On the Interpretation of Aggregate Crime Regressions

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Revised
May 23, 2008

Prepared for the Committee on Law and Justice, National Academy of Sciences. We thank the National Science Foundation and University of Wisconsin Graduate School for financial support. Arthur Goldberger and Justin Wolfers provided immensely helpful comments on a previous draft.
1. Introduction

Despite recent efforts to employ microeconomic data and natural experiments, aggregate crime regressions continue to play a significant role in criminological analyses. One use of these regressions is predictive, as illustrated by the papers in this volume that study aggregate crime trends regressions, Baumer (2008) and Pepper (2008). A second use focuses on policy evaluation: prominent current controversies include the deterrent effect of shall-issue concealed weapons legislation (e.g. Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (1998), Black and Nagin (1998), Ayers and Donohue (2003), Plassmann and Whitley (2003)), and the deterrent effect of capital punishment (e.g. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, (2003), Donohue and Wolfers (2005)). Of course, these uses are interrelated: the regressions on crime trends

The goal of this paper is to examine the construction and interpretation of these regressions. Specifically, we wish to employ aspects of contemporary economic and econometric reasoning to understand how aggregate crime regressions may be appropriately used to inform positive and normative questions. While by no means comprehensive, we hope our discussion will prove useful in highlighting some of the limitations of the use of these regressions and in particular indicate how empirical findings may be overinterpreted when careful attention is not given to the link between the aggregate data and individual behavior.¹

Our analysis is closest in spirit to Horowitz (2004) which, although focusing on the context of concealed weapons laws, describes some general difficulties in drawing causal inferences about aggregate crime using observational data. Horowitz’ discussion emphasizes the sensitivity of regression findings to the choice of control variables, functional forms, and other assumptions. He argues that lack of prior knowledge as to the validity of such assumptions essentially eliminates the ability of crime regressions to uncover policy effects. In contrast, he argues that inferences about policy effects may, in principle, be drawn in contexts where the policy has been implemented randomly; i.e.

¹The interpretation of aggregate data continues to be one of the most difficult questions in social science; Stoker (1993) and Blundell and Stoker (2005) provide valuable overviews.
that the data may be conceptualized as the outcome of an experiment. We defend a
different perspective in that we start with a microeconomic choice problem for individual
decisions and discuss sufficient conditions from which the individual decisions aggregate
to linear regressions. These conditions are subject to the sorts of criticisms that Horowitz
makes with respect to sensitivity of empirical findings to assumptions. However, we
argue that this sensitivity may be interpreted as a consequence of model uncertainty and
as such may be constructively addressed. The differences between Horowitz’s
perspective and ours reduce to what sorts of prior beliefs and reasoning one is willing to
bring to a statistical exercise. We agree with him that the data cannot speak for
themselves. We disagree with the degree of his pessimism about inferences with
observational data in that we see a role for economic reasoning and decision-theoretic
considerations in the determination of what information is provided by a given regression
or set of regressions.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a standard choice-
based model of crime. Section 3 discusses how this individual-level model can be
aggregated to produce crime regressions of the type found in the literature. Section 4
discusses the analysis of counterfactuals. Section 5 considers issues of model uncertainty
in crime regressions. Section 6 discusses the relationship between statistical models and
policy evaluation. Section 7 applies our general arguments areas in the empirical
criminology literature: convergence of crime rates, capital punishment and shall issue
concealed weapons laws. Section 8 discusses whether the limitations that exist in using
crime regressions means that they should be replaced by quasi-experimental methods.
Section 9 concludes. Our discussion is conceptual: Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2007)
provides a more systematic treatment of many of the issues we raise as well as an
empirical application.

2. Crime as a choice

From the vantage point of economics, the fundamental idea underlying the
analysis of crime is that each criminal act constitutes a purposeful choice on the part of
the criminal. In turn, this means that the development of a theory of the aggregate crime rate should be explicitly understood as deriving from the aggregation of individual decisions. The basic logic of the economic approach to crime was originally developed by Gary Becker (1968) and extended by Isaac Ehrlich (1972, 1973). This logic underlies the renaissance of crime research in economics, exemplified in work such as that of Steven Levitt, e.g. Levitt (1996) and Donohue and Levitt (2001).

In constructing a formal model, the idea that crime is purposeful means that an observed criminal act is understood as the outcome of a decision problem in which a criminal maximizes an expected utility function subject to whatever constraints he faces. The utility function is not a primitive assumption about behavior (i.e. no economist thinks that agents carry explicit representations of utility functions in their heads), rather it is a mathematical representation of an individual’s preferences, one which constitutes a rank ordering across the potential actions the individual may take.

The choice-theoretic conception does not, by itself, have any implications for the process by which agents make these decisions, although certain behavioral restrictions are standard for economists. For example, to say that the choice of a crime is purposeful says nothing about how an individual assesses the various probabilities that are relevant to the choice, such as the conditional probability of being caught given that the crime is committed. That said, the economic analyses typically assume that an individual’s subjective beliefs, i.e. the probabilities that inform his decision, are rational in the sense that they correspond to the probabilities generated by the optimal use of the individual’s available information. While the relaxation of this notion of rationality has been a major theme in recent economic research (behavioral economics is now an established field of the discipline), it has not generally been a central focus on crime research, at least as conducted by economists. But we emphasize that the choice-based approach does not require rationality as conventionally understood. As Becker (1993) has written

“The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal spiteful, or masochistic. Their behavior is forward looking, and it is also assumed to be consistent over time. In particular they try as best they can to anticipate the consequences of their actions.” (pg. 386)
To see how crime choice may be formally described, we follow the standard binary choice model of economics; excellent expositions of the model include Manski (1977). We consider the decision problem of individuals indexed by \( i \) each of whom decides at each period \( t \) whether or not to commit a crime. Individuals live in locations \( l \) and it is assumed that a person only commits crimes within the location in which he lives. Choices are coded as \( \omega_{i,t} = 1 \) if a crime is committed, 0 otherwise. A common form for the expected utility associated with the choice \( u_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}) \) is

\[
  u_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}) = Z_{i,t} \beta \omega_{i,t} + X_{i,t} \gamma \omega_{i,t} + \xi_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}).
\]

(1)

In this expression, \( Z_{i,t} \) denotes a set of observable (to the modeler) location specific characteristics and \( X_{i,t} \) denotes a vector of observable individual-specific characteristics. The multiplication of the terms \( Z_{i,t} \beta \) and \( X_{i,t} \gamma \) by \( \omega_{i,t} \) capture the idea that the utility effect of these variables depends on whether the crime is committed. For example, the effect of a particular set of punishments only potentially affects an individual’s utility if the crime has been committed. The terms, \( \xi_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}) \) and \( \varepsilon_{i,t}(\omega_{i,t}) \) denote unobservable (to the modeler) location-specific and individual-specific utility terms. These are functions of \( \omega_{i,t} \) because these effects also depend on whether a crime was committed.

From the perspective of a modeler, an individual’s sense of guilt is unobservable, and may be thought of as a utility consequence that occurs if he commits a crime. Similarly, the quality of the police force in a location is not observable (even if empirical proxies exist) and will affect utility only if a crime is committed, in this case via the effect on the likelihood of apprehension and punishment.

