Line of Conduct

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nick Russo

Soc 153

Danté Scala

30 April 1998

 

 

 

Line of Conduct

 

Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you're here today to listen carefully to our discussion of a very serious matter. This is an issue that I have very strong feelings on, and I could talk for hours about the way I feel. But I'm not going to. I could yell and scream and curse, to try to make very clear the passion of my opinion. I'm not going to do that.

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America gives me the right to express my opinion, as long as it does not contribute to any kind of harm to either the people or the state. I feel that I am legally allowed by our Bill of Rights to rant for hours to you. But there are a lot of good reasons that I'm not going to do that today.

Firstly, it wouldn't be efficacious! I'm sure that you all consider yourselves intelligent people, sometimes swayed by emotion, but just as able to grasp the logic in a rational argument. So there would be no reason for me to go on and on when I could just as easily show you my case in a reasonable length of time and allow us all to get out of here in time for dinner. But of course, no one says that I have to be wise. There are plenty of idiotic lawyers who consistently take advantage of that fact. But in addition to those rights granted me in the First Amendment, there are certain restrictions placed on my actions that I necessarily and gladly heed.

These, generally, are rules of conduct. They are not laws, because they are not universally applicable. In this courtroom, for instance, I am cautioned to behave accordingly, lest I be held in contempt of court. I don't enjoy wearing a suit and tie, but I am bound by rules that I have chosen to work within. I have made the conscious decision to enter a field, and to enter a courtroom, in which I must operate under additional rules for the good of the system.

"The good of the system." That sounds an awful lot like an authoritarian motto, like something from a George Orwell social commentary. The difference here, which I can not stress enough, is that today we are talking about voluntary membership. In fact, since you may not be familiar with why exactly we're in this room right now, let me fill you on the facts. You may now take notes; I'm about to be specific.

Two Sundays ago, there was, as there always is, a morning service at University Chapel. This service is hosted by three of the religious organizations on campus, and serves as a place where students and other members of the university community can gather with each other, regardless of denomination, and worship as a group of Christians. The difference that Sunday was that half-way through the service, the group was interrupted by a young man who entered the chapel, outfitted with a NAZI armband and a T-shirt whose slogan was "Hang in there, baby!" printed underneath a impious cartoon of Jesus Christ hanging on the cross.

The action then taken by the disciplinary committee is what we are here to talk about today. Their decision was based on part of the university's "hate speech" code, which I'll read to you.

As a community of learners, the University believes that everyone who participates in the intellectual life of this institution owes a return for the benefit. The fact of belonging to this University renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward the other members. This line of conduct includes refraining from expressions or actions deemed malicious, threatening or harmful to part or all of the University community.

Now this wording is taken directly from one of the guiding texts of political science, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. You'll be hearing more from that work, as it addresses the issues that we're faced with here.

During the course of these proceedings, as we filter through a variety of details regarding what happened that day, and how it was handled through the next week, I hope you'll keep in mind a few things:

Having heard the relevant section of the University's code, let's take a look at the original text from which it was modeled.

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring [certain] interests of one another...which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights..." (Mill, On Liberty, pg. 73)

This is what Mill thought appropriate for society at large. He made sure to note that there was no contract that created the relationship between individual and his peers in society. And yet he thought it "indispensable" that every person in the group treats all others with some respect as to their rights. How much more appropriate, then, is it to respect certain rules of conduct when one voluntarily enters into a contract with a microcosmic society such as this university?

Mill was interested in the balance between individual liberty and societal control of individuals, because he knew both were important to a democratic government, and indeed to any society which aimed toward the good of its members. He determined the following principle to guide our negotiation of the delicate balance.

A person ought to be subject to social coercion only to prevent the violation of a "distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons." (ibid., pg. xvii)

This is the point which makes ours such a clear-cut case. The existence of a "distinct and assignable obligation" is most easily noted when there has been a contract entered into.

Now why doesn't this fall under the greatly expounded principle of the First Amendment, that of the "freedom of expression"? Mill would certainly argue that the freedom to innovate is the lifeblood of progressive society. Where does individuality fit into this picture? Mill tells us,

The interference of society to overrule his judgement and purposes in what only regards himself must be grounded on general presumptions which may be altogether wrong and, even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, individuality has its proper affairs [italics mine]. (ibid. pg. 74)

In a person's own home, in any of their actions which reflect only upon themselves, that is precisely where Mill advocates a complete allowance of liberty, even if it leads to license. But this is not an isolated individual we are talking about today, this young man chose to put himself in the company of others, chose to actively make himself a visible part of society, and he blew it.

There is no question here about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now--things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount of experience after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established; and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors. (ibid. pg. 78)

Let's apply Mill. Mill defines liberty early in the essay as "pursuing our own good in our own way." If the defendant holds that his act was accidental, or neglectful, than he was in no way pursuing his own good. His action went beyond that allowed by his natural right to liberty, and entered the sphere of violating the rights of others. However, if he holds that his was a deliberate act, than he is asking us to agree that his purpose was to be offensive. It is exactly this deliberate act that the code of the University hopes to forbid.

Whether through neglect, or a deliberate act, this young man has shown an imprudence that deserves to be addressed. And how should we address it? The disciplinary committee deliberated and decided on suspension from the University for a period of one quarter. Before I go any further, I just want to note, this hardly seems like punishment to me; when I was in college, taking a quarter off was the best thing that ever happened to me! Without going to far off the track here, let me tell you why it was beneficial to me. At 18, I was learning to operate in an adult manner for the first time. And it was too much for me! The responsibility, the stress, all of it built up until I was no longer able to pull it off. I wasn't ready to operate like an adult, and so I was voluntarily removed from the situation in which I was supposed to do so, in the hopes that when I was ready to tackle it again, I would be more prepared, and the results would be better. I was, and they were. This is the same principle that guided the resolution of the disciplinary committee. Their belief should be yours, that an act of this nature is a clear signal that all is not well in this student's life. Their hope too should be yours, that in the course of a break from the rigor of academic life, he might, in the memorable words of Cheech Marin, "get his head together."

When faced with an individual who demonstrates a "defect of prudence or of personal dignity," Mill says, "the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him (ibid. pg. 77)." This is the case regarding adults, full members of society. But lest we forget our role as parents, teachers, and advocates, as, in fact, the ruling generation, we should heed Mill further.

If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. (ibid. pg. 80)

School is a protected environment, where mistakes can be pointed out, and progress may be made toward correcting those faults, in a person that would otherwise cause serious problems in society if left unchecked.

As much as we all agree that various viewpoints are to be discussed and tolerated, we must all surely agree that a religious group on campus must have the right to assemble without being forced to confront such horrific expressions as these. The legality of this young man's action is less at issue than its imprudence. If ever one student leaves this school with the understanding that such actions will be tolerated, if one student matriculates from this institution with the idea that such a necessary and beneficial rule, that "each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward the other members," can be blindly violated without consequences, than this school has done a great injustice to the generation. If this institution is not to uphold its policies and principles, it can hardly be deemed worthy of any student's patronage. Forget alumni contributions; ask for your tuition back! Or demand that university give proper regard to its rules, and most importantly, to its students.