

Basic Monopoly Theory

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Lecture 9
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Introduction

Competitive model so far assumes *price-taking*:

- 1 If firm charged even little above “market price”, *no demand*
- 2 If firm increases production *no fall in price*

Never literally satisfied and bad approximation in detail

⇒ Today we'll begin to study incentives to move prices

- 1 Incentive to reduce quantity
- 2 The Lerner elasticity pricing rule
 - Basic principles of trade-off
 - Ironing, learning and uncertainty
- 3 Deadweight loss and measurement
 - Quantifying the inefficiency created by monopoly
 - How big are the economic losses from monopoly in practice?
- 4 Tax pass-through in monopoly
- 5 Tax pass-through and other comparative statics
- 6 What do real residual demand curves look like?

Quantity reduction and marginal revenue





Basic idea: monopolies reduce quantity to raise price

- To sell more, price must fall on all *infra-marginal* units
- ⇒ Trade-off between selling more and higher price
- Maximize $\pi(q) = P(q)q - C(q)$; but don't set $P = MC$
- Instead set $MR = MC$: MR formula?

$$MR(q) = \underbrace{P(q)}_{\text{good, competitive}} + \underbrace{P'(q)q}_{\text{market power/Cournot distortion}}$$

- Distortion is proportional to:
 - 1 The number of units you sell
 - If you are small part of industry, small impact
 - 2 The amount you move the price
 - If your impact on price is small, distortion small

Graphical examples of marginal revenue



When does monopoly apply?

Monopoly sounds like “this is the only company”

- But basic mechanism applies to *any non-price-taker*
 - Includes when company *can affect purchase price*
- More or less severe depending on size of distortion
- So when do we use monopoly v. oligopoly?
 - 1 Monopoly focuses on *direct effects of interventions*
 - Effects through changes in other eq. behavior ignored
 - Monopoly takes these as fixed, changes small
 - 2 Monopoly ignores welfare effects on other firms
 - Value to them ignored or pecuniary
 - Cannot be used to think about cross-firm externalities
 - 3 Monopoly model cannot study changes in structure
 - Useless for topics like merger analysis, effect of competition

⇒ Focus on incentives of one firm, input to other analysis

Lerner's mark-up pricing rule

Let's derive Lerner pricing?

$$P'q = \frac{dP}{dq}q = \frac{q}{\frac{dQ}{dp}} = \frac{p}{\frac{dQ}{dp} \frac{p}{q}} = -\frac{p}{\epsilon}$$
$$\implies MR(q) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)p = MC(q) \implies$$

Lerner's elasticity pricing rule

$$\frac{p-c}{p} = \frac{1}{\epsilon}, \text{ measures market power}$$

Note that:

- 1 Monopolist will never produce where $\epsilon < 1$
 $\implies MR < 0$, always reduce quantity
- 2 Only works for positive prices: credit cards negative!

Ironing, uncertainty and learning about demand

Simple story, but applies even with several wrinkles:

- 1 Weird marginal revenue curves and ironing
 - What if the MR curve doesn't slope down (relative to MC)?
 - Just like ironing MC : make relatively monotone
 - Skip over anti-monotone regions
- 2 What if demand is not known
 - We have assumed simple price-quantity relationship
 - When demand uncertain, choose both price and quantity
 - Still, Lerner rule based on costs and elasticity:
 - *Average quantity sold*, not average quantity produced
- 3 Learning about demand
 - To avoid this, choose right price, learn about demand
 - Try charging various prices, see what happens
 - Base price on past (or current!) experience

The monopoly wedge

Monopoly raises prices above costs; two effects:

- 1 *Transfers* wealth from consumer to monopoly
 - Distributive problems, but no net social loss
- 2 *Reduces quantity* of goods consumed
 - Some individuals would be willing to buy at cost
 - But don't because price is higher

⇒ *Deadweight loss from monopoly*

 - Monopolist raises prices on all to charge *infra-marginal*
 - If could tell who is who, price discriminate, no distortion