The assumption of linearity of the utility function, while common in binary choice analysis, represents a statistical simplification and does not derive from choice-based reasoning per se. It is possible to consider nonparametric forms of the utility function, see Matzkin (1992). We focus on the linear case both because it is the empirical standard in much of social science and because it is not clear that more general forms will be
particularly informative for the issues we wish to address. Some forms of nonlinearity may be trivially introduced, such as including the products of elements of any initial choice of $X_{i,t}$ as additional observables.

The distinction between observable and unobservable variables is fundamental to the relationship between choice-based theories of crime and their embodiment in a statistical framework. We assume that the individual and location-specific errors are independent across time and individuals. We further assume that the individual-specific errors are independent of both the individual-specific and location-specific observables. We do not make the same assumption about the location-specific unobservables.

Under our specification, the net expected utility from committing a crime is

$$v_{i,t} = Z_{i,t} \beta + X_{i,t} \gamma + \xi_{i,t} (1) - \xi_{i,t} (0) + \varepsilon_{i,t} (1) - \varepsilon_{i,t} (0)$$

and the choice-based perspective amounts to saying that a person chooses to commit a crime if the net utility is positive, i.e. $\omega_{i,t} = 1$ if and only if

$$X_{i,t} \gamma + Z_{i,t} \beta + \xi_{i,t} (1) - \xi_{i,t} (0) > \varepsilon_{i,t} (0) - \varepsilon_{i,t} (1).$$

Eq. (3) is useful as it provides a way of assigning probabilities to crime choices. Conditional on $X_{i,t}, Z_{i,t},$ and $\xi_{i,t} (1) - \xi_{i,t} (0)$, the individual choices are stochastic; the distribution function of $\varepsilon_{i,t} (0) - \varepsilon_{i,t} (1)$, which we denote by $G_{i,t}$, determines the probability that a crime is committed. Formally,

$$\Pr (\omega_{i,t} = 1 | Z_{i,t}, X_{i,t}, \xi_{i,t} (1) - \xi_{i,t} (0)) = G_{i,t} (Z_{i,t} \beta + X_{i,t} \gamma + \xi_{i,t} (1) - \xi_{i,t} (0)).$$

This conditional probability structure captures the microfoundations of the economic model we wish to study. This formulation is in fact a relatively simple behavioral model in that we ignore issues such as 1) selection into and out of the population generated by the dynamics of incarceration and 2) those aspects of a crime
decision at $t$ in which a choice is a single component in a sequence of decisions which collectively determine an individual’s utility, i.e. a more general preference specification is one in which agents make decisions to maximize a weighted average of current and future utility, accounting for the intertemporal effects of their decisions each period. While the introduction of dynamic considerations into the choice problem raises numerous issues, e.g. state-dependence, heterogeneity and dynamic selection, these can be readily dealt with using the analysis of Heckman and Navarro (2007), albeit at the expense of considerable complication of the analysis.

3. Aggregation

How do the conditional crime probabilities for individuals described by (4) aggregate within a location? Let $\rho_{l,t}$ denote the realized crime rate in locality $l$ at time $t$. Notice that we define the crime rate as the percentage of individuals committing crimes, not the number of crimes per se, so we are ignoring multiple acts by a single criminal. Given our assumptions, for the location-specific choice model (4), if individuals are constrained to commit crimes in the location of residence, then the aggregate crime rate in a locality is determined by integrating over the observable individual-specific heterogeneity in the location’s population. Letting $F_{X_{l,t}}$ denote the empirical distribution function of $X_{l,t}$ within $l$. The expected crime rate in a location at a given time is

$$E\left(\rho_{l,t} \mid Z_{l,t}, F_{X_{l,t}}, \xi (1) - \xi_{t,t} (0)\right) = \int G_{l,t} (Z_{l,t} \beta + X \gamma + \xi_{l,t} (1) - \xi_{l,t} (0)) d F_{X_{l,t}}. \quad (5)$$

In order to convert this aggregate relationship to a linear regression form, it is necessary to further restrict the distribution function $G_{l,t}$. Suppose that the associated probability density $d G_{l,t}$ is uniform. In this case, the crime rate in locality $l$ at time $t$ obeys
\[ \rho_{l,t} = Z_{l,t} \beta + \bar{X}_{l,t} \gamma + \xi_{l,t} (1) - \xi_{l,t} (0) + \theta_{l,t}, \]  

where \( \bar{X}_{l,t} \) is the empirical mean of \( X_{l,t} \) within \( l \) and 
\[ \theta_{l,t} = \rho_{l,t} - E \left( \rho_{l,t} \mid Z_{l,t}, F_{X_{l,t}}, \xi_{l,t} (1) - \xi_{l,t} (0) \right) \]  
captures the difference between the realized and expected crime rate within a locality. This is the model typically employed in aggregate crime regressions.

Our construction of eq. (6) from choice-based foundations illustrates how standard aggregate crime regressions require a number of statistical assumptions if they are to be interpreted as aggregations of individual behavior. The assumption of a uniform density for the individual specific heterogeneity is of concern; in order that the probabilities of each choice are bounded between 0 and 1, it is necessary that the support of the uniform density be agent-specific; see Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) for discussion of when the assumption is especially problematic. Unfortunately, other random utility specifications do not aggregate in a straightforward manner. To illustrate the problem, note that if one assumes that \( \varepsilon_{l,t} \) has a type-I extreme value distribution, which is the implicit assumption in the logit binary choice model, then 
\[ \log \left( \frac{Pr_{l,t} \left( \omega_{l,t} = 1 \mid Z_{l,t}, X_{l,t}, \xi_{l,t} (1) - \xi_{l,t} (0) \right)}{1 - Pr_{l,t} \left( \omega_{l,t} = 1 \mid Z_{l,t}, X_{l,t}, \xi_{l,t} (1) - \xi_{l,t} (0) \right)} \right) \]  
will be linear in the various payoff components, but will not produce a closed form solution for the aggregate crime rate. Methods are available to allow for analysis of aggregate data under logit type assumptions, see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), but have not been applied, as far as we know, to the crime context.

On its own terms, our development of a linear crime regression indicates how aggregation affects the consistency of particular estimators. While we have assumed that the individual-specific unobserved and observed determinants of crime choices we have not made an analogous assumption on the location-specific unobservables \( \xi_{l,t} \left( \omega_{l,t} \right) \). In the aggregate regression, these may be correlated with either the aggregate observables
that appear in the utility function $Z_{t,i}$ or those variables that appear as a consequence of aggregation $\bar{X}_{t,i}$. From the perspective of theorizing about individual behavior, there is no reason why the regression residual $\xi_{t,i}(1) - \xi_{t,i}(0) + \theta_{t,i}$ should be orthogonal to any of the regressors in (6). By implication, this means that all the variables in (6) should be instrumented. Hence in our judgment the focus on instrumenting endogenous regressors that one finds in empirical crime analyses is often insufficient in that while this strategy addresses endogeneity it does not address unobserved location-specific heterogeneity. Notice that if individual-level data were available, this problem would not arise since one would normally allow for location-specific, time-specific and location-time-specific fixed effects for a panel.

