The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in Private Law

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Parties who make investments that generate externalities may sometimes recover from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of contract. Previous scholarship has shown that granting recovery, based on either the cost of reasonable investment or the benefit conferred, can provide optimal incentives to invest. This article demonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neither purely cost-based nor purely benefit-based and instead equals either the greater or lesser of the two measures. These hybrid approaches to recovery distort compensation and incentives. The article demonstrates the surprising prevalence of these practices and explores informational and institutional reasons why they emerge.

1. Introduction

Private parties often make investments that benefit others. Such investments are usually made under contract with the beneficiaries. The contract determines the investing party’s right to recover and the measure of that recovery. Sometimes, however, a party considering making an investment is either unable to contract with its potential beneficiaries, or the contract

We thank Hanoch Dagan, Tomotaka Fujita, Alon Harel, Jim Krier, Andrew Kull, Ariel Porat, an anonymous referee and workshop participants at Michigan, Stanford, Yale, and the ALEA 2001 Meeting in Georgetown for helpful comments. Financial support from the John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics at the University of Michigan Law School is gratefully acknowledged.

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is void. In these situations, the investing party must rely upon the law to obligate the beneficiary to pay for the service.

Indeed, private law is replete with doctrines enabling an investing party to recover in the absence of contract. For example, a co-owner may recoup the costs of repairs he or she makes to co-owned property, and a doctor may recover a fee for treating an unconscious accident victim. In measuring the recovery, the law normally uses one of two approaches. In some instances, recovery is measured by the benefit from the investment: The obligor has to pay in accordance with the actual benefit he or she enjoyed. In other instances, recovery is measured by the investment’s cost. A great deal of legal order has been created along this cost versus benefit distinction (Atiyah, 1979, pp. 149–52, 184–89). For example, the law of torts defines obligations that are cost-based, whereas the law of restitution defines obligations that are by and large benefit-based.

The right to recover in the absence of contract has been rationalized from an economic (that is, incentive-oriented) perspective (Landes and Posner, 1978; Levmore, 1985). In particular, it has been defended on the grounds that it encourages parties to make desirable investments that they would otherwise forgo, usually because of the difficulty of contracting with the beneficiaries. This article does not directly take issue with the economic literature demonstrating the desirability of imposing liability in such circumstances. Rather, it explores a systematic and puzzling inconsistency in the way the law actually determines the magnitude of liability. Using economic analysis, it exposes confusion concerning the use of cost versus benefit to measure recovery and the resulting distortion in incentives.

The common situation in which this inconsistency arises involves an investment that is expected to yield an uncertain benefit to another party. This is an investment that confers a chance, or probabilistic value, as opposed to certain benefit. Examples are abundant: Owners of land make investments to repair or improve co-owned property that might (but are not certain to) increase the market value of the property; insured parties take noncontractible precautions that might (but are not certain to) reduce the losses that their insurers have to cover; attorneys invest litigation effort that might result in favorable judgments or settlements for the parties. By the time the law has to determine the recovery ex post, the actual benefit—or lack thereof—becomes known and (usually) can be verified by the court.
If the investing party is entitled to recover, it might be expected that courts would measure the recovery either on the basis of the recipient’s benefit or on the basis of the investor’s costs. The benefit-based measure would depend on (and is potentially equal to) the actual benefit that materialized. This is an ex post recovery regime: The investing party will enjoy a high recovery when the court observes that the benefit is high and a low recovery when the court observes a low benefit. The cost-based measure, alternatively, would not depend on any ex post realization of benefit. Instead, and irrespective of whether the actual benefit is high or low, this measure would award a recovery that is fixed, equal to the reasonable economic cost of undertaking the investment. Under either the benefit-based or the cost-based regimes, if appropriately applied, the investment would be taken if and only if it is cost-justified.¹

It turns out, however, that in many circumstances, the law takes neither a pure benefit-based nor a pure cost-based approach to measuring recovery. Instead, it systematically uses one of two “hybrid” recovery approaches. Under one approach, the investing party can recover either the ex post benefit enjoyed by the beneficiary or the cost of the investment, and can elect the greater of the two. This approach, which we label the “greater-of” regime, permits the investing party to recover the full benefit when it is high or recover the cost of the investment when the benefit is low (or zero). The expected recovery under this approach is greater—potentially far greater—than the expected benefit of the investment, creating excessive incentives to invest.

Under a second hybrid approach, which we label the “lesser-of” regime, the investing party can again recover either the ex post benefit enjoyed by the beneficiary or the cost of the investment, but this time he or she is limited to the lesser of the two. The investing party can effectively recover the full benefit only when it is low; when the benefit turns out to be high, recovery is capped at the cost of the investment. The expected recovery under this approach is lower than the expected benefit of the investment, in

¹. Whether the benefit-based approach is superior to the cost-based approach (e.g., for reasons of fairness, information and administration costs, or risk) is beyond the scope of this analysis. See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1994) and Wittman (1995).
The argument that hybrid regimes are distorting is straightforward and can be fully captured by the following lottery metaphor. Suppose party A owns a lottery ticket that provides a 1% chance of winning $1000, and a 99% chance of winning $0. The ex ante value of such a ticket—its actuarial cost—is $10. Party A mistakenly loses her lottery ticket at party B’s home and discovers the loss after the lottery draw was announced. Under the pure benefit-based recovery regime, party A can recover from party B (who found and cashed the ticket) either $0 or $1,000, depending on the ticket’s actual draw. Under the pure cost-based recovery regime, party A can recover the ex ante value, or the cost of the ticket, $10, independent of the actual draw. The expected recovery under both regimes is $10, correctly reflecting the value of the ticket at the time it was lost. Consider, in contrast, the two hybrid approaches. Under the greater-of approach, party A can recover $1,000 if the ticket wins and can recover $10 if the ticket’s draw is $0. The expected recovery is approximately $20, twice the ex ante expected value of the ticket (the ticket is worth more if lost; party A would have an incentive to lose it!). Under the lesser-of approach, party A can recover only $10 if the ticket wins and $0 when the ticket’s draw is $0. The expected recovery is 10 cents, well below the ex ante expected value of the ticket.

Recognizing the distorting nature of hybrid regimes is, of course, not the main focus of this article. In fact, given how obviously contorted and internally inconsistent these regimes are, the article will have little more to say in terms of their incentive effects. Rather, the main purpose pursued here is twofold: first, to demonstrate that hybrid regimes are a surprisingly common feature in the law, despite their distorting effects, and second, to explain this puzzling legal phenomenon.

To this first end, section 3 of the article (which follows a brief description of the structure of hybrids, in section 2) surveys a variety of recovery doctrines that incorporate the hybrid approaches. The analysis in that section is more than doctrinal. The recognition that a particular hybrid regime exists usually requires more than reading the text of the rule. It requires a more nuanced understanding of the way various rules work together and the way plaintiffs (or defendants) can elect the recovery measures. With careful attention to such details, we identify a host of
examples of prominent recovery doctrines incorporating the hybrid approach.

To illustrate, consider a party who invests in a project potentially adding value to a neighbor’s land in a setting that gives rise to a restitutio-

nary right of recovery. A benefit-based regime would set the recovery equal to the actual enhancement value enjoyed by the neighbor. A cost-based regime would set the recovery equal to the cost of the investment, if it is adjudged reasonable. A greater-of regime would permit the investing party to recover the full benefit when the enhancement value is high and recover costs when the enhancement value is low. Section 3.5 will demonstrate that this is a recovery strategy available to investing co-owners under the repairs and improvements doctrine in property law. On the other hand, a lesser-of regime would limit the investing party to recover the full benefit when this benefit is low and only costs when the benefit is high. Section 3.6 will demonstrate that under the restatement of restitution this is the recovery schedule available to mistaken improvers, for example, persons who mistakenly built an improvement on their neighbors’ side of the property boundary.

Some readers might remain skeptical even after reading section 3 and reviewing the various examples we provide. Are courts really so oblivious to common sense? How could the law apply such distorting recovery schemes? To address this skepticism, the article turns in section 4 to explore why the hybrid approaches are used so frequently in the law, despite the obvious distortions they create. This inquiry demonstrates that courts occasionally employ hybrid rules inadvertently, due to systematic problems in adjudication, such as the information structure and the difficulty of drawing boundaries between related causes of action. Other times, courts recognize the fact that they are applying a hybrid regime, and nevertheless do so deliberately, to adjust the magnitude of recovery in pursuit of aims that may be unrelated to investment incentives. In these cases, however, our analysis shows that hybrid regimes add an arbitrary component to the recovery amount, and are therefore a clumsy instrument to serve their stated purposes.

