Cicero, De Inventione
Book 1
1-2, 4-5, on joining wisdom and eloquence
3, on self-sacrifice vs. natural right, contra Nietzsche
6, politics as architectonic over rhetoric (cf. Topica)
10, need a conflict to have a case (constitutio)
17, ambiguity of laws (see Topica, and Book 2)
18, quaestio, ratio, iudicatio,
firmamentum -- compare Toulmin
on evidence/warrant
20, qualities of the good audience/learner: well-disposed, attentive,
receptive
28-29, qualities of the good story/narration: brief, clear, plausible (30,
well-placed)
partition
31, two kinds of partition: isolate the points of disagreement, or introduce
the different subjects to be discussed
32, qualities of the latter kind, which is "a methodical statement of
topics": brevity, completeness,
conciseness (Quae
partitio rerum distributam continet expositionem, haec habere debet: brevitatem,
absolutionem, paucitatem.)
Adding an argument as a late addition (sero
extra) is vitiosissimum ac turpissimum. Conciseness
(esp. regarding genus/species distinction) is important for classification.
33, there are other rules for partition one finds in philosophy
35, mention of artium liberalium, separated from instruction in how to live (vivendi)
36, def. habit (habitum); def. studium
38, locus -- cf. Burke on scene
41, intention understood as by force or by persuasion (vi, persuasione) -- cf. Milton on force/guile
44, argumentation uses both probabilities and certainties; 51, it works by inductionem or ratiocinationem
53, Socratic method described as under inductionem;
61, Aristotle's under ratiocinationem
46-49, on probability
46, common belief that philosophers are atheists
49, probability based on comparison, via similitude, parallel,
example
50, "every kind of argument can be discovered under these headings"
57-68, on whether arguments have up to five parts, or three; C chooses five:
major, proof, minor, proof, conclusion
77, philosophy is far beyond rhetoric in the need for and the systematization
of principles of reasoning
84-85, on faulty enumeration (how can you ensure that you have a complete
enumeration?--AK)
96, in deliberative rhetoric, competing visions that are all valid by different criteria
Book 2
3-5, pluralistic/eclectic method: find the best (or all the acceptable) features
from among the maximum of available models
8, on Aristotle vs. Isocrates
9, on man’s imperfect knowledge
12, kinds of rhetoric (deliberative, judicial, epideictic) divided by kinds of
decision to be made (ends)
16, knowing which questions to ask: drawing on the store of arguments (argumentorum copia)
31, def. Stadium
44, in preparing one’s presentation, find all the arguments first, and it
naturally becomes clear which arguments support which side
45, applications matter: different arguments fit each case differently
45, method of invention:
narrative examination (tell the story carefully, and the arguments
naturally appear, section by section)
45-46,
comprehensiveness: go through all parts of the affair [AK: maybe in doing so in the particular, you are discovering the
general case under which this is an example; considering what it would mean to
get each part decided right—even then, you still must(?) organize the
fundamental relevant questions, so as to check comprehensiveness]
46: invention as
an automatic process: Cum animus hac intentione omnes totius negoti
partes considerabit, tum illi ipsi
in medium coacervati loci prodecent,
de quibus ante dictum est .
. .
48-51, def common topic – by subject
matter, not persons; need to amplify the common topic for it to hit home in the
specific case
54, compare ‘common belief’ (opinione hominum)
52, on use of definition
53, C. promises that this book permits discovery of “all the issues and
their facts and the disputes . . . for we shall give directions about all of
them” [Hubbell trans.]
63, note that the same issue may have several supporting arguments, based on
which cause one focuses on
65, on instinct, custom, natural law and customary law
116-121, 142, on ambiguity
121 ff., on letter vs. intent in law and written documents
144 ff., on contrary laws
deliberative rhetoric
110: deliberative vs. forensic rhetoric: policies vs. persons
156, deliberative rhetoric =
about both honor and advantage, not (per Aristotle) just advantage; all three
branches therefore include honor (honesta).
157-58, kinds of goals: for something with intrinsic merit (the honorable), for
means (the advantageous), and for things which are both means and ends.
159: reasons for goals: necessity and affection (necessitudo et affectio)
= needs (from force, vi) and wants
(from considering events and persons—see 170)
159, def. virtue = “a habit of
mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature”; has four parts: wisdom/prudence, justice, courage/fortitude,
temperance (prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam)
160, for wisdom = knowing what is
good, need memory, intelligence,
foresight (memoria, intellegentia, providentia) – divided by past, present, future
[therefore these parts fully partition wisdom];
160, on justice; 161, on justice and
natural law (religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence, truth—compare
2.65-67; religion and the rest also can fall under customary law, 162)
163, on fortitude: one undertakes
dangers and endures hardships (under this C. places magnificence, self-confidence,
patience, perseverance)
164, on temperance
165, what to avoid (the opposites, and what borders on the virtues but is not
virtuous, e.g. superstition vs. religion)
166, what serves both honor and advantage: glory, rank, influence, friendship
168, kinds of advantage: internal (in
the body) or external (which most often serves the body)—government body
counts in this regard
169: parts of advantage: security (protection of resources) and power (possession and command over
resources)
169, important to consider whether something is easy or just possible—helps
distinguish needs from wants
170, on need (absolute or qualified)
and want—must decide how honorable
or advantageous is the qualification or want
173, hierarchy of needs: first what is honorable, second security, always last,
convenience [is this a part of power? AK]
174-75: sometimes choose security over temporary
dishonor—shows that we choose security for the sake of honor. “In such circumstances it will be
proper to yield to another, or to meet another’s terms, or to keep quiet
for the present and await another opportunity, provided only that some
attention is paid to the question whether this cause which conduces to our
advantage is worth a loss in glory and honor” (Hubbell trans.)
176, affectio
broadly defined; permits situational ethic: consider time and intention, not
the absolute qualities of an act
178, on invention: “Nunc quoniam omne in causae genus argumentandi ratio tradita est, de inventione, prima ac maxima parte rhetoricae, . . .”
Q.V. in re Topica:
Cope 124-33, Jebb. [see Hubbell edn.
387]