4. Counterfactual analysis

How can an aggregate crime regression be used to evaluate counterfactuals such as a change in policy? Given our choice-theoretic framework, a counterfactual analysis may be understood as a comparison of choices under alternative policy regimes $A$ and $B$. The net utility to the commission of a crime will depend on the regime, so that

$$v_{i,t}^A = Z_{i,t}^A \beta^A + X_{i,t}^A \gamma^A + \xi_{t,i}(1) - \xi_{t,i}(0) + \epsilon_{i,t}(1) - \epsilon_{i,t}(0) \tag{7}$$

and

$$v_{i,t}^B = Z_{i,t}^B \beta^B + X_{i,t}^B \gamma^B + \xi_{t,i}(1) - \xi_{t,i}(0) + \epsilon_{i,t}(1) - \epsilon_{i,t}(0) \tag{8}$$

respectively. The net utility to individual $i$ of committing a crime equals
where $D_{i,t} = 1$ if regime $B$ applies to locality $l$ at $t$, 0 otherwise. The analogous linear aggregate crime rate regression is

\hspace{1cm}

\begin{align*}
\alpha_{i,t} &= Z_{i,t}^A \beta^A + X_{i,t}^A \gamma^A + \xi_{i,t}^A (1) - \xi_{i,t}^A (0) + \epsilon_{i,t}^A (1) - \epsilon_{i,t}^A (0) + \\
D_{i,t} \left( Z_{i,t}^B \beta^B - Z_{i,t}^A \beta^A \right) + D_{i,t} \left( X_{i,t}^B \gamma^B - X_{i,t}^A \gamma^A \right) + \\
D_{i,t} \left( \xi_{i,t}^B (1) - \xi_{i,t}^B (0) - \left( \xi_{i,t}^A (1) - \xi_{i,t}^A (0) \right) \right) + \\
D_{i,t} \left( \epsilon_{i,t}^B (1) - \epsilon_{i,t}^B (0) - \left( \epsilon_{i,t}^A (1) - \epsilon_{i,t}^A (0) \right) \right)
\end{align*}

Eq. (9)

The standard approach measuring how different policies affect the crime rate, in this case regimes $A$ versus $B$, is to embody the policy change in $Z_{i,t}$ versus $Z_{i,t}$ and to assume that all model parameters are constant across regimes. This allows the policy effect to be measured by \((Z_{i,t}^B - Z_{i,t}^A) \beta\). Eq. (10) indicates how a number of assumptions are embedded in the standard approach, in particular the requirement that \(\xi_{i,t}^B (1) - \xi_{i,t}^B (0) - \left( \xi_{i,t}^A (1) - \xi_{i,t}^A (0) \right) = 0\), i.e. that the change of regime does not change the location-specific unobserved utility differential between committing a crime and not doing so. This requirement seems problematic as it means that the researcher must be willing to assume that the regime change is fully measured by the changes in $\bar{X}_{i,t}$ and $Z_{i,t}$. Changes in the detection probabilities and penalties for crimes typically come in bundles and we will argue below that there are cases, specifically capital punishment, where this does not receive adequate attention in the relevant empirical formulations.

5. Model uncertainty
Our derivation of aggregate crime rates from microfoundations assumed that the researcher had strong prior information about the individual decision process. Put differently, our derivation of an aggregate crime regression was based on certainty about the underlying model of criminal behavior. In this section, we discuss ways to relax this assumption, i.e. we consider the case of model uncertainty. In raising this, we emphasize that the problem of inadequate attention to model uncertainty is in no way unique to criminology. Nor do we mean to suggest that criminological studies are unique in the extent to which authors fail to investigate how modifications in baseline models affect inferences.

i. characterizing model uncertainty

Our reading of the criminology literature suggests several general sources of model uncertainty. The categories we will describe have previously been proposed by Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) for economic growth models and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007) for business cycle models. These categories are meant to identify general types of model uncertainty that are common in social science analyses. At the same time, our decomposition of model uncertainty should not be interpreted as based on natural kinds; one can well imagine alternative divisions.

theory uncertainty

Social science theories for a given phenomenon are often open-ended (Brock and Durlauf (2001)) which means that one theory does not logically exclude another as having additional explanatory power. Hence there is often no justification for focusing on a subset of plausible explanations in empirical work. Some evidence of why this matters is suggested by Levitt’s (2004) evaluation of sources of the crime decline of the 1990’s. Levitt identifies 10 alternative theories of the crime decline, all of which are mutually consistent. Without questioning any of his substantive conclusions, we do note that Levitt is to a large extent forced to evaluate the roles of the different theories based
on studies which typically do not account for the full range of the competing explanations when measuring the empirical salience of a particular one.

**statistical instantiation**

Models may differ with respect to details of statistical specification which have nothing to do with the underlying social science theories which motivate them, but rather are necessary to translate these theories into representations that are amenable to data analysis. This is typically so even when the social science theories are themselves expressed mathematically. Differences in these assumptions can lead to different findings.

A good example of how differences in statistical assumptions can affect substantive conclusions is specification of time trends. In the context of the deterrence effects of shall-issue concealed carry laws, different time trend choices have proven to be important. Specifically, Black and Nagin (1998) find that the use of quadratic time trends in place of state-specific linear time trends eliminates the evidence of a link between liberalization of concealed weapons laws and crime rates found in Lott and Mustard (1997). Lott’s rejoinder (1998) argues that it is hard to identify the effects of a policy change (in this case concealed weapons legality) because a quadratic trend will mask it; intuitively, if crime is rising before a law is passed and decreases thereafter, this will be approximated by the quadratic trend.\(^2\) Lott’s intuition may be reasonable, but his argument is question begging as it applies in both directions. If crime follows an exogenously determined quadratic trend over some time interval, and rising crime levels lead to a change in legislation, then Lott’s approach will spuriously identify a causal effect from the legislation. This is true even if state-specific trends are employed.

From the perspective of model uncertainty, Black and Nagin and Lott are working with different statistical instantiations of unexplained temporal heterogeneity. Under the Black and Nagin specification, there may be, as Lott argues, substantial collinearity between the variable used to measure temporal heterogeneity and the variables used to

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\(^2\)This argument is further developed in Plassmann and Whitley (2003).
measure the effects of shall-issue concealed weapons legislation. This multicollinearity does not invalidate the Black and Nagin model on logical grounds. In our judgment, the differences between Black and Nagin and Lott on this issue reflect the absence of good explanations for much of the temporal evolution of crime rates. Neither a linear specification nor a quadratic specification (or for that matter, more complicated splines or alternative semiparametric methods) instantiate substantive ideas about the crime process. Rather, they constitute efforts to purge the data so that the residual components may be analyzed.

Trend specification also matters in the analysis of unemployment rates and crime. Greenberg (2001) criticizes Cantor and Land (1985) for modeling trends using deterministic rather than unit root methods. Again, social science theory does not dictate a preference for one type of trend versus another. While both Greenberg and Cantor suggest microfounded arguments in favor of their trend specifications, neither of them demonstrates a one-to-one mapping from these arguments to their modeling assumptions.

Other examples of this type of model uncertainty include assumptions about additivity, linearity and the use of logarithms versus levels.

**parameter heterogeneity**

A third type of model uncertainty concerns parameter heterogeneity. Researchers often disagree on whether or not observations are simply draws from a common data generating process, so that any heterogeneity in the observations derives from differences in values of some set of observable control variables and different realizations of the model errors. Social science theory typically does not impose that parameters are constant across observations. For example, the argument that there is a deterrent effect from a given penalty does not imply that the effect is independent of the geographical unit where the penalty is present. Parameter heterogeneity may be linked to deep questions about the interpretation of statistical models; see Brock and Durlauf (2001) for a discussion of parameter heterogeneity and the concept of exchangeability of observations. Exchangeability, roughly speaking, captures the idea that observations
such as state specific crime rates may be treated as draws from a common statistical process.