⇒ Consumer purchases create externality, firm profits

 - Could internalize in Pigouvian manner
 - In Lecture 13, we'll talk about problems
 - Could also mandate higher quantity, lower price
 - In Lecture 12 we'll talk about this possibility

The deadweight loss triangle


To measure these losses we consider standard welfare triangle

- Like distortions from tax: externality loss same as tax loss
- Only difference is size determined by monopoly's optimum

⇒ Particular size, relationship to monopoly profits

- We'll explore this in a bit
- Two different expressions, as usual:
 - 1 $\int_{q_M}^{q^*} P(q) - MC(q) dq$
 - 2 $\int_{MC(q_M)}^{P(q_M)} \min \{S(p), D(p)\} dp$
- Similarly profits can be area above MC plus:
 - 1 Square of price above MC
 - 2 Or area between MR and MC
- Also CS is between P and MR , or above price

Graphical example of welfare quantities



Harberger's economy-wide exercise

1950's: Chicago's Arnold Harberger tried to measure, how?

- 1 Identified "abnormal profits" with monopoly
 - Assumes constant marginal cost/constant returns
- 2 Assume all industries have constant elasticity of 1
- 3 Assume resources allocated perfectly within industry
- 4 Got data on profitability of industries, compared
- 5 Backed out degree of excess profits

Found something very surprising; what?

- Total loss from monopoly very small!
- About $\frac{1}{10}$ of one percent of GDP!
- Basic reason: triangle proportional to square of distortion
 - ⇒ Lots of small distortions make little difference
 - Requires a few big distortions to really matter
 - ⇒ Not everything that matters in theory matters in practice

Broader lessons from Harberger's work

Lots wrong with Harberger's work?

- 1 Monopoly arises particularly with increasing returns

⇒ Greatly understates degree of monopoly

- 2 Most of heterogeneity is *within industry*, not across

- 3 Elasticity of demand uncertain, heterogeneous

⇒ Harberger big underestimate (order of magnitude or two)

- Still, carries some important lessons:

- 1 Monopoly distortions exist, but not necessarily large

- 2 Takes large price change before DWL significant

- 3 Primary impact of monopoly may be transfer, not DWL

- We'll return to this in Lecture 13

- 4 Details (costs, heterogeneity) crucial for measurement

Pass-through under monopoly v. competition





Incidence of tax different with monopoly than competition

- Competition: $P = MC$ so $\rho_C \equiv \frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{P'}{P' - MC'}$ or $\frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_S}}$
- Classical incidence formula
- Under monopoly $MR = MC$ so $\rho \equiv \frac{dp}{dt} = \frac{P'}{MR' - MC'}$ or

$$\rho = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_S} + \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_D}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_S} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D}}$$

- Always positive (bottom is second-order condition)
- $\bar{\epsilon}_D \equiv \frac{d\epsilon_D}{dp} \frac{p}{\epsilon_D}$ is *super-elasticity*
 - Curvature of demand function; new element from monopoly
 - When demand v. elastic (almost competitive) doesn't matter
 - Large the more concave demand is; negative if very convex
- ⇒ More convex demand has higher pass-through
 - If MR slopes up, may be infinite: ironing makes infinite
 - We'll see real-world example below; meantime made-up

Graphical representation of pass-through



Pass-through and consumer surplus

Raising taxes enough eliminates market


- Thus use pass-through to trace out surplus of market
- How much does raising taxes reduce profits?
 - Envelope theorem on price, just current quantity: $\frac{d\pi}{dt} = -q$
- How much does it reduce CS?
 - Consumer surplus formula: $\frac{dCS}{dt} = -q\frac{dp}{dt} = -q\rho$

$\Rightarrow \frac{CS}{\pi} = \text{average pass-through rate}$

$$\frac{CS}{\pi} = \bar{\rho} \equiv \frac{\int_{t=0}^{\bar{t}} \rho q dt}{\int_{t=0}^{\bar{t}} q dt}$$

- Similar argument under competition
- Profits fall by $1 - \rho$, so $\frac{CS}{\pi} = \frac{\bar{\rho}}{1-\bar{\rho}}$
- More general ($\lambda = 1$ competition, 0 monopoly): $\frac{CS}{\pi} = \frac{\bar{\rho}}{1-\lambda\bar{\rho}}$

Graphical representation of pass-through and surplus



Pass-through and demand pass-through

Pass-through also determines response to demand?