As the title of the article—The (Legal) Value of Chance—suggests, this work can be interpreted beyond the concrete problem it identifies (and in the conclusion section we briefly explore possible interpretations). The article can be read more broadly, as an observation on how the law values
uncertain or stochastic value. Here, costly actions that are identical from an ex ante, cost-benefit perspective, can appear dissimilar ex post, once the stochastic benefit from them materializes. This appearance can lead courts to apply an inconsistent treatment of the right to recovery, bouncing in an arbitrary fashion between cost-based and benefit-based liability. Hence, a computation problem that is elementary for an economist can become difficult to resolve consistently under the decision-making framework in which courts operate.

2. Hybrid Regimes

Suppose that party A can make an investment that would yield a random benefit to party B (and 0 benefit to party A), and that a contract specifying party A’s fee cannot be written or is disregarded by the law. The reasons for the absence of a contract are, of course, important (for one, they might suggest that party B does not want to pay for this benefit), and include various types of transaction costs and contracting failures. Assume, for now, that party B values the benefit conferred on him. In the absence of a contract, it is up to the court to determine if and how much party B should pay party A.

The first step is for the law to determine whether an obligation to pay exists. The law of restitution and quasi-contract frequently imposes such an obligation (on the basis of unjust enrichment and similar principles). Assuming that an obligation exists, the second step is for the law to determine how much can party A recover. This determination is done through a variety of doctrines scattered through private law (surveyed in section 3). Generally speaking, it is regularly assumed that recovery is measured in one of two ways. The first familiar way to measure recovery is to equate it with the ex post benefit conferred on party B. Under this benefit-based regime, party A can recover a high sum when the benefit is high and a low sum or zero when the benefit is low or null. When party A’s recovery equals the full benefit, she internalizes the entire value of her investment and thus will make optimal investment decisions (Landes and Posner, 1978, p. 90).

A second familiar way to reward party A is to equate recovery with the ex ante value of her investment, independent of the actual ex post realization of the benefit. Under one version of the ex ante regime, party A would
recover the average, or expected benefit. But it is often difficult to estimate, ex post, what was the ex ante value of the investment. Thus, a more prevalent version of the ex ante regime is the pure cost-based regime, in which the recovery is equal to party A’s cost of investment. To guarantee that party A will invest only when socially optimal, recovery here should be conditional on the cost being “reasonable,” that is, efficient. Like the benefit-based regime, the cost-based regime generates optimal incentives to exert effort (Landes and Posner 1978, p. 110).

Instead of using one of these two ways to measure recovery, courts often combine the two in the following ways. Under one type of hybrid regime, the greater-of regime, party A receives the ex post benefit measure when the realization of benefit is high and receives her cost when the realization of benefit is low. That is, she receives the higher of the two, benefit or cost. Here party A’s expected recovery exceeds the expected benefit, and thus she has an incentive to overinvest. The greater-of regime is equivalent to a benefit-based regime compounded by a put option for party A—an option to “sell” the benefit for her cost of investment. When the benefit is less than the cost, party A will exercise the option. Thus, the magnitude of overcompensation under the greater-of approach depends on factors similar to those that affect option prices, such as the variance of the distribution of benefits, and the time period that party A has to exercise the option (Jackson, 1978).

Under a second type of hybrid regime, a lesser-of regime, party A receives the ex post benefit when the realization of benefit is low, but receives only her cost when the realization of benefit is high. That is, she receives the lower of the two, benefit or cost. Here, party A’s expected recovery is less than her cost of investment, and thus she has too little incentive to invest.2

To illustrate the four regimes, consider an investment that yields an expected benefit of $100. The benefit is probabilistic, with 50% chance of $200 and 50% chance of $0. Under a benefit-based regime, party A will make the investment if it costs less than $100, and similarly under a pure cost-based regime. Under the greater-of regime, party A will get

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2. As in the greater-of regime, the magnitude of the distortion is equal to the value of an option, this time a call option given to party B, to “buy” the benefit at a price equal to the cost of the investment.
either $200 (when the benefit is $200) or her reasonable cost (when the benefit is $0), for an expected recovery that exceeds the expected benefit. In fact, any time the cost of the investment is less than $150 party A will make the investment. Under the lesser-of regime, party A will recover either her cost (when the benefit is $200) or $0 (when the benefit is $0) for an expected recovery that is less than the benefit of the investment, in fact, less than the cost of the investment. Party A will never make any investment under this regime.

The focus of the remainder of the article is on the two hybrid regimes. We now turn to show that these regimes indeed occupy a significant role in the law of recovery for probabilistic benefits. Later, in section 4, we will explore reasons for this surprising phenomenon.

3. The Doctrinal Prevalence of Hybrid Regimes

Given the apparent shortcomings of the hybrid approaches, readers may be left wondering whether these devices are of any practical concern. Accordingly, the objective of this section is to demonstrate the prevalent use of the hybrid approaches across a broad range of legal doctrines and thereby dispel any notion that hybrids are a mere esoteric phenomenon. Understanding the context in which hybrid regimes operate will also help us develop, in section 4, a more general discussion of the reasons—good or bad—hybrids are used.

3.1. Remedies for Breach of Contract

A greater-of approach is embodied in the choice of remedies available for breach of an explicit contract. There are two typical situations in which the election of remedy rules entitle the aggrieved party to a greater-of recovery schedule. The first situation involves total breach or repudiation of a contract after one party has partially performed. A common example is a contractor who was discharged after performing part of the service. The aggrieved contractor may seek either expectation damages or restitution. That is, he can either enforce the bargain and sue for “make whole” damages, calculated in accordance with the contract price, or disaffirm the materially breached bargain—employ a legal fiction that the contract does not exist—and recover damages equal
to the benefit conferred on the breaching party (Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) §373; Kull, 1994).

This is a greater-of hybrid regime. When the benefit the breaching party enjoys from partial performance is low, the aggrieved party would seek the standard expectation remedy and will recover the costs actually incurred, plus the profit that would have been made had the contract been fully performed. But when the benefit to the breaching party from the partial performance is high, the aggrieved party can choose to recover more than the cost-plus-profit measure by recovering instead the ex post value of the partial performance. For example, a contractor who was discharged after partially performing was allowed to recover the value of a structure to the client, over $250,000, rather than the contractual fee, which was only $20,000. In fact, procedural rules enable the aggrieved party to join in the complaint a claim for restitution recovery (in quantum meruit) and a claim for expectation damages, thus postponing the election of the remedy until it becomes clear (at trial) which of the two measures is greater.

This greater-of regime is reinforced by the way restitution damages are calculated. Under the Restatement, the benefit to the breaching party may be measured by either the market price for furnishing a service, or the extent to which the beneficiary’s property has been enhanced in value by the service. When the enhancement-in-value measure of benefit is low, the aggrieved party is encouraged to seek the more generous market-price (cost-based) measure of restitution, and when the enhancement-in-value measure is high, the aggrieved party is allowed to seek the more generous measure of reasonable value.

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3. **Boomer v. Muir**, 24 P.2d 570, 577 (Cal. 1933) (“Upon prevention of performance the injured plaintiff may treat the contract as rescinded and recover upon a quantum meruit without regard to the contract price”); see also Kull (1994, pp. 1477, 1498).

4. Courts permit plaintiffs to amend their suits and shift the basis of recovery from express contract to unjust enrichment. They also allow plaintiffs to plead unjust enrichment merely on the possibility that the contractual claims will prove inadequate at trial. See, for example, **Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.**, 158 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1947); **Frontier Management Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co.**, 658 F. Supp. 987, 994 (D. Mass. 1986).

5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) §371 cmt. b (“The reasonable value to the party from whom restitution is sought is usually greater than the addition to his wealth. If this is so, a party seeking restitution for part performance is commonly allowed the more generous measure of reasonable value”).
entitled to seek this larger sum. As a leading case summarizes: “The rule has evolved that the proper measure of damages in unjust enrichment should be the greater of the two measures.”

A second typical situation in which the greater-of damage measure applies is in an action for breach of warranty of title. A buyer who purchases an asset from a seller who is not the true owner and later has to surrender the purchased asset to its true owner can recover from the seller either the purchase price or the ex post value of the asset at the time it was surrendered, whichever is greater. Thus, when the asset depreciates in value below the price paid, the buyer can recover the price. When the asset’s value increases, the buyer can recover the full value, uncapped by the contract price. Effectively, the aggrieved buyer is granted the right to recover the actual value of the asset at the time of breach, along with a put option to sell this right for the original price. The excess recovery under the hybrid regime equals the value of this put option. The more volatile the price of the asset, the more valuable is the option, and the greater the excess recovery.

