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Arbitration and Access to Courts: Economic Analysis

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**I. Introduction**

Mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are widely regarded as problematic because they limit consumer’s access to judicial forums, and potentially to any kind of remedy. “Large areas of U.S life and commerce have silently been insulated from the lawsuit culture.”[[2]](#footnote-2) While public courts are cheap for plaintiffs to access and grant them generous procedural opportunities, the concern is that arbitration is costly to employ and stingier in its procedural and remedial options.

Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are chosen bilaterally by the parties. But many viewers would reject the superficial implication that such choices represent the interests and incentives of both sides.[[3]](#footnote-3) For one, the choice whether to agree to mandatory arbitration is not much of a choice when all vendors who compete in some product space require an agreement to arbitration. It is possible, though, that if consumers demanded access to litigation in courts, some vendors would respond by removing the mandatory arbitration provisions. But consumers, of course, manifest no such demand at the time of contracting.

Consumers’ ex ante apathy towards arbitration clauses may indicate a rational response if consumers indeed have little to gain from access to litigation, and if litigation is, as Gerhard Wagner explained so clearly, inferior by being more costly and overly obsessed with ex post accuracy.[[4]](#footnote-4) But the apathy may also indicate irrational myopia, a failure to account for the problems that might occur when non-conforming products or services are rendered and redress sought. Or, the apathy may simply indicate that consumers do not bother to read contracts (which we know they don’t), and thus are simply uninformed about their agreement to relinquish their access to public courts.

If arbitration is not chosen for its efficiency and mutual benefit, the suspicion then falls on the vendors who draft these clauses for self-serving reasons. As Wagner notes, “it seems plausible to assume that [. . .] arbitration is chosen not for its virtues as a dispute resolution mechanism but as a tool for potential defendants to altogether remove the incentive for consumers to enforce small claims.”[[5]](#footnote-5) If that is the case, then “such clauses should not be enforced at all because any gains from aggregate litigation in terms of better incentives to take care ex ante would be lost.”[[6]](#footnote-6) And many commentators—and quite a few American courts—share this sentiment, although basing more on ex post remedial concerns, rather than on ex ante deterrence.[[7]](#footnote-7) The overwhelming conclusion in the commentary is that arbitration has the “capacity to reduce, if not altogether eliminate, access to the courts and to the law.”[[8]](#footnote-8) I will call this concern the “limited access to remedy” hypothesis, and explore its validity.

Under the limited-access-to-remedy view of consumer arbitration, litigation provides better access to remedies and to justice because it is cheaper to file and to pursue, it provides more effective procedural weapons (like discovery), it is public and thus has precedential value, and it allows for class representation (which arbitration could too, but often does not). As a result, consumers as a group are disfavored, whereas the more powerful businesses benefit.[[9]](#footnote-9)

The question whether arbitration is, in general, less accessible to consumers than litigation is difficult to untangle empirically. Instead, I want to ask a subtler question: assuming that arbitration poses different burdens than litigation, who among consumers types are affected? Which consumers are disfavored, facing greater difficulties in vindicating meritorious claims? And which consumers, perhaps, benefit? If consumers vary in their sophistication, education, wealth, vulnerability, type of injuries, litigiousness, or other traits, does the denial of access to courts hurt weaker consumers more? Does it hurt the more sophisticated consumers more? Rather than looking at “consumers as a group”—as most of the literature does—it is my goal to examine if sub groups of consumers are affected more than others.

The concerns over access to justice would be all the more powerful if the denial of access to courts is disproportionately affecting weak consumers. Indeed, this is a plausible conjecture: those who have less resources and less sophistication, are less likely to be able to pay the upfront fees of filing for arbitration, and thus less access to arbitration or to any kind of redress.[[10]](#footnote-10) On the other hand, the concerns over access to justice would be weakened if it would turn out that only elite groups of consumers are harshly affected by the limited access to remedy, and that—in an unappreciated way, by eliminating an implicit cross-subsidy—weak consumers benefit.

This question—the differential effect of consumer protections among groups of consumers—is not often addressed directly by legal commentators. Instead, it is often implicitly assumed that mandatory protections are of greater benefit to the neediest of consumers. Richard Epstein, for example, has recently conceded that strong consumer protections benefit the weak consumers and could have a progressive effect. In commenting on the proposed mandatory regulations under the Common European Sales Law, Epstein was ready to “assume that the less-sophisticated half of SMEs or consumers stand to benefit from the [protective] regulation and the more-sophisticated half of SMEs or consumers are hurt by them, in equal degrees.” Indeed, he saw this protective regime “an implicit cross-subsidy of weak consumers by their stronger counterparts.”[[11]](#footnote-11) This is an intuitive assumption. Strong consumer protections might benefit *weaker* consumers more because strong consumers can take care of themselves—they can rely on reputation, or advice, or informal sanctions, or market research, or insurance, or a host of protective substitutes before making a purchase—and are thus less dependent on paternalistic legal protections.

And yet, my goal in this paper is to highlight the opposite possibility, that mandatory protections could be regressive, in benefitting the stronger consumers disproportionately, and at times at the direct expense of the weak. I will focus on one type of mandatory protection—access to litigation—but the argument might be of relevance in other contexts as well.

