

March 2011

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Philip John Reny

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EDUCATION: Ph.D. Economics, Princeton University, 1988
M.A. Economics, The University of Western Ontario, 1982
B.A. Economics/Mathematics, Carleton University, 1981

POSITION:

July 1, 2007 – : William C. Norby Professor in Economics and in the College, Univ. of Chicago

July 1, 2009 – June 30, 2010: Visitor, MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern

July 1, 2006 – June 30, 2009 : Department Chair, University of Chicago

July 1, 1999 – June 30 2007: Professor in Economics and in the College, University of Chicago

July 1, 1994 – June 30, 1999: Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

July 1, 1991 - June 30, 1994: Associate Professor of Economics, Univ. of Western Ontario

July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1991: Assistant Professor of Economics, Univ. of Western Ontario

PROFESSIONAL COUNCILS/COMMITTEES:

1993-1994: Member of the Executive Council, Canadian Economics Association

1994 & 1996: Member of the Program Committee for the Summer Meetings of the
Econometric Society.

2000-2001: Program Chair of the 2001 Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society

2001-2002: Program Chair of the 13th Annual Game Theory Festival in Stony Brook

2003-2004: National Science Foundation Panel Member

2003-2004: Program Chair of the Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society

2003-2004: Council of The Game Theory Society (elected January 2008)

SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP:

1996 - Fellow of the Econometric Society
1999 - Charter Member of The Game Theory Society

RESEARCH GRANTS

1990-1992: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
1992-1995: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
1996-1998: US-Israel Binational Science Foundation
1997-1999: National Science Foundation grant # SBR-970932
2000-2003: National Science Foundation grant # SES-9905599
2003-2006: National Science Foundation grant # SES-0214421
2006-2009: National Science Foundation grant # SES-0617884
2009-2012: National Science Foundation grant # SES-0922535

PUBLICATIONS:

Reny, Philip J. (2011): "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," *Econometrica*, 79, 499-553.

Reny, Philip J.: "Strategic Approximations of Discontinuous Games," forthcoming in *Economic Theory*.

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (2007): "The Role of Excess Capacity in Determining Market Power in Natural Gas Transportation Markets," *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 32, 209-223.

Reny, Philip J., and Motty Perry (2006): "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 74, 1231-1269.

Reny, Philip J., and Motty Perry (2005): "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 72, 567-592.

Reny, Philip J., and Arthur J. Robson (2004): "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 48, 355-384.

Reny, Philip J., and Shmuel Zamir (2004): "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," *Econometrica*, 72, 1105-1126.

Govindan, Srihari, Philip J. Reny, and Arthur J. Robson (2003): "A Short Proof of Harsanyi's Purification Theorem," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 45, 369-374.

Reny, Philip J., and Arthur J. Robson (2002): "Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Public Randomization: A Short Proof," *Economics Bulletin*, 3, 1-8.

Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny (2002): "An Efficient Auction," *Econometrica*, 70, 1199-1212.

Reny, Philip J. (2001): "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach," *Economics Letters*, 70, v.1, 99-105.

Reny, Philip J. (1999): "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games." *Econometrica*, 67, 1029-1056.

Perry, Motty, and Philip J. Reny (1999): "On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions," *Econometrica*, 67, 895-900.

Perry, Motty and Philip J. Reny (1999): "A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 26, 279-285.

Reny, Philip J. and Myrna Wooders (1998): "An Extension of the KKMS Theorem." *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 29, 125-34.

Kohlberg, Elon and Philip J. Reny (1997): "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 75, 280-313.

Reny, Philip J. and Myrna Wooders (1996): "The Partnered Core of a Game Without Side Payments," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 70, 298-311.

Reny, Philip J. (1995): "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 28, 1-16.

Bhattacharya, U., Philip J. Reny., and M. Spiegel (1995): "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 65, 136-170.

Harris, C., Philip J. Reny and A. Robson (1995): "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Extensive-Form Correlation", *Econometrica*, 63, 507-544.

Perry, M., and Philip J. Reny (1994): "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," *Econometrica* 62, 795-817. Reprinted in *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, Eric Maskin (ed.), Edward-Elgar Publishing, 1999.

Elmes, S., and Philip J. Reny (1994): "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," *Journal of Economic Theory* 62, 1-23.

Perry, M., and Philip J. Reny (1993): "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," *Journal of Economic Theory* 59, 50-77.

Reny, Philip J (1993): "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information." *Journal of Economic Theory* 59, 257-274.

