Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement

(Reading notes; uses mostly their terms)

Deliberation - requires generality, though never is completely abstracted. Reciprocity (form of discourse) nuances this by helping provide context, and adds humanity/mercy. It also is about public issues and is therefore public, hence there is accountability (the who and where of discourse). The goal is deliberative agreement--if all are seeking agreement, goodwill is more likely. This search for agreement implies that there is no fundamental irreconciliability. "Basic rights" exist outside the discourse: liberty and opportunity [where do these come from? Even these are deliberated in an earlier discourse].

1. Competing self-interest (this idea is too general and amoral; cf. Hobbes)
2. [similar to 1] Scarce resources and meager generosity (cf. Hume)
3. Incompatible values
4. [similar to 3] incomplete or wrong understandings (cf. Franklin, Lemay 254)

1. if this is granted, there is still justification possible for positions taken--the justifications can be studied
2. Hume: moderate scarcity/generosity/self-interest--extremes prevent important disagreement, and prevent the necessity of deliberation (e.g., death by explosion of the sun [I think their examples are not extreme enough/AK])
3. Values are not necessarily always reconcilable in a general way, though a fully nuanced system would solve this, i.e.,
4. We don't have a fully nuanced system, so certain answers remain unknown. But we can mutually nuance our policies to whatever specificity we like. (But are the uncertainties just too large, too often?)

1. Procedural: attention to the process (implies certain rights/conditions). Principle is majoritarian, with special minority protections--but justifications are not needed. Each separate citizen, not his idea, is respected. However by appealing at all to rights, we go outside the simplest proceduralism. And procedures must necessarily be deliberated! (Though I can imagine The Boss Making The Rules, some procedure (war, e.g.) made him the boss [AK].) Further, moral constraints may preclude a simple vote.
2. Constitutional: adds content (implies additional rights, regarding outcomes/justice). When moral constraints are used to preclude a simple vote, and extra provisions must be made, the system becomes constitutional; these extra provisions are also deliberative (The Boss may need to grant certain rights to the people; cf. Magna Carta [AK]). Then, deliberative interpretation of the provisions is also needed.
3. Deliberative: uses justifications (kind of procedural) to try to produce maximally just outcomes (kind of constitutional). Rawls: individual deliberation--but this leaves uncertainties which group deliberation can resolve. Citizens are required to be morally and politically competent and committed. Implication is that deliberated constitutional/procedural democracy is best: the citizens feel more comfortable in the final policy choices. All views get their say (see Ch. 2, reciprocity)--in fact, thoughts toward the common good become encouraged. This also helps clarify any actual moral conflict that was unrecognized. It goes beyond an interest-group mentality, though a risk is that everything becomes an entrenched moral issue. This kind of judgment is not just for the courts, but for legislatures and for the people. Legislators are not just aggregate voters. Deliberation is inescapable (see pp. 67-68).

Reciprocity -- vs. prudence, vs. impartiality

(ADAPTED TABLE FROM CH. 2)

Reciprocity really has two parts: discovery (knowledge, justifications) and action/resolution [this comment came from someone during the discussion]. The danger of the "justifications" is that someone unable to admit real justifications may give false ones, hence there can be "pseudo-deliberation" [this also from someone else].

The authors note that some "impartialists" may have the attitude of moral comprehensiveness, which is different from civic comprehensiveness in morality, in which everyone agrees on all the nuances. If all the nuances are worked out (unlikely), you have a full comprehensiveness; otherwise, if there are any disagreements, you just have reciprocity--or, if deliberation doesn't solve disagreement, you're stuck with prudence (just taking a vote, maybe including bargaining) or a highly uncomfortable (to the minority view) impartiality (60). Nevertheless reciprocity can help tell what to do in the case of irresolvable disagreement (p. 69)--for one, it permits humility about one's position (77).

IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE, in nuancing moral situations through showing specific cases, helps you move from reciprocity closer to impartiality by helping the audience come to agreement about specific cases through a deliberation emceed by the author [AK].

Reciprocity requires willingness both to make one's reasons known and to investigate claims empirically when possible.

Religion and scriptural authority: I think the argument fails to deal adequately with this (p. 57); i.e. it doesn't reconcile experience and faith with generality; or, accepting experience, it doesn't let faith claim experience as a reason when it says that one must not be asked to imagine participating in the moral universe of a given faith [AK]. Furthermore, the authors show a lack of adequate knowledge of the parents' side of the argument in their example (esp. p. 65)--the parents' side is a straw-figure too easily demolished [AK].

PRUDENCE: Some kinds of decisions work fine as prudence under the idea of enlightened self-interest--bargaining as reciprocity--though this won't work on issues that require citizens to care about other citizens, or any morality, and this especially is a problem in societies of inequality. Furthermore any kind of "simple agreement" might ignore a moral principle that indeed would call for an opposite decision.

IMPARTIALITY: requires "shared moral views" (unlikely on many issues) of a comprehensive nature (even more unlikely). For many issues the shared view implies agreement "about the foundations of morality and understandings of human nature" (59). This is much easier in a "partial" particular subgroup of society, especially one where the members subscribe to the same basic theory. Toleration--being able to take a neutral stance--is compromised under impartiality, and worse, insular impartiality inhibits the islands from ever trying to come to terms with each other.

RECIPROCITY: the example of p. 65 is incorrectly understood (the authors do not understand what the parents really mean), but the idea is good [AK]: by agreeing to a democratic reciprocity which requires good citizens, any point of view which is rationally opposed to educating good citizens is thereby excluded. But the empirical part of the example is sound, p. 66 [AK]. What follows, parents "going beyond what they teach in their home" (67), is right, too, but this is not what the parents in the example wanted--they wanted only to exempt their own children.

"Particular values" vs. "public values." (distinctions here are not always easy [AK]) For sure, public values are those which continue to promote "democratic citizenship" by definition.

REASONS and CERTAINTY: some reasons are more compelling than others; some (un)certainties are more certain than others. But beware relativistic skepticism.

ACCOMMODATION: "The virtue of mutual respect" (81). "Excellence of character" (79). Knowing which practical certainties are still open to discussion.

• CIVIC INTEGRITY: consistency and sincerity on one's position, regardless of audience. "Consistency between speech and action" (81). Attention to the broader "principles presupposed by one's moral positions," i.e., consistency at the level of principle.
• CIVIC MAGNANIMITY: when true, recognize that a position is indeed moral and not strategic--but even if the opposing argument is strategically oriented, one's own arguments must be made from a moral basis. Being able to be as open-minded as possible, while still "holding firm convictions" (83-84). In making a decision, minimizing objections among proponents of the opposing decisions--"economy of moral disagreement" (84-85)--narrowing the range of true disagreement.
• These get into publicity and accountability, as discussed in following chapters. (and cf. Franklin)