One example of sensitivity of empirical claims to assumptions about parameter heterogeneity is again found in the controversy between Black and Nagin and Mustard and Lott. Black and Nagin find that evidence of crime reductions associated with shall issue laws are sensitive to the presence of Florida in the data set. They find that eliminating data from Florida eliminates the evidentiary support for a handgun/crime link from some of the Lott and Mustard specifications.

Another example appears in the capital punishment literature. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) challenge findings of Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2003) on the grounds that the findings are not robust to the exclusion of California and Texas. As argued in Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin, this disagreement may be understood as a disagreement about parameter homogeneity.

**ii. model averaging**

How can the dependence of empirical claims on model specification be constructively addressed? We describe a strategy based on model averaging; ideas associated with model averaging appear to originate in Leamer (1978). They have become prominent in the last decade within statistics; a valuable conceptual argument is made in Draper (1995) and the development of formal methods has been greatly advanced by Adrian Raftery e.g. Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997). We proceed using Bayesian language for expositional convenience, but the analysis can be done using frequentist estimators.

For a given exercise, suppose that the objective of the researcher is to construct a conditional density of crime rates $\rho_{t+1}$ based on data $D_t$ and model $m$, i.e. $\Pr(\rho_{t+1}|D_t, m)$. Many disagreements about substantive empirical questions such as forecasts or the effects of alternative policies, derive from disagreements about the choice of model, $m$. This is of course why model selection plays such a significant role in
empirical work. From the perspective of some empirical questions, it is not obvious that this is the appropriate role for model choice. If the goal of an exercise is to compare policies, the model choice is a nuisance parameter. Similarly, if one wants to construct a forecast, then the model itself is not intrinsically interesting.

In order to avoid dependence on a particular model specification, an alternative strategy is to develop conclusions based upon a space of candidate models; denote this space as $M$. Probability statements about a future outcome such as $\rho_{t,z+1}$ can then be constructed conditioning on the entire model space rather than on one of its elements. In other words, one computes the probability density $\Pr(\rho_{t,z+1}|D_t, M)$, which is the conditional density of the crime rate given the data and a model space. From this perspective, the true model is an unknown that needs to be integrated out of the probability density. Formally,

\[
\Pr(\rho_{t,z+1}|D_t, M) = \sum_{m \in M} \Pr(\rho_{t,z+1}|D_t, m) \Pr(m|D_t) .
\]

Here $\Pr(m|D_t)$ denotes the posterior probability that $m$ is the correct model given the data. Intuitively, one constructs probability statements about an outcome such as a crime rate based on aggregating the information available across each of the models under consideration. This aggregation places greater weight on models which are more likely, as measured by $\Pr(m|D_t)$. The linear structure in (11) derives from the law of conditional probability, hence the term averaging.

While model averaging ideas in economics were initiated in Leamer (1978), the methodology has only recently become widespread; this represents a combination of the increases in computational capacity and theoretical advances. Model averaging is beginning to be employed in a range of economics contexts, most notably economic growth (Brock, Durlauf and West (2003), Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001)), finance (Avramov (2002)), forecasting (Garratt et al (2003)) and monetary policy (Brock, Durlauf and West (2003)). An application to a crime context, the deterrent effect of capital punishment, is Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan,
and Nagin (2007). While we regard model averaging methods as very promising, we also emphasize that the methodology is still being developed and a number of outstanding theoretical questions still exist. And of course, model averaging still requires specification of the model space, which itself can be subjected to questioning.

### iii. from model estimation to policy evaluation

This discussion of model uncertainty contains an important limitation in that it does not account for the objectives of a given empirical exercise. Focusing on the use of a single model, it seems intuitive that this model must be correctly specified in order for the model to yield usable findings, so that no distinct considerations arise when one considers the reason why the model is employed. But even in this case, such intuition needs to be qualified.

For example, Horowitz argues that in order to use cross-county data to evaluate the average effect of shall-issue laws, if there are differences between the states, so that the crime rate in a county is determined by some set of factors $X$, then in order to identify

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3 One issue concerning model priors that is worth noting concerns the assignment of priors to similar models. Most of the model averaging literature has employed diffuse priors, i.e. all models are assigned equal prior weights. However, it can be the case that some models in a model space are quite similar, e.g. differ only with respect to a single included variable, whereas others are much more different from the perspective of theoretical or statistical assumptions. In this case, the diffuse prior can be very misleading. Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) propose ways to construct model priors that mirror the nested structure of modern discrete choice theory, but much more needs to be done. The issue of model similarity is usually ignored in ad hoc analyses of the robustness of findings. Lott (1998) defends his findings on concealed weapons permits by stating “My article with David Mustard and my forthcoming book report nearly 1000 regressions that implied a very consistent effect…” (pg. 242). This claim is of little intrinsic interest without knowing what classes of models these regressions cover; put most simply, the different regression results are not independent, so the number 1000 is not informative.

4 Relative to eq. (13), if $\xi^B_{l,t}(1) - \xi^B_{l,t}(0) - (\xi^A_{l,t}(1) - \xi^A_{l,t}(0)) \neq 0$, then the observables $Z_{l,t}$ and $\bar{X}_{l,t}$ do not constitute the correct set to use when estimating the model since one needs to also control for the effect of the location-time unobservables.
the effect of the laws “one must use a set that consists of just the right variables and, in
general, no extra ones.” But as shown in Heckman and Navarro (2004) this is true only
for a particular set of empirical strategies known as matching,\(^5\) of which linear regression
is a special case. Heckman and Navarro demonstrate there are other strategies that are
designed to deal with the problem of missing information, in particular the use of control
functions, see Navarro (2007) for an overview. The control function approach is based on
the idea that the presence of unobservable variables matters only to the extent that their
relationship to the observables cannot be determined; for many cases this relationship can
be determined. And if so, then other information contained in the omitted variables is
irrelevant. The standard example is the Heckman selection correction method in which
one adds a “Mills ratio” term to the regression under the assumption of normality but one
can be much more general and use semi-parametric methods to estimate the control
function term (see Navarro (2007)).

More generally, one cannot decouple the assessment of a model’s specification
from the objective for which the model is employed. Similarly, any assessment of
fragility (or the lack thereof) of empirical claims can only be fully understood with
reference to a decision problem.

6. Policy-relevant calculations

i. basic ideas

In this section, we explicitly consider the relationship between statistical models
and policy evaluation from a decision-theoretic perspective. The fact that statistical
significance levels do not equate to policy statements is well known (see Goldberger

\(^5\)Under matching, endogeneity is solved by assuming that there exists a set of variables
such that, conditional on these variables, endogeneity is eliminated. That is, the
endogenous variables are not independent of the errors, rather it is assumed they are
conditionally independent when the correct set of observable variables (to the
econometrician) is conditioned on.
(1991) for a nice discussion), our goal here is to suggest some ways of reporting and interpreting results for policy contexts. In making this argument, we are drawing both on classic ideas in statistics, notably Savage (1951) and Wald (1950) as well as recent work in econometrics, e.g. Heckman (2005) and Manski (2005,2006); Brock, Durlauf and West (2003,2007) and Brock, Durlauf, Nason and Rondina (2007) implement some of these ideas. Again, our remarks apply with equal force to work in social sciences other than criminology.