Reny, Philip J (1992): "Rationality In Extensive Form Games." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 6, 103-118.

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (1992): "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design." *Econometrica* 60, 395-421.

McAfee, R. Preston, and Philip J. Reny (1992): "A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem Without Closure Under Suprema," *Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society* 114, 61-67.

Reny, Philip J. (1992): "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," *Econometrica* 60, 627-649.

Hellwig, M., W. Leininger, Philip J. Reny, and Arthur Robson (1990): "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: An Elementary Approach to Existence and Approximation by Discrete Games." *Journal of Economic Theory* 52, 406-422.

McAfee, R. Preston, John McMillan, and Philip J. Reny (1989): "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction." *Econometrica* 57, 1451-1459.

Reny, Philip J. (1988): "Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information." In A. Fine and J. Leplin (eds.), *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association: Volume 2* East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association (1989): 363-369.

Chow, Gregory C., and Philip J. Reny (1985): "On Two Methods for Solving and Estimating Linear Simultaneous Equations Under Rational Expectations." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 9, 63-75.

Articles in Books and other Publications:

Reny, Philip J. (2008): "Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Existence," entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition.

Reny, Philip J. (1997): "Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core," in *Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches*, S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (eds.), Springer-Verlag.

Reny, Philip J., and Myrna Wooders (1996): "Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths," in *Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten*, W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme (eds.), Springer.

Reny, Philip J. (1991): "Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," in *Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction*, Bicchieri and Dalla Chiara (eds.), Cambridge University Press, reprinted with permission from the Philosophy of Science Association.

Books:

Jehle, Geoffrey, and Philip J. Reny (2011): *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, 3rd edition, Pearson, U.K.

Book Reviews:

Reny, Philip J., (2003): "The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 42, 327-332.

Reny, Philip J., (1995): "A Course in Game Theory: M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 28, 726-729.

Work in Progress:

Kadan, Ohad, Philip J. Reny, and Jeroen Swinkels (2010): "Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems with Private Information," MFI working paper, University of Chicago.

Hart, Sergiu and Philip J. Reny. (2010): "Revenue Maximization in Two Dimensions," mimeo, University of Chicago and The Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Hart, Sergiu, and Philip J. Reny. (2010): "Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Simple Approach," mimeo, University of Chicago and The Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Reny, Philip J. (2010): "A Simple Proof of the Nonconcavifiability of Quasiconcave Functions with Linear Not-All-Parallel Contour Sets," University of Chicago, MFI working paper series no. 2011-001, http://mfi.uchicago.edu/publications/papers/simple_proof.pdf, University of Chicago.

Williams, Michael, and Philip J. Reny. (2010): "Why Do Large Cable Companies Charge Higher Prices than Small Cable Companies?," paper not yet available.

Williams, Michael, and Philip J. Reny. (2010): "The Deterrent Effect of Cable System Clustering on Overbuilding," paper not yet available.

Reny, Philip J. (2010): "Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," paper not yet available.

Reny, Philip J. (2010): “The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference and Infinite Data Sets,” paper not yet available.

Reny, Philip J. (2010): “A Generalization of Helly’s Selection Theorem,” paper not yet available.

Perry, Motty, Arthur. J. Robson, and Philip. J. Reny (2009): “Testing Theories of Sex Against the Observation that Sex is Biparental,” mimeo, University of Chicago.

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, and Philip J Reny (2006): “Matching to Share Risk,” mimeo University of Chicago.

SERVICE TO JOURNALS:

Associate Editor

Econometrica July 1, 1999 – June 30, 2011

Editorial Board

Journal of Political Economy July 1, 2010 – present

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics July 1, 2007 – present

Referee

Journal of Economic Theory

American Economic Review

Games and Economic Behavior

Review of Economic Studies

Journal of Political Economy

Economics Letters

GRADUATE SUPERVISION:

<u>Name of Student</u>	<u>Degree Date</u>	<u>Appointment</u>
Priscilla Man	2010	University of Queensland
Francesco Decarolis*	2009	University of Wisconsin
Francesco Nava*	2009	London School of Economics
Yukio Koriyama*	2008	Ecole Polytechnique
Amit Gandhi	2006	University of Wisconsin
Jacques Potin	2005	ESSEC Business School
Alex Karaiyanov*	2003	Simon Fraser University
Vasiliki Skreta	2002	University of Minnesota
Ki Joon Jung	1998	Korean Government
Murali Agastya	1993	University College, London
Wing-Yiu Chan	1993	returned to China
Quan Wen	1991	University of Windsor
Chantalle LaCasse*	1991	University of Ottawa
Jacques Robert*	1989	University of Montreal
Dominique Demougin*	1988	University of Toronto

*Committee member.