Before launching into this inquiry, it is important to mention one factor that might suppress any differential effect that access to litigation might have across consumer types: class actions. To the extent that litigation is a public good—produced by few to the benefit of all—the superior access that some groups enjoy would not disproportionately benefit it. Even if only the privileged few among consumers could launch litigation campaigns against businesses, the class representation feature would guarantee the spillover of the benefit to all. This universal benefit could be in the form of class-wide recovery; or, even more importantly, it can be in the form of deterrence vis-à-vis potential offenders. Thus, for access-to-litigation to have any differential effect—either progressive (as imagined by some) or regressive (as argued in this paper)—it must be that class action judgments do not affect all consumers equally, or that class actions selectively address sub-categories of complaints that are more important to some groups, and less to others. These issues will be discussed in the final section of the paper.

**II. “Open Access” and Redistribution**

Open access to courts is a species of “access” policy, and so let us begin by thinking more generally about open access within our social order. The ideal of open access is fundamental to the allocation of primary goods in a liberal society. Societies provide open access to a variety of basic goods and services like primary education, public parks and beaches, roads, libraries, museums, emergency services, and, of course, courts of law.

There is a strong notion of equality underlying such open access policies. If these goods and services where subject to market allocations, instead of being open to all through government mandates (and funding), the poor and the less sophisticated would disproportionately be priced out. Open access enables those who could not otherwise afford to pay entry tolls and service fees to consume the freely accessed good. Since it is funded by tax revenue, the open access policy is an implicit cross subsidy. If tax revenues are collected more from the wealthy, but the good is available to all and broadly used by lower income citizens, the cross subsidy is a form of progressive, redistributive allocation.

In some important cases, the cross-subsidy brought upon by open access is indeed progressive, favoring low-income people. This is largely the case with respect to primary school education in most big American cities, as well as access to emergency medical care, or to city parks. In the public school context, two important sources of funding are property and income taxes, which are paid largely by higher income property owners. And public schools are more likely to be attended by low-income population, since higher income families often opt out for private education. The same is true for city parks and beaches, a more likely destination of low-income residents who cannot afford remote and luxurious vacation destinations.

But in an important class of cases, the direction of the cross subsidy is often favorable to the middle class. George Stigler called it “Director’s Law” of public income redistribution, suggesting that public expenditures financed by taxes are often made for the primary benefit of the middle class.[[12]](#footnote-12) He suggested that social security, or tax exemptions for churches, are example for such pro- middle class redistribution. Social security, for example, taxes most heavily, relative to the benefits they will receive, those who begin work early (instead of continuing in school) or those who die early, all favoring the middle class.

The direction of the cross subsidy becomes less obvious, and tends towards the regressive, when we consider open access to, for example, remote parks, libraries, or museums. To access a remote national park, people need to travel a distance, and those with cars, with leisure time, with appreciation for nature, and with disposable income to pay the cost of travel are more likely to access the remote parks. The Indiana Dunes National Park is indeed open and free to all, but a 45-minute drive from Chicago, it is largely inaccessible to most lower income residents of the city’s south side. Access is subject to an implicit cost of approach, or it provides the types of benefits, that disproportionately filter out low-income people and draw the wealthy and the middle class. Public expenditures on maintaining this this type of free access are regressive.

Regressivity, as used here (and in the public finance literature) has two facets. On the one hand, expenditures could be considered regressive whenever poorer populations utilize the goods that the expenditures finance at a less than proportional rates.[[13]](#footnote-13) In this sense, lower rates of utilization indicate that supply-side subsidies are regressive even in societies where those subsidies are financed by progressive taxes. The assessment that expenditures are regressive is made on the basis of how the benefits are distributed.

On the other hand, regressivity could represent a stronger form of inequality—any time the public expenditures increase the overall inequality of income and welfare distribution.[[14]](#footnote-14) Here, the assessment that expenditures are regressive is made not only on the basis of how the benefits are distributed, but also on who pays for them. The poor pay for what the more affluent consume.

Transportation and roads, for example, are sometimes regressive in the first sense. First, usage rates of open roads and public transportation may be naturally higher among middle- and upper-income users than poorer users.[[15]](#footnote-15) The poor are less likely to drive cars and enjoy benefits from roads and highways. Many among the poor do not drive (due to disability or poverty), many who do drive do not commute (they are retired or disabled), and many who do commute work close to home. Even bus subsidies, it was documented in some places, may lead to an increase in relative use by middle-income passengers (although such policies can also have other progressive effects).[[16]](#footnote-16) Second, it is usually difficult to *target* the transportation expenditures towards poorer groups, unless projects are specifically aimed at improving the poor’s access to infrastructure (e.g. a new Metro stop in a poor neighborhood). More generally, a World Bank study of utilities subsidies—the paradigmatic quantity-based subsidies (ones that are proportional to the amount of the service consumed)—found that of the 25 subsidies considered, *none* were progressive.[[17]](#footnote-17) Accordingly, road and transport policies that eliminate the open access—for example, collection of tolls—are often found to be overall progressive.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Further, if the costs of roads and motorized transportations services are borne by general taxes and impose externalities on all (pollution, congestion, injuries), and if middle income (and up) people not only use transportation more, but gain access through it to income producing opportunities, then the open roads and transportation policy may be regressive in the stronger sense, of increasing the overall degree of inequality.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Similarly, to access a public library and even more so a museum, people have to appreciate the fine arts or literature, a trait that is correlated with income, and they have to be part of social networks that reward fluency in literature and arts. It is possible that some of the services offered freely by public libraries, like free computer and internet access to local residents, are progressive—benefitting low income people who do not have an internet connected computer at home. But other services, for example, the maintenance of expensive collections of works, benefits more the elites.[[20]](#footnote-20) Since they are largely funded by wealthy philanthropists, museums are not necessarily regressive institutions. However, tax credits for the philanthropic class are a form of public expenditure, constituting a transfer from the general budget that funds all programs to the budget of cultural institutions that cater largely to the moderately wealthy patrons.[[21]](#footnote-21)

**III. Regressive Access Policies**

We have seen that open access policies may or may not be progressive. Some benefit the poor, but others benefit the elites. This section examines a few examples of legal policies that have the unintended cross subsidy of the elite.