Suppose that the policymaker has a payoff function

$$V(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p)$$

(12)

where \( p \in \{A, B\} \) denotes the policy regime and, as before, \( D_t \) represents the information available to the policymaker at time \( t \). The conditioning of the utility function on \( D_t \) allows for the possibility that the policymaker’s preferences depend on aspects of the particular locality since location-specific data \( D_{t,j} \) are a subset of \( D_t \). For an expected payoff maximizer, the optimal policy problem is

$$\max_{\rho \in \{A, B\}} \int V(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, p, m).$$

(13)

Eq. (13) implies that the sufficient objects for policy analysis are \( \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, A, m) \) and \( \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, B, m) \); these are the posterior distributions of the crime rate given the data, model, and policy. These probabilities fully capture the aspects of the data that are relevant to policy evaluation calculation. Notice that these calculations may not require all aspects of a model to be correctly specified; this was seen in our discussion of the use of matching versus control functions; Heckman (2005) provides a deep analysis of the relationship between models and policy calculations, emphasizing what he denotes as “Marschak’s maxim” given ideas found in Marschak (1953):
“...for many policy questions it is unnecessary to identify full structural models...All that is needed are combinations of subsets of the structural parameters, corresponding to the parameters required to forecast particular policy modifications, which are much easier to identify (i.e. require fewer and weaker assumptions.” (pg. 49)

One advantage of explicit calculations of posterior densities for policy effects is that they naturally allow one to assess the effects of portfolios of policies. Evidence on the effects of individual policies may be imprecise whereas evidence on the effects of combinations of policies may not be. We do not know whether there are cases of this type in criminology.

Another advantage is that such calculations avoid confusion between the lack of statistical significance of a coefficient for a policy variable and the claim that a policy has no effect; while this is a banal observation, the mistake is often seen. An example of this is found in Lott (1998) who, in evaluating Black and Nagin’s (1998) critique of his work, asserts “On the basis of Black and Nagin’s comment and our original article, the choice is between concealed handguns producing a deterrent effect or having no effect (one way or the other) on murders and violent crime generally.” (pg. 242) Lott’s exclusion of the possibility of any crime-enhancing effect of concealed weapons ignores the uncertainty associated with point estimates of the effects. That is, concluding that we cannot reject that the effect is equal to zero does not mean that the effect is indeed zero. One may not be able to reject that it is 0.1 (or −0.1) either. The point estimate is only the most likely (in a particular sense) value of the parameter given the data, not the only possible one. The policy relevant calculation requires assessing the probabilities for different magnitudes of positive and negative effects, which cannot be ascertained from the numbers he (and other participants in this literature) report.

**ii. model averaging and policy evaluation**

When model uncertainty is present, the optimal policy calculation (13) may be generalized in a straightforward fashion as the policymaker simply conditions on $M$ rather than $m$. The relevant calculation in this case is
\[
\max_{p \in \{A,B\}} \sum_{m \in M} \left( \mathcal{V}(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, p, m) \Pr(m | D_t) \right) = \max_{p \in \{A,B\}} \int \mathcal{V}(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, p, M) \, d\rho_{t+1}. \tag{14}
\]

For the model uncertainty case, the empirical objects that are required for policy evaluation are \(\Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, A, M)\) and \(\Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, B, M)\) which represent the posterior distributions of crime rates conditional on the data, the policy, and the model space.

Eq. (14) indicates an important feature of policy evaluation, namely that, unless the payoff function is model-specific, the identity of the true model does not directly affect policy evaluation. For the purposes of policy evaluation what matters is the distribution of outcomes under alternative policies. Unlike the case of the social scientist, the model has no intrinsic interest to a policymaker; it is simply an additional source of uncertainty in the effects of a policy.

### iii. beyond model averaging

Once model uncertainty is involved in policy evaluation, new considerations can arise. One reason for this is that a policymaker may be unwilling to condition decisions on model priors; without these one cannot assign posterior model probabilities and engage in model averaging. The absence of a basis for constructing priors is one reason for recent theoretical work on decisionmaking under ambiguity, which focuses on how agents should make decisions in environments where certain probabilities cannot be defined. For our purposes, what matters is that in such cases, there exist ways to engage in policy evaluation that do not require that one is able to calculate model probabilities. The minimax approach, advocated by Wald (1950) and recently explored in macroeconomic contexts by Hansen and Sargent (2007), evaluates policies by the criterion

\[
\max_{p \in \{A,B\}} \min_{m \in M} \int \mathcal{V}(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1} | D_t, p, m) \, d\rho_{t+1} \tag{15}
\]
Minimax selects the policy that does best for the least favorable model in the model space. Metaphorically, the policymaker plays a game against nature in which nature is assumed to choose the model that minimizes the policymaker’s payoff. This sets a lower bound on the payoff from the policy.

An alternative approach is known as minimax regret, due to Savage (1951) and recently explored in microeconomic contexts by Manski (2005, 2006), which evaluates policies by the criterion

$$\min_{p \in \{A, B\}} \max_{m \in M} R(p, D_t, m).$$

(16)

Where regret, $R(p, d, m)$, is defined by

$$R(p, d, m) = \max_{p \in P} \left( \int V(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) - \int V(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \Pr(\rho_{t+1}, D_t, p) \right).$$

(17)

Minimax regret selects the policy with the property that the gap between the model-specific optimal policy and its performance is smallest, when comparisons are made across the model space. The latter is generally regarded as a less conservative criterion for policy evaluation than minimax. Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina (2007) employ minimax regret in monetary policy evaluation. Manski (2006) applies minimax regret in the context of treatment assignment. An important finding is that optimal treatment rules can be fractional as agents with identical observables receive different treatments. This may be of particular interest in crime policy contexts as it suggests a tradeoff between the fairness and deterrence objectives of punishment that policymakers ought to address.

7. Applications to criminology issues
In this section, we apply some of our general arguments to current controversies in criminology.

i. convergence in crime rates

A first example where more careful attention to the determinants of aggregate crime regressions is needed involves efforts to evaluate convergence between aggregate crime rates. Two examples of studies of this type are O’Brien (1999), who focuses on male/female differences in arrest rates and LaFree (2005) who considers cross country homicide rates. Both papers interpret convergence in terms of the time series properties of the differences between the series of interest.

Both papers suffer from a lack of formal attention to the determinants of individual behavior and their associated aggregate implications. The substantive social science notion of convergence involves the question of whether contemporaneous disparities between two time series may be expected to disappear over time. As formulated in Bernard and Durlauf (1995), convergence between $\rho_{1,t}$ and $\rho_{2,t}$ means that

$$\lim_{k \to \infty} E \left( \rho_{1,t+k} - \rho_{2,t+k} \mid F_t \right) = 0$$

(18)

where denotes the information available at time $t$. Hence the focus of O’Brien and LaFree on the presence of time trends or unit roots in the difference in crime rates would seem to be sensible. The problem, identified in Bernard and Durlauf (1996) is that without a theory of how individual crime choices are determined, there is no basis for regarding either of these tests as appropriate. The reason is that the unit root and time trend analyses presuppose that the series $\Delta \rho_{1,t}$ and $\Delta \rho_{2,t}$ are second-order stationary processes. The statistical assumption second-order stationarity has substantive behavioral implications. Specifically, it means that the series are generated by social processes that are local to their long run behaviors and rules out the case where social processes are in transition to a long run type of behavior. When societies are in transition, the stochastic process characterizing a socioeconomic outcome will not possess time invariant
moments, which is what is assumed in time series analyses of the type conducted by O’Brien and LaFree. These issues have been long understood in the economic growth literature, where convergence has been studied primarily with respect to per capita output (and where the relationship between trends, unit roots and convergence were precisely characterized long before the papers we are discussing.)