It might be perceived that the right to elect restitution damages even when they exceed expectation damages is restricted to situations in which breach is so egregious that greater deterrence is necessary. Indeed, as we will see shortly, the egregiousness of the breach can explain the emergence of other greater-of recovery rules, particularly those involving fiduciary and agency relationships. There, embezzlement by a fiduciary is the very reason that gives the victim the enhanced recovery rights. But in the general doctrine of contract remedies, case law does not conform with the “egregiousness” hypothesis: Although the right to restitution damages does depend on breach being “total,” it is not dependant on the breaching party’s mens rea. The only restriction the Restatement imposes on the power to elect the greater remedy applies in a narrow set of circumstances, when the aggrieved party has performed in full and the breaching party’s

7. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969); Williston (1960, §1395A) (limiting damages to the purchase price “virtually confines the buyer to rescission and restitution, a remedy to which the injured buyer is undoubtedly entitled if he so elects, but it is a violation of general principles of contracts to deny him in an action on the contract such damages as will put him in as good a position as he would have occupied had the contract been kept”; emphasis added).
contractual obligation is a “definite sum of money” (Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) § 373(2)). Then, the aggrieved party is limited to expectation damages. Otherwise, the aggrieved party is generally unrestricted in his freedom to elect the greater of the two measures.8

3.2. Implied Contracts

In drafting the provisions of their contract, parties are free to determine whether the beneficiary’s obligation to pay is to be based on effort (as are most contracts) or whether it is to be contingent on measurable benefit. In the absence of an explicit contract between the parties, however, it is up to the law to determine the recovery for services rendered.

Normally, the absence of an explicit contract indicates that the beneficiary did not wish to be charged, and thus there is no obligation to pay. However, when the absence of an explicit contract is due to high transactions costs, the doctrine of implied contracts may be invoked, and an obligation to pay may be imputed. A typical situation in which an implied obligation arises is when one party performs a service during negotiations over a contract. The party providing the service may do so in anticipation of striking a deal, at the encouragement of the other party, or in an attempt to show the other party what terms are desirable. For example, an advertising agency might develop an idea for a campaign and, in bidding for the client’s account, share it with the client. If negotiations eventually break down, the investing party may seek to recover its costs or the value created for the other party.

Courts are careful not to impose an implied obligation where an explicit one could have been negotiated. But when the liability hurdle is cleared—when an implied contract is recognized—courts distinguish between two types of obligations that might be imputed, labeled implied-in-fact and implied-in-law contracts. An implied-in-fact contract may be found where actions other than an express promise indicate that the beneficiary intended to pay for the service. Here, as in many other areas of contract law, the parties’ expectation is determined not merely from the text of their agreement (or lack thereof) but from the context as well. An implied-in-law

8. Corbin (1964, §1113) (“The generally prevailing rule is that the plaintiff’s recovery of the value of the consideration received by the defendant is neither measured by nor limited by the contract price or rate”).
contract, in contrast, arises even in the absence of any reliable indication of
the parties’ intentions. It is based instead on the benefit and is intended
to strip the beneficiary of this gain if the acquisition is deemed unjust
under the established principles of the law of restitution (Farnsworth,

The two types of implied contracts also lead to different measures of
recovery. An implied-in-fact contract, once inferred, is supplemented by
courts to include a provision mimicking the fee that an express contract
would have stipulated, which is usually (though not necessarily) calculated
on a per-effort basis. In the advertising contract example, it would require the
client to pay the firm for the billable hours spent on the project. In contrast, an
implied-in-law obligation leads to restitution of the full benefit enjoyed by the
beneficiary.9 The client would have to pay the value it actually derived from
the advertising campaign, which can potentially differ from the contract fee.

The implied-in-fact doctrine embodies a cost-based (or fee-based) recov-
ery approach, whereas the implied-in-law doctrine embodies a benefit-based
recovery approach. Either regime, if applied consistently and in the appro-
priate situations, can lead to optimal recovery for precontractual effort. A
distortion arises, however, when the plaintiff can elect the greater of the two
recovery measures. In particular, when courts allow a party who conferred a
high benefit to seek the restitutionary implied-in-law recovery for the entire
benefit, and a party who conferred a low (or zero) benefit to seek the
implied-in-fact recovery for the per-effort fee, excessive recovery results.

The implied-contracts doctrine is structured in a way that falls into this
greater-of trap. While acknowledging the difference between the two types of
claims, courts accord plaintiffs the power to choose between them. In the
casebook favorite Hill v. Waxberg, for example, a contractor who was nego-
tiating a building project invested in “plans, ideas, and efforts” that benefited
the landowner after negotiations broke down. In allowing a recovery, the
court didactically distinguished between the two types of implied contracts

9. In rewarding the value the benefit conferred, courts use one of two possible
measures, equal either to the “net enrichment,” namely, the increase in total wealth
to the beneficiary, or to the “cost avoided,” namely, the saving to the beneficiary in
obtaining the service (Farnsworth, 1999, p. 107; Restatement (Second) of Contracts
(1981), §371). It is only when a net enrichment measure is applied that the recovery
under an implied-in-law claim differs from the recovery under an implied-in-fact
claim.
and their associated recovery measures and confirmed the plaintiff’s right to choose between them. Accordingly, it was suggested that even when no actual benefit materializes, an implied-in-fact claim for the reasonable fee should lie (Farnsworth, 1987, p. 232). Thus, when the benefit conferred on the other party is low, the investing party is generally encouraged to seek a recovery of her cost or hypothetical fee, based on an implied-in-fact contract claim. When the benefit is high, the investing party is not precluded from making an implied-in-law contract claim for the full benefit conferred.

One may wonder whether cases in which the plaintiff is permitted to select the greater of the two implied contract recovery measures are all that common, and thus whether the problem we identify here is of much practical significance. Specifically, if the circumstances under which each type of claim could arise were easily distinguished, the problem of overlap would arise only in exceptional cases. Unfortunately, such circumstances are not clearly distinguished. For one, whenever a court is willing to recognize an implied contract, the plaintiff is generally able to satisfy the elements of both types of implied-contract claims, and the defendant cannot argue that the other rule is more suitable. That is, although courts have repeatedly distinguished the two types of obligations and their respective measures on conceptual grounds, the circumstances under which each obligation arises are common if not identical. Both claims arise when there is intent to charge for a benefit that is desired by the beneficiary and when high transactions costs interfere with the drafting of a contract (Posner, 1998, pp. 151–52). Indeed, even when denying implied contract claims, courts invoke identical tests for each of the two types of obligations, focusing on why an explicit contract was not made. Thus, it is not the

10. The court noted that “the elements of either theory could be satisfied, but since counsel has declined to choose between them, we are not prepared to make the choice for him”; 237 F. 2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).

11. Earhart v. William Low Co. 600 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1979) (in the absence of actual benefit to the defendant, the recovery of expenses incurred is allowed).

12. Nowhere is this identity of grounds as obvious as in another casebook favorite, Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414 (R.I. 1969). In deciding that the plaintiff, who maintained the defendant’s horse for four years, cannot recover any fee, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island explained that an implied-in-fact contract does not exist because defendant indicated that he “would not be responsible for boarding the horse” (417); similarly, an implied-in-law contract does not exist because the defendant notified that he “would not be responsible for [the horse’s] keep (418).”
confusion of an outlier court that creates this greater-of regime but rather the core feature of the implied contract doctrine, which allows two types of claims to coincide.

Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that a greater-of regime is regularly implemented in this context. First, courts explicitly permit it. When an implied-in-law action fails due to the absence of proof concerning the magnitude of the benefit, courts allow recovery to be based instead on an implied-in-fact claim for the standard fee.¹³ Similarly, plaintiffs are permitted to offer several alternative theories of recovery and delay their commitment to any particular remedy until the stage of trial at which it will become clear which recovery measure is higher and even to amend the complaint if they originally stated only the lower theory of recovery. Second, the existence of a greater-of regime here is less puzzling in light of the explicit adoption of a greater-of regime in the recovery of restitution damages. The implied-in-law/implied-in-fact dichotomy is a close parallel to the restitution/expectation dichotomy in computing damages for breach of an explicit contract, where—as we saw—the doctrine openly embraces a greater-of regime.

In the end, the question remains: How distorting is the greater-of regime in measuring the recovery for failed contracts? We have focused on some elements of the doctrine, but the full picture is more nuanced than sketched here. Other limitations on recovery may at times offset the overcompensation effect of the simple greater-of regime. In bouncing between fee-based and benefit-based measures of recovery, courts are trying to tailor damage remedies that serve what they perceive to be the ends of justice. Thus, alongside the rule allowing plaintiffs to elect the greater-of several recovery measures, courts apply other rules (such as damage caps) to temper the risk of overcompensation. Still, in the interface between restitution and contract remedies, pockets of hybrid regimes occupy a significant domain of the doctrine. Recognizing the pattern of their existence indicates that a more systematic solution, not reliant on ad hoc adjustments, is desirable.

3.3. Attorney Fees

Recovery of attorney fees in the absence of an enforceable contract is commonly governed by a hybrid regime. This subsection considers three prominent examples. The first involves a trial attorney’s right to recover

from his or her client after being discharged without cause prior to the conclusion of litigation. The second example concerns a defendant’s right to seek indemnification of litigation expenses that run to the benefit of third parties. The third and final case regards a litigant’s right to recover attorney fees from opposing parties.

