been published in works written or edited by McKeon and Perelman.⁴⁵

Chapter 7 will report on what actually goes on when an interdisciplinary consultant advises an interdisciplinary group. Like Comenius, Diderot, and other encyclopaedists who have organized modern learning, McKeon was enamored by comprehensive projects to organize all knowledge.⁴⁶ The potential scope of Chicago’s undergraduate curriculum intrigued him, because no field other than general education curriculum development—with one exception—articulates and applies principles of order to combine such a wide variety of subjects to such a great degree. That exception, Aristotle

⁴⁴ A basic but illustrative contemporary source is the set of essays collected by Morton Deutsch (a leading psychologist in the study of conflict) and Peter Coleman in their *Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (2000).

⁴⁵ I see the work of these committees as an inspiration for the Institute for Philosophical Research’s independent project on “freedom” led by Mortimer Adler. The Great Books *Syntopicon* volume, which demonstrated the variety of historic formulations of a multitude of philosophical terms, also should be seen as a product of this line of inquiry.

⁴⁶ McKeon later would write the article on encyclopedias for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Far from accepting the argument that our society is now too fragmented for comprehensive projects, many people continue to engage in such endeavors. In 1975, for example, the National Center for Education Statistics assembled a twenty-member planning council, supplemented by twenty-one subject matter committees, to produce “a hierarchical array of the knowledge presently known to exist in American education,” using the criteria of *maturity*, *universality*, and *magnitude*. “The finished document,” disagreements about definitions and content notwithstanding, “will serve as the only comprehensive array of knowledge as it is currently presented in American education” (McBath and Jeffrey 1978, 182-87).

In further work, I would like to compare McKeon’s architectonic projects with those of some others, including Comenius and Diderot, who also sought to accomplish comprehensive projects of great scope. Especially relevant to that work is the journal *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie*, which includes many articles (in French and English) on the coherence and comprehensiveness of Diderot’s project and the way Diderot characterized and presented other philosophers in his work; some of that material may help me assess McKeon’s projects.

notes, is the architectonic art of politics, which (if it is possible to make people better through the laws) combines wisdom and prudence to organize the state and educate citizens in virtue. Political deliberation has analogues in deliberation about curriculum and pedagogy, and absent a great political master-builder or *architecton*, the thoroughly dominant alternative to the laws for making people better is education. The ideal educational *architecton* remains in no single discipline but brings them all together in a general-education context, in order to educate all students in the wisdom and prudence promoted by an institution. How to bring the disciplines and the aims of education together into a justifiable, viable whole is a difficult, perennial question. It is even more difficult to aim for a curriculum that is not merely adequate but as good as possible under particular circumstances, efficient with its resources and reflecting thoughtful, comprehensive deliberation in its design.

In a research university whose faculty consists primarily of specialized scholars, an *architecton* can use the method described in this dissertation to lead the deliberations about the undergraduate curriculum. Indeed, the resources McKeon brought to bear on such deliberations are worth examining to illustrate how deliberative architectonic rhetoric can be applied to this common interdisciplinary dispute.

But does this method bear any resemblance at all to what actually goes on during curricular deliberations? The Association for Integrative Studies has agreed to let me observe its interdisciplinary consultants as they advise institutions of higher education. I will report on these observations in this final chapter.

Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric: A New Method for Resolving Interdisciplinary Conflicts

Dissertation Outline

I: Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric as a Method for Creative Interdisciplinary Communication

1. Introduction

- Define interdisciplinary conflict; rhetorical schema of interdisciplinary communication – lit review, interdisciplinarity
- Preview characteristics of DAR
 - Decision science vs. deliberative rhetoric
 - Mutual understanding vs. efficiently maximizing invention – what is stasis theory
 - Multiple stasis systems: plurality of first principles
- Preview role of McKeon & his contexts