1. *Products Liability*

Tort and products liability create regressive redistributive effects whereby poor consumers subsidize the insurance and compensation of wealthier consumers. In areas like automobile accidents and products liability, tort law embodies an insurance element, because the losses recovered by victims are spread (through the price of products or through mandatory insurance) to all consumers. This form of insurance creates perverse and regressive cross subsidies, as poor consumers unknowingly subsidize the insurance of wealthier consumers of the same mass-market product.

Products liability, for example, is regarded widely as a method to accord all consumers equal protection and redress in using products. What is less often understood is that this equal-access-to-remedy policy has unintended distributive effects.[[22]](#footnote-22) Since sellers lack the ability to discriminate ex-ante in price between different groups of consumers according to characteristics such as wealth or propensity towards getting into accidents, all customers end up paying an equal implicit premium in the form of a higher product price. The products liability awards paid at the end of the day are, however, based on victim-specific characteristics. Accident-prone and high-loss consumers benefit at the expense of safe and low-loss consumers. Specifically, high-income consumers receive greater benefits, since the awards for damages in tort law are correlated with lost income.[[23]](#footnote-23) This cross subsidy in favor of the wealthier consumers is bolstered by the fact they are more likely to seek an attorney and to sue and to recover for their damages.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Thus, in a system where liability is imposed on the sellers, low-income consumers subsidize the high-income ones who buy the same product, either by paying for an implicit compensation fund that benefits the high-income disproportionately, or by paying for safety improvements that reflect the safety preferences of the wealthy. Moreover, for some low income consumers the insurance premium included in the price of the product might become prohibitive and cause them to avoid purchasing the product. While they no longer cross-subsidize the wealthy, the adverse effect on these weaker, poorer, groups further undermines an even more important “equal access” policy—the equal access to markets.

1. *Mental Health Insurance*

The products liability example above illustrates a more general phenomenon of insurance: elites can often take greater advantage of insurance benefits that are equally available to all. This effect has been suspected also in the area of health insurance. For example, elites are less sensitive to copayments and thus can more easily access the treatment benefits that the poor are equally entitled to, but have more difficulty to trigger.[[25]](#footnote-25) As health plans and medical and insurance bureaucracies become more complex, it is the affluent elite that can better understand and utilize the benefits.[[26]](#footnote-26) The disproportionate rate of utilization of benefits can become regressive in the strong sense if it outweighs the disproportionate premiums that the affluent pay.

This regressive effect—a wealth transfer from those with less means to the more affluent—has been documented, for example, in the area of mental health. Barak Richman found that under health plans that provide equal mental health coverage benefits, whites and high-income individuals consume more services than nonwhites and low-income individuals.[[27]](#footnote-27) If mandatory health insurance premiums are withheld in equal amounts from all insured workers, this might create a regressive effect.[[28]](#footnote-28)

In a further study, Richman et al. demonstrate that the greater use of mental health treatments among whites and high-income patients is not explained by greater incidence of mental illness.[[29]](#footnote-29) Nonwhites and low-income individuals simply do not take advantage of their mental health benefits at the same rates as their white and more affluent coworkers, and to the degree that they seek care for mental illnesses, they are more likely to turn to general practitioners rather than to mental health professionals. Differences in mental health services consumption patterns were also evident across race. For example, it was found that whites take advantage of outpatient mental health benefits four times more often than blacks. Strikingly, there is no significant evidence that higher incidence of outpatient mental healthcare reduces the likelihood of adverse mental health (measured by the probability of hospitalization for mental illness).

If these studies are right – if mental health insurance mandates like the one being instituted under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act benefit the elites more – they constitute transfers from nonwhites to whites and from low-income to high-income workers. They are available to all, and they are commonly supported by the rhetoric of access for the weaker, otherwise uninsured, groups. But, as insurance goes, all pay for them through higher premiums, and—regressively—elites enjoy them far more often.

1. *Mandated Disclosure*

Mandated disclosure is another equal access policy. It distributes information to all, in equal portions. But free access to information and disclosure does not mean equal utilization of it. The information has to be noticed, read, understood, processed and then used in a way that improves decisions and outcomes. In each one of these steps, the poor and poorly educated benefit less than the wealthy and the better off.