- Imagine there is a subsidy s given to consumers
 - Demand pass-through $\rho_d \equiv \frac{dP}{ds}$
 - Consumer subsidy and producer tax of \$1 has no effect
 - If firm raises price \$1, everything exactly the same
 - Fundamental result on neutrality of physical incidence
 - General, applies with competition as well
- ⇒ Quantity does not change, price rises by \$1

Theorem

$$\rho + \rho_d = 1$$

- $\rho > 0$, but may be > 1 so ρ_d may be negative
 - May seem counter-intuitive, but monopolist follows demand

Pass-through and quantity pass-through

Another natural question is how firm responds to competition

- Simple form, which we will study later, is another producing
- Suppose firm has constant marginal cost c
- Another firm, with same cost, produces \tilde{q}
- *Quantity PT*: how much total q^* increases, $\rho_q \equiv \frac{dq^*}{d\tilde{q}}$
- This is actually closely connected to pass-through
- Profits are now $[P(q) - c] (q - \tilde{q})$
- So FOC is $P'(q) (q - \tilde{q}) + P(q) = c$
 - \tilde{q} serves to reduce inframarginal units, incentive to distort
 - This is competition at work
- Size of effect proportional to P' , equivalent to subsidy of P'
- Thus changes price by $P' \rho$ and quantity by $Q' P' \rho$
 - But by inverse function theorem, $Q' P' = 1 \dots$

$\implies \rho_q = \rho$ (with constant MC, similar in general)

Quantity pass-through and deadweight loss

We can use this concept to link to deadweight loss

- When \tilde{q} increases, how much do profits fall?
 - Firm loses \tilde{q} sales worth $M \equiv P - c$ each
 - By envelope theorem, therefore, $\frac{d\pi}{d\tilde{q}} = -M$
- When \tilde{q} increases, how much does DWL fall?
 - Effectively externality of size M
 - So increasing production raises social welfare by $Md\tilde{q}$
 - Production rises by $\rho_q = \rho$ so $\frac{dDWL}{d\tilde{q}} = -M\rho$

$$\implies \text{With CMC, } \frac{DWL}{\pi} = \tilde{\rho} = \frac{\int_{\tilde{q}=0}^{\tilde{q}=q^*} \rho M d\tilde{q}}{\int_{\tilde{q}=0}^{\tilde{q}=q^*} M d\tilde{q}}$$


- Thus pass-through also determines size of DWL
 - To calibrate, we need to figure out what ρ is in real world
 - Simple way to do this is move prices around, see quantities

Einav et al. (2011) analysis of seller experiments

One place where this is very easy to do is internet

- Einav et al. collect data from seller experiments on EBay
 - Many seller try identical items at different prices
 - Trying to figure out what price to charge, terms to use
 - Just like they should do to learn
 - Use to construct “demand curve” in auctions?
 - Higher reserve price set \implies higher price if sale
 - If higher than bid of second highest, raises price
 - Also reduces probability of sale
 - If no one bids above, no sale occurs
- \implies Just like a demand curve
- Draw out average price, probability of sale relationship
 - Marginal cost always constant (probability of sale)
 - Basic shape very similar across products

Einav et al. data



Other evidence on pass-through

Here, pass-through infinite over ironing region!

- ⇒ At least in some cases, PT very large
- General other evidence fairly poor
 - One source income: suppose WTP proportional
 - Then with power law, demand has constant elasticity, $PT > 1$
 - Luxuries likely even more spaced-apart, superior goods
- ⇒ Luxury goods likely have very high pass-through
- Others (inferior, money saving) have low pass-through
 - Construction materials, office supplies; homogeneous WTP
 - Evidence shows range of PT, but corresponds to theory
 - 1 When very elastic, cost structure crucial:
 - Economies or diseconomies of scale
 - 2 When less elastic (strong monopoly), distribution of WTP
 - Judge by how much CS in market