For the crime context, it is easy to develop intuition as to why time series analysis of convergence may be invalid. Consider O’Brien’s analysis of gender differences. The period 1960-1995 is one of changing gender roles, family structure, etc. If one considers the determinants of female crime rates, there is no reason to believe that the changes between 1960 and 1975 are simply another draw from the same process generating the changes between 1975 and 1990. Similarly, LaFree’s evaluation of convergence between industrializing poor nations and industrialized rich ones assumes that intracountry homicide rate changes are second-order stationary. LaFree’s invocation of the modernization process as explaining national crime dynamics is inconsistent with his statistical methodology. Countries experiencing crime which “results when modern values and norms come into contact with and disrupt older, established systems of role allocation” (LaFree (2005) pg. 192) do not obey the assumptions needed for his statistical analysis.

These convergence analyses may be criticized from a second vantage point, namely the absence of any distinction between conditional and unconditional convergence. Conditional convergence means that there exists a set of initial conditions such that convergence between two units (gender, country) occurs only if these initial conditions are identical. Denoting these conditions as $X$, conditional convergence means that

$$\lim_{k \to \infty} E\left(\rho_{1,t+k} - \rho_{2,t+k} \mid F, X_{1,t} = X_{2,t}\right) = 0$$

(19)

In the economic growth literature, it is well understood that conditional rather than unconditional convergence is the natural object of interest. Two countries with different savings rates are not expected to unconditionally converge and there is no substantive
theoretical implication when unconditional convergence fails; see Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) for the classic analysis. For the crime context, it is unclear what is learned from unconditional convergence exercises. O’Brien is relatively circumspect in interpreting his results, but even his speculations on how one can explain his finding of no convergence in homicide with convergence in other crimes, are not justifiable since without a theory as to why unconditional convergence is to be expected; there are so many ways to differentiate the experiences of men and women that it not clear why there is a fact to be explained. For LaFree, if there are factors outside the modernization process that determine crime rates, and obvious candidates include socioeconomic factors such as levels of unemployment and inequality, demography, and differences in national criminal justice systems, then the absence of unconditional convergence does not speak to the empirical relevance of modernization or any other theory considered in isolation.

ii. deterrence effect of capital punishment

Our second example concerns recent arguments about the deterrence effects of capital punishment. We focus on two papers, the empirical study of deterrent effects by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003) and the philosophical study by Sunstein and Vermeule (2005). We choose the first paper because it has been quite influential in resurrecting claims in favor of a deterrent effect and because it has recently come under criticism by Donohue and Wolfers (2005). Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd do not make general policy claims about the desirability of capital punishment given their findings. Sunstein and Vermeule (2005), on the other hand, make this connection. They argue that evidence in favor of a capital punishment deterrence effect can render the punishment morally obligatory. Hence our interest in this second paper.

The behavioral foundations of Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd recognize that the consequences for the commission of a murder involve three separate stages: apprehension, sentencing and carrying out of the sentence. Defining the variables $C =$ caught, $S =$ sentenced to be executed and $E =$ executed, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd estimate the murder rate regression
\begin{equation}
\rho_{i,t} = \alpha + Z_{i,t} \beta + P_{i,t} (C) \beta_C + P_{i,t} (S|C) \beta_S + P_{i,t} (E|S) \beta_E + \kappa_{i,t}
\end{equation}

where

\begin{align*}
P_{i,t} (C) &= \text{probability of being caught conditional on committing a murder}, \\
P_{i,t} (S|C) &= \text{probability of being sentenced to be executed conditional on being caught}, \\
P_{i,t} (E|S) &= \text{probability of being executed conditional on receiving a death sentence}.
\end{align*}

and other variables follow the definitions associated with eq. (6). Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd argue in favor of a deterrence effect based on the negative point estimates and statistical significance of the coefficients on the various conditional probabilities.

**microfoundations**

From the perspective of our first argument, that aggregate models should flow from aggregation of individual behavioral equations, the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd specification can be shown to be flawed. Specifically, the way in which probabilities are used does not correspond to the probabilities that arise in the appropriate decision problem. For Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, the potential outcomes are

\begin{align*}
NC &= \text{not caught}, \\
CNS &= \text{caught and not sentenced to death}, \\
CSNE &= \text{caught, sentenced to death, and not executed}, \\
CSE &= \text{caught, sentenced to death and executed}.
\end{align*}

The expected utility of a person who commits a murder is therefore

\begin{equation}
\Pr_{i,t} (NC) u_{i,t} (NC) + \Pr_{i,t} (CNS) u_{i,t} (CNS) + \\
\Pr_{i,t} (CSNE) u_{i,t} (CSNE) + \Pr_{i,t} (CSE) u_{i,t} (CSE).
\end{equation}
The unconditional probabilities of the four possible outcomes are of course related to the conditional probabilities. In terms of conditional probabilities, expected utility may be written as

\[
\left(1 - \Pr_{i,t}(C)\right)u_{i,t}(NC) + \left(1 - \Pr_{i,t}(S|C)\right)\Pr_{i,t}(C)u_{i,t}(CNS) + \left(1 - \Pr_{i,t}(E|S)\right)\Pr_{i,t}(S|C)\Pr_{i,t}(C)u_{i,t}(CSNE) + \Pr_{i,t}(E|S)\Pr_{i,t}(S|C)\Pr_{i,t}(C)u_{i,t}(CSE).
\]

A comparison of (22) with (20) reveals that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd specification does not derive naturally from individual choices since the conditional probabilities in (20) interact with each other in the calculation of expected utility as in (22). If one substitutes in a linear representation of the utility functions for the different outcomes, it is evident that (22) cannot be rearranged to produce an aggregate crime equation in which the conditional probabilities appear additively as in (20); a full analysis may be found in Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2007). Put differently, the effect of the conditional probability of execution given a death sentence on behavior cannot be understood separately from the effects of the conditional probability of being caught and being sentenced to death if caught.

Therefore, we conclude that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd specification fails to properly model the implicit decision problem involved in homicides. Their analysis is based on a misspecification of the implications of their assumed behavioral model.

**aggregation**

Our aggregation discussion suggests how correlations can arise between regressors and model errors because of unobserved location characteristics. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd only instrument the conditional crime probabilities in (20), doing so on the basis that these probabilities are collective choice variables by the localities.
However, in the presence of unobserved location characteristics, it is necessary to instrument the regressors contained in \( Z_{i,t} \) as well. Since instrumenting a subset of the variables in a regression that correlate with the regression errors does not ensure consistency of the associated subset of parameters, the estimates in Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd would appear to be inconsistent (in the statistical sense).

Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd might respond to this objection by noting that they use location-specific fixed effects. However, these will not be sufficient to solve the problem, since the location-specific unobservables \( \xi_{i,t} \), can vary over time.