3.3.1. Discharge of an Attorney–Client Contract. Trial attorneys are typically compensated using one of two possible formulae. Under one approach—the billable hours contract—the attorney is paid the same fee regardless of the outcome of the litigation. This fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the attorney worked on the case by a pre-agreed hourly rate. The alternative approach is the contingency-fee contract, under which the attorney is paid a portion of the client’s award. If the client’s claim is denied, the attorney recovers nothing, but if the client’s claim prevails, the attorney receives a substantial premium vis-à-vis the billable hours contract.

To protect the interests of clients to be represented by attorneys they trust, courts have traditionally held that a client has an “unfettered” right to discharge an attorney working under either type of contract. When the client exercises this right before the conclusion of litigation and dismisses the attorney without cause, the question arises as to whether and how the dismissed attorney is to be compensated for the services already provided to the client. If the attorney worked under an hourly fee contract, he or she is of course paid for the hours billed, regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Annotation, 1957, p. 616). Here, in mimicking the contract price, the law provides a pure cost-based recovery. But if the attorney worked under a contingency fee contract, figuring out compensation is more complex. This situation fits well into the framework of this article, because the benefit from the attorney’s investment was, at the time discharge, still probabilistic.

Strikingly, in surveying the different state rules governing discharged attorneys’ remedies, we can identify all possible approaches to recovery of probabilistic benefit (Annotation, 1998). Some jurisdictions apply a pure benefit-based recovery approach that simply enforces the contingency-fee agreement. As soon as the underlying litigation concludes or settles—that is, as soon as the “benefit” to the client, if any, becomes known—the dismissed attorney recovers his or her full contingency fee, minus any
expenses not incurred by the attorney in performing the balance of the contract.\textsuperscript{14} If the suit is ultimately successful, recovery is high; otherwise, the attorney recovers nothing.

Other jurisdictions apply a variant of a pure cost-based approach, which permits the dismissed attorney to recover, under a damages remedy known as a quantum meruit claim, the reasonable value of his or her services (i.e., costs) but not the contingency fee. Neither the attorney’s right to recover nor the amount of that recovery are affected by the outcome of the litigation.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, recovery resembles what the attorney would have received under a billable-hours contract: the number of hours worked, multiplied by the hourly fee.

In theory, a lesser-of regime might still emerge in these “pure” cost-based recovery jurisdictions, if the client is permitted to dismiss the attorney after the client obtains new information on the likelihood of success in the suit. Under this hypothetical scenario, when the client learns that the suit is about to succeed (or reach a favorable settlement), the client would dismiss the original attorney and pay the attorney his or her costs, and when the client learns that the suit is about to fail, the client would retain the attorney and pay the contractual contingency fee—nothing. However, courts recognize the danger of such manipulation and, when detected, allow the discharged attorney a recovery equal to the full contingency fee.\textsuperscript{16} A similar lesser-of approach may also arise whenever the client has limited financial resources. In that case, if the client loses the suit, the attorney will not get paid, and if the client wins the suit, the attorney will recover only the hourly fee figure. As will be explained in section 4, this type of the lesser-of scheme is more difficult for courts to avoid without switching to a pure benefit-based recovery approach, because they would be required to take into account counterfactual scenarios, that is, to adjust recovery in one state of the world (“client wins”) to

\textsuperscript{14} Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261 (Wis. 1959).
\textsuperscript{15} This, for example, is the rule in New York. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
\textsuperscript{16} See, for example, Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972) (holding that an attorney discharged without cause under a contingency-fee contract is normally limited to recovering the reasonable value of his or her services, but may recover the full contingency fee when discharge occurs “on the courthouse steps”).
make up for the potential of nonrecovery in another, hypothetical state of the world ("client loses").

Interestingly, a third set of jurisdictions applies a greater-of approach by permitting the dismissed attorney to elect his or her remedy. The attorney may collect either the reasonable value of services or the contingency fee minus any expense saved because of the termination. Therefore, if the award the client eventually collects is high, the attorney may elect the benefit-based measure of recovery, namely, a fraction of the client’s award; otherwise the attorney may elect the cost-based measure of recovery, namely, the hourly fee.

Of course, application of this greater-of regime is controlled (one would expect) by the client, and a client will likely choose not to dismiss an attorney without cause where doing so will increase the expected fee owed to the attorney. For example, if the client discovers that the suit is likely to fail, the client will have a disincentive to dismiss the attorney because he or she will have to pay the attorney his or her costs, whereas by retaining the attorney, the client will ultimately have to pay nothing when the suit fails. Still, the greater-of rule that looms in the background would cause the client to refrain from discharging an attorney whom he or she no longer trusts, and all the more so in cases that are headed toward litigation failure—the very cases in which it is more likely that the client is dissatisfied with the attorney. Thus, the greater-of recovery can be avoided, but not before it would generate overdeterrence and undermine the stated policy of enhancing clients’ economic freedom to discharge their attorneys. The courts that have adopted the greater-of approach have failed to recognize this consequence.

Last, many jurisdictions, including—after long judicial deliberations—California, apply a lesser-of approach by limiting the attorney’s recovery to the reasonable value of the services and then, only if the client’s suit is ultimately successful. Thus, if the client receives a high award, the attorney gets the cost-based measure of recovery (the hourly fee), whereas

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17. As one court explained, a discharged contingency fee attorney “has the election to claim a reasonable fee for the work done . . . or to wait until the claim is liquidated by judgment or settlement and then sue . . . for his contract fee.” In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963).

18. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14; see also Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So.2d 1016, 1021-22 (Fl. 1982) (holding that “fees . . . should be limited to the value of the services rendered or the contract price, whichever is less”).
if the client receives no award, the attorney gets the benefit-based measure of recovery (nothing). Courts are applying this lesser-of approach by design: “The better rule is that because a client has the unqualified right to discharge his attorney, fees in such cases should be limited to the value of the services rendered or the contract price, *whichever is less.*”19

It should be emphasized that in measuring the “reasonable value” of the attorney’s services, courts distinctly use the cost-based measure—the attorney’s hourly fee multiplied by the number of hours worked—and not the benefit-based measure that reflects the magnitude of the client’s award. But at the same time, courts are wary not to enable clients to take advantage of this extremely client-friendly regime by, for example, discharging the attorney on the courthouse steps, after the attorney has completed most of the work. If courts suspect the client of engaging in such tactics, they will increase the measure of “reasonable value” to equal the full (benefit-based) contingency award. Thus, in theory, the lesser-of regime is limited to “honest” dismissals.20

Jurisdictions following the lesser-of approach have cited several reasons to reject either pure approach. The pure cost-based regime, according to some courts, is unfair to poor clients who cannot afford to pay the attorney’s fees unless the client recovers in the suit. At the same time, the pure benefit-based regime, according to these courts, would place an undue burden on the client’s right to dismiss the attorney, because the client might end up having to pay two attorneys a full contingency fee. The lesser-of recovery scheme seems to address both concerns.

What these courts fail to recognize is that giving clients unbridled freedom to terminate an existing contingency relationship with an attorney may deter attorneys from agreeing to represent some clients in the first instance or from investing cost-justified litigation effort. In the alternative, attorneys may charge their clients higher rates (to reflect the risk of dismissal), switch to billable-hours contracts, or accept quick, risk-free


20. The *Fracasse* court, which articulated the California version of the lesser-of rule, recognized this danger of manipulation and thus emphasized that attorneys who are dismissed at the last minute can still recover their full contingency fees, as an exception to the general rule that limits their recovery to hourly fees. 494 P.2d at 14.
settlements. Like any mandatory term, the right to dismiss an attorney without cause comes at a price, one some clients might prefer not to pay.

A similar issue concerning recovery by contingency fee attorneys has come to the fore in the settlement of state lawsuits against tobacco companies. The contractual arrangements between the states and their outside (i.e., private) attorneys usually entitled the attorneys to a pure benefit-based recovery measure, anywhere between 2% and 25% of the settlements. When the tobacco industry agreed to settlements involving enormous sums, the attorneys’ combined fees reached billions of dollars. Ex post, this translated to hourly fees reaching, in some cases, tens of thousands of dollars per hour. At that stage, lawmakers were ready to discharge the contingency fee arrangements and override the contracts. Recognizing that these fees overwhelmingly exceed standard legal hourly rates, commentators, judges, the press, and many lawmakers called these fees excessive, exorbitant, and even unconscionable (Brinkman, 1998).

Critics of the fees are effectively advocating a lesser-of recovery regime. If the suits had been unsuccessful—as were most tobacco suits prior to the settlement—the plaintiffs’ attorneys would have recovered no fees. But now that the states have prevailed against the tobacco companies, the attorney fees have been scrutinized relative to hourly fees, and—as many critics endorse—capped not to exceed standard (i.e., guaranteed) hourly rates. What critics overlook is the enormous risk that many of these attorneys (albeit not all) had taken at the outset of the litigation. Ex ante, in light of the slim chance of victory against the tobacco industry and the projected out-of-pocket cost to be incurred by the attorneys, the negotiated contingency fees seem less excessive. Measuring in hindsight the hourly fee that the attorneys in fact recovered overlooks this risk factor. It is equivalent to the view that the holder of a winning lottery ticket is unjustly enriched by collecting the award and that he or she should recover no more than the price paid for the ticket. In this lesser-of regime, attorneys would be less willing to undertake risky projects under contingency-fee arrangements.