Medical informed consent forms—one of the crown jewel of the mandatory disclosure paradigm—are so long and complex, mostly written at a literacy level exceeding that of poor and unsophisticated patients.[[30]](#footnote-30) Similarly, consumer financial disclosures require some financial education and savvy to be useful. Better educated (and wealthier) consumers know better how to search for information, understand it, ask questions about it, comparison-shop, and receive better advise with it.[[31]](#footnote-31) They are likelier to have baseline education and experience with which to interpret information. Even simple information disclosed in the sale of used cars—the car’s safety and repair history, odometer readings, and warranties—seem not to help the poor, who continue to pay more for worse quality cars. In an unintended way, but not surprising, mandated disclosure solutions may have even failed to improve the relative situation of the poor.[[32]](#footnote-32)

But mandated disclosures not only benefit the better off, they can hurt the worse off. If the costs and other burdens of disclosure are borne equally, or even disproportionately, by the less educated poor—those least likely to enjoy them—disclosures create a regressive wealth transfer. Although not general, there are some disturbing instances in which this phenomenon has been empirically documented. For example, hospitals must disclose report cards—scores that measure of the quality of treatment they provide, most often mortality rates. There is some evidence that this mandate led hospital to improve the reported dimensions, but there are also discouraging findings that the disclosure hurt the sicker and poorer patients. Healthier patients found their way to higher rated hospitals, while sicker patients were treated in hospitals with worse grades. Researchers found “marginal health benefits for healthy patients, and major adverse health consequences for sicker patients.”[[33]](#footnote-33) Perhaps this is due to the enhanced ability of more sophisticated patients to enter higher quality hospitals, thereby leaving less space or bumping out the less sophisticated and sicker patients (a “musical chairs” dynamic). The disclosure regime—although equally accessible and distributed to all—appears to have made things better for the rich and worse for the poor.

In sum, mandated disclosure often benefits the privileged more than the unprivileged. Disclosures are nuts distributed to all, but only those with teeth can bite. And “teeth” are evidently correlated with wealth and privilege.

1. *Accommodations for Disabilities*

In general, laws mandating access for people with disability have an important effect that goes beyond income redistribution. Enabling disabled people to access public areas, buildings, and transportation allows them fuller participation in society, and serves the goal of “equal access to societal opportunities.”[[34]](#footnote-34) For example, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 forbids organizations and employers from excluding or denying individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to receive program benefits and services. It is aimed to “guarantee equality of opportunity” and “equal access” for people with disabilities.[[35]](#footnote-35)

But disability accommodations could be regressive, when they disproportionally benefit high income and elite groups. Consider the following example. Under Section 504, public school students with disabilities are entitled to accommodations such as additional time on exams and assignments. There is now growing evidence that in reality students from affluent areas are far more likely to enjoy these accommodations than students from poor families. Based on data from the U.S. Department of Education's Civil Rights Data Collection, it was shown that students in wealthy districts have nearly 5 times more utilization of the accommodations, relative to the state average. In Illinois, only about 1% of public school students statewide had Section 504 accommodations, compared to 5% in Chicago’s wealthy suburbs. The 20 districts with the highest percentages enrollment had 76% white enrollments and all had lower percentage of poverty than the state average, while the 20 districts with the lowest enrollment were only 19% white and far higher poverty than the state average.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Section 504 was designed to level the playing field for people with disabilities in order to afford them equal opportunities. In a broad range of areas, it benefits people with disabilities relative to others. But in some areas, it is a privilege that is not simple or cheap to invoke. First, some measure of sophistication is necessary to know about the available accommodations and rights, and to ask for it. Second, exam accommodations require the qualifying student to be diagnosed as having a learning disability. These diagnostics are expensive and require both financial investment and motivation. It is here that a gap between the sophisticated and the poor re-emerges, and the accommodations disproportionally benefit high income and elite groups.

This is not a transfer from the poor to the wealthy, because the advantages accorded to disabled students in wealthy suburbs do not come at the expense of disabled students in poor districts. Instead, the advantages are largely at the expense of healthy students (and disproportionately those from wealthy suburbs). But as long as the accommodations benefit the wealthy and not the poor, the relative opportunities of the wealthy increase, contributing to the relative deprivation of the poor.

1. *The General Pattern*

The pattern that the examples above demonstrate is the following. An open access policy can unintentionally become regressive if two conditions are met:

1. Wealthier sub-groups are more likely to enjoy the benefits of open access
2. Poorer sub-groups pay a share for the funding of the open access that exceeds their proportional benefits.

That is, when the proportion paid by the poor is greater than the rate by which they withdraw the benefits, the policy is regressive.

To illustrate this general pattern, consider the following numerical example. Imagine a society in which there are 100 consumers. The rich (20% of population) have a base income of 1000; the middle class (40%) have a base income of 400; and the poor (40%) have a base income of 100.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Consumer type | Frequency | Base Income per consumer |
| Wealthy | 20% | 1000 |
| Middle class | 40% | 400 |
| Poor | 40% | 100 |

A social policy is enacted, which provides equal access. The benefit of the policy depends on income: each consumer’s direct benefit from the policy equals 10% of its base income. (For example, the policy might be a social insurance plan that pays benefits proportional to income.) The cost of the policy is divided equally across all consumers. (For example, the cost of the insurance benefit is bundled into the price of a product that everyone buys).

In this scenario, each rich consumer enjoys a benefit of 100 from the policy (10% of 1000); each middle class consumer enjoys a benefit of 40; and each poor consumer enjoys a benefit of 10. The total benefits to the citizenry under the policy is

20×100 + 40×40 + 40×10 = 4000.