**policy effect estimation**

Our discussion of policy effect evaluation also calls into question the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd analysis as it assumes that the fluctuations in their arrest, sentencing and execution probabilities constitute the full set of changes in policies across time periods. This seems problematic. The decision to commit a homicide, under the economic model of crime, depends on the entire range of penalties and their associated probabilities. Changes in the rates at which murderers are sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, for example, are not accounted for in Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd or, as far as we know, any other capital punishment deterrence studies. Hence these studies suffer from an obvious omitted variables problem.

This argument can be pushed farther. As shown in Gelman, Liebman, West and Kiss (2004), the probability that a given death sentence will be overturned by a state or federal appeals court is at least 2/3. These authors also find that only 5% of the death sentences between 1975 and 1993 led to the eventual execution of those sentenced. Relative to our choice model, the Gelman, Liebman, West and Kiss findings mean that the reintroduction of capital punishment in a state, on average, substantially increases the probability that the commission of murder leads to the outcome \( CSNE \), i.e. arrested, sentenced to death, and not executed. Since exonerations are rare, it is reasonable to conjecture that murderers with outcome \( CSNE \) experience longer prison sentences than they would have had had they not been sentenced to death. This suggests that
periods in which criminals face higher probabilities of capital sentencing and actual execution are also associated with longer prison sentences. Yet this increase is not reflected in the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd regression. Put differently, if an increase in the conditional probability of a death sentence given arrest, \( \Pr_{lt} (S | C) \), is associated with an increase in \( \Pr_{lt} (CSNE) \), then it is no longer clear what it means to say that a Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd-type regression provides evidence on the effects of capital punishment; does an increase in long prison sentences because of death sentences followed by reversals correspond to what is understood to be the deterrent effect of capital punishment?

**model uncertainty**

Donohue and Wolfers (2005) have argued that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd findings of strong deterrence effects are fragile as small changes in their baseline specification can lead to an absence of a statistically significant effect or even evidence that a larger number of executions is associated with a larger number of murders. Specifically, Donohue and Wolfers show that the Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd findings change when one alters the lag structure for the instrumental variables used for the punishment probabilities as well as when one drops California and Texas from the sample. The latter may be interpreted as a change in the assumption that all states are exchangeable with respect to the model employed by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd.

Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan and Nagin (2007) attempt to adjudicate the differences between Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd and Donohue and Wolfers by treating the problem as one of model uncertainty. To do this, a space of potential models was generated using different combinations of the assumptions found in the two papers. Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin conclude that the evidence for deterrence in the sample studied by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd is quite weak.

**policy-relevant calculations**
Following our general discussion, the statistical significance of the capital punishment variables in a murder regression does not produce the appropriate information needed to make policy comparisons. This has implications for the way such evidence is employed in death penalty debates. Sunstein and Vermeule (2005) argue that evidence of a deterrent effect can produce a moral case for capital punishment, in that the decision of a government to fail to implement a life saving policy is equivalent to the decision to implement a policy that costs lives.

Sunstein and Vermeule (2005) develop their argument conditioning on evidence of a deterrence effect. Leaving aside the insouciance with which they treat the empirical literature, their argument suffers from the lack of attention to appropriate nature of the policymaker’s loss function and nature of the uncertainty of the empirical evidence.

The Sunstein and Vermeule analysis treats the expected number of lives saved as the variable of interest to the policymaker; in Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd this value is a function of the estimated parameter $\beta_E$ in (20). The expected number of lives saved is not necessarily sufficient in describing a policymaker’s utility function, even if this function is a monotonically increasing function of the number of lives saved. As such, their attention to this figure is analogous to making a utilitarian as opposed to a welfarist calculation, see Sen (1979). While Sunstein and Vermeule would presumably respond that they are assuming that the precision associated with estimates of the expected number of lives saved is high, precision needs to be defined with respect to the policymaker’s utility function. It is not an independent object.

The sensitivity of deterrence evidence to model choice, as demonstrated by Donohue and Wolfers and extended in Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin (2007), raises the issues we have discussed with respect to decisionmaking under ambiguity and the evaluation of policies when one does not wish to base them on a choice of model priors. Without a justification of the choice of priors, there is no expected deterrence

\footnote{At the same time they also state that

“The foundation of our argument is a large and growing body of evidence that capital punishment may well have a deterrent effect, possibly a quite powerful one…The particular numbers do not much matter.” (p. 706).}
effect on which Sunstein and Vermeule can even rely. Our impression of the philosophy literature is that the issue of policy evaluation under ambiguity has generally not been discussed, although Gaus (2006) makes an interesting argument in favor of following principles rather than expected effect calculations when assessing policies when the effects of policies are associated with substantial uncertainty.

To be clear, none of this means that Sunstein and Vermeule (2005) are incorrect in their conclusions about the ethical implications of a certain deterrent effect for a policymaker or that the death penalty is either moral or immoral per se. Rather, our claim is that the policy implications of the uncertainty associated with deterrence effects cannot be assessed outside of the policymaker’s preferences.

iii. right to carry laws and crime: *Firearms and Violence revisited*

Our third example is the controversy over the effects of shall-issue concealed weapons laws in the National Academy of Science report *Firearms and Violence*, Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie (2004). This report concluded that

“…with the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there is a causal link between the right to carry laws and crime rates…It is also the committee’s view that additional analysis along the lines of the current literature is unlikely to yield results that will persuasively demonstrate a causal link between right-to-carry laws and crime rates (unless substantial numbers of states were to adopt or repeal right-to-carry laws), because of the sensitivity of the results to model specification.” (pg. 150-151)

Committee member James Q. Wilson dissented from this part of the study, on the grounds that the sensitivity to specification found in the report did not account for the sensibility of different models; in particular, he questioned whether the failure of models that excluded socioeconomic control variables to find deterrent effects was of importance in assessing the deterrent effect. Wilson observes

“Suppose Professor Jones wrote a paper saying that increasing the number of police in a city reduced the crime rate and Professor Smith wrote a rival paper saying that cities with few police officers have low crime rates. Suppose that
neither Smith nor Jones used any control variables, such as income, unemployment, population density, or the frequency with which offenders are sent to prison in reaching their conclusions. *If* such papers were published, they would be rejected by the committee out of hand for the obvious reason they failed to produce a complete account of the factors that affect the crime rate.” (pg. 270)

The committee’s rejoinder to Wilson argued that

“…Everyone (including Wilson and the rest of the committee) agrees that control variables matter, but there is disagreement on the correct set. Thus the facts that there is no way to statistically test for the correct specification and that researchers using reasonable specifications find different answers are highly relevant. Given the existing data and methods, the rest of the committee sees little hope in resolving this fundamental statistical problem.” (pg. 273-27)

We believe that this conclusion is too pessimistic. The disagreement between Wilson and the rest of the NAS committee reflects the absence in the report of an explicit evaluation of how model uncertainty interacts with evidence of shall-issue laws. While the assertion that it is impossible to statistically identify the correct specification of a statistical model is true at some level of generality (though the report is frankly unclear on what is meant by this) this argument is hardly novel; it is known in the philosophy literature as the Duhem-Quine hypothesis (Quine (1951) is the classic statement) and refers to the idea that all theories are undetermined by available data. At this level of generality the NAS committee majority’s claim is an uninteresting observation with respect to social science research, since it begs the question of the relative plausibility of assumptions. For the dispute at hand, we believe that Wilson is correct in his argument that a model whose specification includes controls suggested by social science theory should receive greater weight than one that does not. Further, these two models are statistically distinguishable. To conclude that one should only regard evidence of a deterrent effect as persuasive if both models produce the same findings makes little sense.