SPEAKING INVITATIONS:

- 1987-88: McMaster University
 Harvard University
 Columbia University
 Princeton University
 Carnegie-Mellon University
 University of Toronto
- 1988-89: Carleton University
 University of Minnesota
 University of Chicago
 State University of New York at Stony Brook
 Johns Hopkins University
 Ohio State University
 University of Rochester
 University of Toronto
 Queen's University
 Brock University
- 1989-90: Northwestern University

Penn State University
University of Toronto
Stanford University
California Institute of Technology
University of California at Berkeley
University of California at San Diego
Tel Aviv University

1990-91: University of Texas at Austin
University of Wisconsin at Madison
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1991-92: University of Wisconsin at Madison
State University of New York at Buffalo
Washington University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University
Penn State University
University of Arizona
Boston University

1992-93: University of Wisconsin at Madison
Northwestern University
Stanford University
University of Windsor
University of Rochester
University of Pittsburgh
Princeton University
Yale University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University

1993-94: University of Texas at Austin
Texas A&M University
Cornell University
University of Toronto
Princeton University
McGill University
University of Michigan

1994-95 S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook
University of Pennsylvania
Stanford University
Industrial Institute for Economic

and Social Research, Stockholm

- 1995-96 Northwestern University
Penn State University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- 1996-97 University of Maryland
Princeton University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- 1997-98 University of Western Ontario
Northwestern University
Brown University
Boston University
Harvard University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- 1998-99 Brown University
University of Michigan
University of Minnesota
Princeton University
University of Rochester
University College London
Penn State University
University of Chicago
- 1999-00 Yale University
Harvard University
MIT
European University Institute
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mannheim
Bilbao
- 2000-01 Wisconsin
MEA Panel: "The Future of Microeconomic Theory"
Northwestern
Stanford
Stony Brook Plenary Speaker
- 2001-02 University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Econometric Society Winter meetings
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Northern Illinois University
Northwestern
Duke

Columbia
London Business School
London School of Economics
Dauphine, Paris

2002-03
Princeton
Yale
Harvard/MIT
Stanford
UCLA
London School of Economics
University of Paris
University of Toulouse
Northwestern University
University of Maryland
University of Wisconsin
Washington University
University of Rochester
INSEAD
Econometric Society Summer meetings, invited session
European Summer Symposium, invited session

2003-04
Vanderbilt University
University of Western Ontario
California Institute of Technology
University of California at San Diego
Keynote Speaker: Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Montreal
Woodsworth Visitor, University of British Columbia
Invited Discussant at Yale Conference on Robust Mechanism Design
Invited Lecturer, Econometric Society Meetings, Madrid

2004-05
Johns Hopkins University
Carleton University, Canada
Columbia University
Ohio State University
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Tel Aviv University
Nemmer's Conference Invited Speaker, Northwestern University

2005-06
University of Arizona
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
CIREQ Conference on Auctions Invited Speaker, University of Montreal
Decentralization Conference Invited Speaker, University of Paris
University of Pittsburgh
Yale University

2006-07
Yale University
Princeton University
Washington University
New York University
University of Pennsylvania

2007-08
Laffont Lecture, 2008 Econometric Society European Meetings
Caltech
University of Essex
Indiana University
Iowa State University
Midwest Economics Association Invited Lecture
University of North Carolina
Northwestern University
Penn State Auction Conference
University College London
UCLA
Simon Fraser Conference on Evolution and Economics
Washington University Theory Conference

2008-09
University of Barcelona, JOCS Seminar
Econometric Society Winter Meetings
University of Paris
Institut Henri Poincare
Ecole Polytechnique
University of Rochester

2009-10
Yale University
University of Western Ontario
University of California at Berkeley
Keynote Speaker, 2010 Public Economic Theory Conference, Istanbul Turkey
Pennsylvania State University
Invited Speaker, 2010 Economic Theory Workshop, Rio Brazil
Plenary Speaker, Brazilian Workshop on Game Theory 2010, Sao Paulo Brazil
Stanford University (while visiting SIEPR)
Plenary Speaker, 2010 Stony Brook Game Theory Conference

2010-11