Since the benefits of the policy have to be paid for, a total revenue of 4000 has to raised from all consumers. And, if as assumed, the cost of the policy is divided equally across all consumers, then each pays 40 (for a total revenue of 100×40 = 4000, equal to the cost of the program).

As a result, the net income for consumers, which includes their base income, plus the benefit from the program, net of the cost charged, is the following:

 Rich: 1000 +100 – 40 = 1060

 Middle class: 400 + 40 – 40 = 400

 Poor: 100 + 10 – 40 = 70

The following table summarizes this synthetic example:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Consumer type | Frequency | Base Income per consumer | Combined Benefit from program (10% of income) | Net Income per consumer |
| Wealthy | 20% | 1000 | 20×100 =2000 | 1060 |
| Middle class | 40% | 400 | 40×40=1600 | 400 |
| Poor | 40% | 100 | 40×10=400 | 70 |

In this example, the program is open to all, but it is regressive because the benefits accrue disproportionately to the wealthy, while the poor pay an equal price. The policy effectuates a net transfer—a cross-subsidy—from the poor to the rich, whereas the middle class is overall unaffected.

To be sure, many policies have effects not only on distribution, but on overall welfare as well. For example, a policy that increases overall welfare could mitigate (but not eliminate) the regressive effect if the poor enjoy some of the increased welfare. Similarly, many policies secure benefits to consumers, at a cost that is only partially borne by them (and partially borne by others, e.g., producers). Still, even if the beneficiary group bears only part of the cost, the division of benefits and costs within the beneficiary consumer group could leave the weakest among them worse off.

In the above example, imagine that consumer have to pay only half of the benefit that they get from the policy. Since the total cost of the policy is 4000, half of the cost, 2000, is borne by consumers—a per-consumer cost of 20. This half-cost can be a result of the efficiency of the policy (generating gross benefit of 4000 at a cost of only 2000), or it could be a result of the successful shifting of part of the cost to some external group (“producers”). Either way, the resulting net income would be 1080, 42, and 90 for the rich, middle-class, and poor, respectively. Still, despite the net improvement in the condition of the consumers as a group, the poor are still worse off, and still partially cross-subsidize the benefit to the rich.

**IV. Access to Remedies**

Mandatory arbitration clauses deny consumers access to litigation in courts and replace it instead with arbitration. The working hypothesis among many commentators and courts is that this access denial is a burden to consumers, who would otherwise fare better in securing a remedy through courts. Arbitration is thus viewed as a more effective shield for businesses against lawsuits, reducing the businesses’ liability.

In this section, I will take this premise as a starting point. Some empirical work has contested this view, that arbitration reduces consumers’ recovery, suggesting that consumers (or, for that matter employees, who are also contractually obligated to pursue their complaints through arbitration) actually fair well in arbitration, relative to litigation. But the empirical question remains open and widely controversial.[[37]](#footnote-37) My argument, instead, is that if arbitration indeed reduces consumers’ recovery, this effect is potentially favorable not only to businesses, but also to the weakest sub-groups of consumers. This is a direct application of the strong form of the regressive cross-subsidy idea. Access to litigation is an open-access policy that, although available to all, it disproportionately utilized by the sophisticated elite, and these benefits are partially funded by the less sophisticated consumers. Accordingly, if indeed arbitration restricts access to lawsuits and to recovery, it removes the disproportionate benefit and thus eliminates a regressive cross-subsidy.

1. *Who Benefits from Access to Litigation?*

When access to courts and to litigation is free and unrestricted, who takes advantage of it? In order to pursue any kind of litigation strategy, the aggrieved claimant has to understand that its rights were violated. He also has to believe that a court would share this view and be persuaded that a violation occurred, and have enough of a litigious nature to undertake the ordeal of an adversary court dispute. He then has to find an attorney that would take the case (and pay the attorney). And, importantly, the claimant has to have the patience to await a remedy that sometimes takes years to secure.

All these are features that some consumers have, and others don’t. But the distribution of these features is not random among consumers. Rather, these characteristics are far more likely to be found in wealthier, more educated, and more sophisticated consumers.[[38]](#footnote-38) Take the first link in this chain—the claimant’s ability to recognize that a violation occurred. Even this basic link is more likely to be satisfied when the consumer is sophisticated. The consumer has to know his rights, and for that the consumer has to be educated enough to read, understand, and exploit the information written (sometimes in legal language) in the consumer contract and in other lengthy mandated disclosures that spell out the consumer’s rights. For example, if the consumer is shocked about a large unexpected fee that the service provider inserted into the bill, or about the personal data that the business harvested from the consumer’s account, the consumer needs to verify that the fee, or the data collection practice, are a violation of the fine print terms and conditions or of the privacy policy to which the consumer agreed upfront.