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7The NAS report’s suggestion that randomized experiments represent the gold standard for research ignores the assumptions required for their conduct, e.g. integrity of the researcher, accuracy of data collection, etc. An advocate of randomized experiments would presumably dismiss concerns about such factors as implausible. But this is precisely our point.
The NAS report implicitly suggests that the models without control variables are intrinsically interesting, e.g.

“No link between right-to-carry laws and changes in crime is apparent in the raw data...it is only once numerous covariates are included that the...effects...emerge.” (pg. 150)

but this remark ignores the classic Simpson’s paradox, in which a bivariate relationship has one direction whereas a multivariate relationship does not. The standard example of Simpson’s paradox is the positive relationship between admission to hospital and the probability of death.

Model averaging provides a natural way of integrating the information across the alternative specifications considered in the NAS report. As we see it, the committee could have addressed the sensitivity of shall-issue deterrence effects by constructing a set of specifications that included those found in the literature as well as others that are formed by combining the assumptions underlying these models. Intuitively, one thinks of the assumptions that differentiate models as the axes of the model space, and fills the model space out with those combinations of assumptions that are coherent with one another. Averaging over this space would have integrated the information in the different models and indicated whether evidence of a shall-issue deterrent effect is present when one conditions on a model space rather than a particular model.

One answer to our advocacy of model averaging as a tool to address model uncertainty of the type facing the NAS panel is that a given body of empirical studies only captures a small fraction of the universe of potential models (and indeed might represent a measure 0 set). This is certainly a tenable position. But if this position is taken, then it would be irrelevant whether a given body of studies produced similar or conflicting results. If it is then claimed that the degree of consistency in results across models contained in a subspace is informative about the results that would be ascertained were the model space expanded, then it is difficult to see why the relative prior plausibility and relative evidentiary support within an initial model space are not informative as well.
A second answer to the use of model averaging might rely on the absence of a principled basis for assigning prior model probabilities. We are certainly sympathetic to this view. But if this position is taken, then the implications of the body of model-specific findings of an effect of shall-issue laws to policy needs to be explicitly considered. It is not obvious, for example, that the fragility that the majority report claims to be present in concealed weapons regressions is even an argument against the laws. Suppose that a policymaker possesses minimax preferences with respect to model uncertainty. Fragility of deterrence evidence does not logically lead to rejection of the policy; one needs to know the payoffs under the different models under consideration. The NAS report seems to us to take the position that in absence of strong evidence that the laws reduce crime, they should not be implemented. But minimax preferences do not, by themselves, generate this conclusion, which really is based on the presumption that the law should not be implemented unless there is compelling evidence of crime reduction. This line of reasoning can be justified, e.g. Brock, Durlauf and West (2003), but requires context-specific argumentation.

Therefore, a recommendation we make for policy evaluation studies such as Firearms and Violence is that claims about the robustness or fragility of various findings be evaluated with respect to different loss functions, with particular attention to minimax and minimax regret calculations as supplements to the standard Bayesian ones.

8. Should aggregate crime regressions be abandoned?

One response to the discussion in this paper would be to search for alternative ways of uncovering aggregate criminological facts. The critiques we have raised are part of the source of interest in so called natural experiments, in which an exogenous event of some type allows a comparison of aggregate crime outcomes; see Levitt (1996) for a nice example. In his appendix to the Firearm and Violence study, Horowitz (2004) makes a broad general argument against the utility of observational data analysis (and to be clear, specifically regression analysis) in the presence of model uncertainty.
While we of course concur that there does not exist an algorithm to infallibly identify the “true” model when the analysis is conducted on a sufficiently broad universe of potential models, it is also the case that different models have different ex ante plausibility and ex post goodness of fit with respect to data. The accumulated body of knowledge that a researcher brings to a given question is a legitimate basis for restricting the class under study or for downweighting certain models. Hence the opposite findings, for example, of concealed weapons regressions with and without socioeconomic controls, do not warrant equal prior consideration. And we do not know, given our priors, how the relative goodness of fit of the different models under consideration would translate into different posteriors, as the particular models compared in the NAS report are not observationally equivalent.

Of course, our discussion of the assumptions that underlie the interpretation of aggregate crime regressions may all be interpreted as examples for Horowitz’ arguments about the limitations of regression analysis of crime. We do not claim to have an answer to the question of how to integrate the different types of model uncertainty we have discussed into a single integrated framework, let alone introduce factors such as the extension of the basic crime model to intertemporal decisionmaking. Our disagreement is that we see a role for empirical models in informing policy discussion, even though the researcher is aware of untestable or unappealing assumptions underlying them. The way in which models are used to inform beliefs necessarily requires judgments, which is different from rejecting them altogether. A researcher brings a body of social science and statistical knowledge to bear in the assessment of empirical results; this knowledge matters in assessing the sensitivity of a result to an assumption. In other words, concern about the dependence of an empirical finding on an assumption should depend on what the assumption is.

Further, the need for assumptions is not unique to regression analysis with observational data; all empirical work is theory-laden (to use Quine’s phrase). An experiment of the type proposed by Horowitz with respect to shall-issue weapons permit laws—randomized legalization across states—would, if one is to use the findings to inform policymakers, require assumptions about 1) the degree to which criminals can alter the location in which crimes are committed, 2) the nature of migration by potential
criminals across state boundaries both before the experiment and in response to it, 3) the effect on the current crime choices of potential criminals of knowledge that an experiment which may affect future laws in their state of residence is being conducted, etc. Also, the translation of findings from such an experiment into a recommendation for those states that did not implement the policy requires exchangeability assumptions on the states. Does one assume that the deterrent effect of the law is identical across states? If state-level deterrent effects are heterogeneous, how is this heterogeneity to be modeled, via random effects, varying coefficients or some other method? Randomized experiments cannot avoid the need for judgments; as emphasized in Heckman (2005), judgment is intrinsic to scientific inquiry.

Overall, we do not see good reasons to rank order regressions and natural experiments in terms of their relative utility as means of understanding crime. It is straightforward to construct examples in which one methodology can provide insights that the other does not. Each has a contribution to make in criminological research.

9. Conclusions

In this paper, we have described some issues we regard as important in the econometric study of crime: microfoundations, aggregation, counterfactual analysis and policy evaluation. We have tried to make clear the various assumptions that must be maintained to interpret aggregate crime regressions with respect to individual behavior and have emphasized how standard uses of these regressions to evaluate policy presuppose a number of assumptions. In light of disagreements about these assumptions, which ultimately underlie claims of fragility or robustness of an empirical result, we have outlined some ways of using model averaging methods and statistical decision theory to

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8Heckman (2005) and Manski (2007) provide general discussions of the limitations of experiments, with a particular focus on the assumptions implicit in treatment effect analysis; Heckman and Navarro (2004) compares the strengths and weaknesses of different empirical strategies for uncovering the determinants of individual choice.
make progress. Throughout, we have emphasized the role of judgment in empirical work, for which no algorithm exists.
Bibliography