21. See, for example, 144 Congressional Record S6373-01, S6374 (remarks by Rep. Sessions) (“How can we violate contracts? We violate contracts all the time in this body. . . . Everything about the tobacco business is being changed by this legislation. . . . One of those aspects ought to be how much these fees should count for”).
3.3.2. Indemnification of Litigation Costs. Another regime applying a
hybrid approach to the recovery of attorney fees involves indemnification
of litigation costs. A party expending litigation costs to the benefit of
others may seek reimbursement from the beneficiaries, even in the absence
of an express indemnification agreement. The most common situation in
which such an indemnity right is recognized occurs in products liability
litigation over a defective product, where a seller who has defended a suit
against the buyer seeks indemnity from the product’s manufacturer for any
damages awarded or legal expenditures. Recovery by the seller is based on
quasi-contractual principles; the manufacturer is considered the benefi-
ciary of the seller’s defense because a successful defense would bar the
buyer from reasserting the same claim against the manufacturer.

There are different approaches across jurisdictions regarding sellers’
rights to recover legal expenses. Some jurisdictions allow a seller to recover
reasonable legal expenses regardless of the outcome of the litigation with
the buyer.22 These jurisdictions take a distinctly cost-based approach to
indemnification. If the seller expends a reasonable sum defending against
the buyer’s suit, the seller may recover its costs whether the benefit to the
manufacturer is “low” (because the buyer prevailed) or “high” (because the
seller prevailed).

Other jurisdictions allow a seller to recover its legal expenses from the
manufacturer, but only—and surprisingly—when the seller loses in its
defense against the buyer.23 These jurisdictions follow an inverted lesser-
of approach to indemnification. If the seller expends a reasonable sum
defending against the buyer’s suit, the seller may recover its costs only if
the seller, and hence the manufacturer, is liable, that is, when the ex post
benefit of the defense to the manufacturer is low. If the ex post benefit to
the manufacturer is high, that is, if the seller prevails and the manufacturer
thereby avoids liability for damages, the seller cannot recover its legal
expenses.

22. For example, Booker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 785 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla.
1989).
23. This doctrine is based on the notion that the burden of indemnification lies
only on a liable manufacturer. By succeeding in its defense against the buyer
(thereby establishing also the absence of manufacturer’s liability), the seller elim-
inates the basis for indemnification. See, for example, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Knox
This lesser-of approach distorts sellers’ incentives to defend against product liability suits brought by buyers. The less-than-full indemnity induces sellers to act as less-than-perfect defense agents of manufacturers. Sellers may decline to assert a defense against buyers to avoid jeopardizing their indemnification rights.

3.3.3. Reimbursement of Fees under Statute. The third application of the hybrid approach involving attorney fees arises with respect to a plaintiff’s right to recover attorney fees from a defendant. The general rule of American law is that each party must bear its own litigation costs. But exceptions to the rule are found in state and federal statutes that establish a right to recover litigation expenses from a defendant in a variety of causes of action (Conte, 1993). From an economic perspective, these statutes are intended to give individuals an added incentive to prosecute violations of the law, by reducing the expected cost of pursuing claims, and to persuade attorneys to represent indigent clients, by enhancing the prospects of getting paid for their services. Because most lawsuits involve a sure cost but confer only a chance of victory and recovery, these statutes and their incentive effects are well captured by the recovery-for-chance model, even though a plaintiff clearly does not undertake litigation for the benefit of a defendant.

To recover under most fee-shifting statutes, the plaintiff must first have prevailed in the underlying litigation. The recovery is then measured using the “lodestar” approach. To calculate the lodestar, the court simply multiplies the number of hours the plaintiff’s attorney worked on the successful portions of the case by a reasonable hourly rate. Importantly, this hourly rate is usually the rate the attorney would charge for noncontingent work. The court may then adjust the lodestar to take into account other factors, such as the plaintiff’s degree of success in the litigation. However, although the court may adjust the figure downward to account for poor results obtained in litigation, it may not adjust the figure upward to account for such factors as the risk involved in the litigation.24

This statutory approach to recovery resembles a lesser-of hybrid regime. The regime takes an element of the benefit-based approach by requiring that a party prevail to recover anything at all. However, the

regime takes a distinct element of the cost-based approach by measuring recovery on the basis of the reasonable cost of services. Accordingly, where the value of the suit turns out to be high, the prevailing party may recover only the cost of the attorney’s services. Where the value of the suit turns out to be low or nominal, however, the party recovers the ex post assessment of the suit’s value—nothing or a reduced cost-based figure. The statutory scheme provides less-than-optimal recovery: Whenever the probability of prevailing in the suit is less than one, the party and his or her attorney will be undercompensated by this regime and may thus underinvest in litigation.

3.4. Recovery for Precautions

Another setting in which one party might invest to the benefit of another involves accident prevention. A party who takes actions aimed at preventing a harm that might be suffered by another or for which another party might be liable, often has a claim to recovery, even in the absence of a contract with the other party, on the basis of restitutionary principles. Recovery may be measured by either the benefit conferred, or the reasonable cost of the precautions. If the precautions eliminated an imminent risk, the benefit to the party-at-risk (or the party who is liable for the risk) is readily apparent ex post. Often, however, these precautions only reduce the risk and do not eliminate it, and thus situations arise in which precautions that are cost-justified ex ante provide zero measurable benefit in hindsight. This might be the case if, even after the precautions are taken, the harm—which due to the precautions has become less likely to occur—nevertheless occurs. Or it might turn out that the harm—which, without the precautions, was more likely to occur—would nevertheless not have materialized. In either case, the ex post benefit from the precautions is zero.

In some situations, where the investing party is a professional performing a service that is within his or her occupation, the law provides a pure cost-based recovery, equal to the service provider’s standard contractual fee. For instance, a doctor who treats an unconscious accident victim may recover costs, irrespective of the actual benefit to the patient, which could be either higher (if the risk was eliminated) or lower (if the precautions failed). In other situations the law provides a pure benefit-based recovery. For instance, a salver who comes to the aid of a sinking ship may recover a portion of the
value of the salvaged cargo and vessel, but only if the efforts prove successful; this recovery schedule mirrors the “no cure, no pay” condition commonly found in salvage contracts (Schoenbaum, 2001, §16-5).

Often, however, a lesser-of approach applies. One situation, which was identified by Saul Levmore (1994), involves an insured party who takes precautions to reduce loss for which he or she is insured. Whenever the precautions go beyond the preventive steps required under the insurance agreement and reduce the likelihood of the insured-against harm, the insured party is conferring a probabilistic benefit on the insurer. If the precaution is determined ex post to have been successful in fully eliminating the harm, the insured may be able—although this is still controversial—to recover from the insurer the costs of the precaution, even if the insurance contract does not contain a “sue-and-labor” clause requiring the insurer to cover these charges.25 If, however, the reasonable precaution fails to eliminate the harm that eventually materializes (and becomes part of the insured’s claim), the insured is usually unable to recover the cost of the precaution, as this precaution cannot be proven to have benefited the insurer (Annotation, 1970). Unless there is a provision in the insurance contract covering the insured’s prevention expenses, in which case recovery is independent of the success of the prevention effort, a quasi-contractual claim to recover costs would fail in the absence of an ex post benefit. Thus, when the ex post value of the precaution turns out to be high, the insured recovers only its costs—that is, less than the ex post value. Otherwise, when the ex post value of the precaution is zero, the insured recovers nothing. This “half-step” remedy, as Levmore calls it, or lesser-of approach as we call it, provides inefficiently low incentives to take precaution.

3.5. Repairs and Improvements by Co-Tenants

Property law also governs several types of investments having probabilistic benefits, including repairs and improvements made on co-owned property. Although repairs and improvements are not always easily

distinguished, the courts tend to treat them quite differently, potentially creating a hybrid regime to govern these investments.

Consider first the rule governing repairs. In many jurisdictions, a co-tenant who repairs property without the consent of other co-tenants may recover a portion of the cost of those repairs from the noncontributing co-tenants in an action for partition or accounting (Dukeminier and Krier, 1998, pp. 358–59). These jurisdictions apply a cost-based recovery approach; if repairs are reasonable, the investing tenant recovers the cost of the repairs (the portion commensurate with the other tenant’s stake in the property) regardless of whether the repairs in fact benefit the fellow tenants. For example, a mining company was able to recover one-half of the cost of repairs to a railroad track it jointly owned with another company, even though the passive tenant used the rail far less than the investing tenant and thus derived relatively little benefit from it.26

By contrast, the tenant who improves property without the consent of co-tenants may recover the increase in value of the property attributable to those improvements but not their cost, in an action for partition, or, in some jurisdictions, in an accounting (Dukeminier and Krier, 1998, p. 360). This rule resembles a pure benefit-based recovery regime; the investing tenant recovers the full benefit, if any, of the improvements made. For example, a co-tenant who invested roughly $1,000 in clearing and draining land to use as pasture and crop acreage was allowed to recover a portion of the enhancement value of such improvements, potentially totaling more than $29,000.27 The improving co-tenant may not, however, recover his or her costs where the improvements do not increase the value of the property.