It is well documented that poor, less-educated consumers are less likely to successfully read and understand the terms of the contract.[[39]](#footnote-39) For one, it is no small task to recognize a violation, when it requires reading and understanding contracts and complex legal texts. One study suggests that only 3-4% of the population can understand the language in which contracts are drafted.[[40]](#footnote-40) And to recognize a violation and articulate a complaint, consumers have to be able to perform nontrivial numeracy skills, including some understanding of risk and probabilities—which they often lack. For example only 18% of respondents in a survey could calculate how much a $200 investment that earns 10% interest per year would yield after 2 years ($242).[[41]](#footnote-41) Or, only 16% of sample of surveyed women of above-average literacy answered correctly three basic questions about probability: (1) how often a flipped coin comes up heads in 1,000 tries, (2) what 1% of 1,000 is, and (3) to turn a proportion (1 in 1000) into a percentage.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Not only are illiteracy and innumeracy widespread, they are particularly common among vulnerable people. This is a well-known and documented fact: according to the U.S. Department of Education, income is significantly associated with higher literacy levels. Minorities, and people receiving public assistance, all have lower levels of income and thus literacy.[[43]](#footnote-43)

If a precondition to litigation is to recognize that your rights have been violated, and if only 20% of the population is literate enough to locate such information in legal documents,[[44]](#footnote-44) and if these skill are concentrated in the hands of the educated well-earning elite, then the access to litigation is an open access policy that benefits the elite more. Mandated disclosures, which are first and foremost enacted to help the poor, only exacerbate the cross-subsidy. The more disclosure-trained and cautious are the readers (who are disproportionately well educated), the greater their relative advantage.

But weak consumers are disproportionately likely to seek remedies in court for reasons beyond their poor ability to read boilerplate and understand their rights. The poor and the less sophisticated endure more abuse and exploitation by dealing with lower quality vendors, and as a result their expectations for decent treatment—and for remedies in the event that it is not rendered—may be comparatively depressed.[[45]](#footnote-45)

Further, even when they are defrauded, the magnitudes of their claims are smaller. True, some violations of rights lead to fixed, lump-sum recovery (e.g., statutory damages), or to recovery that is independent of wealth (e.g., medical expenses). But many violations lead to losses that do depend on income.[[46]](#footnote-46) Wealthier people buy more products and pay higher prices, which account for larger nominal losses when fraud or violation occurs. And wealthier people may suffer larger losses when recovery is measured by earning capacity, lost income, or lost property value.

If the poor have lower nominal claims, they become less attractive clients for attorneys. As it is, there is evidence that only 5% of individuals with claims who seek private representation are able to obtain counsel.[[47]](#footnote-47) Low claims leave less net recovery once litigation costs are accounted for (and there is plenty of evidence that litigation indeed takes longer than arbitration, and although the possibility of settlements blurs the empirical comparison, settlements in the shadow of costly litigation are likely to be stingier).[[48]](#footnote-48) And among people who go to court and self-represent, the poor and less educated are also less effective in advocating their claims. There is some important evidence that litigation is a cost effective dispute resolution strategy only for high-stake claims. Most poor consumers don’t have such claims; their small cases are cheaper to pursue in arbitration.[[49]](#footnote-49)

Moreover, courts operate slowly and court-awarded remedies take time to secure. The higher the consumer/plaintiff’s discount rate, the less valuable is the delayed recovery (even if it is compounded by interest), and the more amenable the consumer to accept a small settlement rather than “vindicate” his legal rights in trial.

Finally, litigation is risky business. The greater uncertainty there is about the outcome of litigation, the less beneficial it is to risk averse plaintiffs, who would either accept lower settlements or drop their suits altogether.[[50]](#footnote-50) It is widely accepted that poorer individuals exhibit higher degrees of risk aversion,[[51]](#footnote-51) and thus value the prospect of the litigation “damages lottery” less.

All this suggests that the litigation right would be more valuable, and more commonly employed, with better returns and larger settlements, by strong consumers—those who know their rights and can effectively pursue them against a sophisticated business opponent. This conclusion is consistent with empirical findings in the area of employee claims—where even when litigation is permitted (that is, not barred by pre-dispute arbitration clauses), there are almost no cases of successful litigation commenced by lower-paid wage workers. Eisenberg and Hill argue that “the absence of cases of this type is likely explained by the fact that lower-paid employees seem to lack ready access to court, as other researchers have reported.”[[52]](#footnote-52) Hill concluded that for employees with income below $60,000 litigation is unrealistic, whereas arbitration is.[[53]](#footnote-53) And St. Antoine reports that defendants “wait out most smaller claims, assuming employees will not be able to pursue them in court.”[[54]](#footnote-54) Arbitration is more accessible to low-wage claimants, who are less likely to utilize the litigation option even when it exists. If this employment-dispute resolution pattern is general and applies also in other consumer claims, it provides important indication that the access to litigation deals a disproportionate ex-post benefit to high-wage, high-claim plaintiffs.

1. *Who Pays for Access to Litigation?*

If Litigation is disproportionately accessed by sophisticated elites, it is regressive in the weak sense—a benefit that the poor utilize at a relatively low rate. For Litigation access to be regressive in the stronger sense—increasing the overall degree of inequality in income and welfare—the poor have to bear the cost of litigation at a rate exceeding their utilization of it. That is, the added recovery enjoyed by the elite group of consumers has to be financed, at least in part, by the poor and unsophisticated consumers.

Here, I can only make several conjectures. First, let us return to the assumption mentioned at the outset of this section—that arbitration is cheaper for business than litigation (an assumption regularly made by many commentators, in suggesting that vendors draft arbitration terms to reduce their legal exposure and save money).[[55]](#footnote-55) The most compelling reason for this assumption is the cost of liability. Arbitration that effectively expensive actions reduces the liability exposures of firms, and likely also the cost of liability insurance. If the heightened litigation risk is indeed costly to vendors, then some of the cost of access to litigation would be rolled into the price of the service. In highly competitive industries, most if not all this cost would be reflected in higher prices to consumers; whereas in concentrated industries, only part of this cost would be borne by consumers, and the rest by the vendors, depending on the elasticity of demand.