2. Resources for Studying Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric—Defining a Subject Area

- The “revolutionary” shift from logic to rhetoric/communication around 1900
 - Welby 1903
- The “revolution” in the next generation
 - The “rhetorical turn” and the rhetoric of inquiry
 - McKeon’s Aristotle
 - Perelman (also via new book on Perelman)
 - Burke (source??)
- Invention: Stasis Theory in DAR
 - Cicero, Vico: uniting “wisdom and eloquence,” and “theory and practice.” Dewey??
 - Invention: Aristotle, Hermogenes, Cicero, Quintilian
 - In each case, assertions of completeness but no standard
 - Stasis theory—working through a case (Hermagoras, Cicero, Quintilian): standard of completeness
 - contra Konishi 2001 [“arguer’s dialectical obligations”]: claims stasis theory is insufficiently exhaustive
 - relevance of stasis theory to deliberative interdisciplinarity
- Inheritors of the revolution
 - Simons (1990); Depew/University of Iowa; Hample on stock issues
 - Booth: academic rhetoric; Buchanan: multidisciplinary, ambiguous products; Levine: dialogical turn
 - Watson and derivative hermeneutic works (McKeon’s categories no rhetorical panacea for conflict)
 - rise of composition programs as rhetoric departments
 - Rorty (?)--ask Neil Gross. Alan Gross and stasis theory (2004).

3. McKeon’s Philosophy of Creativity

- drawing on Dewey (how?)
- McKeon essays
- pluralistic matrix described
 - focus on “Selections” (compare James?)
 - origins/features of the matrix
 - role of symbolic logic (Plochmann; McKeon himself)
 - genesis via Plato/Aristotle pluralism
 - rhetorical grounding added over time via Cicero’s “constitutions”
 - Watson’s interpretive matrix vs. McKeon’s pluralistic schema
- merging of logic and rhetoric: how stasis theory offers a heuristic with “good-enough completeness”

4. Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric

- Deliberative architectonic rhetoric: not just for invention of arguments
 - Invention I: (re-)starting the interdisciplinary conversation via stasis theory
 - Multiple stasis systems
 - Invention II: architectonic rhetoric as design of pluralistic product
- McKeon 1970 on communication and the arts
 - traditional criteria: *clarity, distinctness, adequacy, universality, objectivity*
 - new criteria by analogy with grammar, logic, rhetoric, dialectic
 - criterion of completeness, especially in facing mutual exclusivity (reciprocal priority)
- Other criteria for philosophies of communication—from Habermas, Lyotard, Rorty, ??

5. Uses and Limits of Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric

- boundaries of the “rhetoric of inquiry”—by nature free of disciplinary constraints
- problems better solved by decision science/decision trees/satisficing
- problems better solved by other methods
- these methods not so good when problems have certain characteristics (describe): such problems are best candidates for trying out DAR
- seems to require a certain psychological constitution and intellectual skill: worth having a compendium of facilitating skills/habits
 - From the lit on interdisciplinarity
 - From Deutsch, Stein bibliographies on conflict; advice from Levine?
 - Help from the occasional list found in the literature on planning, deliberative democracy, constitution-building
 - McKeon’s essays on ethics, education
 - Synthesis: qualities needed for DAR: “preaffirmative pluralism”? collegiality? curiosity for inquiry? ability to accept experimentation and provisional solutions? . . .

Part II: Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric in Interdisciplinary Communication

6. Architectonic Deliberation among Philosophers in UNESCO (toward Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

- Why this is a relevant case study
- The method of the “committees of experts”
 - McKeon’s, Perelman’s and Maritain’s accounts
 - UNESCO archives in Chicago, Paris, online
 - secondary literature on the development of the document (esp. Glendon)
 - different cultural-philosophical traditions developing common *topoi* for deliberation (recovery, discovery)
- The substance of the document (presentation, action)
 - intentional ambiguity
 - expectation of multilateral, pluralistic interpretation
 - intended effects of the document
 - Why did the real writers (Humphrey et al.) work independently of UNESCO?

Chapter 7: What Really Happens? Observations of Interdisciplinary Consultants (Association for Integrative Studies)

- Newell 2005: uses complex-systems approach, which assumes agreement on how to break down the problem into subsystems. How does this work in practice? Is this enough to forestall interdisciplinary conflicts?
- An alternative: Deliberative Architectonic Rhetoric – any signs of such processes during actual consultancies?

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