One type of distortion arises under the improvements doctrine when courts limit the investing party to recovering the lesser-of the improvement value or its cost (Stoebuck and Whitman, 2000, p. 208). According to this approach, when the improvement value is low, the investing tenant can recover no more than the value added, which might be less than the cost; and when the improvement value is high, the tenant can recover no more than the cost, which is less than the value added.

26. Wagner Coal Co. v. Roth Coal Co., 267 S.W. 1096 (Ky. App. 1925) (noting that the investing tenant shipped five times more coal on the rail than did the passive tenant).

27. Buschmeyer v. Eikermann, 378 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1964).
A similar lesser-of approach is sometimes applied under the repairs doctrine as well. Some courts will allow a co-tenant to recover for making repairs only if, in hindsight, the repairs actually increased the value of the land.\textsuperscript{28} For example, courts may find a repair to be unreasonable, and hence not reimbursable, when the repair turns out not to affect the value of the property, even though ex ante the repair seemed like a good idea. As one commentator noted, “The necessity of a repair has been determined in some instances by judging the results of the mending process rather than by the nature of the repairing act” (Note, 1957).

Even more interestingly, the lack of a clear practical distinction between acts that constitute “repairs” and acts that constitute “improvements” may permit an investing tenant to create a greater-of regime for expenditures lying on the interface between the two categories of investments. When courts cannot easily distinguish repairs and improvements (or simply refuse to do so), a plaintiff is effectively accorded the power to choose the higher of the two measures of recovery, cost or benefit. If the benefit is low, the tenant would sue to recover costs under the repairs doctrine; and if the benefit is high, the tenant would sue to recover the benefit under the improvements doctrine.

It is easy to imagine how such a hybrid approach might arise in practice. Courts struggle to classify some investments as either “improvements” or “repairs” across many areas of property law, often using the two terms interchangeably despite the differing legal treatment accorded each. Indeed, in a variety of cases, courts have (wittingly or unwittingly) allowed the parties to manipulate the distinction between repair and improvement to their advantage.\textsuperscript{29} Given the lack of a clear distinction between the two types of investment and the incentive of some parties to muddle them, the hybrid regime may emerge in borderline cases.

### 3.6. Mistaken Improvements

A related doctrine concerns recovery for \textit{mistaken} improvement of real property. An investor might improve property he or she does not own when he or she unknowingly holds land under an invalid title, mistakes the


\textsuperscript{29} For example, a mortgagee’s investment in finishing a building was regarded as repairs in one case and improvement in another. Compare \textit{Gilpin v. Brooks}, 115 N.E. 421 (Mass. 1917) with \textit{Warwik v. Harvey}, 148 A. 592 (Md. 1930).
nature of his or her interest, or mistakes the location of the land. When the mistake is exposed, an interesting question arises as to whether and how much the improver may recover from the true owner of the land for the improvements.

In most jurisdictions, the mistaken improver who meets certain criteria, such as acting in good faith and under the color of title, may recover from the true owner of the property (Dickinson, 1985). Recovery, however, is capped so as not to exceed the lesser of the cost of the investment or its value. For example, under the Restatement of Restitution ((1936) §42), the improver may recover “to the extent that the land has been increased in value by [the] improvements, or for the value of the labor and materials employed in making such improvements, whichever is least.” Furthermore, many states have enacted betterment acts that accomplish the same result by allowing the true owner to elect the remedy for the improver.

The mistaken improver doctrine takes a lesser-of approach to recovery. Ex post, when the improvement turns out to be valuable, the improver recovers only costs, but when the improvement turns out to be of little or no value, the improver recovers only that nominal sum. The lesser-of approach could potentially distort ex ante incentives. By reducing the recovery from that which the parties would have agreed on had they contracted (namely, a recovery equal to either the cost of the investment or a portion of the benefit it creates), the Restatement’s scheme dilutes incentives to invest and induces excessive caution prior to the unilateral investment in improvements.

4. Why Are Hybrid Approaches Used in Practice?

The analysis thus far has demonstrated that hybrid regimes are distorting. Nonetheless, they underlie a wide variety of substantive legal doctrines. This section explores more systematically why such regimes are used in practice. Does the broad existence of these regimes manifest the confusion of courts in distinguishing between ex post (benefit-based) and ex ante (cost-based) conceptions of value, or can they be justified from either an economic or alternative perspective?

In general, hybrid regimes are created in two ways. Some hybrid regimes are created intentionally by courts or legislatures to adjust recovery and thus serve purposes that are often unrelated to investment
incentives. Section 4.1 explores such purposes and whether the hybrid recovery structure is capable of furthering them. Other hybrid regimes are created inadvertently. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe how problems of drawing boundaries between similar causes of action and problems of information transform what were designed as pure recovery regimes into inadvertent hybrid regimes. Finally, section 4.4 explores whether the distortion underlying hybrid regimes is eliminated when courts condition any type of recovery on the efficiency of the investment.

4.1. Deliberate Adjustment of the Recovery

Courts and legislatures occasionally employ hybrid recovery schemes deliberately, to adjust the expected recovery for the investing party and thus serve other instrumental goals unrelated to investment incentives. This section considers a variety of such goals.

4.1.1. Provide Incentives to Contract or to Avoid Unsolicited Investment. One goal a downward adjustment might serve is to give investors incentives to contract with beneficiaries or to avoid unsolicited investment. For example, a lesser-of regime, by reducing an investor’s expected recovery, may give him or her incentives to verify title to the land before making an improvement.

Although providing such incentives may be desirable policy, use of the lesser-of hybrid regime is a misguided way to implement it. If the policy is intended to induce the investing party to contract with the beneficiary rather than make a unilateral investment, or to take more care before making a mistaken improvement, better incentives might arise if no recovery were allowed. Indeed, the doctrines that create restitution liability already incorporate a fault standard: The right to recover is itself conditional on the investor either taking sufficient care or not having reasonable opportunities to contract. For example, a mistaken improver must show that he or she acted in good faith and under color of title before making the improvements. Such conditions for the incidence of liability provide investors with adequate incentives to take care and to contract, rendering unnecessary additional tinkering with the magnitude of liability. Thus, in those cases where the investor has cleared the “due care” hurdle like the one embodied in the mistaken improver doctrine, it is unclear what instrumental purpose (if any) a reduction of the damages award serves.
4.1.2. Protect “Innocent” Parties. Another stated purpose for the lesser-of approach is to protect “innocent” parties from burdensome liability. For example, the Restatement of Restitution asserts that forcing an innocent owner to pay the full value of improvements mistakenly placed on his or her land is harsh. An innocent beneficiary of an illiquid benefit should not be forced to liquidate the property to be able to pay for the improvements (Restatement of Restitution (1936) §42). Thus, the owner should not have to pay for the full enhancement value. Furthermore, even if the owner could afford to pay, it seems unfair, from an ex post perspective, to require an owner who received no enhancement value to compensate a mistaken investor for the costs of the failed improvement effort. The lesser-of regime seems to perfectly serve this dual protective goal.

On careful examination, however, the lesser-of rule of the Restatement is more difficult to justify. In the absence of any apparent wrongdoing, it is unclear why fairness necessarily favors one innocent party over another, that is, why the owner but not the equally innocent and potentially cash-strapped mistaken improver should be protected. More fundamentally, even if some sort of reduction in liability is desirable, to protect the “autonomy” of the owner who did not solicit the improvement, the reduction achieved through the lesser-of regime is still ill-suited to this purpose. As pointed out in section 2, the lesser-of regime achieves a reduction in liability equal to the option value embodied in election between the cost-based and the benefit-based values. The magnitude of this reduction depends primarily on the variance, or the riskiness of the investment, a factor that is independent of the reasons this reduction was deemed desirable in the first place. Thus, when the investment yields a certain—instead of a probabilistic—benefit, there is no reduction in liability although the same hardships confront the innocent landowner. Recognizing the probabilistic nature of the benefit demonstrates, therefore, that the reduction in liability attained by the lesser-of rule is arbitrary: It is not tailored to serve the goal motivating the reduction.