If consumers as a group pay higher prices when they have the right to sue, then those who are less likely to invoke the litigation right end up paying for the right that others utilize. While I am not aware of direct evidence on the effect of litigation risk on product prices, the dynamics of this cross subsidy is familiar in other contexts. Take, for example, the right to litigate health benefits. Some legal systems recognize a constitutional claim for “right-to-health,” which allows individuals to seek court protection of their right to various medical treatments. Denial by health providers of these constitutionally protected treatments could be litigated and overturned by courts. A study in Brazil (where such right-to-health is recognized) showed that the litigation that ensued under this access-to-medicine paradigm was largely to the benefit of elites, intended to secure “high-tech” and experimental medicines.[[56]](#footnote-56) The vast majority of the cases litigated were brought by a privileged minority seeking access to “high-cost medicines, such as new types of insulin for diabetes and new cancer drugs” that were otherwise excluded by health administrators because of low effectiveness. It was shown that the right-to-health litigation was largely concentrated in the richest regions, where a small minority “is able to use the court system to its advantage.” Access to courts is otherwise “beyond the means and reach of most poor Brazilians.”[[57]](#footnote-57) Further, the cost of these augmented treatments is borne by others. As state resources devoted to health and provision of medications is fixed, such litigation reallocates general health expenditure, which would otherwise benefit broader populations, in favor of the litigating minority.

**V. A Benefit from Class Actions?**

One of the important practical implications of mandatory arbitration, and perhaps their primary objective, is the removal of class representation. Arbitration clauses not only require plaintiffs to turn to arbitration, they also bar aggregation of suits. It is possible, then, that litigation—even if triggered by the wealthy and the sophisticates—would serve the benefit of the poor in two ways. First, it would enable the poor to piggyback on the litigation effort of others, and collect the recovery that every member of the class is entitled to without any deliberate effort. Second, importantly, if the threat of class actions changes the behavior of potential defendants—sellers and businesses serving the poor—this deterrent effect is a public good benefitting all equally.

This is an important qualification that, if true, diminishes the regressive concern developed in this paper. It would, of course, also diminish any progressive ambition that litigation access, as a form of consumer protection, might have. It would suggest, though, that the problem with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements is not related to the type of arbitration procedures chosen (e.g., ones with high filing fees or stingy discovery)—a concern that many American courts seem to have been focusing on[[58]](#footnote-58)—but rather it is the class action bar.

The discussion below will address the two potential class-wide effects of class actions, recovery to all and shared benefit from deterrence. The first effect—the poor piggybacking on the litigation efforts of others—is a phantom. The dynamics of ex post recovery in class actions does not vindicate this interest. Still, the more substantial benefit to the poor may be the second effect—the ex ante deterrence that class actions could potentially engender. It would suggest that class action bars, implemented through mandatory arbitration, are harmful to the poor, but for a different reason than that which animates American case law. This objection to arbitration rests not on the normative foundation of “access to justice” nor of victims receiving proper corrective redress, but rather on the importance of having bad actors pay for their misdeeds. In fact, deterrence might work best if the payments of class action judgments go to the pocket of rich plaintiffs attorneys, and almost never to compensate the truly poor and the worst off among consumers. The more attorneys benefit by such suits, the more motivated they would be to produce this form of deterrence.

1. *Recovery to All?*

Consider, first, the proposition that the poor benefit from class-wide recovery: at no cost to them, poor class members recover at least part of their loss. There is plenty of sobering evidence showing that only a small, negligible fraction of the class members actually redeem their share of the class recovery. For example, many class actions end with the attorneys representing the class being paid in cash, but the consumer-members receiving coupons. The average redemption rate of various coupons has been measured somewhere between 1%-6%, mirroring the typical corporate-issued promotional coupon redemption rate.[[59]](#footnote-59) In one consumer class action alleging deceptive business practices, members were entitled to a total potential compensation of $64 million, but redemption was less than $1.8 million.[[60]](#footnote-60) Or, when Ford agreed to a settlement in a class action over the Explorer SUV rollover problem, it was estimated to cost approximately $500 million. But less than 1% of the eligible consumers signed up to collect their recovery.[[61]](#footnote-61)

There are, to be sure, ways to increase participation rates by providing cash payments rather than coupons, auto-enrollment with sticky opt-outs, and other procedural designs. But in many cases any meaningful consumer recovery would require some active steps by the class members, triggering again the disproportionately low participation rate by the poor, which means that any more-accessible recovery format would benefit all consumers, but the poor least. They do not know that they are part of a represented class action, they do not read the boilerplate notices about the settlements, and have lesser need for any recovery package other than cash.

Furthermore, since many of the compensation schedules are set by the plaintiff’s attorney and defendants in the settlement agreement—both of whom have little interest to maximize the payouts to the anonymous class members who are under-represented in these settlement negotiations—the mechanism is inherently likely to shortchange the poorest among the class members.

It is possible that the value of class litigation would accrue to all, if the remedy granted is a forward looking injunction or corrective advertising. But businesses would have no incentive to comply prior to the issue of an injunction. Furthermore, there is less reason to expect that attorneys and plaintiffs will launch costly class-wide litigation without the reward of compensatory damages. Cease and desist suits are therefore the likely domain of agency-led enforcement.

1. *Deterrence*

What about the deterrence effect? Do class member—rich and poor alike—enjoy the compliance incentives that the threat of class action creates?

A deterrence effect would arise if class actions lead to substantial judgments and settlements that are paid out. The deterrence effect would diminish if these judgments and settlements are only partially cashed in by consumers. While we know that redemption rates are low, we also know that, businesses do seem to worry about the potential class action liability (or else they would not draft class action waivers through arbitration clauses). And so, it is plausible that costly liability is generated even through partial redemption, forcing businesses to account for it in planning their primary conduct.

Ideally, class actions would target the firms that commit the worst offenses against consumers. They would target producers who deceive consumers (e.g, by falsely labeling products and charging higher prices); or manufacturers of defective and injurious products; or business who fraudulently bill consumers more than they are entitled. But since class actions are often driven by the financial incentives of the attorneys launching them, they are likely to target the firms that have deep enough pockets to pay. Bear in mind that firms with deep pockets are often those that have successfully developed strong brands and have much invested in their reputation. If a feature of the product malfunctions, or if the firm promoted a feature that caused disappointment to consumers, the firm with the strong brand and wide reputation would have more on the line and a stronger incentive to redress the problem to avoid the negative reviews. If the business stonewalls and refuses to redress a complaint, it may likely be the type of complaint that invokes a technical or frivolous violation, or a matter of minor value.

To be sure, there are many meritorious claims against shady businesses specializing in the gray areas of sub-prime lending (e.g, credit-repair organizations, debt-collection practices), and pursuing them through class actions could be particularly advantageous to the poor. Class actions in these areas could at times provide an important supplement to public enforcement, and arbitration clauses that shut down the class action avenue would then be harmful, especially to the poor that benefit from the deterrence effect of these suits. Indeed, many consumer protection statutes specifically envision class actions as an effective way of deterring patterns of violations, and the right to recover statutory damages makes the award of damages in class action easy to administer. Arbitration clauses would effectively shut down this avenue of enforcement in an area that might otherwise benefit from increased deterrence.

Still, it is questionable whether businesses that specialize in deliberate advantage taking of ignorant and poor borrowers would be effectively deterred by the threat of “private attorney general” suits. In such cases, a coordinated regulatory solution might be superior, as an enforcement technique. The worst wrongdoers may not be the ones with the deepest pockets that attract private actions. And an effective enforcement campaign might require a coordinated action against a network of disperse defendants, with forward-looking as well as criminal remedies, rather than anecdotal suits that compensate the lawyers more effectively than the victims.

It is also important to imagine different ways in which firms would be “deterred” by class actions. In general, increased liability could have several effects. First, it could lead firms to shut down an entire activity as unprofitable. But an activity could be socially undesirable even though it benefits some. Usurious lending, for example, has long been regarded by many societies as undesirable, but it surely benefits some high-risk, high-need borrowers. Or, a pharmaceutical drug may be both good and harmful, and shutting down its distribution may hurt some sub-sectors of patients.

Second, increased liability could lead firms to continue the activity but make sure they comply with the legal standards. Manufacturers of products could take more precautions to prevent injuries. They may design safer products that, for example, pose a lower fire hazard, thus benefitting all customers. But many of the precautions that would be induced by the threat of class action liability would be the drafting of longer warning labels on products, or complying more meticulously with disclosure standards (to remove claims of negligent failure to warn, or of deception). Who benefits from these enhanced warnings and disclosures? These are precautions that do not serve all consumers equally. Instead, they interact with consumers’ own use patterns, and have greater utility to (the few) consumers who read warning and disclosures—to the sophisticated elite. These precautions provide access to information, but information—we saw—is often a regressive policy.

Third, there is the price effect. Could it be that class actions improve products and behavior, but render them too costly for the poor? One does not need to subscribe to rational-choice neo-classical economic approach to recognize that better products that are more closely scrutinized by courts cost more in competitive and non-competitive markets alike. People make different price/quality tradeoffs, with some preferring low prices over high quality. If class actions have the ex ante effect of higher prices, it is quite possible that the poor come out as net losers.

To be sure, even a sharp price effect is often desirable. For example, when the business is sued for deceptively hiding some service fees, the effect might be higher upfront prices, but here the higher prices are offset by a lower overall quantum of fees. The higher price is a more salient index for the true cost of the purchase. Higher prices might also be desirable when consumers underestimate the risks and losses that might be associated with some products, and fail to insure or to discount their value. And it is more than possible that these benefits associated with salient upfront prices would accrue disproportionately to the poor, who might otherwise be seduced by the false allure of low prices.[[62]](#footnote-62)

In the end, the strongest objection to mandatory arbitration might very well rest on the deterrence rationale. It is possible that various types of socially harmful conduct are insufficiently deterred by public enforcers, and that private class actions could create better incentives, eliminate harmful conduct, and result in more accurate prices—to the benefit of all. But even this rationale for “access to litigation” is tentative and rests on questionable conjectures regarding the distributive benefits of heightened liability. Class action liability may indeed change firms’ conduct in a way that benefits those who brought the suits, but in a way detrimental to others.

1. \* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law. I am grateful to Oren Bar-Gill and Gerhard Wagner for commenting on an earlier draft, and to Irit Brodsky for research assistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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