Another area in which the lesser-of reduction of liability is intended to ease the compensatory burden placed on the beneficiary involves recovery for breach of a contingency fee agreement. Here, courts applying the lesser-of approach intend to give the client greater freedom to dissolve the relationship with his current attorney and enter into a better match with a different attorney. The pure cost-based regime, according to some
courts, is unfair to poor clients who cannot afford to pay the attorney’s fees unless the client recovers in the suit. At the same time, the pure benefit-based regime, according to these courts, would place an undue burden on the client’s right to dismiss the attorney, because the client might end up having to pay two attorneys a full contingency fee. What the analysis here shows, and what is less often recognized, is that the reduction in recovery is greater the larger the variance of the litigation outcome. This added penalty on attorneys who take risky cases might distort their selection of cases and their incentives to accept hasty settlements.

4.1.3. Deter Wrongdoing. Finally, a hybrid approach may also be deliberately tailored to serve deterrent concerns. For example, fiduciary and agency doctrines entitle a principal to a greater-of recovery against a fiduciary or an agent who violates his or her duties to the principal. If the agent receives a large benefit by violating a duty of loyalty (say, if the agent expropriates funds and invests them in his or her own account successfully), the principal is entitled to recover the entire ex post benefit. If the agent receives little or no benefit from the violation (say, if the agent’s investment failed), the principal can alternatively recover damages equal to the value taken from the principal’s account (Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency (1958) §407).

This greater-of rule can be rationalized on the basis of deterrence theory. Because many violations of fiduciary and agency relationships go undetected, the risk of over-recovery, which normally arises under the greater-of regime, is not much of a factor. By applying the greater of the ex post and the ex ante recovery values, an increase in deterrence is achieved, counteracting some of the effect of imperfect detection. That is, though the expected recovery under the hybrid rule exceeds the expected value of the funds that were taken, this premium hardly measures up to the “discount” enjoyed by the wrongdoer who goes undetected.

4.2. Overlap of Pure Regimes

The hybrid approaches are not always adopted deliberately. A hybrid regime might also arise accidentally, where two different “pure” recovery regimes overlap. When a particular investment can lead to recovery under two different causes of action, one employing a pure cost-based recovery approach and the other employing a pure benefit-based recovery
approach, a hybrid regime might de facto govern this investment for two reasons. First, courts may openly defer to one of the parties to choose whether the award would be based on costs or benefits. Not surprisingly, if it is the investing party who chooses, he or she will elect the one that gives the greater measure of recovery; and if it is the beneficiary who chooses, by the same logic a lesser-of regime would emerge. The former was shown to be the case, for example, in the choice of remedies regime governing total breach of a partially performed contract. The latter was shown to be the case in the remedial structure applying to discharged contingency fee attorneys.

More interestingly, courts may not be able to prevent a party from opportunistically pursuing one cause of action over another, as when the boundaries between two related causes of action are imprecise. For example, the co-tenant repairs and improvements doctrines overlap in some cases where an investment can be categorized as both a repair and an improvement. The use of a cost-based approach in recovery for repairs and a benefit-based approach in recovery for improvements may become a hybrid greater-of approach if the investing party can elect which of the two doctrines to apply. To the extent that courts cannot draw a bright line between what constitutes a repair versus an improvement, the investing party can effectively elect the greater of the two pure recovery measures. Likewise, a problem of imprecise boundaries exists within the implied contracts doctrine. To the extent that courts cannot draw a clear line between the grounds for implied-in-fact and implied-in-law claims—and, at least in the context of precontractual investment, such a line is difficult to draw—the investing party can claim the greater recovery measure.

Note that in the repair/improvement case and to some extent in the implied contracts case as well, courts do not openly permit the investing party to characterize the investment so as to secure the higher recovery measure. In fact, if courts were aware of the problem, they might be driven to draw more precise boundaries between existing amorphous causes of action. Unfortunately, the type of sorting of claims that creates these greater-of regimes occurs pretrial, distant from the judge’s scrutiny, when potential plaintiffs privately design their pleading strategies. In the usual case, a plaintiff pleads only one cause of action, either a pure ex post or a
pure ex ante recovery claim. It is only across cases that a greater-of pattern emerges.

4.3. Information Problems

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, hybrid approaches might also emerge inadvertently when courts lack the information necessary to apply a pure regime consistently across a class of cases. To apply a pure benefit-based regime, courts must be able to verify the actual benefit received. To apply a pure cost-based regime, courts do not need to know the actual benefit, but they do need to know the cost of the investment and the ex ante distribution of benefits associated with the investment (to guarantee that the cost is reimbursed only if it was reasonable). The following discussion demonstrates that when some of this information is not readily verifiable in court, pure recovery regimes might be transformed into hybrid regimes. Formally, the doctrine employs a pure approach to measuring recovery; in practice, given information problems, it is transformed into a hybrid regime.

4.3.1. Information Regarding the Distribution of Benefits. To apply a cost-based recovery regime, courts need to calculate the ex ante distribution of benefits. In contrast to the benefit-based regime, in which courts need only measure the actual realization of the benefit, under the cost-based regime courts need to assess whether the investment was reasonable in light of its projected benefits. To do that, courts have to consider the range of possible benefits that were associated with the investment and their associated likelihoods. That is, courts need to be able to measure not only the actual benefit that materialized but also hypothetical (or counterfactual) ones. When the difficulty in estimating the prior distribution of benefits is accounted for, a pure cost-based recovery regime can be transformed inadvertently into a lesser-of regime.

One of the factors that could—and, we believe, in fact does—interfere with a court’s ability to accurately assess the ex ante distribution of benefits is the hindsight bias. When a court knows the ex post value of an investment but does not have enough information to determine its ex ante expected value, it may draw an inference about expected value from the value that was realized. If the actual benefit from the investment turns out to be high, it is likely to appear cost-justified, and recovery of the cost
would be allowed. If, instead, the actual benefit from the investment turns out to be low or zero, the investment as a whole might seem unreasonable, and recovery of the cost would be denied. Under these conditions, a cost-based recovery regime, in which the investing party recovers her costs only if they are reasonable, may turn into a lesser-of regime.

This hindsight bias can explain the emergence of the lesser-of regime in several of the areas surveyed in section 3. For example, it can explain the lesser-of rule that sometimes governs restitution for repairs made by co-tenants and the quasi-contractual recovery for precautions. Some courts, when evaluating the reasonableness of certain repairs, condition the right to recover repair costs on whether the repairs appear, in hindsight, to be justified. Thus, the mere fact that the repairs did not add value ex post is used to justify a conclusion that they were not reasonable ex ante and thereby to deny recovery of their costs.30 Courts fail to see, in this context, that even repairs that failed to generate value could have been reasonable when made. Similarly, in assessing the desirability of precautions taken by an insured, courts already know whether the precautions succeeded in preventing or reducing the loss and are susceptible to a well-documented hindsight bias (Rachlinsky, 1998). One of the effects of this bias is that when a precaution fails to reduce the loss, courts draw an inference that it was not cost-justified in the first place and refuse to award even the cost-based measure of recovery. Another potential effect of this bias might occur when, in hindsight, it is clear that the loss was avoided independently of the precaution, which again might lead courts to wrongly conclude that the precaution was unjustified ex ante and deny the recovery of its cost.

This hindsight problem is also illustrated in the debate over the plaintiff attorneys’ fees stemming from the tobacco settlement. Either an hourly fee that is not contingent or a contingency fee that is not truncated could adequately compensate the attorneys representing the states. However, conditioning the recovery on success and then limiting it to the (guaranteed) hourly fee creates a lesser-of regime. The rhetoric used by advocates

30. See, for example, Clifton v. Clifton, 810 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (no recovery of cost of repair when it added no value to the property).
of this regime suggests that they fail to consider the substantial probability that the attorneys could have received no recovery at all.

In theory, courts can avoid or mitigate the problems created by gaps in information by adopting the “pure” regime for which the best information is available. If it is consistently difficult for courts to assess the ex ante value of any given type of investment, the courts could instead apply an ex post approach to govern those investments, assuming, of course, that information about the actual benefit is relatively more obtainable.

4.3.2. Verifiability of the Actual Benefit. A different type of information problem might arise if courts cannot easily verify the actual benefit. Because it is the defendant/beneficiary who usually possesses the best information regarding the benefit enjoyed, the defendant might manipulate the type of information he or she reveals to the court. Recognizing the plaintiff’s difficulty in proving the magnitude of the benefit conferred on the defendant, courts might allow a plaintiff who cannot prove the magnitude of the benefit to at least recover his or her costs, whenever these costs appear reasonable. Namely, in asymmetric information environments, courts might be willing to award recovery based on the full ex post benefit enjoyed by the defendant whenever reliable information about the actual benefit is provided, but award only some ex ante measure (either cost or expected benefit) otherwise. This adjudication regime quickly transforms into a lesser-of regime if the defendant can selectively disclose information. The defendant would hide information about the actual benefit whenever this benefit is high, thereby limiting the plaintiff to the more moderate cost-based measure of recovery. Conversely, the defendant would reveal information about the actual benefit whenever this benefit is low, to limit the magnitude of the plaintiff’s recovery to the (low) actual benefit. To the extent that discovery procedures enable the defendant to manipulate information in this way, the plaintiff is effectively governed by a lesser-of regime.

The limited ability of courts to verify actual benefits might also translate into a greater-of regime when it is the plaintiff who can manipulate the information provided to the court. One way the plaintiff can control the informational-basis of the recovery is by affecting the timing of the suit. A plaintiff who, on the basis of private information, knows that the ex post benefit will be low, can time a suit prior to the verifiable realization of the
benefit, expecting the court, which cannot verify the actual benefit, to employ instead a cost-based recovery measure. Conversely, a plaintiff who knows that the ex post benefit will be high can await the verifiable realization of the benefit and recover the full ex post value.

4.3.3. Information about the Cost of the Investment. Another type of information problem arises when courts cannot verify the cost of the investment. Because of the stochastic nature of the benefit, any given observable ex post realization of benefit can be associated with any number of different costs of investment. This problem might be particularly acute in the context of preaccident precautions taken by an insured party. Because many of the precaution measures that the insured can take are both nonverifiable in court and nonobservable to the insurer, it is less puzzling why the parties to the insurance arrangement do not contract over them and why the courts cannot apply the pure cost-based recovery rule to them. Courts must look to the verifiable benefit to ascertain, not only whether the precaution was desirable but also whether the alleged precaution was ever taken. Thus, when the realization of the benefit is high, the inference that some unobservable precaution had been taken is more plausible than when the benefit is low. When a ship sinks, courts are less likely to believe that the insured ship owner took the necessary (yet subsequently futile) precautions. A cost-based recovery regime might, in the presence of this Bayesian inference strategy, transform into a lesser-of regime.

However, the lesser-of regime applied in practice to precautions taken by insured parties cannot be fully explained as a by-product of this information problem. If the nonverifiability of the precaution investments were the reason for the transformation of a cost-based rule into a lesser-of rule, one would expect that in cases where precautions are observable and verifiable a pure cost-based regime would survive. This, however, is not the case. Although many preaccident precautions are indeed nonverifiable, most postaccident harm-reducing mitigation actions taken by the insured—which are another category of precautions—are more easily observable and verifiable, and yet are subject to the same lesser-of rule. For example, the actions taken by a ship’s crew to avoid maritime hazards prior to an accident (e.g., safer routes, maintenance of machinery) might be nonverifiable, whereas actions taken by the crew to reduce the harm
after an accident (e.g., raise a sinking vessel) are more readily verifiable. Case law, however, can hardly be partitioned according to this verifiability property of precautions; the adherence to the lesser-of rule and the denial of recovery for failed precautions are more robust than this conjecture would imply.

4.4. The Potential “Incentive-Irrelevance” of Hybrid Regimes

In our discussion of legal doctrines, we often took for granted that a beneficiary is liable for a given investment and focused instead on how the courts measure damages. As we have demonstrated, courts employing the hybrid regimes set damages too high or too low and thereby skew incentives to make the investment in the first instance. But, one might speculate, courts could avoid this problem by deciding first whether the investor’s behavior was efficient, and then, based on that determination, apply one or the other hybrid regime. Thus, if the court were to find the investment was not cost-justified, it could limit recovery by employing the lesser-of approach. If the court were to find that the investment was efficient, it could apply the greater-of approach instead. Used this way, the hybrid regimes would not distort investment incentives. There would be no incentive to make socially undesirable investments and no lack of incentive to make socially desirable ones.

There are, however, several problems with this conjecture. To begin, it does not describe what actually occurs in practice. Courts rarely follow this two-step approach of checking whether an investment was efficient before choosing which of the two hybrid regimes to apply. Investors may have to satisfy certain requirements to establish liability (such as proving a mistaken investment was “reasonable”), but demonstrating the efficiency of an investment is not one of them. For example, in contract damages, there is no such hurdle the plaintiff would need to clear. In fact, in many cases in which breached-against parties recovered the greater restitution damages, expectation damages would have left them with a loss, namely, these are losing contracts that involve seemingly inefficient investments.

Moreover, to correctly encourage efficient investment and discourage inefficient ones, courts would have to decide which hybrid regime to apply on a case-by-case basis. In cases that are found to involve efficient investments, courts must apply a greater-of approach, whereas in cases that are found to involve inefficient investments, courts must apply a lesser-of
approach. Courts, however, do not select a regime on a case-by-case basis, but instead apply a unified rule across an entire category of investment. Accordingly, it would be impossible for courts to tailor the recovery regime according to the efficiency of the investment. To illustrate this argument, consider again the rule governing mistaken improvements. The same lesser-of rule is applied to all mistaken improvements of property, regardless of their efficiency attributes. Suppose a court following the two-step approach determined first that an investment was efficient and that the improver should be compensated. Under the two-step approach, the true owner would be held liable, even when no benefit actually materializes from the investment. Yet under the law, the mistaken improver’s recovery in that case would be $0, inadequately compensating the improver for his or her costs. When a benefit does materialize, the improver’s recovery would be limited to his or her cost. Under the existing doctrine, the court continue to follow the lesser-of scheme, even in situations in which it is clear that the investment is efficient and merits more complete compensation.

Furthermore, the hindsight bias discussed in section 4.3.1 might make it difficult for courts to execute a two-step approach accurately. The hindsight bias might skew courts’ determinations of whether an investment was efficient from an ex ante point of view. A court may be more likely to determine (erroneously) that some expenditure was unjustified if the expenditure did not actually generate a benefit. This bias, which is responsible for creating some of the hybrid regimes in the first place, is also the factor that prevents the appropriate deployment of a two-step approach.

Finally, the use of the hybrid regimes adds an element of arbitrariness to the compensation award. Even if a two-step approach were to be executed properly, such that the hybrid recovery regimes would not distort the investment decision, the measure of recovery remains difficult to rationalize. Raising or lowering the recovery in a manner that depends only on the variance of the distribution of benefits can hardly be said to accomplish the stated purposes of the hybrid regimes, such as encouraging parties to take due care. There is little reason to encourage risky or speculative investments by according the investor a recovery that increases with the variance of the benefits.
5. Conclusion

This article has identified a distortion in the structure of legal rules that deal with the value of chance. Although the type of uncertainty examined here—uncertainty over the value of the investment—is usually resolved by the time the law steps in to determine the recovery, the confusion between the ex ante (cost-based) and the ex post (benefit-based) measures of value leads to hybrid recovery practices with their associated distortions. By identifying the generality of the problem—potentially arising any time the external benefit of an investment is probabilistic—the analysis can be applied to any situation that exhibits this structure. The article explored some half-dozen applications of the hybrid approaches, all from seemingly unrelated areas of law, but all sharing the same analytical structure. The list is, of course, far from exhaustive. Accordingly, the usefulness of the analysis would prove greater to the extent that the trans-substantive tool offered here is found applicable within other areas of the law as well.

One possible application of the analysis is extending it to the case of probabilistic costs, rather than benefits. Some investments, say, in improving property, have fairly certain benefits but involve random costs (e.g., excavating land). Here, too, in the absence of a contract the investing party may be subject to a hybrid recovery regime. For example, the law of special assessment, which taxes property owners for improvements made by the city near their property, allows the city to recover at most its costs, not to exceed the enhancement value of the affected properties.31 According to the analysis in this article, this is a lesser-of regime, which confers on the residents the value of a call option to purchase the improvements at cost and in turn diminishes the city’s incentives to make socially valuable improvements.

In studying the reasons for the emergence of hybrid regimes, the analysis identified factors that disrupt the smooth application of pure regimes. This analysis can be extended to shed additional insight on the comparison between cost-based and benefit-based liability. For example, the hindsight bias discussed in section 4.3.1 suggests that courts are less likely to apply a cost-based regime accurately, thus favoring a benefit-based recovery approach.

The analysis in this article can be read narrowly, as a remark on the benefit principle within the law of quasi-contract. Under this principle, the liable party has to pay only when an actual benefit is conferred upon him. The analysis in this paper provides an argument for expanding the definition of benefit to include not only actual benefits but also potential yet unrealized benefits. Receiving a chance for enrichment is valuable to the beneficiary in similar fashion that receiving a lottery ticket is beneficial. Recovery, though, has to be consistent across realizations. If the beneficiary pays only for the ex ante value of the chance when the chance materializes ex post into a substantial benefit, he or she should also pay for the value of the chance when a benefit does not materialize ex post.

Last, this article can be read more broadly, as a comment on the appropriate interface between cost-based and benefit-based liability in private law. Costly actions that are identical from an ex ante, cost-based perspective, can appear dissimilar ex post, once the stochastic benefit from them materializes. This appearance can lead—and as we showed, it has often led—courts to apply an inconsistent treatment of the right to recovery, bouncing in an arbitrary fashion between cost-based and benefit-based liability. Although the article does not take a position concerning the choice between the two pure methods of measuring liability, it highlights the distortion that an inconsistent choice creates.

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